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April 28, 2004

Gratitious Stupidity, the Iraqi Flag.

You may see The Washington Post for this http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43438-2004Apr26.html

All I can say is the stupidity of this move really is breathtaking.

I wonder whose idea this was.

I hope that this was done by someone working against the American Occupation as a deliberate move, because if it is being done with all sincerity, I can only say that the political incompetence (not to mention artistic idiocy) is of such a level as to leave me dumbfounded.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:43 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

A comment on Iraq

A comment on Iraq that I left with the Washignton Monthly in re this convo:
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_04/003782.php

"There seems to be a large scale incomprehension here of the actual menu of choices available in Iraq.

First, the Arab League does not have the institutional capacity to even be a player, regardless of the fact that it is so badly divided at present that it could not possibly achieve any kind of effective operation in Iraq, or the fact that the Kurds would never accept an Arab League focused 'administration.'

Second, in regards to elegant federal state solutions and the like, the commentators are presuming that constitutional arrangements will have some meaning. There is quite simply not the institutional capacity to make a tripartite administrative structure work. However elegant, the reality will follow actual adminstrative and governmental norms - which in the Arab region are centralizing and authoritarian.

Third, in regards to population, commentators here are presuming that lines can be drawn - ex-the extreme Kurdish north and the Western central region, most of Iraq is rather mixed - e.g. the Baghdad area is mixed Sunni and Shiite, and that holds to the south of Baghdad. No clear line can be drawn there, so speaking to a presumed "Sunni" state makes no fucking sense at all. Then, of course, the Arab (Sunni and Shiite, largely Sunni) / Turcomans (Shiite and Sunni, apparent majority of Shiites) / Kurd (Sunni and Shiite, majority Sunni, but largely adhering to somewhat heterodox Sunni Sufi orders "line" in the North in the Kirkuk region is not at all clear. And again note that even in the North, with a majority Sunni Arabs as the non-Kurdish population, there are the largely Shiite Turcomans complicating the picture. The simplified imagery many of you have of the ethnic map is simply erroneous.

Fourth, de facto seperation has a different political logic than de jure seperation. De facto allows for looseness and fudging, de jure will create a political dynamic further favoring civil war as each ethnic group will have incentives to push for the maximalist position to lock in gains, and with little to no tradition of mediated and peaceful conflict or problem resolution, and in a situation where legitmate authority of any type does not obtain on the national level, there is almost no chance that civil war would be averted.

In short, one needs to get some realism before even pretending to think about what is possible here.

I may add that the comment supra about Arabs not being capable of democracy is pure bunk. What is true is that the socio-economic system and conditions prevailing in the region is not favorable to the instant creation of a fully operative democracy. Mass unemployment, dysfunctional economies and little recent indigenous experience with consultative decision making all preclude "instant democracy." It is not a question of an existential incapacity but rather the socio-economic conditions that obtain at present.

Finally, the commentator who felt Egypt is a positive model clearly doesn't know Egypt. Egypt is a fucking time bomb waiting to explode. If Iraq ends up as Egypt on the Euphrates, you've just made another pressure cooker of an about to be failed state. Open society my fucking ass, bloody "blue tin cans" security armor rolling around picking up "militants" in broad daylight is what Egypt is, although the ignorant Westerner traipsing around for a Pyramid visit may be duped into thinking all is just fine."

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:40 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 25, 2004

"You Travel A Lot in the Middle East, Why?"; New York, Moroccan Bombs; Iraq; Cyprus and EU idjits

Wonderful coming through JFK. I am beginning to hate coming back to the States. The hassle, is well, a real hassle - perhaps I should get that second passport not only for Israel but the United States?

Well, then I might miss the occasion to miss the interaction with the ever surly Customs and Immigration staff, who seem inclined to treat any and all travellers - including someone like myself (expensive suit, anglo name and looks) like bloody criminals. Now, I am not talking about doing their job, which is to say, be aware and ask questions. But demeanor. I hardly expect someone such as myself should be challenged and questioned in a hostile manner, no matter the number of Arab / Middle Eastern stamps in my bloody passport. A bit of training in proper manners would go a long way. Of course, having been in a foul mood, I rather risked a body cavity search and gave as good back, however this can hardly be said to be particularly good manner in which to treat business travellers.

In any event, gave me the occasion to reflect on what a fucking horrible airport JFK is. Really, it is a fucking awful airport and that fucking airtrain is just about the stupidest piece of work I have seen. Bloody awful design, leading to two inconvenient subway stops and confusingly laid out such that they need fucking porters to guide people. The whole fucking airport should be levelled and rebuilt properly. Bloody hell it's New York, one should think New York should have a proper airport (yes, actually it does, Newark, for all that I despise Jersey.)

This aside, the horror that is JFK's completely disorganized madness of a transport infrastructure gabve me the opportunity to share a ride into town with the Provost of Univ. of South Africa. Interesting fellow, nice ride, although we both ended up having to badger the cab into respecting the rate. (As an aside The Economist has a fine article on the idiocy that is the New York medalion auction. Well done, exposé of the idiocy of the medallion system. New York's faux liberalism of corruption.

This aside, I forgot to mention that on Thursday past the Moroccan authorities discovered a bomb making factory outside of Casablanca. Quite accidentally, as reports had it - afraid I do not have online links this was radio - brought in on a domestic dispute next door to the factory - bomb makers panicked. Take this as another sign of the results of the fiasco that is Iraq to date, as well as the sheer idiocy of the Palestinian policy. Not terribly confident I must say in Moroccan security procedures, their airport relies more on hand checks than screenings. The Jordanians are far better at it. Wonder if I might not run a bigger chance of becoming little bits and pieces over the Atlantic there than in Jordan? Ah well,likely to happen one way or the other.

I also note that Sharon's going back on his "pledge" not to harm Arafat provoked no public response of any merit from the Americans. With allies like Sharon, one hardly needs enemies. I am hard pressed to understand what assasinating Arafat gains anyone but some cheap revenge fantasy that Sharon - well make that expensive, the fat corrupt whore doesn't do things cheaply - likes to engage in. The assasinations of the Hamas leadership having produced nothing but a regain in Hamas support (See http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/international/middleeast/25HAMA.html?pagewanted=all&position= ).

Of course short term we seem to have a disruption of Hamas operations, although I note that after the assasination of their bomb maker in 2002 saw a several month pause between the event and the Hamas riposte. It is hard to tell what level of disruption has actually occured. However, the longer term, the secular PA and Arafat's secularists are losing out to the hardline jihadist views of the Hamas people. The Israeli model on this, or rather the Sharonista model for this is based on policies and understandings of Arab societies derived from the 1950s and 1960s, a different era when tribal leaderships and the like had more power and Palestinian society, less modern in terms of fluidity and less stressed.

Unfortunately Sharon and the people who think like him think that if they kill off the radical leadership they will be able to "choose" Palestinian quislings. They may - although Arafat is actually their best chance at that, but it will not hold. Since the 1980s this model, as seen in the Territories and in Lebanon has failed, again and again. However, the rather racist nature of much of Israeli thought on Arabs prevents them from seeing the changes - mind you I add I fully understand the origins and reasons for this thought - it's certainly not hard to become contemptously frustrated with the state of Arab societies at present and indeed it is that same frustration that drives much youth - middle class to impoverished - into the arms of the radicals. Socieity is clearly ill, but the wealthy elite of the "secularists" that the US likes to deal with have no real answers at present - nothingthat would overturn their cushy position.

Now, this aside, I am afraid that after stepping back from the brink, we are about to roll back into Fallujah. The question, and it is not at all clear what good answers are available, is what can one actually do. On one hand, backing down in front the insurgents is a grave error, yet at the same time so is confrontation given the present circumstances. A rather no win situation at present. The problem that obtains is there are not very good options available in Iraq, due to the incompetence of the occupation to date, the progressive alienationn of the Iraqis and the lack of any real substantive progress. Backing down emboldens a set of operators that are indeed "bad guys" in the unfelicitious phrase of President Bush - whose dimwittedness seems unlimited. On the other hand pushing into Fallujah given present circumstances will certainly inflame Iraqis against the occupation once again. The reality is that, well, no one -of any substantial numbers- loves, likes or even particularly respects the Americans at present, and hatred and loathing clearly outweigh fear. The command of Machiavelli, to feared rather loved, but not hated, apparently was lost on the Rumsfeld - Cheney axis.

Now as those of you who waste your precious time reading my funny little notes know that I rather like The Economist's analyses in general. Sadly they have been consistently wrong on Iraq, very wrong. I find this commentary from 7 April 2004 worrying:
Once the Iraqis have elected their own government, the danger of replaying Vietnam in the sands of Iraq should recede. Even if such a government were later to prove deadlocked or unstable, its emergence would permit an honourable enough American exit. That is to say, a President Bush or Kerry could in conscience declare at such a point that America had given Iraq its democratic opportunity and summon the troops back home. So in practical terms, the question of whether the Americans can “succeed” in Iraq boils down to this. Is America willing and able to hold the ring for the year and a half or so until that election takes place?
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2572254
This is abdication. Withdrawing with a faux government that will collapse, with no realistic chance of success is not leaving, i n conscience, it is in fact a longer term disaster. It suggests to me that the editorial writers have looked ahead, and as I noted last week, seen that the Bush Administration has driven off the motherfucking cliff.

I note the 15 April 2004 editorial:

Iraq
Another intifada in the making
Having stepped to the brink, America would be wise to step back

15 Apr 2004
The Economist
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2598976

"The past fortnight has shown that a shocking number of Iraqis are indeed willing to take up the gun, and that most of the Iraqi policemen and soldiers recruited since the fall of Saddam Hussein prefer to lay theirs down than to fire on fellow citizens. This has left the job of pacifying Fallujah and other restive parts of Iraq to an American army that is stretched too thin and shows every sign of having reacted with excessive force. By some estimates the Americans have over the past fortnight killed 500 or so Iraqis in Fallujah. Slaughter on this scale cannot credibly be described as a policing operation designed to rid Fallujah of criminals and terrorists." .... "The best hope in Iraq is that America's tough talk against the rebels of Fallujah and Mr Sadr in Najaf is a bluff designed to incentivise its foes in both places to negotiate their way out of a showdown. Though at midweek Mr Sadr denied talking to the occupiers, mediators seem active behind the scenes. Best of all would be a signal from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Shias' paramount spiritual leader, that the Shia mainstream disapproves of Mr Sadr's antics. But for that the coalition may need to strike some face- (and life-) saving deal with Mr Sadr. As a rule, it is a pity to let armed groups defy authority and get away with it. But Iraq is hardly a normal place right now, and Mr Sadr's is only one of many armed militias. Better, if possible, to co-opt such an enemy than risk a wider conflagration by killing him in a shrine."

I note The Economist's note:
Is there a way out? Optimists argue that the bloodshed must have concentrated minds. It has given America a better idea of which Iraqis wield real influence. Most members of the Governing Council bleated from the sidelines during the fighting, but a few won popular credibility by acting as mediators or organising relief programmes. The groups that showed the most gumption include Mr Jaffari's Dawa party and Mohsen Abdel Hamid's Iraqi Islamic Party, which is backed by some Sunni preachers. The ayatollahs in Najaf, led by Ali Sistani, have sent their sons to soothe Mr Sadr, only to hear Mr Sadr's aides brand them American spies
and hope there may be some grain of truth to the optimistic interpretation that some portion of that gaggle of incompetent self indulgent ideologues in the CPA to actually wake up to reality (rather than engaging in the sort of idiotic, ideological posturing one sees among "conservatives in the United States pissing their pants about "theocrats" and rather unfelicitious and indeed idiotic "islamofascists" (I rather thought that conservatives disliked abusing the phrase "fascist" although I suppose ideologues of all stripes are at heart whinging hypocrites of the worst stripe - and I do note that the new conservative... wing? so hot to trot over Iraq is rather Bolshevik in its mentality, so perhaps it is appropriate they have adopted the language of the Bolsheviks and the twaddlesome left.))

Finally on Iraq, a story in The Independent
Americans believe Saddam terror link
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=514681
drew my attention to this:
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqReport4_22_04.pdf

Fundamentally depressing, the stupidity or laziness of the American public in regards to foreign affaires as illustrated in these the following:
Only around 40 percent of respondants correctly noted Iraq had no connexion with al-Qaeda or had minor intermittan contacts. A staggering 37 percent think Iraq gave substantial support to al-Qaeda, but not involved in 11 September, while a further 20 percent of ill-informed morons think Iraq had connexion with 11 September in addition. I note 45 percent of this subset of ill-informed drooling idiots believe the US has some proof of an al-Qaeda link.

Further, a majority has some belief that Iraq had either substantive NBC weapons (38 percent) or significant (22 percent) programs. It is hard to give credit to actual literacy and holding such beliefs.

I leave you to read the full analysis, depressing as it is.

Finally, on Cyprus, the Greek Cyproites showed once again they are self-indulgent, short sighted fools of the worse kind, as well as having less political maturity than the Turks in fact. How else to explain the significant intervention of that mafia, the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, with interventions saying a vote for the UN plan would damn voters to hell. I note by the way that the Islamophobes out there would have taken a similar intervention by a Muslim Imam as signs of the evilness of the Islamic world, etc. etc.

Returning to Cyprus, well, this really was no surprise if one has ever spent any time in Cyprus - and in some ways it begins to build on my sensation that the EU really is not ready for prime time. I do not say this as someone philosophically or constitutionally opposed to the EU. Indeed, I have long been a fan of the idea, in theory, of the EU as a closer Union. However, the execution of expansion has been, I have to say, a dismal and peurile excerise in a sad combination of wishful thinking and a sort of namby pamby quasi-leftist 'we'll all just get along"ism without a real sense that in fact there are people who will not, in the end, want to get along. (I note I have noted in online fora that this tends to emerge among American and Euro leftists engaging in wishful pandering about the Iraqi resistance)

Anyone who has spent any degree of time in Cyprus should have been able to note the degree to which the Greek Cyproites had not truly grappled in any meaningful manner with their role in the division of the island, nor were they apparently willing to. One could see a clear contrast between the attitude of the average Turk - who rarely fulminates against the Greeks, and seemed in the conversations I had over the years, willing to "throw the Greeks a bone." In contrast, the Greek Cypriotes (a) usually wallowed in a very much misplaced sense of victimhood (yes the Turkish army grabbed a huge share of the Island, but it hardly was without warning, months of warnings, and had the Greeks not tried unification with Greece against Turkish Cypriot wishes the Turkish army would not have had the excuse to intervene.), (b) an unreconstructed sense of a right to dominance - take for example the present change over on the Greek side the change over from the old licence plate plan based on the British system - timed in just for the EU ascension - to a system using Greek rather than Roman characters. A small but subtle sign of the degree of political attention to unification with the Turks - who after all have adopted the roman character system for their langauge, (c) showed little to no sign in my conversations with them of having any sense of recognizing the Turkish point of view or of their legitimate grievances dating from the period when Greek partisans spread terror in the Turkish communities. That is, in the 1960s-1970s, both sides were dirty, both used violence and the main difference was indeed, the Turkish Republic had a kick ass army and the Greek Cypriotes and Greek army did not. I can't say I ever heard on the Greek side any realistic political commentary, but a whole lot of whinging on about how the Brits and the Americans were plotting against them, the Greeks - with little recognition of their role in why their politicla POV was not entirely adopted - given their theocratic politics I suppose this is unsurprising.

The Economist's note:
A chance for peace and unity wasted
25 Apr 2004

"The UN’s plan for ending three decades of conflict and reuniting Cyprus has been rejected by the Mediterranean island’s Greek-Cypriot majority—to the anger of the world powers that backed the plan. The Turkish-Cypriot north of the island will be unable to join the European Union next month even though its people voted in favour"

They should, of course, get the chance now. Why not? Not their fault the Greeks are more immature and backwards politically. Worthy of the Arabs, their political instincts.

"The simultaneous referendums held in both parts of Cyprus on Saturday April 24th could—if all had gone well—have put an end to one of Europe’s most poisonous conflicts. Since the island was divided 30 years ago, when a Greek-Cypriot coup prompted an invasion by Turkish troops, Greece and Turkey have several times come close to war, despite both supposedly being allies in NATO. Since 1974’s bloody events, a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone has divided Cyprus in two—running right through Nicosia, Europe’s last divided capital. Past attempts to resolve the conflict and reunite the island have failed. But in recent months, enormous diplomatic effort has gone into putting together a UN-sponsored peace plan which would see the island reunited as a loose federation. It seemed Cyprus’s best chance yet of ending the conflict. But it has been thrown away.

Turkish-Cypriots voted 65% in favour of the UN plan—even though it meant their having to give up some land and homes to the Greek-Cypriots, and in spite of the call for a “no” vote by their veteran president, Rauf Denktash. But the plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek-Cypriot side, which voted 76% against it. Perversely, the result means that only the rejectionist Greek-Cypriot part of the island will join the European Union (along with nine other countries) on May 1st, while the Turkish-Cypriots will be left out. This is because only Turkey recognises the small, impoverished Turkish-Cypriot republic in the north of the island, while the rest of the world has since 1974 regarded the Greek-Cypriot government as though it represented the whole of the island."

I should hope that the representation issue shall change, and soon.

This section is of particular interest:
"The Greek-Cypriots’ rejection of the plan was met with dismay and anger among the world powers that had pressed both sides to accept it. Günter Verheugen, the EU’s commissioner for enlargement, said the Greek-Cypriots would join the Union under a “shadow”. America’s State Department expressed its disappointment, while praising the Turkish-Cypriots for their courage in voting for peace and reconciliation.

For a short while earlier this year it had begun to look like Cyprus was on an unstoppable course towards unity. In February, leaders of the island’s two communities agreed to start talks under the UN’s auspices. If they could not reach a final agreement by late March, Greece and Turkey would enter the talks. If a deal still could not be struck, the UN would fill in any remaining blanks in the peace agreement and put it to both sides in referendums. Until the past few weeks, it was the Turkish-Cypriot side that had been portrayed as the more stubborn negotiator. But the Turkish-Cypriot government (minus Mr Denktash) accepted the proposal put to both sides by the UN, while the Greek-Cypriots, led by Tassos Papadopoulos, refused to accept it. This infuriated Mr Verheugen, who last week said he felt “cheated” by Mr Papadopoulos."

Well, if the EU had had its fucking eyes open, they should have noted long before the political gamesmanship on the Greek Cypriot side (the Greek mainlanders having played, one should note, a fairly positive and mature role).

Further note the media control - everything I heard from foreign friends their supported the accusation of deliberate intervention.
"Diplomats and “yes” campaigners last week accused Greek-Cypriot broadcasters of focusing on the plan's potential disadvantages, while denying EU and UN officials airtime to put the case for accepting it. Last Wednesday, Britain and other backers of the plan tried to pass a resolution at the UN Security Council, which would encourage a “yes” vote by strengthening the UN peacekeepers’ role in verifying all sides’ compliance with the plan. But Russia (which has longstanding links with the Greeks and shares their Orthodox Christian religion) vetoed the resolution, saying it there had not been adequate debate."

"Mr Papadopoulos had suggested to his people that they could turn down the UN plan with no ill consequences, in the expectation that a better deal will be offered in the near future. There does not seem much chance of this. By rejecting the proposal the Greek-Cypriots will have gained nothing other than the resentment of their fellow EU members; they have lost the moral high ground they enjoyed in the 30 years in which the Turkish-Cypriot side continually resisted a deal. The UN has now said its role in seeking a peace deal is over. Though there might be an effort to get the two sides back to the table for one last try, the chances do not look good. Turkey’s foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, said after the vote that the Greek-Cypriot rejection meant partition was now “permanent”."

I should say that in my opinion they never should have enjoyed the moral high ground, given that the Greek Cypriots never grappled with their own terrorism and terrorists, and have instead done their best to instill anti-Turkish revanchisme in the population.

"The EU and America have made it clear that the 200,000 Turkish-Cypriots—about a quarter of the island’s population—will not lose out from the Greek-Cypriots’ intransigence. The economic and diplomatic sanctions that have crippled the Turkish-Cypriot economy may now be eased. Turkey is likely to press the world powers to grant recognition to the Turkish-Cypriot republic."

I hope there is follow through.

Finally: "The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told a meeting of his ruling party on Saturday that: “This is the most successful event in the last 50 years of Turkish diplomacy.” He might have added that it was also the Greek-Cypriots’ biggest diplomatic disaster in 30 years."

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:49 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 22, 2004

Basrah, Baghdad

I would like to observe two items:
(a) the Basrah bombings suggest to me Saudi based al-Qaedah types are operating. I note the news coming out of KSA (the bombing claimed by al-Qaedah) suggests that the situation there is not good, to say the least. Results, hard to tell. But put in the context of Jordan and other infos I have heard suggests the al-Qaedah people are feeling energized. Recruitment is probably better than it has been in years. I note for the record, by the way, the gross hypocrisy of the anti-Brit demos after the Basrah bombings. Sadrist hypocrites. They really are the worst sort of folks and deserve to be squashed like insects, but the Coalition doing so probably, given the context, is probably net negative. Did not have to be that way, but the sheer clumsiness so far makes it so.
(b) Baghdad - assasinations suggest that the present quasi calm is a false calm, both the Americans and the Resistance are taking a breath.
(c) Fallujah - looks like its going to open up again. The question is, what about the Shiite zone and will the flash of solidarity at the start of the month rebound or not? Will the Cowboy types decide to go after Najaf?

In other items, Steel is Stalled. No fucking data, no fucking response from CPA. Fuck em, they don't fucking want our motherfucking money, they can go to fucking hell the incompetent posers. Worst part, is these fucking assholes are going to go home rapping about their experience in the Arab world, Fucking idiots. Real fucking idiots sitting in fucking villas without any real idea of what it is going to take to get things done.

Final item, got me hands on US plans for a special financial vehicle for the region, a sort of MENA IFC funded by the US. Document talks about getting other peeps to come in, but bloody hell, what kind of cheap crack are they smoking? Europeans and WB are not going to come into the structure they're proposing where Presidential appointees have vetoes. Still, need to give this a close read. Might be some money in it for me - I'm counter cyclical after all. I make money out of your policy makers errors. Except when they get too fucking bad, like Iraq. Assholes.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 19, 2004

Hot off the CPA Presses - well it looks like they are not passing to the offensive.

Well, someone blinked. Sort of.

I see little chance of this leading to anything substantive, but it appears to me that CPA has realised that leveling Falluja is a Phyrric victory.

"Agreed Statement of 19 April
Following the initial meeting on 13 April 2004, the parties met again on 16, 17, and 19 April 2004 to consolidate progress made towards the achievement of a full ceasefire and a peaceful resolution of the situation in Fallujah.

All parties welcomed the improved situation in the city and committed themselves to take all possible measures, with all relevant parties, to implement a full and unbroken ceasefire, which they call on parties to faithfully observe. They recognize that in the absence of a true ceasefire, major hostilities could resume on short notice.

The parties agreed, that as a sign of goodwill, and to improve the humanitarian situation in Fallujah, Coalition Forces will allow unfettered access to the Fallujah General Hospital, to treat the sick and injured. The parties also agreed to arrange for the removal and burial of the dead and the provision of food and medicine in isolated areas of the city. The hours of the curfew will also be shortened so that the curfew will begin at 2100, rather than 1900 each night so that believers may fulfill their religious duties. Measures will also be put in place to facilitate the passage of official ambulances through the city, especially through checkpoints. Steps will also be taken to allow security, medical, and technical personnel access to the city to work. In due course, consideration will be given to allowing additional civilians to enter the city, beginning with fifty families per day commencing on 20 April.

In an initial effort to restore security in the city, the parties agreed to call on citizens and groups to immediately turn in all illegal weapons, illegal weapons defined as mortars, RPGs, machine guns, sniper rifles, IED-making materials, grenades, and surface-to-air missiles and all associated ammunition. This collection has begun and the parties discussed ways to turn the weapons over to the Coalition. Those who give up their weapons voluntarily will not be prosecuted for weapons violation. Unarmed individuals will not be attacked.

The parties also agreed on the pressing need of restoring regular and routine patrols in the city by joint Coalition Forces / Iraqi Security Forces. The parties will oversee the reformation of the Iraqi Police Force and ICDC in the city on an urgent basis. These forces will be bolstered and improved. They will be formed primarily from residents of Fallujah, who are best placed to guarantee security in the city. The Police and ICDC, supported by the residents of Fallujah and Coalition Forces must move to eliminate remaining foreign fighters, criminals, and drug users from Fallujah, in order for stability and security to occur.

The parties agreed that Coalition Forces do not intend to resume offensive operations if all persons inside the city turn in their heavy weapons. Individual violators will be dealt with on an individual basis.

The parties reaffirmed the absolute need to restore law and order in the city as quickly as possible, to rebuild the judicial system, and to initiate thorough Iraqi investigations into criminal acts committed in the city in this period of instability, which includes the killing and mutilation of the four American contractors and the attack on the Iraqi Police Station in February.

To implement these undertakings in a practical, efficient manner and to avoid any misunderstandings, the parties expect to intensify their consultations on security issues. These consultations will include leaders of the city, local security professionals, and representatives of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. For a reasonable period of time, the progress on the agreed upon issues will be monitored on a daily basis. Progress must be clearly demonstrated and the return to law and order observed. Time to settle this crisis peacefully remains extremely limited. The status quo is not acceptable.

The consultations began on April 19 and will continue daily to resolve issues. The parties in attendance agreed to remain in constant touch and reconvene as necessary, but in no case later than April 25."

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 18, 2004

More of the try not to get killed on our watch items

Straight from the Embassy.

Warden Message

In reaction to the death of Hamas leader Dr. Rantissi last night in Gaza, public demonstrations and emotional outbursts by groups and individuals may occur in Jordan. We note some commentators have linked erroneously the U.S. to the Israeli Government decision to strike Dr. Rantissi. The Embassy is aware of at least one demonstration late on April 17, and we expect others may occur over the coming days, culminating at Friday noon prayers. Americans should exercise caution in their movements and avoid areas where demonstrators may gather, including areas near refugee camps, city centers, large mosques, and universities. Areas such as Shmeisani and El Rabiah have been the scenes of demonstrations in the past.

Americans should closely monitor developments via the news media over the next several days, and access the following websites for additional information and public announcements: http://travel.state.gov/ and http://amman.usembassy.gov/
We draw your attention on these websites to the latest Worldwide Caution Public Announcement and the Middle East/North Africa Public Announcement.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:58 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

WP: Iraq situ, ah they think it's bad. Finally.

Well, this article is important on a number of grounds. Among which, validating critiques.

Revolts in Iraq Deepen Crisis In Occupation
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karl Vick
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, April 18, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A20690-2004Apr17?language=printer

Some excerpts.

BAGHDAD, April 17 -- In the space of two weeks, a fierce insurgency in Iraq has isolated the U.S.-appointed civilian government and stopped the American-financed reconstruction effort, as contractors hunker down against waves of ambushes and kidnappings, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials.

No, no everything is fine. Absolutely fine. Really. Turning the corner, a sign of success, reason why the "dead enders are lashing out.

Isn't that the story line. I hate to hear reality.

...

Now here is the important part:
U.S. officials said they are reconsidering initial assessments that the uprisings might be contained as essentially military confrontations in Fallujah, where Marines continue their siege of a chronically volatile city, and Najaf, where the militant Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr has taken refuge in the shadow of a shrine.

"The Fallujah problem and the Sadr problem are having a wider impact than we expected," a senior U.S. official involved in Iraq policy said. In Baghdad and Washington, officials had initially concluded that addressing those problems would not engender much anger among ordinary Iraqis. "Sadr's people and the people of Fallujah were seen as isolated and lacking broad support among Iraqis," the official added.
Emphasis added.

The saddest part here is how the fuck they "concluded" such a thing. It strikes me they could only have concluded that a large military action against Fallujah and Sadr would not draw Iraqi sympathy if (a) they have no clue as to Iraqi nationalism, (b) have no decent intelligence, (c) do not understand the dynamics around them. In short, one could only conclude this if one really does not understand, at all, the environment.

This, this is what is causing Iraq to fail.

And it is failing.

Instead, the official said, "The effect has been profound."

Gee, you don't say.

What a motherfucking surprise.

The violence has brought the U.S.-funded reconstruction of Iraq to a near-halt, according to U.S. officials and private contractors.

Thousands of workers for private contractors have been confined to their quarters in the highly fortified Green Zone in Baghdad that also houses the headquarters of the U.S. occupation authority. Routine trips outside the compound to repair power plants, water-treatment facilities and other parts of Iraq's crumbling infrastructure have been deemed too dangerous, even with armed escorts.

Compounding the problem is a growing fear that insurgents will seek retribution against Iraqis working for private contractors and the occupation authority. Scores of Iraqis have stopped showing up for their jobs as translators, support staff and maintenance personnel in the Green Zone, even though there is a lack of lucrative employment elsewhere.

Pay attention to the last part. Let's call is a market signal of the reality of American positioning.

The security situation "has dramatically affected reconstruction," said another U.S. official in Baghdad. "How can you rebuild the country when you're confined to quarters, when only small portions of your Iraqi staff are showing up for work on any given day?"

Well, I guess that chances of me getting data are fucking low now. Idiots. Fucked Iraq and fucking my fucking project.

Among the firms that have restricted the movements of their employees are the two of the largest private contractors in Iraq: Bechtel Corp. and Kellogg Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton Co. The Research Triangle Institute, a North Carolina-based firm that has been helping set up city councils across Iraq, has sent 80 staffers -- about 40 percent of its non-Iraqi workforce -- to Kuwait as a precautionary measure.

Security concerns also have hindered the implementation of a &dol;6 billion, U.S.-funded wave of construction projects intended to help improve security by putting legions of unemployed young men to work.

"We want to offer people opportunities that compete with the financial incentives they get" from insurgent leaders, an American official said. "But it's a Catch-22. We can't start the work that's supposed to help improve security until security improves."

Everything is fine. Just keep saying that.

The insurgency also appears to be generating new alliances -- and tensions -- among the major sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq.

The most visible leader of the resistance is Sadr, a firebrand whose appeal long appeared to be limited to the young, unemployed Shiites who made up his militia, the Mahdi Army. However, in a surprising development, his poster began appearing this month at Sunni mosques that previously showed little interest in his activities.

Such displays of unity have dampened fears of a clash between the Sunni minority and Shiite majority communities. But worries about a different kind of civil war have been generated by reports that Iraq's ethnic Kurds are fighting alongside U.S. Marines and against the insurgency.

Guerrillas coming out of Fallujah have complained bitterly that Kurdish militiamen known as pesh merga are deployed against them. The Kurds are members of the 36th Battalion of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, built from several exile-based militias that supported the U.S.-led campaign against Saddam Hussein. Commanders of another, overwhelmingly Arab Iraqi army battalion refused to fight alongside the Marines.

"Worse than pigs, thieves and tramps," read lines in a poem circulating on fliers in Kirkuk, a city in northern Iraq where Kurds are accused of pushing Arab families off land claimed by both groups. The fliers condemned the leaders of Iraq's two Kurdish parties. It is not known who produced the fliers, which were also seen in Baghdad.

The Kurdish leaders were condemned in chanting that followed Friday prayers at a major Sunni mosque in Baghdad.

Let me make a prediction. In the long run, the Kurds are going to deeply regret that George Bush toppled Sadaam. Very deeply.
..

The American confrontations with Sadr and in Fallujah also have roiled the political landscape by further isolating members of Iraq's U.S.-appointed Governing Council from the Iraqi population.

In the first few days after Sadr's militiamen clashed with U.S. forces and the Marines surrounded Fallujah, council members -- usually a publicity-hungry lot -- had little to say in public. Although most of them regard the insurgents and militiamen as just as much of a threat as U.S. officials do, few wanted to risk the fallout from condemning a cleric or advocating tough counterinsurgency measures.

But on Baghdad's streets, many Iraqis said they equated the silence with tacit agreement with U.S. policies. In their sermons, clerics lambasted council members, many of whom the Bush administration had hoped would emerge as Iraq's new leaders. At one mosque in Baghdad's Sadr City slum, where streets run with wet garbage, council member Mowaffak Rubaie, a Shiite physician who was recently named national security adviser, was derided as a traitor and "the minister of sewers."

The crises have helped boost the standing of more radical Shiite and Sunni political leaders. Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, a Shiite tribal chief who led guerrilla attacks on Hussein's army in the 1980s and '90s in the southern marshes, gained stature in many Shiite neighborhoods after he suspended his membership in the council because of a disagreement with U.S. policy. Although U.S. officials selected Muhammadawi to sit on the council last summer, they have soured on him in recent months because of his support for an armed militia in southeastern Iraq.

Mohsen Abdul Hamid, the leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, has emerged as the council's most influential Sunni member because of his attempts to broker a peace deal in Fallujah. But Abdul Hamid had also been written off months ago by U.S. officials -- for alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist Sunni movement that is banned in several Arab nations.

"The politicians the Americans wanted to become popular have lost out to the guys the Americans didn't want to become popular," said an Iraqi adviser to the occupation authority. "It was exactly the outcome they did not want."

Emphasis added.

Is this a surprise? It should not be but rather it seems that effective Iraq policies are something too much to aspire to.

The fighting has clearly widened the chasm between the government appointed by the U.S. administration and Iraqi society. In Baghdad, ambulances and hospitals that report to the Ministry of Health took in the wounded from Fallujah but then spirited them to smaller, private hospitals and homes amid rumors that U.S. soldiers were sweeping through major medical centers arresting the injured.

"We must protect them -- we must," said Riad Mohammed Saleh, a receptionist at a public hospital in the capital's Yarmouk district. "We figure they are regular citizens."

The extent of popular support for the resistance is unclear. But in nationwide surveys taken before the sieges of Fallujah and Najaf, a growing percentage of Iraqis said they saw the U.S. forces as occupiers, not liberators. The standing of the Americans was particularly low in the restive towns of Fallujah and Ramadi.

"Whenever the Americans increase their attacks on these areas, the people there become stronger and more willing to fight," said Sadoun Dulame, director of the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies, an independent Iraqi research center. "I think if the Americans break into Najaf there will be a real problem, because they will be affected by the people of Fallujah."
.....

Finally

No less sobering, commanders said, were new reports of children playing roles in guerrilla attacks. In Baghdad Tuesday, a girl about 6 or 7 years old dropped an explosive from a highway overpass onto a convoy. A commander was killed in a similar incident outside Fallujah, when a convoy was ambushed after slowing for a girl leading cattle across a highway.

Great.

Just great.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 17, 2004

Final thought: Gambling on CPA

Have to make another call, likely fruitless, to try to get the promised steel information out of the CPA fuckers, tomorrow.

Now you would think these incompetent [I thought of several obscenities then decided here I should just say CPAers] would be ready to bend over and grease themselves for the opportunity for actual real live serious investment to come in. However, they do not seem to want to do anything to actually enable actual investment. Good fucking lord, they are stupid. I mean, I am now led to understand we will not be able to get any shipping north of the port of Basra because private carriers just consider the routes too dangerous. That is to say, a good 50 percent of the habitable areas of Iraq are now utterly no go for any sane commercial venture. Given that the CPA is always rambling on about "turning corners" and the opposition is emerging because they're doing so well (a truly surreal claim that if they believe it, and I am afraid it may be the idiots who say these things actually do), one should think that these developments are... good news. Up is down. That sort of thing. You know, always been at war with East Asia...

Oh yeah, I have been led to understand by well-placed sources that "for around US $5 thousand [paid to] an Iraqi bureacrat working for CPA you can get yourself spec'ed into just about anything." This is getting real tempting - if not for that fucking corrupt practices act and my own odd obsession with doing things right even at the cost of double the effort and irritation - because clearly the honest request for basic information (that only they fucking hold) is not working.

In any case, anyone wanna lay bets that tomorrow's call is utterly useless?

No, that's not fair odds.

Rather, let's take suggestions on what kind of lame ass excuses or justifications I get, along with empty political blather.

Open to you, the reader.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:17 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Chris Dickey's note on Iraq

Chris Dickey (sr. Middle East editor for newsweek and author) has an interesting note on Iraq:
Indecent Interval
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4733368/

I like Chris, he's got a good sense of the place, although no real Arabic, knows enough people to balance, knows enough to listen as well. Interesting commentary. I have a disturbing sense he's right.

By the way, the head shot is in Amman, taken at a mutual friend's apartment last year as I recall. Could be wrong on the timing though.

[edited to adjust to local (GMT) time, posts have been two hours off for some odd reason.)

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 16, 2004

Bush and Sharon: the "Plan"

I have been reading further analysis of this and have to admit I was wrong. This is a really awful and problematic development. I have said time and time again that the one key condition for Palestinians really making peace with Israel is they have to get 1967 West Bank. Anything less and you have a nasty Versailles peace situ that will never, ever gain real legitimacy.

This is bad for Israel, bad for Palestinians, bad for Arabs, and bad for everyone.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

On the road but a bit of access: thoughts on the dangers of the 'Neo-Cons' or the"Right Bolsheviks"

Thanks to my Ipaq I've done some writing on my thoughts on the dangers of the Neo-Cons or as I will call them from now on, "The Right Bolsheviks."

After reading that note from The Telegraph I've entirely gone over to the view that the Neo-Cons are a serious problem, these "Right Bolsheviks."

However, not done yet and trying to get meetings before Casablanca. Pain in the ass.

I should say, I may add, that I really love BA and I have when I have to fly other carriers.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 15, 2004

Telegraph: a highly revealing and indeed very important insight into CPA political policy

A quick note before I piss off to the airport (presuming the driver gets here on time... why I would presume that, I have no idea, but perhaps from the sheerest optimism.)

Britain and US 'divided on Iraq policy'
By Alec Russell in Washington
(Filed: 14/04/2004)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/04/14/wirq14.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/04/14/ixnewstop.html

Some amusing and not so amusing excerpts.

British officials in Iraq have all but ignored President George W Bush's plan to foster a new democracy in the country in favour of their own agenda, according to an American former official in Baghdad's interim government.

Well, what can we say. A unique spin, if nothing else. Of course the characterization of American policy as a plan in the proper sense of the word verges on delusional.

...

[notes first slip in public unity] They also highlight the difficulties facing Tony Blair at his meeting with Mr Bush on Friday when the two leaders will try to plot the transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, which is due in 11 weeks.

Michael Rubin, who resigned from the Pentagon 10 days ago after returning from the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, gave a stark account of fundamental divisions between British and American officials over how to run Iraq.

He suggested that British officials clearly had little interest in pursuing the White House vision of a democratic Iraq, a keystone of its foreign policy, and were too "soft" in confronting dissent.

Soft.

Demoracy.

Dissent.

Confronting.

Almost a poem of some kind.

Never mind I would call it, that is the British approach, realistic. And I should bloody well hope they have little interest in "pursuing" Bush's "vision" - never mind the odd confusion of ally with the phrase "servile yes man."

He also said that many American officials had been startled at British attempts to capitalise on their presence in southern Iraq for a "freelance" fostering of ties with Iran, one of Washington's most implacable enemies.

Freelance, eh?

"That is a major policy decision for the White House," he said. "It should not be made in Basra [the centre of the British zone of influence].

"We got a sense that Britons were using the CPA as an outreach to Iran, which was not the Americans' intention."

Well, I guess we can thank him for giving us such a clear view of the US DoD of what "ally" and "diplomacy" are.

Tensions between British and American officials have long been hinted at, not least between Paul Bremer, America's proconsul, and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's former envoy to Baghdad who left - apparently in some frustration - last month.

One CPA insider said: "There was an understanding in the CPA that Bremer and Greenstock didn't like each other. It personified the differences between the two views.

"Greenstock thought Bremer was naive; Bremer thought Greenstock was pursuing the wrong policies."

Well, I understand Greenstock's odd pronouncement at a conference I attended some months back regarding his position re CPA. I can't recall the exact formulation (no doubt I have notes somewhere) but it was a stilted pronouncement of unity of views. Wierdly out of place.

Of course, given their respective records, and now the clear contrast between the Shiite areas under British and American administration, I should think Mr. Rubin might have cause for a modicum of reflection, if only for the sheer novelty of it.

British officials play down disagreements as inevitable. But privately, sources close to the CPA suggest that British officials in Iraq see Mr Bremer as too ideological. In particular his decision to disband the Iraqi army and the freezing out of Ba'athists are seen as misjudgments.

Mr Rubin did not comment directly on relations between the two men. "Bremer is following the president's agenda," he said. "And, in general, most British diplomats still don't agree with the president's agenda."

He says, as if the passage of time was encouraging agreement with Bush's... ahem ... "agenda?" How about fanciful wishful thinking trying to pass as something approaching a childish approximation of foreign policy?

Mr Rubin was an adviser on the governance group of the CPA until March. He is now an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank and arguably the ideological engine room of Mr Bush's administration.

Ahhhhh, the specialists in, how would one best characterise is, retardation in analytical thinking. Utter contempt for actually learning from one's mistakes? Reveling in one's own sheer stupidity?

He said he and other American officials had been deeply concerned by the softly softly approach of the British to former Ba'athists, whom Washington felt should be excluded from positions of authority, and also to Iranian groups.

That's right. One should make, gratitiously just to make some obscure theological point, as many enemies at once.

To prove the point, after all.

Purity in purpose before actual achievement, after all.

"When I travelled down to the British zone in southern Iraq I was amazed at what the British were not reporting with regard to what the Iranians were up to," he said.

"With regard to the Iranian presence in Iraq, the Britons were inclined to see the glass half full and the Americans as half empty. Reconciliation with Iran has little to do with Iraqi democracy but it appeared the FO had another agenda.

That's right. A modus vivendi with an important neighbor while one is trying to stabilise a country has nothing at all to do with achieving the long term aim of something approaching, however vaguely, democracy in Iraq.

Well, readers, I believe we have a winner for ... I don't know how to put this? Sheer idiocy in analysis?

"When I came in to Iraq back in July [last year] my question to British colleagues was, 'What is our end goal?' They didn't want to talk about the end goal of democracy.

"It was clear that the US was serious about democracy, the Brits less so. The US and Britain were working at cross purposes basically because of disputes over how realistic was the pursuit of democracy."

Oh right. Realistic, eh?

No doubt this is one of the people my Agency boy was ranting about, one of the CPA people who masturbated over the fine constitution and investment laws they were designing as a shining beacon of free enterprise and blah blah, even as the actual situation around them slowly slid into shit.

This is a form of fantasy world thinking that is more worthy of Marxists than ... well I suppose Republicans, presuming he votes that way. It is really extraordinary. It appears he is blissfully unaware that his ideological purity is producing failure, while the British pragmatism is at least staving it off.

Mr Rubin stressed that on some levels co-operation was very good. He said Britain had proved better at public relations than the Americans.

But he also hinted that some British officials had deliberately tried to keep some of their activities from the Americans. "It didn't appear that Brits were always forthright with their agenda."

Well, lord knows that if they were dealing with him, they were well served in doing so.

Mr Rubin's account was broadly backed up by a non-Pentagon American source close to the CPA who suggested that British and American officials had been divided by their different traditions of government service.

"Many of the people from Washington were political appointees and real true believers," said the source. "But the British tended to be career people."

Emphasis added.

May we be preserved from the true believers.

Career people, meaning professionals focused on actually getting things done and working pragmatically with the actual facts on the ground, rather than some strange quasi-bizaro world inverted Marxist fantasy world?

At the heart of the dispute appears to have been the personalities of the key players: Sir Jeremy, an old-school, highly experienced diplomat, and Mr Bremer, who is, in the eyes of his critics, a brash and very ambitious appointee.

Our Man in Basra also knew the region prior and had some level of Arabic, I was led to understand.

One American source said that when Sir Jeremy arrived last year after his stint as Britain's ambassador to the United Nations, British officials in Baghdad hoped that such a high profile and authoritative figure would be able to steer the CPA in a "moderate" direction.

But he is thought to have become increasingly frustrated at the way Mr Bremer was running the CPA. Another American source suggested that Mr Bremer felt overshadowed by his more experienced British colleague. Sir Jeremy was succeeded by David Richmond, a career diplomat.

Mr Rubin concluded that the two countries' very different histories and experience of colonialism were a major factor. "The British feel they have more experience [in nation building] and that the US is new to this game.

"The Americans see the British as making the mistakes of the 1920s [when Shias rose against British rule]. They think the British don't realise that the situation has changed."

The situation has changed.

It is hard to put a finger on the precise nature of the stupidity here, but ... well, must pack up the lapy toppy shortly.

(ps in re an inquiry re Steel, email is bouncing, I replied. present situ unclear and am awaiting response from principals as we have a critical issue)

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:41 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 14, 2004

West Bank Plan

Rumour has it that Bush is going to approve Sharon's Bantustans. That is going to be a seriously bad thing. Lots of people are talking about it here as "the final proof" in regards to the real intentions of US policy.

I certainly hope it will not happen.

As for status, I was at a US financed business development office today, couldn't find it at first. Why? They can no longer have a sign out front or even internally in the office building, the security concerns are so high.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:34 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 13, 2004

Cohen: "Blind in Iraq"

Cohen is a close second, in my opinion, on getting things right in commenting on Iraq.

Some comments here on his article/op ed:

Blind in Baghdad
By Richard Cohen
Tuesday, April 13, 2004; Page A19
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6750-2004Apr12.html

First, the opening is just right in terms of analysis:
Here are the reasons Iraq is not Vietnam: It is a desert, not a jungle. The enemy is not protected and supplied by major powers such as the Soviet Union or China, not to mention a formidable front-line state such as North Vietnam. The Iraqis are not, like the Vietnamese, a single culture fighting a long-term war of liberation from colonial masters. They are fragmented by religion and language, and they have been independent ever since the British left lo these many years ago. In almost every way but one, Iraq is not Vietnam. Here's the one: We don't know what the hell we're doing.

Of course it is perhaps our Lebanon. Perhaps all the more problematic for that. Now the underlined part is the key, it is very clear US policy really does not engage the actual reality on the ground in any way that engages the Iraqis. Not in any way. One can kill half the population on the route the US is currently on, and it does not achieve the political goals. There is a kind of victory the "wipe them out" crowd needs to learn about, it starts with a P.

But abstracting away from that, he goes on to say:
This is the most important finding you can take from the debacle of the past two weeks. The sudden uprising of the Shiite militia loyal to Moqtada Sadr took U.S. forces by surprise. For now, it does not matter that this uprising is containable or that Sadr may well be little more than a thug. What matters is that he was able to organize an insurrection right under our noses and put up a more than credible fight. Calling him a thug, as we are wont to do, does not change matters.

I recall a commentator here, I think Truth Seeker, noted the bolded part is the most serious item to take away from this insurrection, which was clearly almost general (and may yet be), and was clearly well-prepared and executed, even if it was the US the chose the timing.

And indeed, the American propensity to engage in silly name calling (thug, etc) rather than clear analysis is not helpful.

This remarkable fact, to use the current argot, is sooooooo Vietnam. Once again, we are feeling our way in the dark. We have 130,000 troops in Iraq. We have 77,000 Iraqi police officers on our side, supposedly with their ears to the ground. We have the supposed loyalty of all those Iraqis who tell pollsters that they are grateful for what Americans have done for their country and how much they want the United States to stay. Still, somehow, not a one of them blew the whistle when Sadr was issuing orders and patting his fighters on the back as they were heading out the door.

Bingo.

Paul Bremer, the American proconsul in Iraq, is by all accounts an admirable and incredibly industrious man, "tasked," in Condi-speak, to do the impossible. But on the Sunday talk shows, he seemed right out of central casting, some actor playing the clueless American, down to his striped tie and button-down shirt. When asked who he was going to turn power over to on June 30, he replied, "That's a good question," but supplied no answer. He simply does not know. He does know, though, that the "majority view" among Iraqis is hardly anti-American. The polls tell him so. This is Vietnam all over again.

Another brilliant analysis actually - of course for all that I remian sceptical of polling in the Iraqi context and given what I know about Arab societies (and the strong tendancy to repond as the questioner thinks you desire) so positive or negative, take polls with a grain of salt.

In the first place, minorities make revolutions, not majorities. Most people simply do as they are told. Second, polls -- even in Iowa, for crying out loud -- are notoriously unreliable. Last, Bremer and the rest of us are simply going to have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that we will never know what is happening in Iraq. It's a different culture.

Well, leaving aside his over-generalisation regarding polls - certainly polls in Iowa are far more accurate, but in a culture emerging from the dark night of a police state, and one in which face saving is important, one has to understand polls are highly problematic.

And of course, as the underlined notes, minorities make revolutions. It is very clear that "support" for America is wafer thin and not enthusiastic. On the other hand, opposition down to hatred runs deep, and wide. That means our "supporters" are not terribly motivated to take risks for the Americans and they are not as motivated as those who want to overthrow the American rule (for many, many reasons).

That is not a positive dynamic, and unless one gives a reason besides fear (for in this context, one must recall Machiavelli's warning not to be hated) to not oppose, that is positive Iraqi reasons, one loses. Pure and simple. One loses. It is how the French lost Algeria, never giving the Algerians a solution as part of France that appealed to Algerians, in gross.

These were the hard truths of Vietnam. This is how the base barber, the smiling guy who kidded with GIs as he cut their hair, could be Viet Cong. This is how the trusted legman for some American news outlet could be an enemy intelligence officer, now available for interviews in Ho Chi Minh City cafes. This inability to read the culture, to discern friend from foe, is what produced such frustration and the occasional war atrocity. Even with our eyes open, we were blind as a bat.

Bingo.

It is the same in Iraq. We went to war for the wrong reasons, and with too few troops and too few allies. Just about every expectation turned out to be misplaced. The occupation has not been financed by oil revenue, as we were assured. The Iraqi army and police are not, as promised, up to the task of maintaining order. Americans were often greeted as liberators, but also as conquerors. The United States did not commit enough troops to intimidate looters and the civilian leaders we backed turned out to have larger followings in Georgetown than in Baghdad. Victory remains possible, but first we'll have to figure out what victory is.

Bingo.

The list of mistakes, many of them the consequences of titanic cockiness and utter contempt for dissenters (remember how fast Gen. Eric Shinseki was shunned after he said the occupation would require several hundred thousand troops?), is long and painful. They range from the consequential to what seemed almost trivial (shutting down Sadr's newspaper) and responding to both Shiite and Sunni provocations at the same time. We could have made better decisions, but believe me, even those might not necessarily have made a difference.

Bingo.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:55 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

An excellent editorial by Ignatius

Let me say that over the past several months, the key, best editorial writer in the United States regarding the Middle East has been Ignatius of The Washington Post

Back To the Basics
By David Ignatius
Tuesday, April 13, 2004; Page A19
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6752-2004Apr12.html
Some excerpts - I suppose it is not bad his suggestions resemble my own.

... The Bush administration must recognize that Iraq is now a three-alarm fire. American policy there is stumbling, and the causes need to be addressed urgently. The basic problem continues to be security, but it doesn't have a purely military solution: We can't fix this one simply by sending in more troops, occupying more cities or patrolling more Shiite neighborhoods. That way leads to a brutal quagmire.

Indeed. Indeed. Indeed.

What the "crush them" crowd forgets is that the "rally round the flag" effect is not simply a domestic phenom that applies to them, it happens elsewhere, and in Iraq in its tribal society, the motors are particularly hostile to foreigners/outsiders.

Program:
What's needed is a "New Deal" for Iraq -- a post-June 30 plan that evokes the crash efforts of Franklin D. Roosevelt to turn the momentum of the Great Depression. No more administration pieties about democracy and terrorism, please. In the nine months before Iraq is to hold elections, the United States must focus on the basics: Put people to work, make them feel that the United States and its allies are bringing a better life. Some specifics suggested to me by Iraqi friends:

• Provide electricity everywhere, 24 hours a day, by the scheduled handover of sovereignty. If it takes an airlift of C-17s carrying generators, do it; if it means expensive temporary fixes, do it. The lack of electric power has been a symbol of U.S. failure in Iraq; make reliable electricity a symbol of success.

• Speed up the $18 billion in reconstruction spending the United States promised in January. That effort was supposed to deliver 50,000 new jobs by June 30. Iraqis need to see action, now.

• Put more money on the streets quickly, through crash public works projects. The coalition cleaned up Baghdad last summer by paying thousands of kids a few dollars a day to sweep streets. Do it again. Put more money into the hands of local political, tribal and religious leaders. Some of it will be wasted, but in a good cause.

Good so far.

The politics:
A New Deal for Iraq means correcting some of the political errors that led to the current mess. The Pentagon (which failed badly at nation-building in Iraq) must give way to the State Department. Occupation czar L. Paul Bremer (a brave man who deserved better support from Pentagon civilians) will be replaced June 30 by a new U.S. ambassador. Because so much of the job will involve liaison with the United Nations, a good choice would be the current U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte. And surely it's time to end any remaining Pentagon subsidies to the mercurial Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi and let him fly solo in the new Iraq.

Well, I am not a fan at all of Negroponte, and indeed I think his (required to be sure) public involvement in the run up is a liability. That aside, the underlined notes, I think are important. Certainly I have hammered home the failure of the CPA, and I largely put that in the laps of the DoD civlians. The other item is certainly we should not be subsidizing Chalabi. Period. To continue to do so is to set ourselves up for failure. Even more so than normal.

The Iraqi security situation will remain a nightmare for months and probably years to come, but there are ways to avoid making it worse. Despite last week's spasm of violence, the United States should stick to its earlier plans for pulling troops out of populated areas and moving them to garrisons from which they can deploy rapidly.

Perhaps.

I think rather it would do well to not retreat into fortresses, but rather spend time training with British on how to engage in proper engagement with the Iraqi population, bringing security but without using Helo gunships.

Iraq's own security forces clearly aren't ready to take over yet, so the transition will be ragged. But last week's surprising unity of Sunni and Shiite religious and political figures suggested that perhaps the country's leaders now hate the United States more than they hate each other. Maybe they can find unity in their Iraq-ness. And to gain Iranian help in stabilizing the budding Shiite insurrection, Britain is said to be holding secret talks with Tehran. ....

I am not sure unity around hatred of the US is positive, but... well throw me a bone as they say.

And I agree, engage Tehren and Damascus. It is their neighborhood, they will be around longer than us, and the capacity of actors, official or even worse, free agents, to blow things up from their side is far larger than US ability to punish. Better to engage them in not being spoilers than this idiotic blustering.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Cole II: an important comment

Now, despite my issues with Cole getting overtaken in his analyses and rhetoric by anti-Americanism, he continues to provide valuable analysis, of which the following is most important:
The problem with this approach is that the Sadrists are a widespread social movement whose history goes back over a decade, and killing Muqtada will not end the movement. There are lots of potential successors to Muqtada. The chief characteristic of the Sadrists is their cheekiness. They were cheeky to Saddam, and they will be cheeky to Gen. Abizaid. They are desperately poor ghetto dwellers, they don't like The Man, and they think they have nothing to lose in taking Him on. If the US military thinks this is a military problem with a military solution, they are just clueless. Someone on a discussion list said that Iraq is not Vietnam because this time the generals are in charge, and they know what they are doing. The US officers in Iraq are bright, dedicated persons, but they don't know squat about Iraq (even Abizaid, a Lebanese Christian, is hardly an Iraq expert), and it also isn't at all clear that they are setting the agenda. Going after Muqtada, for instance, almost certainly was the idea of the civilian politicians in the CPA and the Department of Defense. Once the mission was defined, the military wants to carry it out militarily. If they go into Najaf, there will be hell to pay (see below). Emphasis added.
http://www.juancole.com/2004_04_01_juancole_archive.html#108183514550199863

Now, to be fair, Cole is identifying, even in his more intemprate comments, some of the same issues I have seen - that is the definition of the policy problems and who is doing it, and their ignorance.

The issue, I think, at the core of this, is that the military solution is a non-solution, as in Algeria, etc. Certainly security has to obtain and certainly that will require the US military to kill people - bad or otherwise. However, the core question is the following: are the deaths, are the operations actually leading to a sustainable political route? If they are not - and when I say sustainable political route, I do not mean the transformative fantasies of the NeoCons, Islamophobes and the like, I mean something that will get Iraqis on board - then the violence is not only self-defeating, it is generating more of a problem day by day.

One of the worst issues here is that Americans do not seem to understand that by and large, their self-image is not shared by the Iraqis. One of the commentators in a prior post drew a comparision to the American Revolutionary War - I should quote it, actually. From pantom:
These hardy men of the Blue Ridge and Alleghenies, of deep religious convictions, were accustomed to the hardships and independence of a pioneer life, and in their mountain homes in the highlands and the backwaters they but seldom were concerned with affairs beyond their borders or interfered with by Crown or colony. When Ferguson approached their kingdom and threatened to invade their lands and lay waste their country with "fire and sword," and to "hang their leaders," he aroused their indignation and anger to such a degree that they determined to rid the country forever of this enemy, who menaced their independence and the safety of their homes and families. Had Cornwallis and his leaders known more about these mountain and backwater men, they would have carefully avoided all military and punitive measures which might tend to draw them from their mountain fastnesses to enroll amongst the enemies of the King.
The causes of the Revolution were but little known to many of these pioneers beyond the Blue Ridge. They were concerned in the establishment of their homes, breaking the soil of their new settlements, and wringing a livelihood from it; and with their rifles securing much of their sustenance. They sought the seclusion of the western waters; and in the valleys of the Holston, the Watauga, and the Nolichucky, found freedom in the exercise of their religion. Had the western covering force of Cornwallis's army, as it advanced into the Province of North Carolina, confined its activities, to the plains and lowlands east of the Blue Ridge, and had not Ferguson from Gilbert Town uttered his threat of fire and sword and the hangman's noose, these mountain men would probably have remained in their homes, and but few of them would have joined with those who were in rebellion against the King.

from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/RevWar/KM-Cpns/AWC-KM1.htm

It is evocative, and again the "crush them" crowd presumes certian conditions obtain - that they are in the right, that they are perceived by the population to be in the right, and that one can "crush" the insurgency. Certainly one can at one level, but as recent reporting in The New York Times has noted, specialists do not think that this is anything more than a temporary thing - the insurgency will regenerate unless a legitmate (in Iraqi eyes) political and economic order responding to their desires is in place.

Of course, this presents some non-trivial difficulties given many desires are self-contradictory.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:21 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Cole, valuable reporting in re Iraqi views, but also unnecessary nastiness

first, I highly advise reading Cole's recent analyses of the political interplay on the Iraqi side and the meanings. While I would note that I think he overplays the pessimism to an extent, I also would call his evaluation more grounded than the blather one gets from the Bush Administration and its echo chambers.

However on this:
Virulent Racism, Disregard for Civilian Life Mar US Military Approach: British Commander
http://www.juancole.com/2004_04_01_juancole_archive.html#108170945766449202
is why I am growing rather displeased with his commentary despite its value. Virulent racism? Certainly prejudice, but virulent racism is hardly a fair read I think of the British comments (which I myself commented on).

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Dumb Western bitches

My apologies for the title.

This evening, I am afraid I rather alienated some stupid a German bitch. “Development workers”

I am afraid that I have little patience in general, although I suppose that my online perso is more impatience than off-line, but nevertheless it is a matter of degree.

This evening speaking with some people I had the misfortune to speak to a bit too special, hyper blond German … woman who wanted to convince me that as a Western woman she was oppressed and whatever here in the Arab world. For all her privs.

Let me say, as I said in our rather heated convo, that I fully recognize the disadvantages of being a woman in the Arab world (for all that one can frequently exaggerate them), but I argued as Westerners we, ipso facto, had advantages and privs. No, she argued, no she was oppressed. Never mind her experience in the Arab world has been (a) a cushy German internship with the Dubai government (she was oppressed because no one listened to her… that is probably true, but I would suspect in addition to being female the fact she’s (i) a kid (ii) a bit too special (iii) dresses unprofessionally (iv) it is the Gulf were major inputs into this. Now, in the Sham she feel oppressed because she gets “looks” (well dress like a cheap Lebanese whore and you get looks of course) and people do not respect her (while gender no doubt is important, the fact you’re a fucking moron, and a self centered one at that likely plays a role).

Fucking hell, there are real problems here, but cunts like this in their bloody self-absorbed whiney bitch manners do nothing to help. Fucking idiots.

I am afraid I alienated the entire clique, but insofar as (a) they’re not my social circle, (b) I am fucking off, it was fun to go to town explaining why she is an over priviledged bitch.

Pity, there are vast grounds for legit gender complaints by non-botoxing bitches.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:57 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

April 12, 2004

Confirm on convoys

Iraq Gunmen Batter American Supply Lines
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: April 12, 2004
Filed at 11:21 a.m. ET
http://nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Iraq.html

On Monday, a convoy of flatbed trucks carrying M113 armored personnel carriers was attacked and burned on a road in Latifiya, 20 miles south of Baghdad. Witnesses said three people were killed.

A supply truck was also ambushed and set ablaze Monday on the road from Baghdad's airport. Looters moved in to carry away goods from the truck as Iraqi police looked on without intervening.

Emphasis added.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:16 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Current Iraq reporting, some notes

I wanted to draw attention to the following extracts.

Fallujah Mostly Quiet on Second Day of Truce
About 70 Troops, Several Hundred Iraqis Killed in Recent Fighting
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A4788-2004Apr12?language=printer
Compiled From Wire Reports
Monday, April 12, 2004; 9:50 AM

U.S. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt released the first full casualty statistics since widespread fighting erupted on April 4.

"The coalition casualties since April 1 run about 70 personnel. ... The casualty figures we have received from the enemy are somewhere about 10 times that amount, what we've inflicted on the enemy," Kimmitt told a Baghdad press conference.

Numbers. numbers. numbers.

What do they really mean? Are we returning to the silliness of the empty quantification of the Vietnam era?

The real issue is winning the population, for if only a third of the population supports in a real manner an insurgency, that is already a few million to sustain a guerrila. At that is a losing game to play, even if you are killing ten times your losses (not surprising since they have no armor).
About 600 Iraqi dead were recorded by the main hospital and four clinics in Fallujah, hospital director Rafie al-Issawi told The Associated Press.

In all, about 880 Iraqis have been killed, according to an AP count, based on statements by Iraqi hospital officials, U.S. military statements and Iraqi police.

And therein is the problem. the ratio of dead. And the ratio of civilians. Not because the US is monstrous, but because it is a losing PR game.

The top U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, acknowledged that a battalion of the Iraqi army refused to fight in Fallujah -- a sign of Iraqi discontent with the siege.

Well, what can we say?

Byrne said U.S. Marines would not withdraw from their positions in Fallujah. "Diplomacy is just talk unless you have a credible force to back it up," he said. "People will bend to our will if they are afraid of us."

I note, however, Machievelli, had it right, if they fear you and hate you more than that, that is another game.

Byrne cast doubt on the numbers and said he was confident troops in his 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment had not killed any civilians.

"Just because (the Iraqis) say it's so, doesn't meant it's so," he said.

Well, as accurate as the comment may be, it has played poorly. And is bloody tone deaf.

Of course, it's idiotic to assert that when you are using air strikes in an urban area that you have not killed civilians.

I note al-Arabiyah is showing several US convoys in Baghdad and Mosul areas that seem to have been ambushed. Unclear if they were recent, but were still smoking.

al-Arabiyah also notes an explosion hit an American convoy in Baqoubah.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:08 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Aged comment response

What did you think of today's news,
Algerian President Overwhelmingly Wins Re-election?

Nearly 60 percent of Algeria's eligible voters cast ballots in the first multiparty elections since a military coup 12 years ago interrupted parliamentary elections that would have put an Islamist party in power. The coup set in motion a cycle of violence in which more than 100,000 Algerians died and as many as 10,000 disappeared.

Mr. Bouteflika stopped most of the killing four years ago by granting the country's Islamic fighters amnesty in return for their laying down their weapons. Though some armed groups continue to operate, the pace of killing has slowed significantly, and terrorist attacks in the cities are now rare.

"We now have less than 1,000 Islamic fighters in all Algeria, while we were fighting close to 25,000 in 1994 and 1995,"

A drop in terrorist violence is not the only the reason the president has drawn support. Though mismanagement and corruption continue to plague the country, Mr. Bouteflika has presided over an impressive improvement in Algeria's troubled economy.

What do I think of it?

Algeria's war is a war of Army clans as much as Islamist violence. What seems to have happened is that Boutfliqa may have mastered the Army. May have.

If you were granted an audience with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, what advice would you give him?

Well, it's not even within the realm of reasonably khayali to pretend to give advice to Sistani. Regardless, he's playing his hand well as far as I can tell.

What do you make of this, Iraqi Claims U.S. and Falluja Foes Agree to a Deal?
Why does Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Mohri phrase his remarks as follows, "We condemn the acts of sabotage, chaos and takeover of public property by a group that unfortunately is part of one of Iraq's biggest and best-known families?" Is he suggesting Mr. Sadr's militia is not representative of the Shiite perspective but a power play by an extended family?

Well, it seems more to be saying that as-Sadr's behaviour is not ... dignified or appropriate for a man of religion. Which it is not. I would not read this as saying that as-Sadr is representative or not, but rather his behaviour is not appropriate for his background and for the legacy of the as-Sadr.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:42 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

A few quick observations - Iraq

An important article from TheTelegraph

US tactics condemned by British officers
By Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent
(Filed: 11/04/2004)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/04/11/wtact11.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/04/11/ixnewstop.html&secureRefresh=true&_requestid=7631

This deserves a close reading. I note that one has heard this continuously over the past year, from British security specialists, in the Media, etc. The issue is clearly among the more serious ones driving the American failure to date:
Senior British commanders have condemned American military tactics in Iraq as heavy-handed and disproportionate.

One senior Army officer told The Telegraph that America's aggressive methods were causing friction among allied commanders and that there was a growing sense of "unease and frustration" among the British high command.

The officer, who agreed to the interview on the condition of anonymity, said that part of the problem was that American troops viewed Iraqis as untermenschen - the Nazi expression for "sub-humans".

Indeed, I would have to see that however charged the usage is, there is a large component of truth. Of course, the Iraqis themselves have behaved in deplorable ways, and Iraqi public culture after ... well never having a genuine public culture... is ill, distorted and violent.

Speaking from his base in southern Iraq, the officer said: "My view and the view of the British chain of command is that the Americans' use of violence is not proportionate and is over-responsive to the threat they are facing. They don't see the Iraqi people the way we see them. They view them as untermenschen. They are not concerned about the Iraqi loss of life in the way the British are. Their attitude towards the Iraqis is tragic, it's awful.

"The US troops view things in very simplistic terms. It seems hard for them to reconcile subtleties between who supports what and who doesn't in Iraq. It's easier for their soldiers to group all Iraqis as the bad guys. As far as they are concerned Iraq is bandit country and everybody is out to k