« August 2003 | October 2003 »

September 2003 Archives

September 30, 2003

On Iraq: Divides

Eva Luna, in a comment on one of my two notes on Iraq yesterday asked me to amplify my comments on divisions in Iraqi society, to get beyond the Sunnni, Shi'ite, Kurd trichotomy usually presented in the press.

Let me first say that when we get as far east as Iraq, we get to the edge of the area where I consider myself an actual expert, and where I become merely knowledgeable. Matter of experience and lack of great interest in the Turkish and Farsi areas. Nothing against the Turks or the Iranians, indeed I love the Turks, but never pushed my buttons - or never had the opportunity to push me buttons.

This aside, I should hardly wish to blame the media or in general seem critical of a presentation that largely sticks to the macro divides of Sunni Arab vs Shi'ite Arab vs Sunni Kurd. It largely captures, in my opinion, the most important tensions, and given that few Westerners have any degree of knowledge or familiarity with the region (and have a penchant for confusing Muslim with Arab and vice versa), any further detial is likely simply to confuse the average, even educated, reader.

That aside, however, it is important to keep in mind that Sunni (Arabs), Shi'ites (Arabs), Kurds (largely Sunni, some Shi'ite, some Yazidi, etc.), Turcomans (Shi'ite and Sunni - frankly not sure where the balance is) etc. do not represent, ipso facto, coherent ethno-political entitities.

As The New York Times article I cited to here two days ago highlights one of the overriding features of Middle Eastern society - the degree to which larger national level - and in many ways even regional level identities and loyalties have failed to emerge in most places. Most, not all certainly. That makes for highly fractured societies which, barring authoritarianism, have a difficult time reaching durable public consensus and tend to make politics a matter of grabbing what you can for your narrow group (family, then clan).

Now, in the situation in Iraq, you have had an economy in long term decline for a good 25 years, and in free fall since the invasion. Very clearly the pressures to grab what resources you can and screw people not in your group, however defined, are high. The pie, as it were, is getting smaller and has shown no sign of getting bigger and fighting over the crumbs is vicious.

Now then, as I reflect I am not sure I can make particularly insightful comments on particular detials of tensions. What I think I can say, and what is important to keep in mind is that one must not assume - as it natural in the West - that there is a real sense of "common good" or national interest that binds together an Iraqi nation.

The conditions in Iraq, rather, are ripe for what some conflict resolution analysis calls "ethnic entrepreneurship"- a funny piece of jargon meaning the power hungry selling ethnic hatreds (and we can be sure to see this in ethno-religious terms) as a means to grab power and wealth.

An ugly, nasty soup with a lot of potential for going wrong. And the Bush Admin opened this Pandora's Box in their gleeful naivete.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:01 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Drawn to my attention

On Bush by our Novak, the conservo-commentator:
http://www.suntimes.com/output/novak/cst-edt-novak29.html
Link was forwarded to me, it seems of modest interest

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:38 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 29, 2003

On Iraq & the Privatization "Rules" - Economist commentary and my reflections

As it happens, The Economist has a fine article that I should share and comment on as it crystalized some of my as of yet not fully formed reaction to the "Rules" on economic liberalization that Bremer propounded recently.

The article then (which is 'premium content' and as such I shall quote extensively for comment) is:

Iraq's economic liberalisation
Sep 25th 2003

The article then makes the following points:
"A SHOCK programme of economic reforms signals a radical departure for Iraq. The changes ... could see its battered economy transformed abruptly into a virtual free-trade zone."

Keep in mind the key word, abruptly. People never like abrupt and unsettling change, ever.

The Economist notes that "[i]f carried through, the measures will represent the kind of wish-list that foreign investors and donor agencies dream of for developing markets." We know the key points from prior reporting. Foreign investment in any field other than primary resource extraction, 100 percent ownership of assets, full capital freedom of moment, equal legal standing with locals in commercial matters. Now let me highlight the item which I was most annoyed by: "Income and corporate taxes would be capped at 15%. Tariffs would be slashed to a universal 5% rate, with none imposed on food, drugs, books and other �humanitarian� imports." This taxation scheme strikes me as an American wet dream, specifically a Neo Con American wet dream, rather than something that is thought through in terms of what is likely to be collectible, tax wise, by an Iraqi government (in a region where tax evasion is not a marginal item, but a key aspect of operations) - although most Iraqis did not previously pay income taxes. Knowing this region, I have a hard time thinking this taxation scheme will survive contact with reality.

But let's get to reality. The Economist began the article by striking a positive note on the effect of this and other measures, however the journal is honest enough to look at the problems:

They note of course that the chronic violence and insecurity is not going to bring in investors any time soon, that aid funds take a notoriously long time to get moving, above all highly constrained American funds with all their strings, but most importantly "[q]uestions also linger over the durability of the new commercial rules."

Indeed they do, indeed they do.

The Economist notes "Naysayers question the motives and authority of a government that is still widely seen as an American puppet. The regulations were announced by Iraq's nominal finance minister, Kamel al-Gailani, but they bear the signature of Paul Bremer, who heads the American-run Coalition Provisional Authority, and the imprimatur of the American consultants it has hired to frame economic policies." I may add having met some of them, consultants without much experience with the region.

But here is the kicker: "The rules also bear an important caveat. They are subject to �adoption or replacement� by a future, elected Iraqi government. Given the shock and awe expressed by many Baghdad businessmen at the scale of the changes, it is not clear that such a future regime would be able to resist pressures to reimpose protectionism."

Not clear, no it is indeed clear - no Iraqi regime will be able to stick with this too fast, too soon program. None. It's a wish list program of American conservatives that can not even be achieved in America - now how the fuck does anyone think it will stick in a country where Arab socialist nationalism or Islamo-socialism are the most popular economic views and where these rules will be viewed as American impositions?!?! That is indeed a serious question. What would lead one to think that a radically economicall liberal economic structure that frankly would be quite advanced for most industrialized nations is going to work in (a) in a country that has never known real modern free markets, and for most of the past century been run on quasi-socialist if not Stalinist bases, and (b) in a situation where much of the population does not view the governing authority as being terribly legitimate. Further, even allowing for a positive reaction (there will not be, in grosso modo) the Iraqis quite frankly lack the skills to react in the near term.

Now The Economist argues: "Fears of invasion by multinationals keen to wipe out local competition are doubtless exaggerated" - no I don't think so, the Iraqi economy is a mess, Iraqis in large part lack the skills to compete commercially in a pure free market and will need some adjustment time, and further given the risk profile, FDI is not likely as safer export based competition is likely to be seen as a safer bet, meaing transition costs (layoffs, redundancies, etc.) to Iraqis are going to be high. Where is the legitamacy for those costs? It is one thing to note that "Iraq urgently needs outside investment and expertise", it is another to design a viable, politically as well as economically, transitional program that will get one to a set of conditions that will in fact attract FDI. Thankfully The Economist realises this and notes "the instant discarding of 40 years of national-socialist commercial culture is likely to create serious distortions."

Well, no kidding. Now, I do not believe one has to be a regional expert like myself to read serious distortions as being seriously politically problematic for any government running Iraq and thus potentially discrediting a government that tries to run with these rules (or is obliged to, by its "sponsors") as well as potentially the concept of privatization per se.

That is the real danger, one shall spoil what is in fact a necessary set of steps, ones that if done right will enrich and improve the lives of Iraqis and perhaps take a step to breaking the negative cycle of rigid, inefficient, value destroying nepotistic rent-seeking oligarchies. All for a short term political gain.

I think The Economist has it right when it says "The changes will, however, cheer another important constituency, the American Congress. Mr Bremer, testifying before American legislators to justify the demand for huge new outlays, cited the reforms as proof that Iraq is beginning to follow the American way. The unspoken wish is that this will create a poster-child for the recalcitrant economies surrounding it."

In short, the idiots in the American Congress (and frankly the idiots in American in general in their self absorbed yet messianic world view) have an entirely unrealistic, indeed spoiiled and self-regarding idea of "converting" Iraqis into little Americans. I am reminded of the possibly apocryphal quote of an American military officer who opined inside every Vietnamese there is an American struggling to get out. Regretably American foreign policy (not unique in this I may add, but it is my target for the moment) here is being blinded by a kind of messianic narcicism.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:50 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Reflections on corporate governance and culture

I had a long and interesting conversation with my CFO today about what should be done differently. I think it was a 'testing' conversation, but it was interesting.

First, it plays off of yesterday's New York Times article I cited to in my journal yestersay

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:38 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Iraq: series of articles of interest, personal reflections on things learned

I'm moved to do another one of my round ups by a series of interesting articles that appeared today.

First, following on the article yesterday on the clannish structure of Iraqi society - once again I do advise reading it, in conveys quite vividly the challenge of Iraqi (and much of Arab society) in modernization - is an article in The Washington Post on the divides in Iraqi society. In this case, try reading it in conjuction with The New York Times article mentioned (and my dear BFF, I hope you begin to see why your focus on education fails in this social situation, for you presume fluidity that is absent. Education is not the answer.).

Ethnic and Religious Fissures Deepen in Iraqi Society
Tensions Escalating Over Land, Power and Loyalties
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Anthony Shadid
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, September 29, 2003; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14841-2003Sep28.html

The article covers each of the three regions, North, Middle, South and I find adequately conveys the tensions that I long warned could lead to civil war.

On this matter, let me convey a conversation I had with my maid. As many may recall, she is Iraqi and Shi'ite. Now, as it turns out when I previously reported she was from the South I was wrong - her husband and his family are Shi'ites from Basra but she turns out to be a turcoman. I was quite surprised to learn this, although it makes the political differences between her husband and herself rather more clear and explainable. He always rather more ambivalent about the invasion and occupation, anti-Sadaam but not pro-American. They are a typical picture, in my opinion of your average Iraqi, although M. is a more subtle thinker than his wife, less emotive, more calculating. (Let me interject I do not see this as a gender issue, it is personality and perhaps background) She, however, swung from anti-Sadaam to pro-Sadaam over reasons I took to be nationalistic. Now learning she is turcoman, I think I see another angle. Indeed this conversation brought it out.

In discussing Iraq in the morning a few days ago, which I must add consisted largely of me listening to her going ballastic over the suffering of her family (blood and marriage), how the Americans are doing nothing right, etc., I ventured the opinion that I am worried about civil war. Her first reaction was denial, affirmation that the Iraqis are one, etc.

Never believe a first reaction in this part of the world, always probe, underneath the theoretical unity, family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, nation, there are fissures. So, on a hunch I noted, well, the Kurds do not seem to be of the same mind in terms of national unity.

Aha, well then we got to the truth. A long tirade ensued about how (i) the Kurds are interlopers and do not belong in Iraq, they're really from the Caucasus [odd that is more true of the Turcomans, objetively speaking]; (ii) they seek war, they terrorize Arabs and Turcomans, and Shi'ites, they are both apostates and false claimers of being Sunna, they're really devil worshipers (refering to a minor Kurdish sect I believe connected w/ Zoroastarian beliefs) (iii) if there are problems its because the Kurds are being backed by the Americans who want to use to the Kurds to help steal the oil.

These are not pretty things, nor do I think these are rare feelings. Iraq is a pot on the verge of boiling and I do not believe the American administration knows how to turn down the heat. I hope they do, but I don't believe so.

Now, on the matter of understanding Iraq, I found this article engaging, for it raises some hopes that the morons in the Defence Department are slowly realizing Chalabi is a bad actor who sold them a lemon.

Agency Belittles Information Given by Iraq Defectors
By DOUGLAS JEHL
Published: September 29, 2003
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/29/international/middleeast/29DEFE.html?hp

I note the following quote:
" After internal State Department reviews in 2001 and 2002 concluded that much of the $4 million allocated for the program had not been properly accounted for and that the intelligence-gathering program was not part of the department's mission, oversight was transferred to the Defense Department in 2002."

Suckers. Defence is full of naive suckers.

Well, in part. My defence attache contacts here leave me with the impression that at that level, say mid level officers, there is a better understanding.

At the same time, these guys do not know how to 'price risk' - that is properly plan for a full range of events. Well, that is not fair, however I am thinking of a conversation I had with the new man in the Embassy. I got a bit heated on his assertion that sure, there were problems, but that we "could not fail." (I interject to note that none of these fellows thought the reporting on Iraq was in fact inaccurate per se, although they did try to go for that old saw about X% of Iraq is peaceful, although shut up when I noted the demographics.) As I noted, if you're planning on a basis where you have not 'priced in' a catostrophic failure, then you're not giving yourself an accurate picture in the cost-benefit analysis of your actions. Well, this becomes a bit convoluted and it will distract from this little note, the essence of the conversation arose from my assigning a probability to complete failure (I believe 30 percent it was, 10 percent to magnificent success, the rest to some middle scenarios).

Now, this article on the recent polling data from Iraq is of interest and should not be overlooked. It gets to the spin. I believe those of you arguing with the "pre-fooled" will find no small utility in this:
Data Reveal Inaccuracies in Portrayal of Iraqis
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, September 29, 2003; Page A14
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14545-2003Sep28.html

I suppose pedestrian spin and mendacity should be expected, but expect to rebut.

I note the following quote:
"That same poll, however, found that, countrywide, only 33 percent thought they were better off than they were before the invasion and 47 percent said they were worse off. And 94 percent said that Baghdad was a more dangerous place for them to live, a finding the administration officials did not discuss.

The poll also found that 29 percent of Baghdad residents had a favorable view of the United States, while 44 percent had a negative view. By comparison, 55 percent had a favorable view of France."

I found this particularly useful as I immediately recalled tangling on the SDMB with my little friend Sam Stone over his khayali assertions that Iraqis like Americans better than the French - a whole logic chain that somehow had it that France supported Sadaam so Iraqis who hated Sadaam must hate the French. Essentially an issue of projection of his own thinking onto Iraqis, pedestrian failing but one all-too-common in the thinking of the Neo Con Clique.

I remain, by the way, highly wary of the polling results - this goes for the negative as well as the positive. I am very, very sceptical that we can get a very good fix on real opinion in a situation where unregulated violence and politically inspired killings are a fact of daily life and where there is no effective punishment for that. This point differs rather significantly from the East Europe situation that the pollsters indicate they have used to address bias. The polls, as I have said, probably are a decent rough estimate, but I would assert that the bias involved makes the error estimates put forward by the pollers nonesense.

Finally, connected with the idea of public opinion, we have this sad article on Cheney continuing to pimp the discredited idea of Iraq being connected with the events of 11 September.

Iraq, 9/11 Still Linked By Cheney
By Dana Priest and Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, September 29, 2003; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14901-2003Sep28.html

What I find disturbing here is that this appears to be a deliberate attempt to on one hand have the idea officially kept in the public mind, yet officially denied. It is, in short, a mangificent play of spin, the pre-fooled, the gullible and the inattentive will continue to believe while the Administration through its other mouthpieces can say "Well we never said that."

This Administration is magnificent in its brazen mendacity - I almost admire that.

By the way, I note that the drooling moron cunt Amity Shlaes has a perfectly benighted moronic column on privatizing the Iraqi oil sector. Read it to see how to comment on a country, region and situation you know litterally nothing about, in pious ignorance. People like her should be ... I don't know, can't think of a reasonable suggestion although she makes my blood boil. She should be on The Wall Street Journal's editorial board, she'd be perfect there.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:55 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 28, 2003

Business report, my venting as it were

Another long weeekend of meetings of a semi-clandestine nature.

A blue print of how to approach the issues is emerging, but I remain paranoid about who the actors are. Thank goodness I learned that a potential actor I thought of approaching on my own is going to be approached for a potential management participation. Double approach might have been less than ideal. I did learn that there is a push from the lead Director back in the States to see me in the solution, which is good, but some push back from one of the other parties. The Resignation thing is complicated.

Learned there is some leakage in Dubai (not you Istara, Fin contacts) which is not good, but not too damaging as of yet. The key is positioning. I don't trust my local "ally" but need some local leverage. He forgot to include me in a conference call, conveniently called me afterwards. I won't forget this, but have to play carefully.

Not sleeping well, but this is not going to change for a while. Cut the hell out of my face shaving this morning, bleary eyed. Really hurts, that, I hate shaving to begin with, but hate hair more.

The not sleeping well is of course connected to this huge uncertainty and some huge risks I have taken of late, but I was also an idiot and watched a film about Stalin before going to bed last night. Let me tell you, when you're in a paranoid state, can't trust anyone and are working 'clandestinly" on a corporate coup d'etat, watching a movie about a bloody minded political intriguer (Stalin) and real purges etc. just does not make for good dreams. No, it does not.

So memo to self, watch happy films for the next few months. No need to up one's stress level.

I should note that today was a shitty day so far, come into office to find someone had been through it. Then I am approached asking why the old audit books were in my office. As it happens, they've always been there, as I reminded them, but it is clear someone suspects something. As well they should, although these books are of such age that they're not likely to contain anything interesting. But on the other hand perhaps the paranoia is that they do contain something. Well, when the audit comes, I know to tell them to look at the audit books of those years.

Ah well gotta eat.

By the way, the Tuna Fish Sandwich now comes with four or even six chips. I am not sure why, but remain afraid to ask.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:32 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Iraq: Socio-economic vignette, a particularly good article to read

Iraqi Family Ties Complicate American Efforts for Change
By JOHN TIERNEY
Published: September 28, 2003
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/28/international/middleeast/28CLAN.html?hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1064734968-Hwm5nt7olQqRnjq0aHAobA&pagewanted=all&position=

A very decent article on clan and family structure as a socio-economic barrier to democracy in Iraq.

Certainly the issues involved in the clannish social structure or tribal social structure, where loyalty runs to family before all have been touched on before, but I rather liked the manner in which the article conveyed issues I think I spoke to in a fairly dry and abstract manner.

While not insurmountable, they do require a certain degree of sophistication to deal with (the disaster at work which I am dealing with is in many ways intimately related to very similar problems and local staff habits) and the naivete show by the Americans to date do not encourage confidence in this connection.

On the other hand I am hearing news that the basic economic conditions may be improving, which is a good thing. We're moving out of the horrid heat of the summer so perhaps some movement can be had on righting the economy, which will do a lot for reducing opposition.

On the other hand we have this article from The Washington Post
Analysis
Reluctance to Share Control in Iraq Leaves U.S. on Its Own
By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, September 28, 2003; Page A27
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10285-2003Sep27.html

Truly extraordinary, this blind obstinance. Well, true believers and all that, I am sure the pre-fooled will remain on board.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 25, 2003

Iraq: Oh my dear readers, lawyers

I finally sat down to look through the CPA materials on economic policy, etc.

Someone please tell me that the following documents are not the ones that were the source of the media reports:
From http://cpa-iraq.org/regulations/index.html
Foreign investment: http://cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030921_CPAORD39.pdf

Banking: http://cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030924_CPAORD40.pdf ; although I do see this http://cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030924a_CPAORD40ANNEX.pdf needs to be read

(for context see http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/iraq_commercial_law_current.pdf)

Also, I believe this article needs to be read attentively:

Crossed Wires Deprived Iraqis of Electric Power
War Plans Ignored Worn Infrastructure
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, September 25, 2003; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61044-2003Sep24.html

Highlights the extreme incompetence of efforts to date. I am particularly amused by the claims that the problems of the initial strategy could not have been anticipated. I for one anticipated them in my initial thread on the SDMB for bloody fuck's sake. However, they were afraid of the political problems of putting the price tag on.

And now we have the incredibly ludicrous idea in Congress of making Iraq aid a forced loan.

(See the NYT for a decent if overly polite look at this cockamamie idea: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/25/opinion/25THU2.html)

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:01 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

A news item I wanted to discuss

Have been too caught up in things, as you all know, but I did want to mention and discuss the shooting of the Italian delegate's driver in Northern Iraq a few days ago. I'll edit to add the story in a few, have to run to a meeting.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

al-Hashemi Dead

Mrs al-Hashemi of the "Ruling Council" died just a little while ago of her wounds.

Afraid this further reinforces the sense of lack of control.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:58 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Iraq: Further thoughts on short sighted cheapness

I found the articles reporting that Democrats and Republican rumps are pushing to make Iraq reconstruction money as loans, to get payback from the Iraqis for liberation, to be stupefying.

It strikes me as an extraordinary case of believing one's own propaganda to the point of being willfully blind. Very clearly forcing a heavily indebted Iraq deeper in debt is not truly sustainable - and will only feed a backlash on both a global and Iraqi level. It smells and looks effectively like war reparations. It's an extraordinarily cheap-skate, short termist view of the situation, a level of idiocy that is hard to overstate.

However, I long suspected the US lacked the political vision and will to pull this off. I am ever more convinced that this is heading towards disaster, although I very much hope not.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:47 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

The Bush Speech @ UN; Iraq notes

A strange move to speak to the UN at this point, and yet clearly not be prepared to offer anything. It struck me as a domestic stump speech to the wrong audience. Lackluster, nervous in my opinion and typical of his low quality speaking skills, I don't see what the purpose was. Contrast with the somewhat cool but well-structured speech of Annan or the impassioned discourse by Chirac - a very good speaker I may add if you listened to the French original - and you see how unconvincing Bush is to all but the "pre-fooled".

However, the real point of puzzlement is why this speech?

I suspect the Bush Admin. had lined up the idea when they had "pre-fooled" themselves once more into thinking their self-regarding anti-diplomacy would have real payoffs, and that the Bush speech would crown a movement to have other nations kick in to pay for their mistakes.

By the time things rolled around, it was clear that was not happening, but speech-writers were stuck with a triumphalist theme.

Or they are stupid.

In other matters, I note The Financial Times reported the Bush Administration is afraid now that nations will use Iraqi sov. debt write offs as their contribution to Iraq - in lieu of giving the Bush Admin. cash to spend via the CPA-Iraq.

I remain staggered at these characters' naivete and indeed blindness. They offer no real concessions, no real engagement with genuine concerns, they posture and berate. Then they are surprised at luke warm responses? This truly is singularly one of the most diplomatically incompetent administrations the United States has ever had, ever. To manage to go from global sympathy to a rump coalition of the willing (to be bribed or willing to accept kickbacks) in but two years, and over what may be said to be non-core (in pragmatic terms) issues - although core to their ideology - is astounding.

At the same time I note the recent Zogby poll in Baghdad indicating still a reservoir of patience in even that city.

A few comments on this poll. I hope that it is correct, but I am worried about reading too much into it. First, Iraqis emerging from a police state where one is conditioned to say what one thinks an official questioner wants to hear, I suspect are likely to give less-than-fully-honest answers to independent pollsters - something that never existed in Iraq in the past. As such, insofar as the pollsters represent a Western body, I see a potential skew in the respondant sample saying what they think the pollsters want to hear. Second, I am unsure that a representative, balanced sample can be obtained at present in the city, so we may have some skew here.

I would guess, overall, that the general idea one gets from the poll is correct, but the margin of error is ridiculously understated due to underestimating biases in the original approach. Regardless, an interesting and unbaised datapoint, useful if taken in the context of the inherent limitations of polling methodology in such circumstances, and hopefully broadly indicative that there is still time to pull the chesnuts out of the fire.

Now, what I have found particularly disturbing and even bizarre is the cut off your nose to spite your face reaction in some quarters of the US congress. Several reports have congress members grumbling that if other countries don't step up to the plate, then they will oppose reconstruction funding for Iraq.

This is one of the most nonsensical things I have ever heard in my life. It was widely agreed before and during the war that Iraq would be key to US FP success, that in order to defend our prestige, etc., that Iraq would have to work. And because other nations don't want to pay, you will oppose the US spending to ensure the success of its own policy?

Am I the only person that finds this position to be bordering on the surreal and insane?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:57 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 23, 2003

Efficient Road Crews

In cutting my phone lines at least. Utils out at home, the brilliant road crew (or some utility outfit, whatever) cut them last night. I was reflecting on what makes them think that heavy work in a quasi residential neighborhood in the evening is a good idea.

Morons.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:31 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 22, 2003

Further to Iraq

I wonder how long before the American electorate fully realizes how horribly things are going in Iraq.

I know the Conservo Porn Press such as the WSJ are still pimping the idea we are loved, it is a liberation, things are getting better (my I have heard that since June, yet they keep getting worse).

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:09 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 21, 2003

Iraq Invest. Code to be published

Looking forward to reading this.

However, the question given the deteriorating situation, is this meaningfu. Will it stick?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:37 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 18, 2003

Peel of FT on Euro Iraq policy

I very much enjoyed this column by good old Quentin Peel.

Quentin Peel: Europe must hold firm
By Quentin Peel 17 Sep 03
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1059479911265&p=1012571727126

Quentin Peel, one of my favorite commentator’s from The Financial Times (aside, I shall never forget the day on the SDMB that someone described FT as a “liberal” paper in the American sense of the word. Nothing like provincialism.) has a fine little article which rather captures my feelings on the issues involved in how Europe should deal with the Bush Admin approach in Iraq.

The focus of the commentary is on the shambles of the ‘common foreign policy’ for Europe (I think unrealizable) and on the tensions within the EU, and the upcoming trilateral mtg between Chirac, Shroeder and Blair.

Some key extracts:

“With luck, they will realise they share two fundamental concerns. One is over the miserable state of transatlantic relations. The other is a fear that without new impetus from the top, the European project may itself grind to a halt with the impending enlargement to 25 member states.”

There is of course something to be said for resuscitating the transatlantic alliance, although I daresay this is well-nigh impossible given the current Administration’s contempt for other points of view, or even rational analysis.

Perhaps as rather more important is addressing the issues in the EU, and the clear tensions over economic policy – foreign policy as well of course.

Continuing on:
“As far as transatlantic ties are concerned, it is not just about the lack of dinner invitations from the White House. The normal lively exchange of ideas between politicians and pundits from both sides has almost dried up. Even Mr Chirac, quite wrongly seen in Washington as an unreconstructed anti-American Gaullist, knows that both sides are weaker as a result. But the three leaders undoubtedly differ in their analysis of who was at fault, and how to respond.

The Bush administration must bear much of the blame, with its prickly unilateralism and fundamentalist division of the world into good and evil. Its insistence on trying to run the world with "coalitions of the willing" has caused extraordinary bitterness among old allies. But the EU is also at fault, because its leading governments have been so divided, although their voters were far more united.”

I rather like the turn of phrase I have to confess.

I am not sure, however, that I would analyze this in precisely this manner, above all in regards to the Europeans. Although as I pause and consider, in the end I have to confess that the total lack of coordination on the European level may be considered part of the problem.

Peel notes:
“A recent opinion poll by the German Marshall Fund* shows that the war has had a disastrous effect on European attitudes towards US leadership. Every single European country polled, except Poland, showed a large majority disapproving of US foreign policy. In Germany and France more than 80 per cent disapproved. In Britain it was 57 per cent.”

He continues a bit later on regarding the new found American interest in multilateralism, i.e. getting people to help in Iraq:
“ But is that simply an admission that the US wants more troops in Iraq, from anywhere but home? It may be a recognition that the US cannot succeed in stabilising the country on its own, but there is still little sign of realisation that it is because the US is seen as an occupying power in Baghdad - not a liberator - that the situation remains so chaotic. Nobody wants to make matters worse but there is equally no international enthusiasm for sending more troops - whether they are Indian, Turkish or French - until the US starts to hand over power.”

Peel adds, and I agree very strongly here:
“ This is not the right moment for Europe to swallow its doubts about US foreign policy, just for the sake of better transatlantic ties. There is a dangerous temptation to sign up to the US security agenda, with its focus on rogue states and weapons of mass destruction. That was wrong after September 11 2001 and it is wrong now. Europe is right to insist that tackling the causes of terrorism is most important, and using the tools of the multilateral system is essential.”

Now, I do not agree that the US security agenda is entirely wrong, in regards to ‘rogue states’ – there is some real content to that, other than Rumsfeld’s play to “roll everything up” strategy. However, I believe what Peel is getting at is the idiotic conflation of Sadaam with al-Qaeda, something the Administration continues to play the implication game with, despite an utter lack of evidence.

This dangerous, naïve, and ultimately self-destructive conflation has gotten the US into a bind which will be very difficult to exit. I have read some idiocy regarding it being better to fight “them” over “there” than in the States. This ad hoc line of reasoning is frankly a rather bankrupt, post hoc attempt to find some justification, rather illogically at that, for the current morass.

Now, Peel argues, and I agree as one might expect:
“If Britain, France and Germany could settle their differences on Iraq, they could at last become a positive influence on Washington. This is the moment to do so, when the mistakes of the US-led coalition are becoming obvious to all but the most obtuse. It would also be a vital signal to ordinary Europeans that their Union can forge a common foreign policy on something that really matters. Is that too much to ask?”

The last is too much to ask, but some organized pressure on this perennially stupid Administration would be useful.

* Transatlantic Trends 2003, www.transatlantictrends.org

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:15 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Times London: Iraq Commander, mistakes were made

From the AFP summary of the Times article

US commander in Iraq admits mistakes
Wed Sep 17

Quoting the key information:
"Talking to the newspaper at his office in one of Saddam Husseins former palaces in Baghdad, Sanchez said that the coalition should have done a better job of communicating with local people. He said it needed more Arabic speakers and regional experts to gather intelligence.

Referring to incidents such as the "friendly fire" killing of nine Iraqi security men by US soldiers in the Iraqi city of Fallujah last Friday, Sanchez said that the coalition must improve "synchronisation, co-operation and integration" with Iraqi police.

He could not say whether ousted leader Saddam had weapons of mass destruction capable of deployment at the time the US-led invasion began in March "because Iraqis have not come forward and told us where it is."

Sanchez acknowledged that ordinary Iraqis were now taking revenge for the killing of their loved ones by coalition soldiers, according to The Times, a right-of-centre broadsheet."

Well, nice to see this finally coming forth, officially, although of course I might expect a private slap down by Rummy or Wolfie, as this admission does not jibe with their world view.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:30 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 17, 2003

Iraq, some further items

A few other news items on my now 2nd favorite subject of commentary.

First item, on women in Iraq, an Op Ed piece of potential interest:

Veiled and Worried in Baghdad
By LAUREN SANDLER
http://nytimes.com/2003/09/16/opinion/16SAND.html

The key quote which sums up the article:
" This violence has made postwar Iraq a prison of fear for women. "This issue of security is the immediate issue for women now — this horrible time that was triggered the very first day of the invasion," said Yanar Mohammed, the founder of the Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq."

Liberty indeed.

However, I am a little irritated with the headline and general implication that women following traditional dress are oppressed. This is not of necessity the case.

Moving on, we have this article, timely but not really news per se. I share it for the general use for those of you in arguments. It is clearly something I have been saying for a long time now.

OCCUPATION FOES
Iraqis' Bitterness Is Called Bigger Threat Than Terror
By DOUGLAS JEHL with DAVID E. SANGER
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/17/international/middleeast/17MILI.html?pagewanted=all&position=

The opening says it all: "New intelligence assessments are warning that the United States' most formidable foe in Iraq in the months ahead may be the resentment of ordinary Iraqis increasingly hostile to the American military occupation, Defense Department officials said today."

Well, very nice for the Defence Department to wake up to this. I suppose the "usual suspects" will have to begin backpeddling.

Unfortunately I have a strong sensation we are not looking at a positive evolution of policy and attitude but a probable development of a "game over, man" attitude. Too hard, working with the 'sand niggers' all their own fault anyway...

Pity, we are about to spoil the entire effort. A crock of shit, but there is some value to rescue if done right.

Nota bene the following: " The defense officials spoke on condition of anonymity, saying they were concerned about retribution for straying from the official line. They said it was a mistake for the administration to discount the role of ordinary Iraqis who have little in common with the groups Mr. Rumsfeld cited, but whose anger over the American presence appears to be kindling some sympathy for those attacking American forces."

I do not like Vietnam analogies per se, but I think the limited one here to a leadership blinded by its ideological suppositions is valid in a bounded manner.

However, on getting things right, and this point above, that leads us to this article:
Diplomats Say U.N. Pact Still Is Feasible
Authority for Allies, Iraqis Is a Factor
By Peter Slevin and Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 17, 2003; Page A22
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21561-2003Sep16.html

The key point of the article I believe is that while the Bush Administration may ram through its views in the latest UN proposition, it will win by fatigue and not by buy in from our allies or other countries, a Phyrric victory.
"Although a number of governments want the White House to give more power sooner to the United Nations and the Iraqi authorities, there is a reluctance to replay the bitter prewar battles that could end in a stalemate or a veto of a U.S.-sponsored resolution.

A larger doubt, if the administration prevails, is that the result might not deliver the troops, civilian experts or financial contributions sought by President Bush to bolster the Iraq rebuilding operation and relieve the burden on U.S. forces and taxpayers. "

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:05 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

The World Turns, Iraq Messes

The World Turns, Iraq Messes

A few items from the past several days of interest.

First, this article from The Financial Times on Rice:
'Weakness' in the White House
By James Harding
14 September 2003
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1059479813263&p=1012571727085

Discusses supposed weaknesses in Rice’s style and approach, which the article implies has allowed Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz to become the effective drivers in the foreign policy battles. Also notes at one point the opinion that Rice does not have a deep grasp of history and in particular of the Middle East, leading to the comparisons between Japan, Germany and Iraq.

This opinion peace is also of interest for its even analysis of the shortcomings of both US and Euro approaches
How to promote change in the Mideast
By Rouzbeh Pirouz and Mark Leonard
14 September 2003
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1059479813270&p=1012571727126

Some key quotes which convey the argument:
“ The danger with America's muscular approach - as evidenced by the branding of Syria as a "rogue nation" on the last day of the war in Iraq - is that it gives the impression that states have already forfeited the right to reform. The Bush administration's decision to treat the whole Iranian regime as irredeemable, breaking with the Clinton administration's policy of encouraging "reformists" within the government, will lead to fatalism among those in Tehran trying to champion reform.

Moreover, Washington's failure to make a clear distinction between supporting democratic movements from afar and rationalising US intervention in sovereign states' internal affairs plays into the hands of conservative forces. Many Iranian Americans were reluctant to join in the anti-regime protests outside Iran earlier this year because of concerns that US leaders would construe their wish for democracy as support for US interference. However, the EU's "constructive engagement" approach - hoping that economic liberalisation will bring about political change - is unlikely to disturb the sleep of autocratic rulers. In Iran's case, the distant prospects of an EU trade deal, full diplomatic relations and even World Trade Organisation membership have had little effect. The link between internal reform and external consequences is too loose.”

Turning to the American Press, this article on domestic politics has some disturbing insights on rhetoric on Iraq, specifically Republican rhetoric.

Job Losses Unsettle Republicans
GOP Lawmakers Don't Want Voters' Blame for Economy
By Juliet Eilperin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, September 16, 2003; Page A03
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15726-2003Sep15.html

“Bush's $87 billion request for Iraq -- and particularly the $20 billion of it earmarked for reconstruction -- is generating some GOP resistance in Congress. Jones [inter: R-NC] said he would vote against the reconstruction money if it were separated from the rest of the funding request.

Rep. Ginny Brown-Waite (R-Fla.) said she wants to make sure the reconstruction funds are "a loan, not a gift" to Iraq. "We didn't cause the decaying infrastructure," she said. "It was Saddam Hussein who caused the decaying infrastructure."

Ah, the fine rhetoric about the concern for the Iraqi people falls aside. Always was a cheap façade, can’t say I am surprised how quickly it falls away, although these two are provincial backbenchers so their significance should not be overplayed.

However, I am both amused and dismayed by the Florida Rep calling for the chintzy reconstruction funds to be made as loans – given Iraq is insolvent and the US wants previous debt holders to right off. Of course the whole schtick about Sadaam causing decaying infrastructure not shall we say, US imposed sanctions, rather forgets that the Iraqis hardly chose Sadaam. But then I guess liberation by a Republican party dominated by know-nothing provincials from backwards regions of the US is a cash and carry affaire. For all that the American South is a shining example of how second rate one can be in first rate country.

A further item, Zakaria’s opinion column
Don't Rush to Disaster
By Fareed Zakaria
Tuesday, September 16, 2003; Page A19
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15667-2003Sep15.html

Zakaria’s column is wise advice, as is typical from his pen to my reading of him.

His main thrust is not to rush a transition, that will end up in a failed state. Franco-German pressure in this area, with the UN stems less from a proper analysis of what is correct, but more from a well founded frustration with the combined incompetence and self-righteous blindness and arrogance of the Bush Administration, which can’t seem to admit it’s incompetent for this job.

To quote, in extenso:
“The Governing Council is a vital part of the new Iraq. But there is simply no way it could become the government right now. It is a group of 25 disparate people, chosen to fulfill ethnic, religious and other quotas, that has never worked together. When asked to choose a chairman, it chose nine. Even if it functions well, the council will function best as a legislative body, not as an executive. You cannot have Iraq run by 25 coequal chiefs, especially during this crucial period of reform and restructuring.

When it needs anything -- money, security -- the council has to turn to the coalition. After the recent bomb blast in Najaf, the Coalition Provisional Authority condemned the attack but then stepped back, explaining that the Governing Council was in charge. Several hours later, the council had not even issued a statement. "I think someone is writing up a statement, somebody, I'm not sure," a council member explained. "We don't have satellite. . . . The Americans should give us a satellite."

Iraq may not be a failed state, but it is a highly dysfunctional one. It has been through three decades of totalitarian rule, three wars, 13 years of economic sanctions and massive internal repression. Its ministries are organized along Stalinist lines. Its people have been cowed into submission for decades. It will take some time to reform the Iraqi state and heal Iraq's political culture. An immediate transfer of power would retard and perhaps even reverse this process of reform. New political leaders would seek to use the Iraqi state to consolidate their power, not limit its reach. That is what happened in Bosnia. Once elected, ethnic thugs didn't want to build the rule of law; they wanted to use the law to stay in office.

A quick transfer to locals would also mean the end of American aid. The United States is planning to put at least $20 billion into Iraq this year -- half the GDP of the country. Iraq has not had a published budget since 1979. Its ministries cannot spend $20 billion, let alone spend it well. There is no chance that the United States would keep the aid flowing if it went directly into such a system.

And yet the United States must agree to some change in the political structure of the occupation or else it will not get help it sorely needs. Even if a U.N. resolution passes, unless it is a strong resolution backed by important countries, it will not translate into troops and money. The solution might be to turn Paul Bremer into a U.N. official reporting to the Security Council. This would share control of Iraq, yet maintain the structure of authority and the momentum for reform that has begun.

Beyond troops and money, internationalization gives the occupation time. Bremer has outlined a seven-step process that would lead to the ratification of a constitution and then elections, probably in two years. During that period, Iraq's courts, police, army and administration would be remade. This is a sensible path; indeed, it may itself be too rushed.”

Frankly I am not a fan of Bremer to date, but freeing him from the Pentagon’s blindered idiocy and forcing a degree of mixed UN participation might do the trick.

All in all, I am in full agreement with Zakaria, but I fear that cheap, even miserly self-absorption, short sightedness and frankly ignorance will lead America to opt for an Afghan model of an on the cheap rushed transition to a dysfunctional but highly Politically Correct (for Right and Left fantasies) Iraqi government, that will turn into (in a best case) an Egypt on the Euphrates.

Again from the post, David Ignatius proves to be a perceptive commentator:
The Turkish Card
By David Ignatius
Tuesday, September 16, 2003; Page A19
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15665-2003Sep15.html

Ignatius rightly notes the Turks are not the panacea that the historically ignorant suppose. They are former Imperial rulers there themselves, and at the end of their rule, they were widely (in my opinion rather unfairly) despised by the Arabs. There continues to be bad blood to this day. This, however, is not the focus of the article, but rather the Kurdish angle and blunders in American planning.

I rather liked, by the way, his opening: “ One hidden casualty of the Iraq war has been the strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey. Like so many other things, it was a victim partly of the Bush administration's overconfidence and wishful thinking.”

How sadly true.

Ignatius runs down the Administrations idiocies in pre-war run up, it’s diplomatic incompetence and most importantly disregard for other countries own political environment. With us or against us, you know.

Worse, however, are the signs that this remains ad hoc.:
“"There's an idea that we should just get Turkish troops on the ground and see what happens, but that's a mistake," says Bulent Aliriza, a Turkish analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He argues that any troop deployment should be part of a broader strategic pact that makes Turkey a partner in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. Otherwise, he says, "once the bodies start coming back to Turkey, the public won't understand."”

Now, this article is just depressing. First, it causes me to lose even more respect for Powell, second its Orwellian 1984 overtone in rewriting history borders on the farcical.

Powell Says Gas Attack On Kurds Justified War
Secretary Visits Town Where Thousands Died
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, September 16, 2003; Page A14

HALABJA, Iraq, Sept. 15 -- Secretary of State Colin L. Powell asserted today that a 1988 poison gas attack that killed an estimated 5,000 Kurds in this farming town nestled in Iraq's barren northern mountains was ample evidence that former president Saddam Hussein's government possessed weapons of mass destruction and justified the U.S. decision to go to war.

Extraordinary. First, of course, US Gov thought at the time it was an Iranian attack gone wrong, second, the use of an event from the 1980s, when the US was turning a blind eye to Sadaam’s real nastiness, to justify a war some decade and a half later is a grotesque distortion of reality and a sad illustration of the Administration’s likely correct calculation that the average American voter is stupid or ignorant enough to fall for this little slight of hand.

Well, my former of esteem for Powell has, in the past year, slowly melted away. This damages it further.

Now, as to Iraq, MacFarquhar of the NYT has yet another excellent article:
Open War Over, Iraqis Focus on Crime and a Hunt for Jobs
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Sept. 15
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/16/international/middleeast/16IRAQ.html?pagewanted=all&position=

First, I wish to remind readers that the Neo-Cons were arguing as late as July that the problems in Iraq were but a blip, that things were better than reported…. Etc. On the SDMB message board Sam Stone and december were particular sinners in this farcical assertion.

Well, that has all proven to be false, the concern now is how bad will it get.

This article is hardly encouraging:
The judge sits in his chambers, waiting. He is waiting for the United States military to deliver the first batch of prisoners for trial in the newly refurbished criminal court in Kharkh District. The judge, Nawar Mohammed Nasser, the court's chief justice, has grown accustomed to waiting. He was promised prisoners on Aug. 16. No one showed up. It happened again on Aug. 23, then on Sept. 6 and once more on Sept. 9. "It's not a problem with the judicial system," said the 53-year-old judge, nattily dressed in a gray suit and a deep gray tie with white polka dots. "It's a problem with the coalition forces. If they cannot get prisoners to court at the right time, how can we expect them to run the entire administration, the entire state — to establish a new order in Iraq?" The question of whether the Americans can transform Iraq is asked with increasing frequency.”

Indeed, I believe I have conveyed well enough over the past two months or so the farcical nature of CPA-I efforts.

The article notes “ The residents of Baghdad, more than in any other part of the country, object to living with rampant crime, terrorist bombings, constant power cuts, an ill-defined political process, sluggish reconstruction and a mostly American administration that remains largely inaccessible in its bunkered palaces.”

Here are some disturbing, even wrenching statistics:
“ Dr. Faiq Amin Bakr, director of the Baghdad Central Morgue for the past 13 years, reels off the grim statistics that confirm to Iraqis that they have entered what they see as a terrifyingly lawless twilight zone: 462 people dead under suspicious circumstances or in automobile accidents in May, some 70 percent from gunshot wounds; 626 in June; 751 in July; 872 in August. By comparison, last year there were 237 deaths in July, one of the highest months, with just 21 from gunfire.”

Some liberation, eh what?

Further from the morgue:
“Several families from Abu Ghraib are there to gather some of the four victims, including an 8-year-old girl, who they said were shot dead by American soldiers in the market after a grenade was thrown at an armored personnel carrier. An American military spokesman in Baghdad confirmed that one soldier was wounded in a grenade attack but denied that the soldiers, from the First Armored Division, fired back. "The American soldiers are so panicky that if a tire bursts in the street, they start shooting," said Nabil Saleh Al-ani, a cousin of victim. Dr. Bakr, the morgue's director, said he had never seen street crime like this. "When you see your people are killed every day," he said, "you imagine the amount of crime in the country, you imagine how much insecurity there is." ”

A farcical vignette from the police station in an-Nasr:
“The main problem with the police, senior officials admit, is that there are just not enough and they remain ill equipped. Three weeks ago, the 60 officers at Al Nasr shared seven guns, two cars and no radios. They told a visitor to leave the area before nightfall because it was too dangerous even for them to venture out. This week they have 44 guns — mostly rifles — and three radios. They can only use the radios every other day, however, because they have to take them to headquarters to recharge the batteries. They also lost their two cars to an emergency police unit. When they arrest someone now, they hail a cab.”

Super.

Now to what I am … perhaps was and will be … concerned with:
“The Reconstruction Scene”

Sadly what follows rings all too true.

“Adnan Janabi, the part owner of a construction company, believes the solution to the rampant crime will be to distribute contracts to an array of Iraqi companies to refurbish the forest of burned government buildings in Baghdad. That would get the unemployed off the streets.

The Baghdad City Council recently hired 11,000 men at $3 a day for a month to clean the streets. That helped spread around a little money, one councilman said, but it is seen as too limited.

Mr. Janabi has been either unable to reach the officials involved or has hit the Iraq reconstruction "Catch-22."

He has been told that American government regulations require numerous studies before any reconstruction can get started — and that the people needed to conduct the studies do not want to come to Iraq because of the dire security conditions.

He points at the sidewalks bursting with electronic equipment and other consumer items; despite the frequent hijackings and thievery on the road from Amman, Jordan, the demands of the booming market are such that the traders absorb the losses.

Private Iraqi construction firms would take similar risks, working under the danger of attack just to get the business, Mr. Janabi says.

"They tell us there is no security, that they cannot rehabilitate the oil sector, that we cannot rehabilitate hospitals, because there is nobody to guard them," he said. "We are fed up with being told to wait because there is no security. We can make our own security."

He filled out a complicated, 10-page form in May to try to bid for some of the $215 million in subcontracts that the Bechtel Corporation says it will hand out from the $680 contract it was given.

At that time, Bechtel had an office in the Sheraton, which they closed on Aug. 1 due to security concerns.

Now their two offices lie behind the barbed wire and multiple barricades that the military maintains around all government offices. The mood of the American soldiers often determines who gets in and who does not.

Mr. Janabi has tried to reach Bechtel and other major contractors via the Internet, but gets no response, and yet he can see on the Web sites that contracts are being awarded.

"A liberal economy is an open economy, a competitive economy," he said, his remarks echoed by a banker who works with similar small- and medium-size companies. "That does not exist here; we don't even see the birth signs."

Gregory F. Huger, the Bechtel manager in charge of major reconstruction projects, said the timetable involved did not allow for open bidding. Instead, the company screened those who attended its early conferences about contracting work and asks 15 to 20 selected companies to bid on specific jobs.”

Indeed I know who attended those conferences. INC (Chalabi) connected corrupt bastards, fat cats, and others of the sort one would not want to be encouraging.

An excellent article, and indicative of the inertia and incompetence of the CPA-I / Bechtel approach.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:57 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 16, 2003

Conniving bastard

Yes, I am.

Not only that, but based on today's conference call, I am overly talented conniving bastard. Yes, plans have passed stage one, moving on to stage two. Not a done deal, but the foundations are being layed. I feel like laughing like an evil movie villian.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:09 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 15, 2003

In other idiocies: Israel threatens Arafat's life

Just when I think we can not reach a yet more benighted fucked up situation here in this region, I am decieved, no, we can get even worse.

I am of a divided mind on how to analyze Israel's truly moronic declaration.

On one hand, there are likely a substantial segment of the population which, from ingrained racism and in reaction to the suicide bombings, thinks that 'teaching them a lesson' and killing Arafat (and others) will actually somehow cause the Palestinians to cease their violent resistance to occupation (as well as the even darker aims at Israel itself).

This is fantastical and without any basis in reality at all. However, some segment of the Israeli population believes it.

On the other hand, it strikes me that the key leadership in Israel has to understand that is not how the political game in Palestine works, that the assasinations and the general policy of strong-arming the Palestinian population has invariably ended up in further radicalization and further, yet blinder violence as the Palestinians become further atomized into radicalized but leaderless cells.

I fail to see any way in which any reasonable analyst, well informed on Palestinian politics and society, can think otherwise: the evidence is clear.

I am close to concluding that the Sharon Government is pursuing a devilishly clever policy of atomoization and marginalization of the Palestinian politic leadership willing to deal with Israel, on the probably quite correct calculation that they will be able to pursue their creeping ethnic cleansing of the West Bank and be able to dictate terms according to their wishes.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:27 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 14, 2003

Iraq: Securitization - thoughts and comments

This weekend I had dinner with the new Commercial Officer and we discussed the possibilities for securitizing Iraqi contracts to inject some liquidity into Iraq and enable Iraqi firms with thin capitalization to take on larger projects.

An issue, laying aside the lack of funding overall, challenging current efforts to get more Iraqis working is that private sector firms are largely challenged with two problems. First, the private sector firms are largely smaller, thinly capitalized firms, and their few liquid assets are partially out of touch as the banking system remains non-functional. Second, those few firms with the financial weight to take on partnerships with Bechtel and Bechtel's foreign sub-contractors have ties to Sadaam's old elite and are suspected of playing a double game.

The issue, which lies at the heart of the problem in rebooting the Iraqi economy, is the tension between financial considerations and political considerations. While I suspect there may be excessive interference from the political side, I see a real reason to be concerned that the Sadaam connected operators are playing a double game (working on reconstruction, but also potentially financing and assisting in sabotage). If one reflects on this, one can see on e has a real bind.

So, thinking about enabling smaller operators, those without a big stake in the old system, and those most likely to be tied into a new order, one needs to find ways to get these fellows, who lack cash (and what they have is often tied up in inoperative banks) and access to normal fincing, financing to boot-strap themselves up the contracting food chain.

A thought bouncing around now is to try to securitize the contracts in some manner to enable some up front payments to Iraqi contractors. It's an interesting idea, a bit unusual, but I think it could work if approached aggressively.

First, most of the contracts are payment on performance - which is both an obvious and a necessary stipulation. However, we run into the liquidity problem and the fact no normal financing is available for Iraqi operations. As one of the instututional finance people in Arab Bank told me, "no proper bank is touching Iraqi [domestic] risk now." Some of the riskiest (local regional) players on the market are gambling, but that's not a recipe for getting proper financing.

thus the concept of packaging the USG contracts / sub-contracts in a security form. After some informal conversations with bankers (by the way Boo Boo, I'm not a banker, investments is my game) and lawyers, including my own, I think there are structures by which we could pull this off, legally and acceptably from a technical point of view. However, the real issue is performance risk. The payment on performance is obviously there for good reasons. You do not want a million to walk out the door.

Therefore we need to structure this with two added features:
First, some oversight on the payout to ensure proper usage, I am thinking of a private equity kind of arrangement, only overseeing some bundle of securities that are in fact USG contracts.

Second, some kind of performance insurance wrapper. This has to be USG funded as no insurance company is going to touch any of this. The insurance wrapper is to give comfort to the Bechtels and other sub-contractors.

Actually on reflection one might be able to get away with either one or two.

It's an incomplete concept, but something I like and am going to see if I can push to whatever extent I can push things. Float this with my "sponsors" back in the US of A to see if it can get some policy traction.

Bloody hell, it looks whacky, but as we agreed, the situation is bad and business as usual just can't go on. Business as usual has led OPIC sitting around with a thumb up its ass waiting for a fucking bilateral treaty and counting on securitized oil revenues to finance hypothetical insurance offerings.

Bloody hell, the intertia in this Admin. on action is staggering. Really staggering.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:42 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Unrelenting bad news

It becomes harder and harder to envisage a scenario where this Administration pulls its collective head out of its ass and stops wasting time.

The negative roll of events, the clear loss of initiative, the frustration I hear from the US diplomatic staff - this is getting to be depressing. I mean seriously depressing.

On one hand, there is a little voice in me that says, let it go bad (silly phrasing you know, as if one has control over such things, but what are little voices for except for such silly things), it will take down that incompetent moron Bush and his posse.

On the other hand, self interest and long term interest play in the other direction. This situation is becoming very dangerous for long term US interests - never mind my personal interests - and something needs to be done.

However, the Bush Administration seems unable to undertake the required climb downs to make this a workable proposition.

It's bloody depressing.

Some news on this point:
Iraq's Security Weakened by Fear
U.S- Trained Police Are Accused of Being Collaborators and Spies
By Anthony Shadid
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, September 14, 2003; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6774-2003Sep13.html

The article covers the difficult position of Iraqi police, who have neither support nor authority in the Sunni region (and given the demands in the Shiite areas that the Badr Brigade be given authority, it would appear similar developments there), and appear in this station interviewed to actually support the resistance movement(s).

This is not, rather clearly, a good thing.

'Now Everything Is Messed Up'
Killings by U.S. Troops Outrage Iraqis
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, September 14, 2003; Page A24
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6532-2003Sep13.html

Covering reaction to the killing in 'friendly fire' of 10 Iraqi police officers by US troops.

In many respects what this highlights is the chaos of Iraq and the degree to which US forces, almost entirely trained for classic combat conditions, are more or less utterly misplaced for the current duties.

The issue, however, is how to get around this?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:25 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

News Roundup: Iraq & the UN

Reading over this article on the UN, it struck me as an interesting mode to reflect on ways to rescue the Iraqi situation:

Aug. 19 Blast Reverberating in U.N. Debate on Role in Iraq
By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, September 14, 2003; Page A21
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6242-2003Sep13.html

A few thoughts here.

I believe that while no foreign presence will be immune to the Baathist reaction per se, it is actually the Islamists who pose the core danger, from which none are immune at all. However, a seperation between the UN and the US forces is probably the best manner to ensure the widest acceptance of UN efforts, and to help innoculate UN and other international efforts from the contagion of discredit the US efforts currently are suffering.

However, this will not be possible under the current Administration, unless there is some major change of heart.

As much as it hurts in the short-term (especially me, damn it), I believe that it is best for the international community not to enable the failed policy structure and get covered in the same inevitable discredit. I see no way the current policies are going to work - inadequate funding (and I am horrified to see the public does not understand the need for the funding to date), inadequate policy framework, inadequate training for the troops providing securiyt, inadequate conceptual framework for moving forward....

On the issue of funding:
Public Says $87 Billion Too Much
By Richard Morin and Dan Balz
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, September 14, 2003; Page A01

This is simply depressing, unless this knee jerk reaction is leveraged into some real pressure to put up real money in a properly concieved reconstruction framework. I am more and more convinced the CPA-I needs to be ditched / reworked and put under the auspices of State & Commerce, and ditch the Pentagon influence. The ideologues are hedging things into disaster.

However, this is not going to happen.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:35 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

A story which amused me

Very pleasant weekend, this weekend. Besides rapping with the new Comm Offic. in town, spent some time with an old school mate in with D&T. It was nice to catch up and so forth (although going out we accidentally ran into the strangely indiscrete Israeli sec. agent from hell, but more on that in a moment).

His reason for being in town amused me immensely. His firm (a major international consulting firm) is consulting on the privatization of the power industry, under Rothschild. Now, for those of you who've dealt with this kind of thing, privatizations are a huge pain in the ass. You have to package a state industry that often has been run under somewhat dodgey accounting and budgeting practices into something digestible for foreign investors, or private investors generally. It's a lot of fucking work, that goes without saying. Part of packaging all this up is to create a repository for due diligence documentation, including supporting underlying documentation. All organized and accessible for any and all serious bidders.

All well and fine, one should think, but no. The local shop did not quite get that right. My friend's story was of absolutely no surprise, was amusing but sadly expected. Rothschild's head came down to visit and found the local office could not retrieve what was needed, that the index was made with the Hindi numbers (which he and any non-Arab can't read), and the actual repository was a disorganized mess. No one had bothered to actually organize the documentation. So his firm had to fly in a team from the States to put it right, as well as calm down the Rothschilds bankers. It was hilarious - well the stories to me were knowing where this was coming from.

The usual problems. Sometimes I despair.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:12 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

September 10, 2003

Comments, extensive & Questions to the readers [edited to move forward a day]

First, a note to indicate I made some extensive replies to yesterday's comments.
In particular: http://www.livejournal.com/users/collounsbury/37898.html
[edited: originally referred to 8 Sep 03: have actually added comments to that link as well]
[edited: also added comments to 9 Sep 03]

Second, a few questions.

(a) Battle of Algiers: is my harping on this subject lost on everyone?
(b) Moving Forward, Request?
(i) Topics: any items I should comment on? I will likely ignore any and all suggestions, but in an effort to moderately useful, as well as indulging my own outsized ego, I like to solicit suggestions.
(ii) Readers: all from SDMB I suspect. Any others?
(iii) Any items that seem just a waste? Of course I am likely to ignore comment I don't care about.
(c) Comments: Identifications. I don't know why but 100% anonymous comments irritate me. Now I can understand that perhaps a few commentators might not wish to disclose, which is fine, I am jealous of my identity privacy myself, however can I ask for at least a moniker? Obviously my only means of enforcing is simply to delete, but I hate the idea of censorship so...

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:27 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Random office observations

First, our receptionist, lovely attractive girl as she may be, needs to wear more clothes. It's distracting, and when she leans over difficult to keep one's attention in profesional areas. Today is particularly bad, and she's complaining she's cold. Well, of course she's cold, given what she's wearing. Bloody hell.

Second, my secretary poked me. Why on earth would my secretary poke me? Poke me. All to make a point about my shirt I think. Ick.

Third, the Chimpanzee and Brother who pretend to be the IT specialists, drooling nitwits that they are, show up at my office to try to sell me (me personally) a wireless network for my apartment. Why the fuck would I buy a wireless network for my apartment from someone who I despise, consider a witless incompetent and have tried to get fired - and who knows all this?!? I made him cry once, for the sake of whatever, and he wants me to buy a wireless network from him?

This office is a disaster of unprofessional nitwits. I am going to go mad. The Iraqi ambitions which made this all come together are sputtering about like headless chickens, our venture partner is stabbing me in the back and I work with witless unprofessional sluts and chimpanzees. I am in a foul mood.

Ah well, maybe the Com Officer will cheer me up.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:16 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Dec 2003

Abu Ala II

From a comment by Fang yesterday:

“Well it's all well and good for him to be credible among the Palestinians, but if he makes no attempt to break Hamas all is really for naught. Additionally, I get the sense that he is merely an Arafat puppet, having been nominated by him and already making statements that essentially nothing will happen without Arafat's approval. ISTM the whole point of the prime minister thing was to do an end run around Arafat without killing or expelling him; since Oslo there had been 5 different Israeli PMs with 5 different policies, while Arafat and a lack of progress remained. Even those who had originally urged Israel to swallow the bitter pill and bring Arafat back from the dead are realizing he is not a leader that Israel can work with. What will "break the negative cycle" is if Qorei cracks down on Hamas and PIJ, so Israel won't have to.”

Now before I start, let me say to Fang that none of the following is personal at all, I just got on a roll, having been slightly irritated when I first wrote this:

Well, you rather missed the point. I will note 5 different PMs but never a stop in settlements, but history is not of interest to me at this moment.

Primo, an end run around Arafat was motherfucking dumb-ass idioticly naïve policy that only the Israeli Sharonistas and the gullible and ignorant Bush Administration, and of course persons like yourself, bought into.

Arafat is an elected, in more or less fair elections, and whatever his drawbacks – they are legion indeed – “sidelining” him against the will of the Palestinian electorate (which was never all that enamored of Arafat, but he has been something of a flag to rally round when the Israelis attack) has exactly the opposite motherfucking effect. That has been rather clear for a rather long period of time, as indeed have been the effects of the assassination policies. No reduction in real violence, just reduction in the cohesion of Palestinian leadership. But then, that’s the real goal, not peace.

Should one wish to engage a bit of reflection, one should understand the natural electoral political response to outside powers “sidelining” your elected representative, however much one dislikes him. Above all, in the context of an Israel that has shown precious little will to adhere to its own commitments. There are two sets of sinners here. Two motherfucking sets of sinners and to bumble on like morons pretending it is only the Palestinians is to permit the same old same old policies of faux peace efforts and creeping annexations.

This rubbish, this simple minded, naïve swallowing of Israeli agit-prop in stating that breaking the negative cycle depends on Abu Ala cracking down on Hamas et al simply gets us back to the same idiotic and empty position that the Bush Admin. has had in its failed policy to date. It gets us back to putting all the weight on the Palestinians and giving the Israeli Annexationists every excuse to break off their faux peace efforts when they so desire. Plunging the Palestinians into civil war, which is indeed what will occur should the battered (by Israel) PA security forces try to put down the militant factions without some s