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June 30, 2004

Further to the disaster, on Media and Incomprehension

A well-done article on the Arabic media on this - I only caught parts on al-Arabiyah that morning but this analysis strikes me as on target:

Nagm is a cautious man, and his "if there is a ceremony" spoke volumes. By Sunday, the escalation of violence and the persistence of rumors that the handover might be moved up had journalists here and in Baghdad ready for fast-breaking news. But the timing of the handover -- which took place Monday, two days ahead of schedule and without warning or advance notice -- not only took al-Arabiya by surprise, it left the network scrambling for "visuals." No one, it seems, had bothered to call the Arabic-language channel that says it has the largest viewership in Iraq. Their cameras were not even in the room when Iraq was reborn as a sovereign nation (or "so-called sovereign" in the local parlance).

"I don't know what they were thinking -- they didn't tell anybody," said Abdul Kader Kharobi, an assignment editor at al-Arabiya, a few hours after the transfer at 10:26 a.m. local time. There was no frustration in his voice, just disgust and a lot of weary irony. The Americans have been all but incompetent in manufacturing images, he said, and yet what does it matter? After Abu Ghraib, and after what he believes was a sham investigation into the March 18 killing of two al-Arabiya journalists in Baghdad by U.S. soldiers, who believes the Americans anyway?

Emphasis added.

Again and again, needless stumbles.

"It doesn't look promising," he said. "Like some people in a bunker doing something illegal."

Later, it was announced that Bremer had left, but it took time to get images of the man (whose "reign" was widely criticized by Arab media as a failure) touching terra firma in Iraq for the last time in his trademark boots and suit. Richard Nixon, skulking out of Washington after his resignation, looked more exultant.

The paucity of images on Arab television, and lag time during the first hours after the handover, contributed to a sense that the American part of this moment was a bit furtive and sad. Al-Arabiya, which spent the day interviewing notable political and cultural leaders, often split its screen, returning again and again to a tape loop of Bremer, at the handover, looking exhausted and almost dazed. For much of the afternoon, Arab leaders talked over him, plunging into all the problems the new nation faces, the violence, the debts inherited by the new government, the question of the interim government's legitimacy. They talked, and Bremer listened, or so the juxtaposition of images seemed to say. A neat reversal of who dictates to whom, and perhaps a last dig at a man sometimes referred to on Arab television as a "dictator."

and

The most striking aspect of Monday's coverage -- besides the fact that channels al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera were left on the outside of an event that one might have expected the Americans to spoon-feed them -- is how quickly everyone moved on. Although an al-Arabiya journalist, doing man-in-the-street questions, asked a group of Iraqis, "Is this a government of stooges to the United States?" there wasn't a lot of obsessing about the meaning of the actual transfer. Rather, the handover itself was nudged to the side, and the conversation turned to the future: money, police, safety, foreign affairs, the future of Saddam Hussein (taking possession of, and prosecuting him, may be the first items of business attempted by the new government).

I still do not understand the childish peevishness of the present American govenrment in regards to the Arab Sats. Yes, they are hostile to you, but this is not Soviet TV, this is not State TV, the Arab Sats are more or less genuinely free - some limits exists due to their home bases, but then their home bases are tiny insignificant and comfortable countries - but most of their reporting is "market driven" for all the idiotic gnashing of teeth in America regarding Jihadi propaganda (which the Arab Sats are not). They respond to what their viewers tastes are - largely speaking.

For that, one has to talk to them - excluding them, not talkiing to them merely means one's own voice is not heard at all, and one talks to oneself in an echo chamber. That appears to be the sole concern of the present Administration, and it is dangerous. It is indeed true there is no convincing much of the prospective audience of the goodness of one's overall aims, above all when policy re Israel is so Sharon-centered, but damage control is often about limiting the down side, not turning a bad event into a good event.

(all from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13301-2004Jun28.html)

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Further Reflections on the Iraq Failure: Ignatius of WP

Rather busy at the moment (who knew setting up an office was such a bloody nightmare), but a quick note on this:

After the Handover
By David Ignatius
Tuesday, June 29, 2004; Page A23
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13503-2004Jun28.html

Ignatius has long been my favorite American commentator on Iraq, and I may add a richer and more interesting one than Freidman's idiotic bowlderizations of the latest nitwit observation spoonfed him by the pampered elites.

In particular I want to draw attention to this:

"The invasion also helped spawn a wave of anti-Americanism in the Islamic Middle East and around the world. Bremer's departure from Baghdad yesterday may ease those divisions, but the damage to America's reputation is significant. In Europe and Asia, as much as in the Arab world, the United States is seen as the god that failed.

As with any policy reversal, the essential question is whether its architects have learned from their mistakes. "

Precisely, and I note that working for an American firm I am seeing the hesitations, the resistance. Doing business, as I have noted several times, is becoming harder - where only two or three years ago, to take a North African example - you heard things like "We're sick of being captive to the French [business] interests, we want to work with Americans" now you hear rather snide jokes about Iraq, skepticism that American products are worth the trouble.... One can do business, but clearly the mental barriers are up, the reflexive skepticism has increased.

There is a real price, then, to the political angle. Now, sometimes prices have to be paid, but it is painful to see this price being paid for an incompetent folly, and administration one that continues to muddle along blindly, without any real sense of how to turn things around, and yet incapable either of learning from the mess. Only seeking to push off real accounting until after the elections.

I also note the following for its entertainment value as well as its sardonic truth:
"Ahmed Chalabi smiled contentedly at the thought. L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator who ran Iraq like a viceroy for more than a year, was reduced to a hasty exit with a stealthy helicopter ride to the airport, seen off without fanfare by no one higher-ranking than a deputy prime minister. "Bremer put his hand in his pocket and went to the airport ignominiously," Chalabi chortled Tuesday, the day after Bremer's departure. "And Dan Senor with him," he added, referring to Bremer's spokesman, who had denigrated Chalabi on television."
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16002-2004Jun29.html)

I confess some guilty pleasure in Chalabi laughing at Senor.

But here is a more useful nuggest:
"Iraq has a long history of Arab nationalism and support for Palestinians against Israel, dating from before Hussein's Baath Party took over in 1968. As a result, its foreign policy, if tradition and popular sentiment are followed, could end up being adversarial with that of the Bush administration."

Could? It will, if of course popular sentiment is followed. But then the real model is the Egyptian one - the faux democracy covering a vampire state. Not even one that brings economic progress like Tunisia, but is a convenient lap dog.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 29, 2004

Among the effects of transfer, adieu oh useless CPA

The CPA site is suddenly silent, although they continue to send me their useless press oriented blather.

No more updates on cool things like what fucking things are not working and other fine things that enabled one, if one wanted to, to track how fucked up everything is. (Although I am amused to note that at some point they stopped posting the security reports for "security reasons" - never noticed when that stopped)

Good planning opportunities of course.

Now the route seems to be Iraqi ministerial. Have to probe on that. Investment memo proceeding apace, but pain in the ass to work on when I am also looking for a new damned apartment.

Should try to find some time to comment on the transition and the like - wonder how this will play in the US?

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 22, 2004

Reconstruction Articles: indictments of the CPA

The Washington Post has been running a rich series on the "reconstruction" of Iraq, which I find rather confirmatory of my own observations and explanatory of why reconstruction has been such an abject failure.

In the current edition, the following article has some interesting gems:

An Educator Learns the Hard Way
Task of Rebuilding Universities Brings Frustration, Doubts and Danger
washingtonpost.com
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, June 21, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56414-2004Jun20?language=printer
Second of three articles

The article focuses on a certain John Agresto, responsible for the "reconstruction" of the university system. Without meaning to sneer, the naivete recorded rather explains the failures.

A few quotes: "Like everyone else in America, I saw the images of people cheering as Saddam Hussein's statue was pulled down. I saw people hitting pictures of him with their shoes," said Agresto, the former president of St. John's College in New Mexico. "Once you see that, you can't help but say, 'Okay. This is going to work.' "

Well, I should hope some minority in American paid attention to the wider context, which was there, of vast and deep distrust for the US and ambiguous feelings regarding the toppling of "their president" by a foreign army. Fool.

Although he notes:
""I'm a neoconservative who's been mugged by reality," Agresto said as he puffed on a pipe next to a resort-size swimming pool behind the marbled palace that houses the occupation authority.

"We can't deny there were mistakes, things that didn't work out the way we wanted," he added. "We have to be honest with ourselves.""

This is perhaps the key to understanding why he and his ilk when so wrong:
He knew next to nothing about Iraq's educational system. Even after he was selected, he did not pore through a reading list. "I wanted to come here with as open a mind as I could have," he said. "I'd much rather learn firsthand than have it filtered to me by an author." He did a Google search on the Internet. The result? "Not much," he said.
...
None of that fazed him. He assumed, he said, that Iraq would feel like a newly liberated East European nation, keen to embrace the West and democratic change. "

Blindness and hubris, fundamentally misunderstanding the situation and the problem. It strikes me the idiotically misplaced, utterly ahistorical analogies with the Cold War and Eastern Europe indeed informed most of the CPA-Iraq ideologues understanding of Iraq. It is little wonder they failed to understand what was going on around them, and failed to respond in practical manners.

It rather does behoove one, I would add, to learn something of the country you are trying to remake, if only to understand what the real basics you are working with actually are, so as to avoid the silly idiocy of believing some selective, distorted TV images, and thinking like a naive fool that your invasion is going to be like Praque 1989. The differences should have been obvious to anyone who knew even a modicum about the history of the region, never mind the culture and the religion. Leaving aside, however, the Islamic versus outsider issue, one need only look to the rather more ambivalent Russian attitudes compared with Eastern European to understand Eastern Europe, under a foreign empire's domination, was/is in no way a sociological model for understanding a post-Sadaam Iraq.

This particular passage amused and annoyed me, I may add:
"While acknowledging American mistakes, Agresto aimed some of his most pointed criticism at Iraqis. In his view, the Americans toppled a dictator and prepared the ground for democracy, but Iraqis have not stepped up to build on that start.

"They don't know how to be a community," he said. "They put their individual interests first. They only look out for themselves.""

Well, no shit. There has not been a community and a modicum of reading regarding Iraqi sociology would have taught him that Iraqi society has remained highly tribalized, and indeed regreseed along those lines in the 1990s. A modicum of preparation, rather than trying to "learn" on the ground, wrapped in a bubble.

I would like to note I consider this statement to be pure rubbish and deeply hypocritical:
"Had it been someone different than Agresto, the possibility of that would have been so much better," said Keith Watenpaugh, an assistant professor of Middle East history at Le Moyne College in Syracuse, N.Y., who traveled to Baghdad last year to assess Iraq's university system. "The politics of the occupation were so divisive, and the American academy felt so disempowered by the way things were happening, that when such political creatures like Agresto came asking for things, it was too difficult to put aside those politics. If the administration had really been committed to rebuilding Iraq's education structures, they wouldn't have sent Agresto."
Emphasis added.

American academy felt disempowered? Oh poor whinging ineffectual babies. Bloody twit: at least Agresto is honest - a fool but honest - this whinging twit would have me believe he would have let go of his attachment to "the Academy" (one of those idiotic pomposities that I so despise from this kind of academic), and his politics to work on Iraq? I should think not.

Agresto was a mistake, to be sure, for his lack of background in the region and his idiotic lack of preparation on that, but his past fights with "The Academy" strike me as irrelevant except to highlight the self-indulgence and navel gazing.

Now, more naivete:
Agresto, who was inside the palace and heard the blast, assumed that the attack would provoke widespread revulsion at the taking of innocent life, and would rally popular sentiment against the insurgency and in favor of the goals of the occupation.

"What I expected was the Mothers March for Peace or the Don't Kill Our Kids movement or somebody to come out and say: 'Stop this. We want democracy,' " he said. But that never occurred. Iraqis held funerals and went on with life. U.S. troops erected even larger concrete blast walls in front of the gate.

When he asked Iraqis working for the CPA why there was not more outrage, he sensed apprehension. Everyone he talked to was too scared to condemn the insurgents in public.

"I saw people still afraid," he said. "I saw how easy it was to speak against the Americans and how dangerous it was to speak for democracy and liberty."

The aftermath of the bombing led Agresto to rethink some of his most fundamental assumptions about the American effort to transform Iraq. Suddenly, a goal that had appeared attainable seemed so far from reach. Perhaps, he concluded, U.S. planners should have settled for something less than full democracy.

A mother's march for peace? Well, that has some entertainment value - although it sadly displays how much he and his ilk have been living in a fantasy world disconnected from the realities of Iraqi society,

He reasoned that the occupation's chief goal should have been to restore security, and only later to begin other work in earnest.

"We're trying to establish a democratic government without a democratic people," he said. "I don't know how possible that is."

Here, here at least we have some realism. It is not possible, is the answer, first one has to create the conditions necessary. .

Now, perhaps a dose of realism:

"Later in the meeting, Agresto distributed copies of a revised education law written by the CPA that included the rights document. He said the CPA had decided not to promulgate the law and instead was giving it to the ministry with the hope that it would be approved by the university presidents and the minister. The changes would have more legitimacy, Agresto figured, if they were enacted by the new minister, rather than the occupation authority."

Well, at least a tiny bit of realism regarding what they can achieve.

Now regarding the prior article,

Mistakes Loom Large as Handover Nears
Missed Opportunities Turned High Ideals to Harsh Realities
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A54294-2004Jun19?language=printer
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, June 20, 2004; Page A01

Bloody long and very much worth reading, although if you have been reading my ranting about my experiences with the CPA since May of 2003, none of this is a surprise.

Some key items

First, this one line summary: "The ambitious, 15-month undertaking stumbled because of a series of mistakes that began with an inadequate commitment of resources and was aggravated by a misunderstanding of Iraqi politics, religion and society in occupied Iraq, these participants said."

Well ain't that beautiful. What truly irritates me, however, as this was painfully obvious a bloody year ago, and to anyone with the least sense, the combination of an occupation administration that knew literally nothing and had no resources, was a recipe for disaster (although I note we had the usual suspects in the mindless cheerleading camp try to pimp that idea everything was going fine off of some senseless neo-Con journo morons quick trips through safe zones. Indeed, let me point out the importance of "loyal criticism and its utility over mindless sycophantic cheerleading. Should the USG morons have heeded well placed criticisms, they would have avoided massive errors.

But more on this later.

"We blatantly failed to get it right," said Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution who served as an adviser to the occupation authority. "When you look at the record, it's impossible to escape the conclusion that we squandered an unprecedented opportunity."

Squandered is bloody right. Nothing had to be this bad. Not even after the looting, but again, the current Administration's blind mendacity, its extreme preference for sycophants over skilled and pragmatic operators is deadly. Martin Wolf had it right, opposition to this Administration is a duty for anyone who cares about competency. I am not pleased with the concept of a Kerry White House, but I would rather have the occasion to vote out a mediocre Kerry than suffer through the disasters these incompetent fools are wreaking out of pure blind hubris.

I note this is rich: U.S. reconstruction specialists commonly complain of ungrateful Iraqis. What the fuck these idiots think the Iraqis should be grateful for I don't know, but certainly merely toppling a dictator is not enough, the motherfuckers in Iraq know bloody well that toppling dictators does not make the fucking pie in the end, so no reason to congratulate the Chef for simply having bought the motherfucking ingrediants, he's gotta fucking make the pie in order to fucking congratulate him. Mindless idiots, these stupid fucking American "reconstruction" idiots in the CPA, full of their bloated farts of empty pompous "liberation" posturing.

In many ways, the occupation appears to have transformed the occupier more than the occupied. Iraqis continue to endure blackouts, lengthy gas lines, rampant unemployment and the uncertain political future that began when U.S. tanks rolled into Baghdad. But American officials who once roamed the country to share their sense of mission with Iraqis now face such mortal danger that they are largely confined to compounds surrounded by concrete walls topped with razor wire. Iraqis who come to meet them must show two forms of identification and be searched three times.

Emphasis added. I rather think that says all there really needs to be said about this "liberation."

The Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. entity that has administered Iraq, cites many successes of its tenure. Nearly 2,500 schools have been repaired, 3 million children have been immunized, $5 million in loans has been distributed to small businesses and 8 million textbooks have been printed, according to the CPA. New banknotes have replaced currency with ousted president Saddam Hussein's picture. Local councils have been formed in every city and province. An interim national government promises to hold general elections next January.

These are successes? Five fucking million? And replacing Sadaam on the currency?

Most telling:
About 15,000 Iraqis have been hired to work on projects funded by $18.6 billion in U.S. aid, despite promises to use the money to employ at least 250,000 Iraqis by this month. At of the beginning of June, 80 percent of the aid package, approved by Congress last fall, remained unspent.Electricity generation remains stuck at around 4,000 megawatts, resulting in less than nine hours of power a day to most Baghdad homes, despite pledges from U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer to increase production to 6,000 megawatts by June 1.

Incompetence.

Pure and simple. Incompetence.

And these people sneered at the UN. With more potential resources they have done a far worse job and squandered vast amounts of political capital.

And of course, my fucking steel project is still fucking stuck.

Yeah, that pisses me off still. But beyond the personal angle, rather emblamatic of who these incompetent fools can't get out of the fucking starting gate.

AS for the political system and that shining beacon of democracy that would transform the region (in their masturbatory dreams of course, naive idiots), well we're going to have an Egyptian style "democracy" as a I long predicted, if not a civil war (I note al-Hayat reports this AM 22 June 04 that Turkey has warned the Kurds not to move into Kirkuk or face consequences).

Of course the following is not surprising at all in the context of the abject failure of the CPA. : On the eve of its dissolution, the CPA has become a symbol of American failure in the eyes of most Iraqis. In a recent poll sponsored by the U.S. government, 85 percent of respondents said they lacked confidence in the CPA. The criticism is echoed by some Americans working in the occupation. They fault CPA staffers who were fervent backers of the invasion and of the Bush administration, but who lacked reconstruction skills and Middle East experience. Only a handful spoke Arabic.

What I always found strange, I may add, is that although I knew a goodly number of CPA Staff, and knew they desperately needed persons like myself, no one tried to recruit me. Now, I am sure it was really quite clear that I am no partisan of Ibn Bush, that I was highly critical of what was going on, however one should think that my skills, language and business, would have been of some interest to an Administration that was grappling with an ever deteriorating situation and, to be frank and perhaps a bit arrogant but I think accurate, desperately needed people like me.

Now, maybe I would have said no. Maybe not. I certainly am glad I did not get all covered up in the shit so far, but I find it strange, bizarre that I was never approached, not even obliquely. I need not even have been that good, in the final analysis, considering what a cock up things have been, to have added some value, I can not but assume that not being a partisan, that being a critic (and of course they don't know about this site) was a show stopper.

Ideology over all.

Now this little piece on Bremer, it is rich. In an interview last week, Bremer maintained that "Iraq has been fundamentally changed for the better" by the occupation. The CPA, he said, has put Iraq on a path toward a democratic government and an open economy after more than three decades of a brutal socialist dictatorship. Among his biggest accomplishments, he said, were the lowering of Iraq's tax rate, the liberalization of foreign-investment laws and the reduction of import duties.

Well, since Iraq is not on a path to democratic government, but sliding dangerously between trumped up democracy masking authoritarianism and open civil war, looks like point one down, "Ambassador" Bremer. An open economy. Well, insofar as no law truly obtains, I suppose I don't even know how to judge this "accomplishment" since I doubt it will survive intact. Lowering the tax rate is an accomplishment? He clearly exists in the same la la land that the rest of his sycophantic incomptetent stooges do, when they think such things really fucking matter at this fucking stage, or that will survive whatever emerges from this mess. Same for liberalization of investment laws and import duties. Bloody idiocy. Bloody self-regarding un-realistic idiocy. It is truly stunning how stupidly removed from reality these idiots are.

As to this, let me quote the following
Several current and former CPA officials contended that key decisions by Bremer favored a grandiose vision over Iraqi realities and reflected the perceived prerogatives of a military victor. Critics within the CPA also faulted Bremer for working to advance a conservative economic agenda of tax cuts and free trade instead of focusing on the delivery of basic services. "There was this grand idea that we were going to turn Iraq into a model nation, a model democracy, with an ideal constitution and an ideal economy and an ideal military," said a State Department official who spent several months working for the CPA. "It was just naive."
Emphasis added:
Indeed. indeed, indeed.

On the underlined part, well, I will say, I like low and stable taxation, I like open and free trade and I think that the overall "grandiose vision" would have been a fine thing to achieve, in an ideal world.

The problem I have had, and always had with their idiotic transformation talk and bloody idiotic self-indulgent political messianism is that this had no relationship with what could have been realistically achieved under the best of conditions, given Iraqi society, given economic realities and given the resources. One does not "transform" societies - that is bolshevism and these idiot Neo-Cons and their so called "conservative" supporters are engaging in right wing bolshevism when they engage in such bloody nonsense.

There was no way that any of these reforms were going to take when the country was prostrate and without services. I, I may add, ranted on about this throughout the summer, fearing, as I think they have done, that they have by their bolshevism managed to discredit many fine reforms, and went too far beyond what Iraqi social consensus would support. There will be a backlash, mark my words, and these self-indulgent twits have discredited necessary reforms.

Naive and stupid.

Now, on staffing:
The CPA also lacked experienced staff. A few development specialists were recruited from the State Department and nongovernmental organizations. But most CPA hiring was done by the White House and Pentagon personnel offices, with posts going to people with connections to the Bush administration or the Republican Party. The job of reorganizing Baghdad's stock exchange, which has not reopened, was given in September to a 24-year-old who had sought a job at the White House. "It was loyalty over experience," a senior CPA official said.
Emphasis added.

My experience more or less. What to say about this other than this is purely incompetence. Deep and bloody incompetence.

Mind you, I happen to know that they have more or less simply translated American rules and documentation into Arabic with little to no regard for the local context, and despite a fine model next door in Jordan for a reasonable Arab framework for an exchange (although I believe later inputs have included Jordanians).

Now let me quote the following in whole:
Economic Miscalculations
The Daura Power Plant in southern Baghdad was supposed to be a model of the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq. Bombed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and neglected by Hussein's government, the station could operate at no more than a quarter of its rated capacity, leading to prolonged blackouts in the capital.

After CPA specialists toured the decrepit facility last summer, they vowed to bring it back to life. German and Russian firms were hired to make repairs, and it was placed atop a list of priority projects intended to achieve a 6,000-megawatt goal for national electricity production. More power, Bremer hoped, would improve the economy and daily life enough to reduce violence and stabilize Iraq.

Today, the Daura plant is indeed a model -- of how the U.S. reconstruction effort has failed to meet its goals.

The German contractors fled for their safety in April. The Russians departed in late May, after two of their colleagues were shot to death by insurgents as they approached the plant in a minivan.

Inside the facility, parts are strewn on the floor, awaiting installation. Iraqi technicians in blue coveralls lounge around, smoking cigarettes and waiting for guidance. In the turbine room, graffiti on the wall reads: "Long Live the Resistance."

The CPA intended for the Daura plant to be producing more than 500 megawatts of power by June 1. But the best it can do at the moment is 100 megawatts -- half of its output of last summer.

"We were supposed to have improved," said Bashir Khallaf, the plant director. "But we have gotten worse."

The failure to fix Daura and other plants, coupled with sabotage attacks on power lines, have renewed the debilitating blackouts that plagued Iraq last summer. The situation is not much better for other services. Attempts to fix water-treatment plants and oil refineries also are far behind schedule, forcing the country -- which has the world's second-largest oil reserves and two large rivers -- to import gasoline and bottled water. Recent attacks on fuel convoys and pipelines have depleted stockpiles, resulting in lengthy gas lines.

Several CPA officials said the Bush administration has long underestimated reconstruction costs. In its war planning, the administration devoted $900 million to reconstruction despite reporting by the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations that depicted a far greater need. In the first months of the occupation, an additional $1.1 billion was committed by the White House. It was not until September that the administration asked Congress for billions more.

No news here, just a sad illustration of the errors.

Although the $18.6 billion reconstruction aid package was approved by Congress in November, the Pentagon office charged with spending it has moved slowly. About $3.7 billion of this package had been spent by June 1, according to the CPA. Many projects that have received funding have slowed or stopped entirely because Western firms have withdrawn employees from Iraq in response to attacks on civilian contractors.

CPA officials contend the money should have been earmarked and spent far sooner. Had that happened, they argue, the CPA could have retained much of the goodwill that existed among Iraqis after the U.S. invasion and possibly weakened the insurgency.

"The failure to get the reconstruction effort launched early will be regarded as the most important critical failure," said one of Bremer's senior advisers. "If we could have fixed things faster, the situation would be very different today."

Not very different, too many fuck ups.

By starting late, the adviser said, the CPA got "caught in a security trap." More than $2 billion of the aid package will be spent hiring private guards for contractors, buying them armored vehicles and building secure housing compounds, CPA officials estimate. "If we had spent this money sooner, before things got bad, we could have spent more of it on actually helping the Iraqi people," the adviser said.

Because many of the 2,300 projects to be funded by the $18.6 billion are large construction endeavors that will involve foreign laborers instead of Iraqis, they will result in far less of a local economic boost than the CPA had promised, another senior official involved in the reconstruction said. The projects were chosen largely without input from Iraqis.

"This was supposed to be our big effort to help them -- 18 billion of our tax dollars to fix their country," the senior reconstruction official said. "But the sad reality is that this program won't have a lot of impact in it for the Iraqis. The primary beneficiaries will be American companies."

Well, wasting tax payer dollars. Why not? The whole cock up has been a waste, why go for any novelty value by stopping pissing away on the electric rail now?

On Sadr and political confrontation:
The sympathy for Sadr today at the Rafidain station -- on Fridays, officers pin his picture to their uniforms before going to the mosque -- suggests that the odds of getting the police to resist the cleric's militia have not improved. The scope of the confrontation could have been smaller, according to several CPA officials, had U.S. forces moved against Sadr in August, when an Iraqi court issued an arrest warrant for him. Instead, they allowed him months to build support for his anti-occupation views.

By April, with the CPA's internal polling showing 80 percent of Iraqis holding positive views of Sadr, the CPA should have sought a political solution, the officials contend. At the very least, they argue, CPA strategists and military commanders should have realized that many Iraqi security officers would side with the cleric.

"The Americans misunderstood us," Kadhim said. "We will fight for Iraq. We will not fight for them."

I doubt moving in August would have been much better, but certainly when your data tells you your opponent is massively popular and you are hated or at best regarding with moderate dislike, you might want to adjust strategy.

I shall quote this section as well, in extenso, for it is both amusing and appalling to me:

Out of Touch

Life inside the high-security Green Zone -- what some CPA staffers jokingly call the Emerald City -- bears little resemblance to that in the rest of Baghdad. The power is always on. Shiny shuttle buses zip passengers around. Outdoor cafes stay open late into the night.

There is little effort to comply with Islamic traditions. Beer flows freely at restaurants. Women walk around in shorts. Bacon cheeseburgers are on the CPA's lunch menu.

"It's like a different planet," said an Iraqi American who has a senior position in the CPA and lives in the Green Zone but regularly ventures out to see relatives. "It's cut off from the real Iraq."

Because the earth-toned GMC Suburbans used by CPA personnel and foreign contractors have become a favored target of insurgents, traveling outside the Green Zone -- into the Red Zone that defines the rest of Iraq -- requires armored vehicles and armed escorts, which are limited to senior officials. Lower-ranking employees must either remain within the compound or sneak out without a security detail.

Although the CPA has tried to bring Iraqis into the CPA headquarters for meetings and other events -- there has even been an "Iraqi Culture Night" in the Green Zone -- the inability to mingle with Iraqis has isolated the Americans. "We don't know the outside," the senior adviser to Bremer said. "How many of us have gone out to buy a bottle of milk or a pair of socks?"

Instead of building contacts at social events in the city, CIA operatives in Baghdad drink in their own rattan-furnished bar in the Green Zone. Instead of prowling local markets, CPA employees go to the Green Zone Shopping Bazaar, where the most popular items are Saddam Hussein memorabilia.

Limited contact with Iraqis outside the Green Zone has made CPA officials reliant on the views of those chosen by Bremer to serve on the Governing Council. When Brahimi, the U.N. envoy, asked the CPA for details about several Iraqis he was considering for positions in the interim government, he told associates he was "shocked to find how little information they really had," according to an official who was present.

The CPA official who got around the most was Bremer, who travels with an entourage of private guards, most of them former Navy SEALs, equipped with helicopters and a fleet of armored vehicles.

Bremer's willingness to travel and to work 18-hour days has won him respect within the CPA. The chief criticism of his tenure within the former Hussein palace that serves as CPA headquarters was that he failed to recruit enough seasoned diplomats with experience in the Middle East.

In the final days of the CPA, many officials have succumbed to bitterness. Some blame military commanders for not asking for more troops to stabilize the country. "They had enough soldiers to ensure that Saddam's men didn't come back to power, but there were nowhere near enough to make the country safe enough for us to do our work," a CPA reconstruction specialist said.

Military officials say CPA personnel spend too much time in the 258-room headquarters. "Nobody has any idea what they do back in that palace," a senior Marine commander in Fallujah said recently. "We certainly don't see any results."

Several veterans of other reconstruction operations characterized civilian-military relations in Iraq as the worst they have encountered. "It has been poisonous," the reconstruction specialist said.

The other major conflict within the occupation bureaucracy has set the legions of young staff members chosen for their loyalty to the Bush administration against older, more liberal diplomats from the State Department and the British Foreign Office. Several of the diplomats said they regarded the young staffers as inexperienced and eager to pad their résumés during three-month tours.

These diplomats singled out the Office of Strategic Communications as unsuccessful in its efforts to disseminate information to Iraqis. Instead of creating an all-news television station that would compete with other Arab broadcasters that the CPA deemed anti-occupation, the communications office, with several employees straight from Republican staff jobs on Capitol Hill, set up a channel that aired children's programs and Egyptian cooking shows.

"It didn't put any effort into communicating with the Iraqi people," a British CPA official said. "Stratcom viewed its job as helping Bush to win his next election."

If the underlined sections are not a complete and utter indictment of this effort as deeply corrupted by short termist facile politics, by temporizing and incompetence, by idiotic sycophancy in the face of a clearly world-imporant event, then I do not know anything.

The question is, what can be salvaged from this utter cock up?

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 20, 2004

Iraq, encore [edited to correct link]

Some recent conversations about Iraq and opportunities, we kept coming back to the widespread sense around here that Iraq is tipping into civil war. Speaking with a Jordanian business man this morning, I gave a 30 percent chance I would be back next year to work on an improved Iraqi menu of opportunities. That is, of course, a 70 percent chance Iraq is still a mess. He thought I was being too optimistic.

I may be, news as the following leave a strong sense that the ethnic pot can not but get into a boil:
Kurds Advancing to Reclaim Land in Northern Iraq
DEXTER FILKINS
Published: June 20, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/20/international/middleeast/20KURD.html?hp=&pagewanted=all&position=

I also wanted to draw attention to
As Handover Nears, U.S. Mistakes Loom Large
Harsh Realities Replaced High Ideals After Many Missed Opportunities
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A54294-2004Jun19?language=printer
[EDIT: Oops, earlier provided incorrect link]

Interesting article. Will have more comments later.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Entertainment Value with "secret sewer" projects

A beautiful, amusing little story:

But the next day the First Cavalry Division, which is charged with guarding sites like the sewage plants around Baghdad, agreed to transport two visitors to another plant, using a three-vehicle convoy laden with weaponry.

Inside, under the blazing afternoon sun, was a scene that perhaps only the combination of occupied Iraq and a secret sewage plant could produce � a Turkish site manager who did not seem to speak either English or Arabic, Iraqi engineers with strict orders not to show anyone the treated sewage without permission from the front office, and a compound mostly deserted except for some low-level staff members and managers and the few engineers.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/international/middleeast/19SEWA.html?hp=&pagewanted=all&position=

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 18, 2004

Another Beheading

Poor bastard. al-Arabiyah reported this not long ago.

Unlike Berg, who bumbled around, this fellow was righteous in terms of what he was doing.

Poor bastard.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 16, 2004

Iraq: The Popularity Contest

Juan Cole unearthed the following tidbit:
Poll: 55% of Iraqis Would feel Safer without US Troops
67% Support Muqtada al-Sadr
http://www.juancole.com/2004_06_01_juancole_archive.html#108736144801952076

Which can be viewed directly here:
http://wid.ap.org/documents/iraq/cpapoll_files/v3_document.htm

Odd, I didn't get an email from the CPA about this one. I get it for every other inane fucking thing. Footballs and Dan Senor shitting, but this...

Well, what can one say but off a fucking cliff.

More commentary later, bloody hard to read the original documentation.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

News Flash? al-Qaedah and Iraq not connected....

It really is a sad statement to the depths to which the U.S. Government has sunk under the current administration that this is news.

See
Sept. 11 Commission Report Says Iraq Rebuffed Al Qaeda
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
The New York Times
Published: June 16, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Sept-11-Commission.html?hp
and
9/11 Panel Finds No Collaboration Between Iraq, Al Qaeda
By Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, June 16, 2004; 9:00 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45853-2004Jun16.html

I should say it is transparently clear that Bush and Cheney's mendacious and grossly misleading statements re Iraq and al-Qaedah are aimed at the gullible fool segement of the American voting population that is unable to distinguish between Arabs and Muslims, and for whom all of "them" are the same. It is a real pity for it does a real diservice to actually addressing the al-Qaedah issue, as well as Iraq.

Mendacity when done right, and competently has its place in government. When done stupidly and incompetently, it is rather like scoring an own goal. Of course, the current Administration seems to specialise in this.

Now, some key notes from the articles:
From the WP version:
"Although Osama bin Laden briefly explored the idea of forging ties with Iraq in the mid-1990s, the terrorist leader was hostile to Hussein's secular government, and Iraq never responded to requests for help in providing training camps or weapons, the panel's report says.

The findings come in the wake of statements Monday by Vice President Cheney that Iraq had "long-established ties" with al Qaeda, and comments by President Bush yesterday backing up that assertion..... "There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan [in 1996], but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," the report says. "Two senior bin Laden associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States." "

The NYT art. rather brief merely notes:
"Bluntly contradicting the Bush administration, the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks reported Wednesday there was "no credible evidence" that Saddam Hussein helped al-Qaida target the United States. .....

Bin Laden made overtures to Saddam for assistance, the commission said in a staff report, as he did with leaders in Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere as he sought to build an Islamic army.

While Saddam dispatched a senior Iraqi intelligence official to Sudan to meet with bin Laden in 1994, the commission said it had not turned up evidence of a "collaborative relationship."

The Bush administration has long claimed links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida, and cited them as one reason for last year's invasion of Iraq.

On Monday, Vice President Dick Cheney said in a speech that the Iraqi dictator "had long established ties with al-Qaida." "

Electoral gain, of course, not any respect for policy making is what is driving that.

However, in my opinion more relevant and interesting is the following:
" "Contrary to popular understanding," the report says, "bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses," and he never received a $300 million inheritance. "Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fundraising network developed over time," the report says.

.....

Since the Sept. 11 attacks and the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, "al Qaeda's funding has decreased significantly," the report says. But the group's expenditures have decreased as well, and "it remains relatively easy for al Qaeda to find the relatively small sums required to fund terrorist operations," the report warns.

Now, the organization is far more decentralized, with operational commanders and cell leaders making the decisions that were previously made by bin Laden, the panel found.

Yet, al Qaeda remains interested in carrying out chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attacks against the United States, the report says. Although an attempt to purchase uranium in 1994 failed -- the material proved to be fake -- "al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic objective of obtaining a nuclear weapon," according to the report.

By any means possible, it warns, "al Qaeda is actively striving to attack the United States and inflict mass casualties." "

Emphasis added.

I note the following:
First, some time back I opined that Bin Laden's wealth, according to my understanding, had been exhausted, and that people were unnecessarily obsessing about "Saudi" wealth when more pedestrian funding, including quasi criminal, were more important. It is important to understand this to avoid falling into the trap of fighting a mirage (the great benefactor Bin Laden / the Evil Saudis).

Second, I would hazard the opinion that al-Qaedah funding and recruitment has seen a huge rebound since the fiasco that is Iraq has been underway, making the United States look very much like the giant with clay feet. This is a dangerous perception, and the staggering incompetence in this area desperately needs to be addressed.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 15, 2004

Clumsily, Clumsily

Rather more important, in my opinion than the unfortunate deaths of the GE contractors, or the bombing of the oil terminal (Go long in oil?), but perhaps on the level of the assasination of shiite truck drivers are the following tidbits: (from The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/international/middleeast/15CND-IRAQ.html
" Adding to the tensions, the American and Iraqi governments clashed over several contentious issues in what appeared to be the first major test of power for this country's new interim government.

Iyad Allawi, the prime minister, called for the Americans to hand over all detainees � including Saddam Hussein � to the Iraqis by June 30, when Iraq will gain limited sovereign powers. Mr. Allawi also said through a spokesman that foreign contractors should be subject to all Iraqi laws. The president, Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, demanded that the Americans hand over Mr. Hussein's Republican Palace, a prominent symbol of power, to the Iraqi government after June 30.

American officials said they did not have to meet any of the demands and were in discussions with the Iraqi government over them. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt said the resolution passed earlier this month by the United Nations Security Council granted the Americans final authority over detainees, while President Bush said he wanted to make sure there was "appropriate security" before handing over Mr. Hussein.

"We also do not have to hand him over until there's a cessation of active hostilities," said Dan Senor, a spokesman for the occupation. "Hostilities, unfortunately, continue."

On the issue of American contractors, Mr. Senor said such workers would answer to Iraqi laws if they committed criminal acts, but that an order signed by L. Paul Bremer III, the top American administrator here, gave contractors immunity from legal prosecution over any incident involving their work.

As for handing over the Republican Palace, he added, "we need substantial space, property, for the U.S. mission here." The palace is being used by the Coalitional Provisional Authority as a headquarters building and will likely become an annex for the American embassy due to open here after June 30, Mr. Senor said."

Emphasis added.

I suppose I should give up hope of the Americans in Baghdad ever adopting phrasing or public statements that will not unnecessarily rile up people and confirm their clumsy arrogance. Have to... Well "have to" in the legalist terms is probably not the most relevant issue. What is probably far more relevant is rescuing some tiny piece of your influence and some tiny bit of an ability to achieve something approaching your original goals. The public response could be far more... helpful in its phrasing.

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

The Long Term Decline (Iraq again)

Again, an elderly article, but one which I desire to point out:

washingtonpost.com
Iraqis Put Contempt For Troops On Display
By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, June 12, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35558-2004Jun11?language=printer

" Since U.S. forces drove to Baghdad and overthrew President Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the 138,000 American soldiers stationed here have lost their status as liberators in the eyes of most Iraqis. Polling by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority has chronicled a steady souring of opinion, with the most recent surveys showing about 80 percent of Iraqis with an unfavorable opinion of U.S. troops."

Inevitable really. I recall military friends of mine early on in conflict complaining bitterly about the understaffing and undertraining for the military units in Iraq.

However, the happy talkers one out....

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Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Wolf: On Bush

This is a rather aged article by Wolf, but I wanted to convey it and comment at the same time. As it is in archives, I will not bother with a link.

I mostly wished to convey it as I rather agree with the reasoning and heartily agree with the point of view.

Bush is not up to the job
The Financial Times
By Martin Wolf
Published: May 11 2004

First, Wolf opens:
I am a huge admirer of the US. Freedom and democracy survived the 20th century only because of American actions and values. Without the US, Hitler or Stalin would have emerged as undisputed winners of the second world war. Thereafter, the US turned defeated enemies into allies and undertook the long - and ultimately successful - task of containing and defeating the Soviet empire.

I am also neither hostile to Republican administrations nor opposed to the use of force. On the contrary, I was heartened by Ronald Reagan›s efforts to liberalise the US economy and oppose the Soviet Union. I preferred Richard Nixon to George McGovern, in 1972, and George H.W. Bush to Michael Dukakis, in 1988. I supported the first Gulf war, though I opposed the one in Vietnam.

For my part I was rather deeply ambivalent towards the First Gulf War, feeling it less-than-necessary although I now think it was largely a positive endeavor. And of course, I myself am "neither hostile to Republican administrations nor opposed to the use of force, although insofar as wars are expensive and often wasteful of resources, I rather prefer they be avoided if possible. If possible. And of course I have voted for a good many Republican administrations (although not the present one).

Wolf then adds:
"This personal history is of no intrinsic importance. But if I find the Bush administratio's foreign policy disturbing, so must the vast majority of humanity. If I feel Tony Blair has
allied the UK too closely, then sympathy for this alliance must be perilously low."

I concur. I very much concur. While no Government should be prisoner to foreign popularity, when one's account is so low with so many otherwise staunch friends, and one's not otherwise inclined to be harshly critical, one has to ask, is there not something wrong? Or another way, to use Machiavelli's observation that it is better to be feared than loved, but one should also not be hated.When one's natural allies fear and begin to loathe you, then one can guess that the remainder of the world may have well passed through fear into hatred, or be on that path.

Wolf then adds:
"So what is wrong with this administration? Put simply, it fails to understand the basis of US power, mis-specifies US objectives and is incompetent in executing its intentions. As a result, the position of the US - and so of the west - is worse, in significant respects, than it was the day after September 11 2001. Then, a huge proportion of humanity viewed the US as the victim of an outrage. Today, after the revelations of the treatment of prisoners in Iraq, it is seen as a perpetrator of them. Then it had the support of all its allies, now it can rely on the public›s sympathy in very few."
Emphasis added.

I rather agree and have argued this, I think, consistently. The revelations now that the current Bush Administration engaged in legalistic searches for justifying the use of torture, in clear contravention of the international accords the American government had long supported further these somewhat aged comments. As some who read my comments on the old "SDMB" message board know, I did not unalterably oppose... recourse to unpleasant methods in case of dire need. However, it has always been my view that this should be exceptional and something that remained shameful and indeed illegal. The current administration, as some commentators (I believe it The Washington Post editorial page) noted, has followed the logic and reasoning of rogue regimes where the rule of law does not obtain but rather the rule of the personal power of the ruler obtains. This is dangerous. Very dangerous, and very damaging to American standing. The revelations in this area have diminished American standing to (rightfully) comment on human rights abuses across the globe, and to further its own agenda for greater democratisation and greater respect for human rights - in short the very values said to be at the core of the country. Clumsy, naive cynicism for clumsily executed short term gain, and utterly unnecessary across a number of fields.

In short, gross incompetence.

Wolf adds then:
Let us start with the administration's faith in the application of US military power. This is a double error. The first lies in its exaggerated belief in force. The US was able to defeat the armies of Saddam Hussein, but a civilised occupying army cannot coerce the obedience of a population. The second error lies in its belief in the irrelevance of allies. A country containing 4 per cent of the world›s population cannot impose its will upon the world. It needs permanent allies, not reluctant stooges, willing acceptance of its leadership, not sullen acquiescence. The contempt shown by leading members of the administration for those who disagree with it is now matched by the hostility of those whipped by their scorn.
Emphasis added:

I have long called this the Napoleonic error. Shining belief in one's own rightness is rarely all that convincing to others, above all foreigners whose values are not in entire congruence with one's own.

Clumsy incompetence.

Wolf amplifies this:
Without military power, victory would not have been achieved in the second world war. Nor would the Soviet tanks have been kept at bay for more than 40 years. But the cold war was won not because the US had a bigger army than the Soviet Union, but because it offered a more attractive model. The more the US plays the unilateral bully, the more its attraction fades.

Precisely, the pole of attraction is a powerful tool.

Turn then to definition of US objectives. Terrorism is a technique of the powerless adapted to the age of mass communications. A war against terrorism is as empty a slogan as one against crime, drugs or disease. But proclaiming a war against terrorism justifies the indefinite suspension of the rule of law, allows every thug on the planet to ally his repressive policies to those of the US, spawns new enemies and foments a war psychosis in the US itself.

I believe this passage rather takes on a great deal of weight in the context of the revelations regarding the legal memoranda on torture, on the strange lawlessness (rather unnecessary as well as self-damaging) in regards to detainees. I note the strange collapsing of the Padilla case, the incident of the arrest of the Oregon lawyer, etc. I would note that this article in The New York Times Commander Swift Objects is instructive and interesting.

"As David Scheffer pointed out in the Financial Times last Thursday, the behaviour of the guards at Abu Ghraib is the natural, almost the inevitable, consequence of the position in which the administration has - in its pursuit of its war on terrorism - put detainees.These are neither prisoners of war nor criminal suspects. Instead, they are in a legal limbo for as long as the US decides that this so-called "war" continues. Interrogators have absolute power and, as Lord Acton pointed out, absolute power corrupts absolutely. Nobody, not excluding Americans, is immune to the temptations such power creates."

There is little to add to Wolf's observation than to draw the line to the legal memoranda regarding torture.

Wolf notes re competence:
Now let us turn to the question of competence. In the short history of the war on terrorism, only one institution has shown its effectiveness - the US armed forces in "shock and awe" mode. Almost everything else has been a humiliating shambles. Afghanistan is, once again, in the arms of the war lords whose behaviour led to the Taliban invasion. The outcome in Iraq now looks far worse than that. "

Indeed, and a month has not changed that, other than my feeling that the new Iraqi of the moment probably represents a sureptious slide to re-Baathification, which is to say, not long before one sees a new Iraqi dictatorship, but one dressed up a little better to meet simple minded tastes for the appearance of democracy - Potemkin or Egyptian democracy.

"The decision to wage a war of choice, not of necessity, was a great risk. It could be justified only by discovering the weaponry Mr Hussein was alleged to hold or by leaving the country, if not a Jeffersonian democracy, at least in a reasonably stable condition. Having been so resoundingly wrong on the first point, the US must now succeed on the second. Always difficult, the chances of such an outcome now seem vanishingly small. What will Iraq be a few years from now - a military dictatorship, a theocracy, a divided country, an anarchy, or a permanent US occupation? Any of these, except the last, seems more plausible than stable democracy."

I would lay my bets on a military dictatorship rather like Egypt. A ticking bomb.

"It is impossible to exaggerate the dangers attendant upon a US failure in Iraq: jihadis would conclude that they had now defeated a second superpower; friendly regimes would be shaken; and US prestige would be destroyed. Iraq is not another Vietnam. It is far more dangerous than that. While this venture was never going to be as militarily perilous as that war, this time dominoes could well fall. An incontinent US withdrawal could be a deciding moment in the relationship between the US and the Arab, if not the entire Muslim, world."

I would add that in fact American standing has already been badly, badly damaged by the clear, indeed gross incompetence shown in Iraq to date. No one, not even a cynic such as myself, expected things to go this badly, so quickly. I recall stating on the SDMB that I expected car bombs by Spring. I did not even think by the past Fall that such utter incompetence would have generated what it did.

Wolf adds
"The US has, rightly or wrongly, staked its prestige not just on getting rid of Saddam Hussein, but on leaving behind a thriving country. If, instead, it leaves behind despotism or chaos, it will be a grievous defeat, with huge long-run consequences. Responsibility for such a failure must rest with the White House. It cannot be blamed on any subordinate department, not even the defence department. This is the president's policy and responsibility. The buck stops there."

Precisely, and precisly why this current president must go. Incompetence of this magnitude can not be tolerated.

Crafting a foreign policy for a new era is hard. The last time this had to be done was in the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman more than half a century ago. The
institutions they established and the values they upheld were the foundation of the successful US foreign policy of the postwar era. Now, a task even more complex has fallen on this
president. He is not up to the job. This is not a moral judgment, but a practical one. The world is too complex and dangerous for the pious simplicities and arrogant unilateralism
of George W. Bush.

Emphasis added. My feelings exactly.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:22 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Interim Thoughts, A Local Editorial on the "Greater Middle East Initiative" [edited - comments added

Unfortunately a rebound in the nastiness from the Chicken Biryani has me down again - I am beginning to suspect the old iron stomach is getting delicate in its old age (well not old age yet, but my woman tells me I have a grey hair, first one, so there.).

Nevertheless, a brief comment on this, which I will quote in full as there is no online archive. Emphasis added at the key points, in my opinion of course, with [Key Point Markers] in brackets for ease of reference.

Jordanian Perspective
Reform — need and conviction
Musa Keilani
I have just returned from Qatar, where the Gulf Studies Centre held a conference on Democracy and Reform in the Middle East. The former prime minister of Sudan, Sadeq Al Mahdi, Prof. Sadd Eddin Ibrahim, who was recently released from a Cairo jail for his human rights activism, Dr Hasan Mohammed Al Ansari from Qatar University and nearly 80 Arab intellectuals discussed the chronic question of democracy and reform in their respective countries and wondered why decision makers abide by Washington's recipe for economic reform, through the International Monetary Fund, but refrain from applying a parallel political recipe for reform, and consider it a violation of their territorial imperative and sovereignty.

[Point A]We know that it is not exactly the great desire to see democracy prevail in the Arab world that is behind America's Greater Middle East Initiative. The US wants the Arab governments to eliminate local groups opposed to the American policy in the Middle East and Washington's approach to the Muslim world in general. The only way the US could think of achieving its objective is to insist on “democracy” and “reform” in the Middle East as a pressure point and leverage against the governments.

The equation is quite simple: [Point B]the world knows that if there were to be Western-style elections in the Arab world today, the winners would be those who are described by Washington as anti-US hardliners and extremists — Islamists, the very party that the US is targeting for crackdown. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the American explanation that the root of all troubles in the Middle East is lack of democracy and that is why the US is pushing for it.

The Arab countries expressed their rejection of the American drive to impose reforms on the Arab world. No externally imposed reform is going to work in the Arab world; it would only result in chaos and confusion and that is something we, Arabs, could ill afford. Reforms in the Arab world have to take into consideration many factors, including history, culture, traditions, politics, tribalism and indeed the ground realities.

Several Arab countries, including Jordan, accepted the American invitation to the Group of Eight summit in Georgia, but their attendance does not signal an endorsement of the US plan. [Point C]If anything, they took advantage of the marked absence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to emphasise the Arab rejection of the US proposals and managed to dilute it. Instead of the Greater Middle East Initiative, it became “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa”. It is obvious that the changes did take into consideration the Arab reservations over the first draft prepared by Washington, although the amendments did not go far enough.

[Point D]The prevailing feeling in the Arab world over whatever the US does in the region is scepticism. Rightly so, because Washington has done little to convince the Arabs that it is interested in a fair, just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, the American track record has nothing but open bias in favour of Israel.

Therefore, the feeling is that Washington is again trying to hoodwink the Arabs into believing that it has a genuine intention to find a just, fair and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention the original American draft of the reform initiative, which reeked of a grand design to reshape the Arab region to suit American and Israeli interests.

The endorsement of the “amended” US plan by the G-8 has given it an international look. Why should other members of the group worry about the impact of the US plan on the Arab world, anyway? They signed on the dotted line and lined up behind the US in this context, while refusing to let the US have the full Iraqi pie. [Point E] Again, we Arabs find ourselves and our future being judged by others. No one is disputing that the Arabs need reform; that the Palestinian problem remains unresolved and the Arabs were unable to respond effectively to the Iraqi crisis are the best indicator of the dire need for reforms in the Arab world. However, the American way is not the answer, since its objective is not reform, but serving American interests.

The need of the day is for the Arabs to look inwards and find out for themselves where they have been going wrong and what should be done to correct things. It needs a sea change in mindset. The Arabs have to be convinced of legitimacy regarding the areas where they need reform and they need to come up with realistic and feasible ideas to usher in the changes. It has to be done gradually and in phases. Those who do not want to share power should be persuaded to understand and accept that changes are inevitable, and it is much better if they come from within rather than being imposed from the outside.

Sunday, June 13, 2004

Coming Soon, my reflections on the above.
[EDITED ADDED ANALYSIS]

A bit late, but here it is:
Comments

Well, an interesting article. It reflects fairly common thinking, some of it dead on in my opinion, some of it rather whinging on.

Now as to my "Point A", as I identified it, it strikes me that the author is correct in writing "The US wants the Arab governments to eliminate local groups opposed to the American policy in the Middle East and Washington's approach to the Muslim world in general." There is no doubt about that, although how one defines "opposed to" (tightly, widely) changes the meaning of this in some respects. The author, I know, means this very broadly. I doubt that is entirely fair (although it is not so off the mark in some respects. Certainly there is a dangerous and clumsy tendancy in certain quarters to identify any opposition to the United States with terrorism - e.g. the accusations of al-Jazeerah spreading jihadi agitprop when al-Jazeerah is really just more or less plain vanilla pandering to inchoate Arab nationalist sentiment. I would grant then the author has a real point here, despite the implicit exageration.

He adds, on this same line, "The only way the US could think of achieving its objective is to insist on “democracy” and “reform” in the Middle East as a pressure point and leverage against the governments." Hard to say how I would characterize this analysis. Certainly on its face (leaving aside the "only" which is mere hyperbole) it is hard to say this is an incorrect analysis. Certainly the insistance on democracy and reform is indeed intended to pressure Arab governments along some path the United States believes best, although I would qualify this by saying it is not at all clear that the current American Administration has anything approaching a clear, analytical view of what that path is, what it should and can entail and what trade offs between near term and long term goals need to be made given limited resources.

Certainly, while the author implies here and later on rather more clearly that the focus on democracy and the like is utterly cynical, I would argue that from what I have seen, I would be happier if it were, for sadly it appears naively sincere. That is to say, the present Bush Administration seems all-too driven in its Middle Eastern policy (as probably other policies, but I don't care very much about anything but my turf), by airy, pie-in-the-sky thinking and cotton candy analysis of what "democracy" can achieve - one can understand this as the sort of childish, amateur bar=room analysis of "democracy good, autocracy bad" and the equally childish and simplistic analysis that if one simply brings "democracy" to a country, why all will just turn fine and dandy.

Which is to say, that frighteningly this current Bush Administration is not cynical enough in the right ways, and deeply off-track in its approach to practical matters - as we have seen in my ... bloody hell over a year of commentary on the CPA-Iraq. The senior officials no doubt really mean it when they say, in their blithe and childish ignorance of the real world over here, that they consider the "European" position that one cannot just drop in democracy into the region (mis-stated in their hazy cotton candy thinking to be that democracy is impossible - full stop - in the Middle East) to be "incredibly condescending" etc. Of course they are blissfully unaware that their naive and childish assumption that the rest of the world thinks, acts, reacts exactly as they do, and I mean that very precisely not merely in a general sense, is itself the actually condescending view. I note again that few of us specialists - I say few as I imagine there are always exceptions - believe democratic, free market states are impossible in the Arab world, rather I would say that "we" (I and people like me) understand there is a hard row to hoe in terms of near term material and cultural conditions before you can create healthy democratic polities in most of the Arab states. The socio-economic stresses are just too high.

Now as to "Point B," the author is largely right in stating: " the world knows that if there were to be Western-style elections in the Arab world today, the winners would be those who are described by Washington as anti-US hardliners and extremists — Islamists, the very party that the US is targeting for crackdown. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the American explanation that the root of all troubles in the Middle East is lack of democracy and that is why the US is pushing for it."

Indeed, he is perfectly correct in pointing out the fundamental contradictions in the new US policy, and the reason why it is viewed so. I think the implication, however, that the new push for reform and democracy is utterly cynical is off-base. Rather, it is not cynical enough, in my opinion, and as I states supra, in my opinion more informed by cotton-candy, wishful thinking than clear-headed analysis. Regardless, in my opinion, the first portion of the statement is perfectly correct. Now, the second half, with the implication that lack of democracy is not at the root of issues, is a bit more problemetic. I certainly would agree that there are issues more important than democratisation in the immediate future, such as economic reform and opening up opportunities for the huge demographic bulge coming up in the Arab region.

I note that "Point C" actually surprised me, but his statement that attending Arab countries "took advantage of the marked absence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to emphasise the Arab rejection of the US proposals and managed to dilute it" rather clearly reflects hostility towards the Saudi and Egyptian regimes. I am not sure where to place that. Probably both as ineffectual toadies of the Americans, or perhaps panderers. Hard to place, but an interesting comment.

Now, as to "Point D" where the author writes that scepticism towards the US rules, well that is quite clear. His explanation, in terms of local perceptions or rather regional perceptions is spot on: "Rightly so, because Washington has done little to convince the Arabs that it is interested in a fair, just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, the American track record has nothing but open bias in favour of Israel." The loss of the pretence, the plausible deniabilty - rather typical of the artless foreign policy of the present Administration - was incredibly damaging. The transparent adoption and discarding of policies for near term domestic political gain, or rather childishly cynical adoption for achieving "next week goals" at the expense of longer (and I speak only of months or years) term goals seems all too typical, and rather indicative of the tedious idiocy of this present American Administration in its clumsy lurching about.

This comment, regarding Israeli designs in particular should not be too quickly dismissed: Therefore, the feeling is that Washington is again trying to hoodwink the Arabs into believing that it has a genuine intention to find a just, fair and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention the original American draft of the reform initiative, which reeked of a grand design to reshape the Arab region to suit American and Israeli interests.

There is much to Iraq planning that suggests to me that certain personnages in the present Administration confused American and Israeli strategic interests in regards to Iraq.

Finally, regarding "Point E" it rather appears to me correct on one level, that the Arabs need to move and generate their own reforms - certainly with outside help as appropriate, but only as far as they wish to go. Islamophobes such as the 'blogger' Tacitus and others with a desire to see the entire world turned into a little America (or a big one as the case may be) are simply going to be disappointed and frustrated with their messianic transformational dreams. Transformation does not happen without massive bloodshed and war, something that I doubt is worth the cost on either side, and frankly trying to 'transform' other cultures was already done - colonialism was its name, and it worked rather poorly as the incetive incompatibilities are too great. This is not to emptily moralize against "change" in the region or maunder on about imperialist imposition, blah blah blah. Rather it is simply to accept the reality of what is actually achievable, and what the reality of social reaction is to outside penetration, above all by people like this Tacitus who are so clueless as to write about the false consciousness of the Xian elite in this region, because their views on Israel match those of their fellow Arabs and not his. That is to say, all this "tranforming" the Muslim/Arab worlds talk is largely driven by deep-seated ignorance and misconceptions regarding what the cotton candy thinking dreamers "understand" of the region. Incremental change on the margins, in key areas, above all economic are the points which are most likely to help, and indeed are least controversial and most likely to succeed. Not a matter of idealizing the culture, but mere practicality, economics is easier.

However, even here there is controversy and the work is hard. An example to ponder: recent conversation with an Ass't GM of a bank here, the AGM opined that there was "too much" competition and that it would be better to restrict the number of authorized companies so as to provide more stability.

This the AGM of a bank, and someone otherwise well versed in economics of some kind.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:11 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 12, 2004

The benefits of getting poisoned by Chicken Biryani.

Why order such a thing, at a Five Star. You know the chef has probably made it twice, lord knows how much turnover there is, ... etc.

So, the benefits? None, really, except being laid out all Friday (non-working day you know out here), and having the opportunity during my in and out of consciousness moments, to watch the (in)famous al-Hurra, the US Propaganda Channel in Arabic.

First time I subjected myself to it.

Likely the last.

Let me say, lame does not quite capture the effort.

Primo, the format was "chatty" American style joke-around TV anchors. Completely alien format to the region, and my read of my friends reactions (some amigos dropped in to make sure I was not dead) tells me it went over like a lead balloon. Not to say people like the local State TV "Living Dead News Caster" format, but the more formal European style of news reporting (e.g. BBC) is clearly rather more appreciated. One amigo sarcastically remarked "all they're doing is translating American TV."

Secondo, choice of topics. Again, it was... well as if I was watching American TV translated into Arabic. I mean, carrying Reagan's funeral live with color commentary? How the fuck is that speaking to Arab audiences? Cover the damn thing, yes, but carry it live? The rest of the newscasting was similarly bizarrely parochial (i.e. American focused). They could have at least tried copying BBC Arabic, which is highly appreciated and manages to promote a certain British POV without being staggeringly parochial.

I was left with the sensation that maybe, just maybe this might appeal to Arab Americans, but for Arabic speakers in the region (never mind the agitprop aspect) it simply will be passed over in total bemusement. What a stupid idea and waste of money. Bloody navel gazing idiots in the States who know nothing of the ground here.

Reminds me, last week having dinner with some American VC guy from Arizona, who starts loudly talking about the Jihadi propaganda on al-Jazeerah (misprounounced of course).... where do people like this get this crap? Jihadi propaganda indeed. Corrected that.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:02 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 05, 2004

The Amazing Ability of American Consultants to Reach Sweeping Conclusions on a data point.

I am not sure if I impressed or not, but I thought I would share my continued bemusement (arising from a recent conversation) at this. Nothing new here, no news, but I was bemused to hear, after a meeting wrapped up, one of the financial consultants praising the "entreprenurial energy" that he sees in Jordan, after holding some meetings with some SMEs that are anything but SMEs, and hearing a bunch of nice English packaged up to dupe him.

I would rather think that sitting in a conference room, one might think, "Perhaps I should validate the glurge I am hearing?"

More on this later, re specific financial matters and the stunningly stupid comments.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:31 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

A Damn Good Decision: POW lawsuit thrown out [edit, additional comment]

I know this will be yet another item to make me unpopular in many quarters, but the following is an excellent development.

U.S. Gulf War POWs Denied Settlement
By Hope Yen
Associated Press
Saturday, June 5, 2004; Page A15

"An appeals court panel threw out a $959 million judgment yesterday for U.S. prisoners of war who say they were tortured by the Iraqi military during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, ruling that Congress never authorized such lawsuits against foreign governments.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned a lower court's ruling that said 17 former POWs and 37 family members were entitled to the damages under a federal statute allowing suits involving countries that financed or aided terrorists.

The three-judge panel said the statute allows lawsuits for pain and suffering only if they are filed against agents and officers of those foreign states responsible for the torture who are not acting on behalf of their government. So, even though the lawsuit also names Saddam Hussein, he is immune because the POWs sued him for his alleged activities as Iraq's president.

"We are mindful of the gravity of the allegations in this case. That appellees endured this suffering while acting in service to their country is all the more sobering," Judge Harry Edwards said. "Nevertheless, we cannot ignore . . . its impact on the United States' conduct of foreign policy where the law is indisputably clear that appellees were not legally entitled.""

I note the underlying judgement was a default judgement.

Rather simply, while suing another government for abuses etc. sounds all nice and touchy feely, it is, like the Belgian courts, something that opens a pandora's box of problems... an inappropriate mechanism. Of course, one can only imagine how a similar Iraqi lawsuit might go in re Abu Ghrieb.

EDIT Added:
Further to this point, I note the following comment from here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/05/international/worldspecial/05court.html

"David Eberly, an Air Force colonel, now retired, whose F-15 fighter was shot down over northwest Iraq and who says interrogators repeatedly pointed a gun at his head and pulled the trigger on an empty chamber, described himself as confused by the administration's priorities. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has expressed support for compensating Iraqi detainees who suffered abuse by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison, Colonel Eberly noted, even as the government fought the former prisoners' suit.

"I can't believe," Colonel Eberly said, "that the government is willing to spend U.S. tax dollars to compensate Iraqis when they are not willing to allow us to pursue this judgment against Iraqi dollars. And they have fought it with U.S. dollars."

Reasons of state, simple fellow, reasons of state. The compensation for the Iraqi detainees is not justice, it is bribery, it is face saving. And of coruse trivial in comparision with the ridiculously large judgement won against the Iraqi state. I note further that use of private lawsuits in matters of foreign policy is recipe for chaos and self-defeating disasterous posturing. The spectacle of (relatively) wealthy Americans winning nearly a billion dollars from an impoverished country for abuses/torture, while US soldiers commit the same is bad politics and harms US interests. As soldiers, their personal interests fell behind interests of state.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:25 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

Tenet

At present I do not have a view on this, but let me share some phone calls I got from "friends" here:

"Hey, you're director resigned" [I.e. my personal director, not ambig. in Arabic)

"Your boss resigned."

Etc.

I note that the convos suggested more people than I thought really do think I am not what I am. Fucking irritating.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:25 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Jan-Jul 2004

June 02, 2004

Possibly the lamest item I yet from CPA

The following, besides being senselss, is just silly. They're doing PR for "nameless" officials "on the record." Fucking waste of human flesh, these fucking useless ass idjits.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BACKGROUND BRIEFING

SUBJECT: NEW IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT

ATTRIBUTION TO A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

LOCATION: BAGHDAD, IRAQ

DATE: TUESDAY, JUNE 1, 2004

(Note: Because the briefer and questioners were off mike, this transcript contains numerous inaudible portions.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (In progress) -- against the armed opponents of democracy in Iraq.

So this new cabinet which has been announced today along with the presidency is, we think, deeply committed to democracy. And their willingness to take these responsibilities in such difficult and dangerous times is inspiring, I think, to all of us who love freedom.

So with those comments, I'm happy to take your questions. If you could identify yourselves, I'd be grateful. (Off mike.) Okay, so I'll just -- I'll spread them around as best I can.

Yes.

Q (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think you'll have to use the mike. Begin again.

Q As far as the interim --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Can I have somebody -- (inaudible.)

Q There had been an agreement with the Governing Council and with the women -- (inaudible) -- for a quarter of the new government to be women, and this looks like you have six of 33. That's less than a quarter. Could you talk about that?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, this was -- the outcome was the result of enormously intense and complex discussions. As you know, the political geometry in Iraq is complicated, so there are many, many factors that were balanced one against the other. I think as you get a chance to see the biographies of these women, you'll be impressed.

Why don't we go to somebody on the side of the room. Okay. (Off mike.)

Q (Off mike) -- with the Washington Post. The U.N. released a statement earlier today saying that Dr. Pachachi was offered the position of president, but declined for personal reasons. And then Dr. Pachachi at a press conference just a little while ago said that the reason he had declined it was because there were people inside the Governing Council who didn't want him to be the president. Can you talk to us a little bit about the process of the selection of the president and how we, you know, got from Pachachi to Ghazi Yawar?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to intrude on Ambassador Brahimi's purview. He'll, I think, explain the latest events in that respect -- (off mike) -- in the statement that you mentioned.

I will say several things. We had, as we went through this process in this (four-cornered ?) way, many, many suggestions of who ought to be the president of Iraq. About -- now about a week ago, the list was narrowed and -- (off mike) -- the cabinet -- (off mike). And -- but the -- (off mike) -- just explain the process, but it was narrowed; however, really up until yesterday, other names started appearing. So someone would say, "Well, that's good, but have you thought of so-and-so?" So this was evolving really right on up through yesterday -- (off mike) -- including the presidency where there were some other names that came up late in the process.

But I think it was clear that Sheik Ghazi and Ambassador -- Minister Pachachi had the most significant support, so the preoccupation was centered on them, both of whom I think are exemplary.

One thing I did want to say in that regard is, I noticed -- you all are in that -- (off mike) -- but I noticed that several days ago, somebody wrote that Pachachi was the American choice; some of you wrote it, maybe even somebody in this room. And then every other story said this. I think this is -- (off mike). It's not true. In the middle of last week, when it looked as if these two were the strongest contenders -- (off mike) -- were those two gentlemen, Ambassador Bremer and I went back to Washington for guidance. We asked our -- the top of the administration -- these are the two; please express whatever preferences you might have. And fairly rapidly, within, indeed, I think, several hours, the answer came back, either of them would make an excellent president of Iraq, and we don't have a favorite.

And therefore, as these discussions went on, we lobbied for either one. You won't find any of these people that we talked to who will tell you -- truthfully, anyway -- that we went to them and said you should choose A or B.

By the way, there were some other stories, although they're fewer in number, that had exactly the opposite argument. We didn't lobby -- (off mike.) We said that we thought either one of them would make a fine president of Iraq. So I've corrected that, for what it's worth.

Yes?

Q (Name off mike) -- from -- (off mike) -- newspaper. Yesterday we heard about the -- (off mike) -- with Sheik Ghazi and Mr. Pachachi. Can you describe to us -- (off mike) -- nominate and how has he been chosen -- how the Governing Council or the -- (inaudible) -- Sheik Ghazi -- (off mike)?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not, of course, going to name who else's name came up, not least because they didn't get the job. (Chuckles.) I don't think that would be (smart ?).

But I think I've just said all I need to say about the process that produced these decisions. And essentially, it was Ambassador Brahimi put out the statement, and you would want to talk to him, and you ought to ask him about it.

Sir? (Off mike.)

Q (Name off mike) -- from National Public Radio. Thank you. Do you expect the Governing Council to dissolve? There's been some discussion --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: My best understanding is it did.

Q (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think it dissolved this morning.

STAFF (?): Yes, they dissolved this morning. (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Okay. It dissolved this morning. It dissolved itself, I believe, if I'm not mistake