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September 10, 2004
No Exit: Lebanon on the Euphrates [Edit to add citation to new report]
First, my thanks to the point to this article.
What Went Wrong in Iraq
By Larry Diamond
From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040901faessay83505/larry-diamond/what-went-wrong-in-iraq.html?mode=print
An interesting oversight. I can see (as I would say ever serious article has) this confirms my 'on the ground' sense of things and what I observed. However that is hardly news.
Rather, I point to these paragraphs:
Not only did the fighting in April and May fail to eliminate Sadr's forces, it also did nothing to counter Iraq's other heavily armed militias. These include not only the battle-hardened Kurdish Pesh Merga (which number at least 50,000 fighters) but also the large and well-armed militias of the two most important Shiite religious parties, SCIRI (the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and Dawa. At the beginning of 2004, the CPA began negotiating an agreement with these militias for their disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) into the new Iraqi police and armed forces. The CPA's plan was intelligent and comprehensive in design. But the Kurds, understandably wary of any new central Iraqi government, refused to agree to anything more than a superficial integration of their forces (with command structures intact) into the new Iraqi military, and it remains unclear whether the other large militias will truly demobilize and disarm or just warehouse their heavy weapons while temporarily joining the new armed forces. The ddr plan was supposed to have been finalized and announced on May 1. But it was set back seriously by the outbreak of twin insurgencies in Fallujah and the Shiite south in April. The U.S. military was forced to rely on the cooperation (or at least forbearance) of the SCIRI and Dawa militias to evict and defeat the Mahdi army, and this sharply reduced the CPA's leverage over them. The plan was finally released in early June, but with little time left to implement it before the transfer of power. Even as the CPA insisted that the Mahdi army's failure to comply would disqualify Sadr from participating in electoral politics, other Iraqi political leaders began negotiating with him to try to bring him into the political game.
It now seems unlikely that the weak and besieged new Iraqi government will have the will or capacity to enforce the demobilization plan. In fact, the new Iraqi state is caught in a Catch-22: to be viable, it must build up its armed forces as rapidly as possible. But the readiest sources of soldiers and police are the most powerful militias, which will probably allow their fighters to join the new military only if their command structures remain intact. Thus, if the fledgling Iraqi state hopes to truly defeat the militias, it may have to go to war with itself. That seems hard to imagine. Yet if Iraq tries to hold elections while the militias remain intact (in one guise or another), the campaign is likely to become a very bloody and undemocratic affair. Candidates will face assassination, weaker political opponents will be run out of town, and the electoral machinery will be hijacked by those with the most guns.
Even if the security situation improves enough to allow elections to go forward on time, Iraq could still get into further trouble if it follows the UN's recommendation and uses a national-list system, apportioning seats in parliament on the basis of nationwide voting, since this would give the big regional and religious parties an added incentive to inflate their numbers through force and fraud. Should that occur, the biggest winners will be the best-armed and most-organized forces-the Kurds in the far north and the Iranian-backed Islamist parties in the Shiite south. The American occupation could wind up paving the way for the "election" of an Iranian-linked Islamist government in Baghdad.
Emphasis added.
I would like for any doubters to tell me how this does not echo Lebanon c. 1975? (Only in some ways worse, perhaps I should say Lebanon c. 1979)
Somewhere else I saw a comment by someone who said that he could not believe that Iraq's leadership could be so stupid as to allow a descent into civil war. This of course is an entirely too simplistic view. Descent into civil war is not about "stupidity" but rather a negative cycle of tit for tat violence and the emergence, for a lack of better political exchanges, of a winner take all logic in terms of politic power. The bigger pie picture of a peaceful, stable Iraq is convincing only if (a) you believe you're not going to get screwed, (b) you believe that you're getting what is to you an 'appropriate' portion of power. Absolute gains may or may not count, relative changes in position, in a context where the parties seriously (and not without reason) fear exclusion, become paramount in importance.
Under such conditions, it is highly logical and intelligent not to be a weak minded do gooder for some theoretical "good of the nation" but to push to protect your own.
In economics we might call this a negative equilibruim.
In short, do not make the mistake of thinking the descent into violence in illogical, or stupid. In many ways, given the situation, it is highly logical and until the pain exceeds the near term gain, a winning game strategy for sectarian leaders consolidating power.
I note the countervailing incentives for cooperation are (a) weak, (b) often exist only in the fairy tale civics book views of Americans et al, (c) probably of smaller marginal value to key leaders with the means of destruction than the marginal value of consolidating their power bases.
Now a word on this paragraph:
Part of the problem was that both Garner and Bremer never comprehended how Iraqis perceived them. Throughout the occupation, the coalition lacked the linguistic and area expertise necessary to understand Iraqi politics and society, and the few long-time experts present were excluded from the inner circle of decision-making in the CPA. Thus the coalition never grasped, for example, the fact that, although most Iraqis were grateful for having been liberated from a brutal tyranny, their gratitude was mixed with deep suspicion of the United States' real motives (not to mention those of the United Kingdom, a former colonial ruler of Iraq); humiliation that the Iraqis themselves had proved unable to overthrow Saddam; and unrealistic expectations of the postwar administration, which Iraqis expected to quickly deliver them from their problems. Too many Iraqis viewed the invasion not as an international effort but as an occupation by Western, Christian, essentially Anglo-American powers, and this evoked powerful memories of previous subjugation and of the nationalist struggles against Iraq's former overlords.
Emphasis added.
Too much navel gazing, too little understanding.
And another item which I heartily agree with as I saw the same thing:
The obsession with control was an overarching flaw in the U.S. occupation from start to finish. In any postconflict international intervention, there is always a certain tension between legitimacy and control. Yet for most of the first year of occupation, the U.S. administration opted for the latter whenever the tradeoff presented itself.
I might add that I saw more than obsession with control, an obsession with the appearance of 'mastery' for Washington / home consumption more than even a real obsession with actual, effective measures of control.
As throughout, it seems to me that playing to the home audiences usually counted more than actually getting things done.
Overall, a very decent article although the slighly apologistic ending leaves something to be desired. I suppose as an official he felt a need for that.
Now, the real issue is how to pull out of the nose dive?
Frankly, I continue to ratchet back my expectations.
As I sit, looking at the situation, I see no way to avoid a civil war. Let me be clear, that does not mean, for example, on day one of an American withdrawal, for example, all hell breaks loose. No. Look at Lebanon. Starts and stops will occur, but slowly, but surely the center of the country, with its volatile mix of Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, and some confettis of Sunni and Shia Turcomans and Sunni and Shia Kurds can not avoid violent competition for power.
There is no avoiding this. I see no way for the Allaouie led government to pull out of its Catch 22, I see no way for these issues to be resolved in reality without Iraq going through a spasm of violence. This was possible c. June - November 2003, but no longer. Some commentators may speak of federal solutions, but note well our authors comment regarding Iraqi's "majoritarian" views on democracy. Federalism is not going to be acceptable, everybody wants all the pie. Even more so that the pie is felt to be at once rich (we have oil!) but diminishing.
Of course, my question is, who gets what? I suspect that the Kurds, who have so far (due to roughly a decade of experimentation in politics) shown more political stamina and maturity (in terms of playing a clever hand) than other factions, will likely continue their slow march to de facto statehood. I suspect that they will not opt for any de jure statement - for fear of Turkish and perhaps Iranian intervention and perhaps to maintain an option of actually working with the Turks (who may as some commentators have said) prefer the distasteful option of a stable, largely secular Kurdish protectorate to an Arab dominated hard-Islamist government and likely guerrilla war right up to their borders. The flash point in this case is really the Kirkuk zone, and probably a slow, rolling ethnic cleansing of Arabs, and thus a conflict zone.
The center, as I have said before, is really the heart of darkness. There is no way the capital will not be contested. And given the mixedness of the semi-urban zones around it, I can hardly see a clear status.
The south may very well become a quasi statelet if the Shia avoid internal conflict. Certainly I have been considering whether Basra remains an area of potential investment given the super giant fields there and potential for development if the southern zone remains reasonably stable and a more or less legitimate southern governance structure emerges. It will, of course, be Shia Islamist if it is going to be legitimate, but that's not my problem - it perhaps is an American government problem, but realism requires working with the options actually available, not fictive civic government pie in the sky dreams.
Really a pity that this situation requires such grim calculus, but that is where the facts are.
EDIT:
From Kevin Drum (http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_09/004671.php)
http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf
Worth reading and dissemination.
Posted by The Lounsbury at September 10, 2004 11:54 AM
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Aug-Dec 2004
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