Well, it appears that our writer would like to see the US military commit atrocities as in the Philipinnes, scorched earth policy as by Sherman.

At one level, he is likely correct, but it is incorrect and indeed ignorant to stop there. It is also an observation that is distorted by the analogy to the American Civil War.

First, let us clearly admit that it is without a doubt true that current military operations in Iraq are as he says, merely doing just enough to antagonize without actually stopping the resistance. That is clearly true.

However, his sequential observation in that the resistance must be crushed and the Iraqis bear, as he puts it so quaintly, the cruel weight of war, is not as true.

It is certainly true that is one way to proceed, but at what cost versus what gains is the proper question. Of course there is a corollary, what are the costs.

Now, supra I note he is someone who forgets the complete observation of Machiavelli, to whit that while it is better to be feared than loved, it is important not to be hated. Therein lies the key problem facing the United States.

But let me return to the analytical error in regards to the use of the American Civil War as his analytical point of departure – I may add the error is the error of someone engaging in no small bit of navel gazing. – for it seems to me the differences are such as to explain immediately why it is not a good point from which to draw lessons.

First, of course, it was a civil war. Whatever the ultimate legitimacy of the political point of view, the effective question of the legitimacy of the Union trying to regain lost territory was one not particularly in question among the Union’s population or its main economic partners (whether they wished it success or not). That automatically puts a different cast on how any post-war or wartime … unpleasantness shall we say?... will be understood. Invasions of another nation are not typically understood in the same light.

Second, of course, is that the Confederacy was more or less alone. Certainly certain European powers played with the idea of intervening for power reasons, but that is rather different. The trend among relevant powers was to abolish slavery, and there was little ideological audience of any important for the Confederacy. Moreover, there were no immediate or related neighbors implicated in the struggle. Iraq, on the other hand, is part of an Arabo-Muslim ideological network, where the events in Iraq have echoes in the body politic, where American interests may be harmed by negative echoes.

Third, wider Muslim and Arab anger at the United States is a continuum. To blandly consider antagonized as a simple state is to rather badly misconceive the range of the problem, or its potential. Angered but not motivated to active opposition is not the same as angered and ready to declare war, etc. etc. That al-Qaeda and its affiliates and fellow-travelers have experienced a boom in recruiting I think is well-accepted. Ever greater violence is not merely something that plays into a black-white / on-off state, rather it is something that feeds a continuum from the unfortunate (merely annoyed or frustrated with American policy), to that which concerns (angered and ready to protest), to the dangerous and beyond, (angered to the point of hatred and violent action). Fear and respect are not bad things, but angered to the point of hatred – that is the sense of the back against the wall and violently lashing out, that is something that breeds new rounds of terror.

The author probably, instead of reflecting on a war that was completely different, under circumstances utterly different, and involving two state actors, should have considered actually relevant analogies. Two that spring to mind are of course Algeria and Lebanon. In the former case, France, in the latter case Israel. The Lebanese example is so close to the Iraqi example that it is almost painful, and the lessons it holds are rather painful as well. In the Algerian example, one can rightly object there was a real difference in terms of French settlers and the French fighting to retain a colony, whereas the US is fighting to set up a friendly but ‘independent’ government. Sadly, while the difference is real, in terms of the political dynamic, I think it counts less than it appears, for most Iraqis certainly believe that the United States is there to colonize them, to take their resources. Ergo, and this makes a usage in the French press all the more… poignant for some parts of the French press have taken to calling the Iraqi police et al the harkis of Iraq, the actual political dynamic is likely to be the same. For those that do not know, the harkis were the Algerians who fought for/on the side of France and suffered terribly in the post-war period, most fleeing to France. Perhaps the United States can look forward to welcoming its Iraqi harkis.

The main lesson may be that once the resistance reached critical mass (I believe it is hard not to argue that it has indeed reached critical mass, and probably did so sometime in the Fall of 2003), there is little a power such as the United States can do if it lacks strong local allies with their own, independent legitimacy.

In short, I am arguing that Iraq is doomed to be a complete failure for the United States, that the point of no return was already passed, in Fallujah perhaps, or perhaps sometime in the late Fall or early Winter of 2003.

The question is what options are the least bad. While crushing the Resistance is certainly possible, militarily, I suggest that the gain would be ephemeral (like the French winning the battle for the city of Algiers, the resistance might go quiet for a bit), and the costs in terms of lost prestige, in terms of dirty hands would far outweigh the gains, above all insofar as the time horizon for the costs will likely extend beyond those of the gains.

However, merely pulling out of Iraq is a disaster as well, and certainly a pure pullout, the negatives, the immense costs (attention: not just to the US or to the present Administration, but globally) are likely to outweigh the costs of crushing the Resistance.

Recall, I have argued what presents itself now is not a question of “winning” in any meaningful sense, but of limiting losses. Given the above, one should chose crush the insurgents and install a nasty little dictatorship in its place, to keep the lid on.

But that is a short termist strategy. Well, rather, a nasty little secular dictatorship is, insofar as it is likely not to survive long after departure – and it does, not well.

It may well be more profitable to try to find a modus vivendi with the Shiite hard core (ex the unstable Moqtada) and Iran and quietly renounce the pie-in-the-sky transformational rubbish that is still mooted. Better other Shi’a militias eliminating Moqtada than US troops, although that would be a dangerous game to play.

On the other hand, there remain only dangerous games to play in Iraq.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:17 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

August 18, 2004

From my buddy at MENAFN

A fine article on how well the money is moving in Iraq.
http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story.asp?StoryId=CqsluqeicvvnjuKfrlvjfqLvjteq

This in particular I wish to note:
Although Congress approved the $18.4 billion aid package on an emergency basis last year after the Bush administration said it was urgently needed, only about $600 million, or roughly 3 percent, has been spent so far.

"We should not be this far behind," Kolbe said. "It is absolutely inexplicable to me, and fairly outrageous, that last fall we were told we needed this `now,' that it was `desperately needed,' and here we are, 10 months later, and we still have only spent a tiny fraction of the money."

Recall only a year ago I was hearing from CPA types, like Dan Senor (not him personally though, to be fair - by the way did I mention I wierdly shared a flight with him to Amman? It was a bit strange) how the US was going to show how rebuilding was to be done. The sneering references to the UN incompetence....

{edit]

I also thought this was fun:
By the time it dissolved, the CPA reportedly had fallen short by more than 200,000 jobs from its original goal of creating 250,000 construction positions for Iraqis.

Shall we do the percent undershoot?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:03 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

Peel: an interesting commentary on US and Iraq and Empire

I shall quote this in extenso as I think it useful and imporant.

Quentin Peel: No way to change the world
By Quentin Peel
Published: August 18 2004 20:52 | Last updated: August 18 2004 20:52

Ommiting the first sectoin about the troop redeployments.

The timing of the announcement certainly has a lot to do with Mr Bush's re-election campaign. But whichever way you read it, the decision also seems to have been affected by a growing awareness of US imperial overstretch: the world's most magnificent fighting machine can no longer handle all the global security tasks it has set itself.

Hmm, I am not sure this is fully supportable, but the argument goes on.

It is a pity that what is rather a sensible move should be tarnished by a whiff of panic, precipitated by the strains of the ill-judged campaign in Iraq. For that is what has put such a strain on US military resources.

Yes. A whiff of panic. Well, more like blundering, but let us not parse words too closely.

Here is the meat:
It is not the US force reductions that are misguided, but the muddled thinking in the wider context of this comprehensive review of American “global force posture”. Unchallenged as the sole superpower, technologically capable of demolishing any threat within days if not weeks, this US administration is nonetheless attempting to do too much on its own, and in the wrong way. It is attempting to run a global empire without admitting it, and without making the essential compromises needed to win enough allies to its cause. Indeed, instead of winning friends, all too often it alienates them with heavy-handed intervention, whether military or diplomatic.

Brilliantly put. Emphasis added of course.

Americans insist that their power is not imperial. Their whole history is one of resisting empires, especially the British one. ....

Some fear that if the situation in Iraq deteriorates further, we will face an American withdrawal and a new era of isolationism. That is not the greatest threat. The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 demonstrated that US defences are not enough - even the most sophisticated missile defence system cannot stop suicide bombers. The US must engage internationally. The awful dilemma for the sole superpower, however, is when and how to intervene without making matters worse. For in the very act of intervention - whether militarily, as in Iraq, or politically, as in backing opponents of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela - the US tends to stoke opposition because of its overwhelming power. It may not wish to behave like an imperial power but it is condemned to be seen as one and can seldom resisting behaving like one.

Again, emphasis added.

Here we have something called the security paradox, in which at some point seeking ever more security actually diminishes security.

Law of dminishing, and in this case, even to the point of being negative, returns.

It was so much easier for empires in the past, before the days of instant communication. The Romans and the British did not have to worry too much about popular opinion. They ran their territories by co-opting local leaders and conscripting local armies. They did not try to do it all themselves. If a heavier hand were needed, the British could usually rely on their famous gunboat diplomacy to quell incipient insurrection from a safe distance offshore.

But this US administration is altogether more ideological. It believes in exporting democracy. Christopher Preble, director of foreign policy studies at Washington's Cato Institute, calls it “democratic imperialism”. In his recent essay “The Unrealism of American Empire”, he points out that the proponents of a democratic empire too often ignore the still more powerful forces of nationalism.
That is what has gone wrong in Iraq: Iraqis want their country back more than they want to import some idealised form of liberal democracy. Which leaves the Americans trying to impose it through the barrel of a gun, so far without success, and the empire feeling sorely overstretched.

Bingo.

I hardly feel a need, other than in my emphasis added, to comment on this and the problematics.

Again, competence.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:39 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

Zakaria and Iraq

Interesting op ed which I wil write about in the place of reading more about steel companies. You know, I have come to dislike steel companies, but more on that at a later date.

Let me direct you to

Why Kerry Is Right About Iraq
By Fareed Zakaria
Tuesday, August 17, 2004; Page A15
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6678-2004Aug16.html

First this passage I enjoyed:
The more intelligent question is (given what we knew at the time): Was toppling Hussein's regime a worthwhile objective? Bush's answer is yes; Howard Dean's is no. Kerry's answer is that it was a worthwhile objective but was disastrously executed. For this "nuance" Kerry has been attacked from both the right and the left. But it happens to be the most defensible position on the subject.

Now, on to the part I very much thought important and useful:
Bush's position is that if Kerry agrees with him that Hussein was a problem, then Kerry agrees with his Iraq policy. Doing something about Iraq meant doing what Bush did. But is that true? Did the United States have to go to war before the weapons inspectors had finished their job? Did it have to junk the U.N. process? Did it have to invade with insufficient troops to provide order and stability in Iraq? Did it have to occupy a foreign country with no cover of legitimacy from the world community? Did it have to ignore the State Department's postwar planning? Did it have to pack the Iraqi Governing Council with unpopular exiles, disband the army and engage in radical de-Baathification? Did it have to spend a fraction of the money allocated for Iraqi reconstruction -- and have that be mired in charges of corruption and favoritism? Was all this an inevitable consequence of dealing with the problem of Saddam Hussein?

Say this in the business world and it is considered wisdom. But say it as a politician and it is derided as "nuance" or "sophistication." Perhaps that's why Washington works as poorly as it does.

I think Zakaria has made important points here, and I think ones that have substantially dovetailed with my own observations.

For all that the current President in Washington DC is of supposed CEO background, his operative form has been rather poor. (As an aside, what comes to mind just now is an FT piece on Donald Trump that comments snidely but accurately (and I paraphrase) that anyone can build a reputation as a great businessman when their businesses actually succeed, but to do so when their businesses demonstrably do not takes real genuis. We perhaps overlook a certain genuis in Ibn Bush.)

The failures, as I have insisted again and again, in Iraq, have been ones of choice and poor execution from sheer and willful blindness. From believing one's own agitprop.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:30 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

US Troop realginment

I was just reading about this.

I have to say, Korea.

In what way does the Korean redeployment make sense?

Germany makes sense, Korea.....

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:02 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

Ecnomist: An Article Close to Home - "Doing Business in Dangerous Places"

I was amused, entertained and ... well displeased with an article in the Economist on me.

Well not me personally, I'd never cop to that even in the bizarre case it ever happened, but on the cover article, "Doing Business in Dangerous Places
Doing business in dangerous places

You don't have to be mad to work here
Aug 12th 2004 | BAGHDAD, JOHANNESBURG, MOSCOW AND LONDON
From The Economist print edition
http://economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=3089844
(public content, registration may be required, and if so, don't fucking whinge on about it)

I note this in particular:
Risk-taking wins markets. Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution has written a book on private military firms. “For firms that are second or third in a market, taking risks is a way to get ahead,” he argues.

Quite true that.

However, it's about taking risks intelligently.

Not being a cowboy (not literally of course).

I also liked this:
"Past experience is useful. Among the companies that fly UN staff and oil firms to countries such as Congo, Afghanistan and Sudan are two South African businesses, SAFAIR and National Airways Corporation (NAC), which even runs a commercial air service to Baghdad. It teams inexperienced crew members with experienced ones in dodgy areas. SAFAIR pays great attention to risk assessments and to logistics before flying into a new place. “Africa is not really for sissies,” says Neville Desselss, its manager, helpfully."

Nor is much of the Middle East, although of course Africa is far more challenging. I have hot water for example.

This observation is also useful and important in thinking about cutting edge markets:
He finds that people who like working in dangerous places tend to be independent and want to run things their way; that often clashes with an employer's need for tight control, in order to manage the risks to workers

I suppose this says quite alot about current personal issues.

However, more substantively, the following is important, after noting that hiring locals often is more useful and cost effective:
" On the other hand, it is sometimes easier to find an expat to do a difficult job than a local. Luc Jones, senior manager of Antal International, a recruiting firm, says that a decade ago his company would have been “crawling over broken glass” to find an expat finance manager with a smattering of Russian. Now there are ten such expats for every vacancy, and most firms prefer to recruit Russians. The country has become relatively safe and comfortable to work in. But, where jobs in remote regions such as Sakhalin or northern Siberia are concerned, “it is more difficult to get Muscovites to move out than expats,” he says."

I would observe of course to the foriegner, anywhere in the Russia Fed may be equally interesting / exotic relative to career goals and the like, as opposed to a local. A foreigner coming into the States is not going to look at a Chicago or a Utah assignment with the same sense as a New Yorker, or equally someone sent to Edinborough versus London (not to say that any of these comparisons are comparable to Siberia versus Moscow).

I would also highlight the importance of having at least an Expat core to any new operation, and especially a sophisticated expat core, so as to instill values. I think I have commented on this before. My old Fund never had that, and, well..... but not just the personal anectdote, I've seen it a lot, the branch office in the hands of pure locals goes "too" local in a region where "too local" means probably corrupt.

I note this also (and yes I see how it applies to me):
When should a firm pull out of a country? William Day, who has worked for several big aid groups, worries that people on the ground do not notice when things are getting worse. “Visitors arrive and say, ‘Why are you still here?' When the reply is, ‘Don't worry, the shooting always starts at three o'clock,' it may be time to leave. Adrenaline is a very attractive drug.”

Actually I would say that outsiders, however, frequently have a terribly exagerated view of the threat level. Everyone wanted me to fuck off during the War however my real threat level was okay. Of course, I blend well, I might have pissed off if I thought otherwise.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:59 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

August 17, 2004

Mutual Funds for Iraq....

Someone actually asked me if I knew of such vehicles for the small investor.

You really have to wonder what such people are thinking.

On the other hand the vague idea flashed through my primordial brain, ..."why not, if somone is stupid enough."

But of course they would have to be offshore to avoid all that unpleasant scrutiny and the silly lawsuits from idiots when they lost their money.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:42 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

August 15, 2004

Iraq: Conference and Shiites

Well, I see things are going according to plan. The US forces are killing expendable militiamen in that every more silly body count game, and the Shittes generally are becoming inflamed against the Americans. Super. The coverage of the conference by al-Arabiyah today showed Shiite centrists threatening to walk out if the assualt on Najaf is not halted.

The American military is doubtless a great fighting machine, but its command structure seems without any clue as to how to master the situation. Of course one has to admit they were not given the tools.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:18 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

August 13, 2004

Cole on Iraq - as-Sadr

Juan Cole has an interesting commentary at http://www.juancole.com/2004_08_01_juancole_archive.html#109237845611257539 that is worth noting:

Note that al-Shinabi called him "Sayyid" Muqtada. A Sayyid is a putative descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Sayyids have a special status in Muslim societies, and even moreso in Shiite Islam. Tribesman see Sayyids as almost magical purveyors of blessings from God.

My guess is that if Muqtada is killed, and maybe also if he is captured and imprisoned, that will tip the Sadr movement into conducting a long-term low-intensity guerrilla war, similar to what Sunni radicals and Arab nationalists have done in the Sunni heartland for the past 16 months. The south had been much quieter than the Sunni Arab areas, but I suspect that calm can no longer be taken for granted. The question is what happens to the Iraqi government if it faces two major guerrilla insurgencies going on at the same time.

Emphasis added.

Some points of Cole's commentary are speculative and arguable. However, I note the congruence with Hoagland's commentary yesterday. Place that in the context of Cole's observations, who certainly knows more about Shi'a than I do.

Overall, it does strike me that severe strategic errors are being made, largely through lack of comprehension of the opinion dynamics in Iraq, The expression Pyrrhic Victories comes to mind immediately when examining what is going on in Iraq right now.

Of course among the challenges is that there are no longer good options, nor even mediocre options. Rather, there are different levels of bad.

On one hand, in order to see an Allaouie government survive the US needs to be active. On the other hand having pissed away credibility and good will so very needlessly, almost any action will be interpreted negatively.

In that context, it is a matter of managing the downside, not pretending there is some magical upside.

First, losing the Shi'a is a disaster. Not just for yours truly (who presently is watching a beautiful option slowly, slowly sink further and further out of the money. The Zombie should be renamed the Titanic.) but for the general project.

As I said a few days ago, it is difficult to see ways to avoid a Lebanese civil war type situation, and the blundering ad hoc actions of the US are not making it any easier to be optimistic.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:49 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

as-Sadr - Martyr upcoming?

I hope not, that would be something of an error.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:21 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

August 12, 2004

A quick note in re Iraq (II)

I noted the following op ed from Hoagland, who I rarely find convincing in his analysis of Iraq. However, in this case he gets the issues in part right.

Iraq, Strategic Failures
By Jim Hoagland
Thursday, August 12, 2004; Page A23

I will skip the nonesense about the politics of elections and the like.

Last fall the president gave three stirring speeches in which he vowed to end 60 years of reflexive American support for repression by Arab governments: Morality and pragmatism required Washington to support democracy in the region. Iraq would be the model.

But Bush's priorities seem to be different today, as his administration engages in or condones cynical maneuvering designed not to create democracy in Baghdad but to create political cover at home and fear and turmoil in Tehran.

Well this is no surprise, is it?

Simultaneous U.S. military assaults on Shiite rebels in Najaf, a new and brutal power play in Baghdad against that ever troublesome Shiite politician Ahmed Chalabi, and the temporary suppression of critical news coverage by al-Jazeera satellite television this week have established the fact that "stability" of the Arab strongman kind is again tolerated at the White House.

Interesting set of linkages and I think largely correct.

Long backed by the CIA, Prime Minister Ayad Allawi is now supporting the U.S. intelligence agency's closely related campaigns to destroy Chalabi and use Iraq to subvert Iran's ruling Shiite ayatollahs.

Shrug. I doubt the CIA is creating the issues for Chalabi. Rather one would suspect Allaouie is settling scores the old fashioned way, no need for CIA assistance.

The agency is determined to protect its all-important liaison relationships with Sunni Arab governments in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which fear the Shiite majorities in Iran and Iraq. That is the decisive background to the appalling choice of priorities for the use of military and judicial power that Bush at least implicitly condones in Iraq.

KSA and the Gulf fear the Shites as Shites. Egypt, Jordan? Nah, rather more along the lines of prefering the old Sunni elite. No Shite minorities in either Jordan or Egypt.

Baathist killers and Wahhabi terrorists go unarrested, unprosecuted and unchallenged in the streets of Fallujah, Ramadi and Sunni sections of Baghdad. At the same time the ragtag Shiite militia of Moqtada Sadr triggers an all-out U.S. assault in Najaf that risks damaging some of the holiest shrines of the Shiite branch of Islam, for small strategic gain.

Well, interesting of him to notice.

Sadr deserves no sympathy. U.S. miscalculation is almost entirely responsible for turning this insignificant demagogue into a rebel with a following. Shiites, who are still bitter and distrustful of the United States for its failure to support their uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991, are likely to note the disparity of treatment of the Sunni and Shiite insurgencies, and to conclude that Shiite political will is the true target of the Najaf operation.

On the first point, correct. On the second, well that is arguable, but indeed he puts a finger on an item that had not occured to me. Shedding much Shiite blood now, after sparing Fallujah...

The fact that Allawi is by heritage a Shiite will not reduce the sting of his approving the operation. An ex-Baathist, he has always made his career in Sunni-dominated power structures.

Eh, anyone with any political experience could be so characterized. Although to be fair the author does point out the issue that Allaouie's Shiiteness is likely suspect to many.

The timing of the latest burst of specious charges and allegations against Chalabi, his nephew Salem and his political party also suggests, at a minimum, a highly selective use of limited resources.

Specious charges?

Maybe, maybe not. Perhaps Hoagland is hurt his old fav. is doing so poorly.

Of course, no doubt the charges are political as much as (or perhaps more than) factual.

Chalabi, whom I have known and written about for 30 years, has made a large number of necessary and unnecessary enemies in his long campaign to bring down the Baathists and then to keep them from returning to power. Among the unnecessary and unforgiving enemies was L. Paul Bremer, Bush's proconsul in Baghdad during the formal U.S. occupation and a man quick to see a hidden Iranian hand in Iraq's problems.

Chalabi's fight with other Iraqi factions in Baghdad is his business. But the Bush team petulantly stakes American prestige, credibility and honor on a covert campaign of score-settling against Chalabi, Sadr and any other Shiites who might be influenced by Iran, while terrorists reign in Fallujah. This is not strategy; this is folly.

Let's leave aside Hoadland's little spinning. The point where he has a leg to stand on is the issue of perception between Sunni and Shiite.

The reality is it is near impossible to resolve the expectations of either community at present. The Lebanese civil war is the model now.

Question is, is the present set of tactics worse than the past set of bungling?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:46 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

So Najaf it is

With but a day's delay. Unless it goes to the old city, this is the same old round robin I expect. A few hundred dead militia, a few thousand new followers.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:51 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

August 11, 2004

Iraq, another climb down

Again.

Whatever the excuse and / or reason, I would like to know, when the US military is going to learn that blustering and then not doing is very bad PR. The phrase speak softly, carry a big stick seems to have been forgotten.

Of course a full on assault on Najaf falls into those actions of losing by winning. I can hardly convince myself that any real gain would come out of 'winning' in Najaf. At least not any real gain for the Americans.

I thought of asking when they would learn some lessons from this macabre dance, but when it comes right down to it, there are none to learn. There is nothing that can cause the resistance to fade away, and neither nothing that a civilized nation of the 21st century will tolerate (if only for the blow back of live imagery) that will crush the resistance.

Not from American actions in any event.

So, more of the dance of the macabre. In cemetaries, which has some felicitious value, although using airstrikes again in Urban areas and in on holy ground defies reason.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:15 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

Sex and Clothing, a clarification

In comments I was asked the following (in re my comment on my assistant):

"The prevalence of slut wear here is really to much, I may add, not healthy for a still very conservative society."

Also, unless I'm mistaken, you think Bush's alliance with religious groups is a reason to vote Kerry, yet you don't think that if more people wore hidjabs in Jordan, that would be a bad sign. Why is religious resurgence in the US bad but in Jordan it's neutral? Reminds me of a former philosophy teacher who, to counter anti-Jewish Catholics, would always present Catholicism negatively while never admitting there might be something wrong with Judaism.
A mirror image of what he disliked most, if you will.

The first thing to note is that noting that I don't think slut wear (I mean the kind of stuff that would turn heads in a Western metro area) is a good thing for a conservative society is not saying girls should wear hijabs.

I think we can all discern that there is a range of 'conservative' between girls wearn plunging, belly-showing skin tight tops and hot pants and a wearing a Saudi style outfit. So we have really begun with a red herring.

But let me use that red herring as an excuse to clarify.

On one hand, on the political level, it is my judgement that the reality is that given economic and social circumstances, the region has to pass through a period of conservative reaction. It's the nature of the social dynamic. In observing that I am not saying it is good or bad, only that rather than sweeping it all under the carpet, I would rather see the societies work it out. Iran comes to mind as a place where popular reaction on the social level has, at least in large urban areas, seen a more rooted advance of women than the Arab world.

Compare this to my opinion of Bush - I actually never really comment on domestic politics. I don't live there any more, and at some level do not really care. Nevertheless, were I living in the United States, yes, I would find Ibn Bush's cozying up to the Religious Right (in domestic terms) with its profoundly illiberal (I mean liberal here in the classic sense) something to oppose. And of course I find Xian fundies every bit as tedious as any other kind, and in that domain where I do care about them (their influence on foreign policy where it effects me, i.e. in the Middle East, I don't give a flying fuck about their influence elsewhere) of course I am hostile.

However, these are different calculations. The socio-economic context of the United States is not that of the Middle East, and to apply one set of standards to the other is a gross error. In my view the United States is a mature society that both can handle and needs more liberalism (again small L: meaning liberal policies in economics such as free trade and reduced state role [although I am not a libertarian loon, government intervention is a good and necessary thing in many cases in order to create healthy long term markets], and in the same respect, reduced state intervention in social policy, especially as 'morality police.' I suppose a moderately libertarian position in current North American political vocabulary). The same is not the case for the Middle East, and insofar as one has a restricted amount of choice and there is a play off between economic and social liberalism, in the Middle East I opt for the economic liberalism given the desperate need to create growth. In the longer run, that will generate the capacity for greater social change.

In the short run, it's healthier to avoid social explosion by playing along with the social conservatives.

So, final word: Appropriate analysis for the situation, not one size fits all rubbish.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:51 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

August 10, 2004

On Iraq, yet again: A report

Via Oldman I found this article, http://fairuse.1accesshost.com/news2/philly3.html, which prompted me to comment a bit.

The situation in Iraq right now is not as bad as the news media are portraying it to be. It's worse.
By Ken Dilanian
Inquirer Staff Writer

A funny article. Amusing.

First, there is this:
A kind of violence fatigue has descended over news coverage of Iraq. Car bombings that would have made the front page a year ago get scant mention these days.

Assassinations and kidnappings have become so common that they have lost their power to shock. More U.S. soldiers died in July (38) than in June (26), but that didn't make the nightly newscasts, either.

Well, the above is not so amusing, per se, but true, now let me get to the points that amused me.

The U.S.-led effort to restore basic services has become a story of missed goals and frustrations. Hoped-for foreign investment in Iraq's economy hasn't materialized - what company is going to risk seeing its employees beheaded on television?

As for the turnaround, I couldn't have been more wrong.

Well, of course.

It strikes me as strange the degree to which commentators such as this one (or in the National Review with its delirious 'media bias' spin) could have duped themselves, and continued to do so even through the Spring.

In the spring, I wrote: "I have seen a lot of good that has come of this painful expenditure of blood and treasure - very real progress that has made life better for some Iraqis, and promises to make it exponentially better, over time."

I still believe the U.S.-led effort in Iraq is accomplishing many good things, most of which get no publicity. And I still think it's too early to abandon hope that a stable and democratic Iraq will emerge from this crucible.

Emphasis added.

Ah, hope springs eternal.

However, wishful thinking and actual analysis are not the same thing. As the underlined section shows, our dear reporter in this instance is one of those starry eyed wishful thinkers.

And I may add with seriously distorted ideas to begin with - I suppose they go in thinking every second it going to be an action film. Even war zones have their calm areas and their calm moments.

But I learned this summer that the insurgency has been far more successful than I would have imagined at sowing instability and halting progress. Most Iraqis aren't seeing the improvements they had hoped for, and they're not blaming the guerillas - they're blaming the Americans. Sovereignty seems to have had zero effect on this equation.

Well, no shit. Of course anyone with the vaguest understanding of Iraqi attitudes towards Americans and foreigners would have been able to see that, over a year ago actually. As for sovereignty, there is nothing worse than believing one's own propaganda.

In March, as I was writing, the $18.4 billion reconstruction effort was just getting off the ground. I had sat in on a briefing in which a senior U.S. official confidently predicted that, by June, thanks to American rebuilding efforts, Iraq would have electricity 18 hours a day throughout the country.

But that's just what they did.

Again.... sucker. Bloody drooling sucker. What the fuck was this dumb fuck thinking? All one had to fucking do was following the dumb fucking CPA bullshit for three months last summer to see publicly set goals were all about fucking spinning the idiots at home, not about real achievements. Never mind no one there has one fucking clue as how to proceed.

Gullible twits.

It's now August, and that goal still hasn't been reached. Throughout much of the country, the power goes off for half the day or more. That has meant another summer of babies sweltering in 120-degree apartments, of factories that can't run, of despair turning to hatred.

Yeha.

One reason the goal was missed is that the uprising by Muqtada al-Sadr's militants - and the since-abandoned Marine effort to pacify Fallujah - ushered in the worst violence since the United States and its allies invaded Iraq last year.

That explosion of insecurity upended another observation I made in that April article. I said the insurgents thus far had not been able to substantially undermine the rebuilding effort.

Well given there had not been a substantial effort by April, this was a somewhat trivial assertion. Not even true I would say.

Well, in April and May, that changed. U.S. contractors hunkered down or pulled out, supply lines were attacked, and the reconstruction sputtered to a near halt. The Sunni triangle has always been risky, but now, so is the Shiite south.

Those battles are over, but the results were mixed, at best. The First Armored Division chased Sadr's men from several southern cities, yet he and his armed followers remain active in Najaf and parts of Baghdad, a force for instability. The Marines backed off in Fallujah, and that city is now a safe haven for foreign terrorists and Iraqi insurgents.

And the enemy became even more politically popular.

Some reconstruction work has resumed in the last two months, but continued attacks have driven up security costs astronomically. The current wave of kidnappings may halt the rebuilding again. Security issues pervade everything.

Oh do they.

Take telephones. In my April piece, I said Iraq's new mobile-phone network was an unheralded success story that has changed the lives of many average Iraqis, at least in Baghdad. That's still somewhat true.

Similar problems plague the entire reconstruction effort, which is moving so slowly that the Bush administration is thinking of overhauling it. A near-total lack of visible progress has prompted even the most pro-Western Iraqis to lose faith in the capabilities - and worse, the intentions - of the United States.

And our man reports this last as if it were news.

It's amazing how many Iraqis are convinced that the Americans are withholding electricity to punish them. Absurd, sure - but people who think like that are more inclined to plant a bomb, pick up a gun, or at least look the other way when their neighbor does.

Hardly amazing if you step out of your own skin or put yourself in their context of (a) past experience, and (b) the near universal human trait of placing blame on the foreigner or the outsider.

Again, none of this should be a surprise to anyone.

That's one reason large swaths of the country that once were safe are now considered danger zones. I felt that myself, driving south to Karbala a few weeks ago in an unarmored car with no guards or weapons. There is where the two Polish journalists were killed, my driver noted. There's where the CNN guys got hit.

Ah well.

Finally on this:
Staff Sgt. Sheldon Rivers doesn't speak in the nuanced language of a television talking head. The full picture as he and his buddies see it is much more practical - and much more telling:

"I'm tired of every time we go out the gate, someone tries to kill me."

As anyone who has been reading my journal since last year knows, I heard the same things from upper level CPA types last year. This is not news. Rather news is our reporter has just figured out that his vision is fucked.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

On who's holding mortgage securities

I wanted to belatedly thank oldman (http://oldman1787.blogspot.com/2004/07/housing-who-is-buying-mortgage.html) for the data on mortgage securities and for correctly understanding the thrust of my concern. Like him, I have some serious concerns about systematic risk (as well as my dollar exposure - need to move assets into Euro accounts I think, given my particular positioning).

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:05 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

August 09, 2004

On the oil call

Mostly for Pantom:

Didn't I say oil assets? Now we have Sadr's bit of fun putting a halt to exports, per recent reports. That should do fun things to oil prices for a few hours.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:21 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

Iraq, tired random rambling on how violence costs me money

First, the Sadr thing is simply bizarre. I think Juan Cole sometime back opined that Sadr is mentally unstable - the erratic nature of his actions I think suggests this is true. The uprising right now simply does not make all that much sense. Although of course to presume that this whirling headless dervish of a country allows anyone to have any real degree of control is to engage in the same fantastical thinking as our Ibn Bush idjits.

By the way, the helicopter footage over the weekend (the one that went down in Sadr City) had all the signs of real ugliness. I believe Ibn Bush is running on luck that a "Blackhawk Down" moment has not happened yet. Of course I'm surprised none of the transports into Baghdad airport haven't been whacked.

Finally, Steel is going through another iteration. The Zombie is stumbling around like a blind drunk, perhaps we may end up with something, although fuck knows that with the current Shi'a uprising we're getting into yet shittier territory. Where to put this bastard, I don't know. Northern Iraq, Southern Iraq? 7th pit of hell? So many choices, so little data.

Sitting here thinking about this, a bizarre expression of an old colleague of mine sprang to mind: "I'm so happy I could gnaw on my own penis." Now the origin of this ... well disgusting and truly warped phrase is/was a complete whack job, but suddenly in contemplating Iraq and a beautiful project with a 70 percent return over four years (projected... blah blah), I can almost see a use for it.

A thought occurs, perhaps overly cynical but what the hell: Open warfare between the factions might actually be a step forward.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:02 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

Challabi II

I note that I could care less if the charges are true... they probably are Allawi playing dirty pool, but then not playing dirty pool in the Middle East is a suckers game.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:39 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

Challabi I

I was deeply entertained that the Neo Cons' Great Iraqi Patriot (tm) is facing counterfeiting charges. al-Arabiyah had that last night. And Salem, the war crimes nephew, murder.

Wonderful. I believe I am experiencing a bit of guilty pleasure.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004

Darfur - On Racism, On Ignorance, On Laziness and just plain stupidity (and Arab responses)

First, to avoid the typical miscomprehensions from the ignorant twits who lack in reading comprehension, let me say that what is happening in Dar Fur is a disgrace, and terrible. Ethnic cleansing (not genocide, ethnic cleansing, let's keep the word genocide for... well genocide and not yet engage in another namby pamby debasing of meaning for shock value to mobilize the sensitive) is never a good thing, and the Arab supremacist government in Sudan deserves scorn and pressure. Perhaps even getting a good spanking with an oil blockade.

This aside, Western commentary - whether in "blogs" or ordinary media has been remarkably ignorant and frankly often racist in a lazy and stupid sort of way falling into stupid "Black" versus "Arab" idiocies.

Let me first refer readers to this article, thanks to Charles Stewart: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17326

It is a serviceable article and far better than the piss-poor stuff I have generally seen. I'll return to comment on it after some comments I began before finding this.

Continue reading "Darfur - On Racism, On Ignorance, On Laziness and just plain stupidity (and Arab responses)"

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:09 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004 , MENA Fringe

August 05, 2004

Iraq: Signals of slow but sure Lebanonization

As I have been sitting down arguing over the investment memo on the steel facility, it's becoming ever more clear to me that we have an issue far more serious than simply investment structure, for all my whinging about that.

Are real issue is, even with USG risk insurance, who will want to touch Iraq given any intelligent observor can see the country is slowly, but surely sliding towards Lebanonization circa 1975. That means a slow, but sure slide into communitarian violence. Pauses will occur, there will be hope in regards to pulling out, but inexorably the hard core factions in each (major) community will see greater benefit in trying to grab power rather than share it. The logic is there, the ingredients are there, and I see absolutely no real countervailing measures to prevent this slide. Except perhaps an international peace keeping force, although that is not going to happen, and in reality I suspect the factions are too heavily armed to be able to successfully be suppressed (except by massive and bloody force that is unacceptable to all in that context).

Excellent. Now, that does not mean you can't still make money out of Iraq, but it sure does mean you have to think about where the enclaves are likely to be, and where the "green lines" are likely to be. Central region is likely to be a fucking mess. North West of Baghdad a Sunni controlled zone, North east perhaps neutralish, Kurdish region, long line of skirmishing, with Kirkuk a mini Baghdad cauldron of violence, south of Baghdad, another skirmish zone. Baghdad, the heart of darkness.

For my money, I bet Basra may emerge as another economic center over the next decade.

I may be too pessimistic at present, but that's my present call.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:49 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Filed Under: Aug-Dec 2004