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April 25, 2004

"You Travel A Lot in the Middle East, Why?"; New York, Moroccan Bombs; Iraq; Cyprus and EU idjits

Wonderful coming through JFK. I am beginning to hate coming back to the States. The hassle, is well, a real hassle - perhaps I should get that second passport not only for Israel but the United States?

Well, then I might miss the occasion to miss the interaction with the ever surly Customs and Immigration staff, who seem inclined to treat any and all travellers - including someone like myself (expensive suit, anglo name and looks) like bloody criminals. Now, I am not talking about doing their job, which is to say, be aware and ask questions. But demeanor. I hardly expect someone such as myself should be challenged and questioned in a hostile manner, no matter the number of Arab / Middle Eastern stamps in my bloody passport. A bit of training in proper manners would go a long way. Of course, having been in a foul mood, I rather risked a body cavity search and gave as good back, however this can hardly be said to be particularly good manner in which to treat business travellers.

In any event, gave me the occasion to reflect on what a fucking horrible airport JFK is. Really, it is a fucking awful airport and that fucking airtrain is just about the stupidest piece of work I have seen. Bloody awful design, leading to two inconvenient subway stops and confusingly laid out such that they need fucking porters to guide people. The whole fucking airport should be levelled and rebuilt properly. Bloody hell it's New York, one should think New York should have a proper airport (yes, actually it does, Newark, for all that I despise Jersey.)

This aside, the horror that is JFK's completely disorganized madness of a transport infrastructure gabve me the opportunity to share a ride into town with the Provost of Univ. of South Africa. Interesting fellow, nice ride, although we both ended up having to badger the cab into respecting the rate. (As an aside The Economist has a fine article on the idiocy that is the New York medalion auction. Well done, exposé of the idiocy of the medallion system. New York's faux liberalism of corruption.

This aside, I forgot to mention that on Thursday past the Moroccan authorities discovered a bomb making factory outside of Casablanca. Quite accidentally, as reports had it - afraid I do not have online links this was radio - brought in on a domestic dispute next door to the factory - bomb makers panicked. Take this as another sign of the results of the fiasco that is Iraq to date, as well as the sheer idiocy of the Palestinian policy. Not terribly confident I must say in Moroccan security procedures, their airport relies more on hand checks than screenings. The Jordanians are far better at it. Wonder if I might not run a bigger chance of becoming little bits and pieces over the Atlantic there than in Jordan? Ah well,likely to happen one way or the other.

I also note that Sharon's going back on his "pledge" not to harm Arafat provoked no public response of any merit from the Americans. With allies like Sharon, one hardly needs enemies. I am hard pressed to understand what assasinating Arafat gains anyone but some cheap revenge fantasy that Sharon - well make that expensive, the fat corrupt whore doesn't do things cheaply - likes to engage in. The assasinations of the Hamas leadership having produced nothing but a regain in Hamas support (See http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/international/middleeast/25HAMA.html?pagewanted=all&position= ).

Of course short term we seem to have a disruption of Hamas operations, although I note that after the assasination of their bomb maker in 2002 saw a several month pause between the event and the Hamas riposte. It is hard to tell what level of disruption has actually occured. However, the longer term, the secular PA and Arafat's secularists are losing out to the hardline jihadist views of the Hamas people. The Israeli model on this, or rather the Sharonista model for this is based on policies and understandings of Arab societies derived from the 1950s and 1960s, a different era when tribal leaderships and the like had more power and Palestinian society, less modern in terms of fluidity and less stressed.

Unfortunately Sharon and the people who think like him think that if they kill off the radical leadership they will be able to "choose" Palestinian quislings. They may - although Arafat is actually their best chance at that, but it will not hold. Since the 1980s this model, as seen in the Territories and in Lebanon has failed, again and again. However, the rather racist nature of much of Israeli thought on Arabs prevents them from seeing the changes - mind you I add I fully understand the origins and reasons for this thought - it's certainly not hard to become contemptously frustrated with the state of Arab societies at present and indeed it is that same frustration that drives much youth - middle class to impoverished - into the arms of the radicals. Socieity is clearly ill, but the wealthy elite of the "secularists" that the US likes to deal with have no real answers at present - nothingthat would overturn their cushy position.

Now, this aside, I am afraid that after stepping back from the brink, we are about to roll back into Fallujah. The question, and it is not at all clear what good answers are available, is what can one actually do. On one hand, backing down in front the insurgents is a grave error, yet at the same time so is confrontation given the present circumstances. A rather no win situation at present. The problem that obtains is there are not very good options available in Iraq, due to the incompetence of the occupation to date, the progressive alienationn of the Iraqis and the lack of any real substantive progress. Backing down emboldens a set of operators that are indeed "bad guys" in the unfelicitious phrase of President Bush - whose dimwittedness seems unlimited. On the other hand pushing into Fallujah given present circumstances will certainly inflame Iraqis against the occupation once again. The reality is that, well, no one -of any substantial numbers- loves, likes or even particularly respects the Americans at present, and hatred and loathing clearly outweigh fear. The command of Machiavelli, to feared rather loved, but not hated, apparently was lost on the Rumsfeld - Cheney axis.

Now as those of you who waste your precious time reading my funny little notes know that I rather like The Economist's analyses in general. Sadly they have been consistently wrong on Iraq, very wrong. I find this commentary from 7 April 2004 worrying:
Once the Iraqis have elected their own government, the danger of replaying Vietnam in the sands of Iraq should recede. Even if such a government were later to prove deadlocked or unstable, its emergence would permit an honourable enough American exit. That is to say, a President Bush or Kerry could in conscience declare at such a point that America had given Iraq its democratic opportunity and summon the troops back home. So in practical terms, the question of whether the Americans can “succeed” in Iraq boils down to this. Is America willing and able to hold the ring for the year and a half or so until that election takes place?
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2572254
This is abdication. Withdrawing with a faux government that will collapse, with no realistic chance of success is not leaving, i n conscience, it is in fact a longer term disaster. It suggests to me that the editorial writers have looked ahead, and as I noted last week, seen that the Bush Administration has driven off the motherfucking cliff.

I note the 15 April 2004 editorial:

Iraq
Another intifada in the making
Having stepped to the brink, America would be wise to step back

15 Apr 2004
The Economist
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2598976

"The past fortnight has shown that a shocking number of Iraqis are indeed willing to take up the gun, and that most of the Iraqi policemen and soldiers recruited since the fall of Saddam Hussein prefer to lay theirs down than to fire on fellow citizens. This has left the job of pacifying Fallujah and other restive parts of Iraq to an American army that is stretched too thin and shows every sign of having reacted with excessive force. By some estimates the Americans have over the past fortnight killed 500 or so Iraqis in Fallujah. Slaughter on this scale cannot credibly be described as a policing operation designed to rid Fallujah of criminals and terrorists." .... "The best hope in Iraq is that America's tough talk against the rebels of Fallujah and Mr Sadr in Najaf is a bluff designed to incentivise its foes in both places to negotiate their way out of a showdown. Though at midweek Mr Sadr denied talking to the occupiers, mediators seem active behind the scenes. Best of all would be a signal from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Shias' paramount spiritual leader, that the Shia mainstream disapproves of Mr Sadr's antics. But for that the coalition may need to strike some face- (and life-) saving deal with Mr Sadr. As a rule, it is a pity to let armed groups defy authority and get away with it. But Iraq is hardly a normal place right now, and Mr Sadr's is only one of many armed militias. Better, if possible, to co-opt such an enemy than risk a wider conflagration by killing him in a shrine."

I note The Economist's note:
Is there a way out? Optimists argue that the bloodshed must have concentrated minds. It has given America a better idea of which Iraqis wield real influence. Most members of the Governing Council bleated from the sidelines during the fighting, but a few won popular credibility by acting as mediators or organising relief programmes. The groups that showed the most gumption include Mr Jaffari's Dawa party and Mohsen Abdel Hamid's Iraqi Islamic Party, which is backed by some Sunni preachers. The ayatollahs in Najaf, led by Ali Sistani, have sent their sons to soothe Mr Sadr, only to hear Mr Sadr's aides brand them American spies
and hope there may be some grain of truth to the optimistic interpretation that some portion of that gaggle of incompetent self indulgent ideologues in the CPA to actually wake up to reality (rather than engaging in the sort of idiotic, ideological posturing one sees among "conservatives in the United States pissing their pants about "theocrats" and rather unfelicitious and indeed idiotic "islamofascists" (I rather thought that conservatives disliked abusing the phrase "fascist" although I suppose ideologues of all stripes are at heart whinging hypocrites of the worst stripe - and I do note that the new conservative... wing? so hot to trot over Iraq is rather Bolshevik in its mentality, so perhaps it is appropriate they have adopted the language of the Bolsheviks and the twaddlesome left.))

Finally on Iraq, a story in The Independent
Americans believe Saddam terror link
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=514681
drew my attention to this:
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqReport4_22_04.pdf

Fundamentally depressing, the stupidity or laziness of the American public in regards to foreign affaires as illustrated in these the following:
Only around 40 percent of respondants correctly noted Iraq had no connexion with al-Qaeda or had minor intermittan contacts. A staggering 37 percent think Iraq gave substantial support to al-Qaeda, but not involved in 11 September, while a further 20 percent of ill-informed morons think Iraq had connexion with 11 September in addition. I note 45 percent of this subset of ill-informed drooling idiots believe the US has some proof of an al-Qaeda link.

Further, a majority has some belief that Iraq had either substantive NBC weapons (38 percent) or significant (22 percent) programs. It is hard to give credit to actual literacy and holding such beliefs.

I leave you to read the full analysis, depressing as it is.

Finally, on Cyprus, the Greek Cyproites showed once again they are self-indulgent, short sighted fools of the worse kind, as well as having less political maturity than the Turks in fact. How else to explain the significant intervention of that mafia, the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, with interventions saying a vote for the UN plan would damn voters to hell. I note by the way that the Islamophobes out there would have taken a similar intervention by a Muslim Imam as signs of the evilness of the Islamic world, etc. etc.

Returning to Cyprus, well, this really was no surprise if one has ever spent any time in Cyprus - and in some ways it begins to build on my sensation that the EU really is not ready for prime time. I do not say this as someone philosophically or constitutionally opposed to the EU. Indeed, I have long been a fan of the idea, in theory, of the EU as a closer Union. However, the execution of expansion has been, I have to say, a dismal and peurile excerise in a sad combination of wishful thinking and a sort of namby pamby quasi-leftist 'we'll all just get along"ism without a real sense that in fact there are people who will not, in the end, want to get along. (I note I have noted in online fora that this tends to emerge among American and Euro leftists engaging in wishful pandering about the Iraqi resistance)

Anyone who has spent any degree of time in Cyprus should have been able to note the degree to which the Greek Cyproites had not truly grappled in any meaningful manner with their role in the division of the island, nor were they apparently willing to. One could see a clear contrast between the attitude of the average Turk - who rarely fulminates against the Greeks, and seemed in the conversations I had over the years, willing to "throw the Greeks a bone." In contrast, the Greek Cypriotes (a) usually wallowed in a very much misplaced sense of victimhood (yes the Turkish army grabbed a huge share of the Island, but it hardly was without warning, months of warnings, and had the Greeks not tried unification with Greece against Turkish Cypriot wishes the Turkish army would not have had the excuse to intervene.), (b) an unreconstructed sense of a right to dominance - take for example the present change over on the Greek side the change over from the old licence plate plan based on the British system - timed in just for the EU ascension - to a system using Greek rather than Roman characters. A small but subtle sign of the degree of political attention to unification with the Turks - who after all have adopted the roman character system for their langauge, (c) showed little to no sign in my conversations with them of having any sense of recognizing the Turkish point of view or of their legitimate grievances dating from the period when Greek partisans spread terror in the Turkish communities. That is, in the 1960s-1970s, both sides were dirty, both used violence and the main difference was indeed, the Turkish Republic had a kick ass army and the Greek Cypriotes and Greek army did not. I can't say I ever heard on the Greek side any realistic political commentary, but a whole lot of whinging on about how the Brits and the Americans were plotting against them, the Greeks - with little recognition of their role in why their politicla POV was not entirely adopted - given their theocratic politics I suppose this is unsurprising.

The Economist's note:
A chance for peace and unity wasted
25 Apr 2004

"The UN’s plan for ending three decades of conflict and reuniting Cyprus has been rejected by the Mediterranean island’s Greek-Cypriot majority—to the anger of the world powers that backed the plan. The Turkish-Cypriot north of the island will be unable to join the European Union next month even though its people voted in favour"

They should, of course, get the chance now. Why not? Not their fault the Greeks are more immature and backwards politically. Worthy of the Arabs, their political instincts.

"The simultaneous referendums held in both parts of Cyprus on Saturday April 24th could—if all had gone well—have put an end to one of Europe’s most poisonous conflicts. Since the island was divided 30 years ago, when a Greek-Cypriot coup prompted an invasion by Turkish troops, Greece and Turkey have several times come close to war, despite both supposedly being allies in NATO. Since 1974’s bloody events, a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone has divided Cyprus in two—running right through Nicosia, Europe’s last divided capital. Past attempts to resolve the conflict and reunite the island have failed. But in recent months, enormous diplomatic effort has gone into putting together a UN-sponsored peace plan which would see the island reunited as a loose federation. It seemed Cyprus’s best chance yet of ending the conflict. But it has been thrown away.

Turkish-Cypriots voted 65% in favour of the UN plan—even though it meant their having to give up some land and homes to the Greek-Cypriots, and in spite of the call for a “no” vote by their veteran president, Rauf Denktash. But the plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek-Cypriot side, which voted 76% against it. Perversely, the result means that only the rejectionist Greek-Cypriot part of the island will join the European Union (along with nine other countries) on May 1st, while the Turkish-Cypriots will be left out. This is because only Turkey recognises the small, impoverished Turkish-Cypriot republic in the north of the island, while the rest of the world has since 1974 regarded the Greek-Cypriot government as though it represented the whole of the island."

I should hope that the representation issue shall change, and soon.

This section is of particular interest:
"The Greek-Cypriots’ rejection of the plan was met with dismay and anger among the world powers that had pressed both sides to accept it. Günter Verheugen, the EU’s commissioner for enlargement, said the Greek-Cypriots would join the Union under a “shadow”. America’s State Department expressed its disappointment, while praising the Turkish-Cypriots for their courage in voting for peace and reconciliation.

For a short while earlier this year it had begun to look like Cyprus was on an unstoppable course towards unity. In February, leaders of the island’s two communities agreed to start talks under the UN’s auspices. If they could not reach a final agreement by late March, Greece and Turkey would enter the talks. If a deal still could not be struck, the UN would fill in any remaining blanks in the peace agreement and put it to both sides in referendums. Until the past few weeks, it was the Turkish-Cypriot side that had been portrayed as the more stubborn negotiator. But the Turkish-Cypriot government (minus Mr Denktash) accepted the proposal put to both sides by the UN, while the Greek-Cypriots, led by Tassos Papadopoulos, refused to accept it. This infuriated Mr Verheugen, who last week said he felt “cheated” by Mr Papadopoulos."

Well, if the EU had had its fucking eyes open, they should have noted long before the political gamesmanship on the Greek Cypriot side (the Greek mainlanders having played, one should note, a fairly positive and mature role).

Further note the media control - everything I heard from foreign friends their supported the accusation of deliberate intervention.
"Diplomats and “yes” campaigners last week accused Greek-Cypriot broadcasters of focusing on the plan's potential disadvantages, while denying EU and UN officials airtime to put the case for accepting it. Last Wednesday, Britain and other backers of the plan tried to pass a resolution at the UN Security Council, which would encourage a “yes” vote by strengthening the UN peacekeepers’ role in verifying all sides’ compliance with the plan. But Russia (which has longstanding links with the Greeks and shares their Orthodox Christian religion) vetoed the resolution, saying it there had not been adequate debate."


"Mr Papadopoulos had suggested to his people that they could turn down the UN plan with no ill consequences, in the expectation that a better deal will be offered in the near future. There does not seem much chance of this. By rejecting the proposal the Greek-Cypriots will have gained nothing other than the resentment of their fellow EU members; they have lost the moral high ground they enjoyed in the 30 years in which the Turkish-Cypriot side continually resisted a deal. The UN has now said its role in seeking a peace deal is over. Though there might be an effort to get the two sides back to the table for one last try, the chances do not look good. Turkey’s foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, said after the vote that the Greek-Cypriot rejection meant partition was now “permanent”."

I should say that in my opinion they never should have enjoyed the moral high ground, given that the Greek Cypriots never grappled with their own terrorism and terrorists, and have instead done their best to instill anti-Turkish revanchisme in the population.

"The EU and America have made it clear that the 200,000 Turkish-Cypriots—about a quarter of the island’s population—will not lose out from the Greek-Cypriots’ intransigence. The economic and diplomatic sanctions that have crippled the Turkish-Cypriot economy may now be eased. Turkey is likely to press the world powers to grant recognition to the Turkish-Cypriot republic."

I hope there is follow through.

Finally: "The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told a meeting of his ruling party on Saturday that: “This is the most successful event in the last 50 years of Turkish diplomacy.” He might have added that it was also the Greek-Cypriots’ biggest diplomatic disaster in 30 years."

Posted by The Lounsbury at April 25, 2004 06:49 PM
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

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