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December 08, 2004
Islamic Democracy [edited to clean up coding]
Very interesting essay in The New York Times which shows a greater sophistication in addressing the issue of democracy and Islam than is ordinarly in the case. I don't beleive it has attracted much attention as of yet, so I'll permit myself a few moments to run through this with some comments.
An Islamic Democracy for Iraq?
By IAN BURUMA
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/05/magazine/05ESSAY.html?pagewanted=all&position=
Published: December 5, 2004
First, I have to say I find the underlying question silly:
Is ''Islamic democracy'' really possible? Or is it something meaningless, like ''Jewish science,'' say, or contradictory, like ''people's democracy'' under Communism?
The term is really like Christian Democracy, as it emerging in Europe in the 19th century in Europe when transition from authoritian traditions to democracy began to emerge.
But granting that the question is being posed, the more interesting points
The more interesting points
The ayatollah insists that an Iraqi constituent assembly must be chosen through direct elections and that ''any basic law written by this assembly must be approved by a national referendum.'' He makes only cursory reference to Koranic law as the basis for that legal code. .... It is the duty of the Shiites, according to the ayatollah, to protect Sunni and Christian interests as well. And although he opposed a plan to allow Kurds, who make up 15 to 20 percent of the Iraqi population, veto power over the constitution, he has not squelched Kurdish hopes of preserving some degree of autonomy under a new government. All these are fine words, of course, yet to be tested in reality. But they are remarkable words for a Shiite cleric born in Iran and should be taken seriously.
Quite right, although I would say that the fact he was born in Iran is rather irrelevant insofar as pre-Khomieni, it was Sistani's approach that was dominant.
Despite the recent surge of conservative Christian activism in the
A very able set of comparisions. Keep them in mind, the fishbowl manner which we tend to look at the Middle East can often be decieving, exagerating differences, obscuring similarities.
Now, some excellent observations on the history of secularism in the region (after the author draws attention to my old man Wolfowitz and our favoriate historian Lewis - who as you all know I genuinely like in the context of keeping in mind his weaknesses - penchant for Kemalism):
Similar revolutions happened or were tried elsewhere. After the Meiji Restoration in
Unfortunately, what came out of all this secularizing zeal was not democracy but militarism, absolute monarchy, fascism and variations of Stalinism. The religious revolution that now stalks the Muslim world has come as a reaction, in part, to the failure of modern secular politics. And yet many Middle East analysts sympathetic to the Bush administration, like Daniel Pipes, see a secular strongman, along the lines of Ataturk or Chiang Kai-shek, as the best option in Iraq, since elections in the short term would bring ''Khomeini-like mullahs'' to power. Neoconservatives are not alone in their distrust of clerics. This distrust split the left-leaning anti-Communist opposition in Poland too. It was hard for some dissidents to support the priests against the commissars. As Jerzy Urban, one of the last spokesmen for the Communist regime there, once remarked, it's either us or the Black Madonna of Czestochowa. But does it always have to be one or the other? Is the choice in Iraq really between Ataturk and Khomeini?
As those of you who have been with me for a while, the bold and underlined argument has long been my argument. Of course, you also all know my extreme contempt for Pipes. I rather like comparision with the Polish situ, even if it is of necessity inexact. Nevertheless, the contrast is useful, is the choice actually between Ataturk and Khomieni? I say, as you all know, no.
The following note is also useful for keeping on context the history of secularism as we normally approach it and to a warning to fetishizing a certain constellation of political arrangements as the one and only approach. Of course that does not mean either that any given alternative is actually better, only that a bit of critical thinking about processes and means of efficiently getting "there" from "here" is badly needed.
The idea that modern democracy has to be secular in its ethos is, of course, rooted in European history. The Enlightenment was partly an assault on the authority of the church, especially in France. Political arrangements were to be subject to reason, not to theology. To be modern was to reject religion, or ''superstition,'' and to believe in science. It was not enough, in the view of Voltaire, among others, to put organized religion in its place; it was necessary to ''wipe out that rubbish.'' The belief in science as a solution for all human problems became a kind of superstition itself. Scientific socialism, a la Stalin and Mao, for example, led to all manner of crackpot experiments that caused the deaths of millions.
Again, valuable and useful points, and not simply on a political science level, but rather on a practical level. Rather like transplanting a series of business processes from one firm to another, transplanting a certain set of political operational frameworks does not really work unless one adapts to how people really use the tools, and that means understanding where they are actually coming from. Erecting a certain process method as the way of doing things without grappling with the potential changes needed from one firm or culture to another means failure.
Of course, not all rationalists were so extreme. Many typical Enlightenment thinkers, like John Locke, were convinced that a political system based on enlightened self-interest could not survive without a strong basis in religious morality. The kind of anti-clericalism that inspired Stalinists and other authoritarians was more a product of the French Revolution than of the pursuit of democracy in itself.
Really nothing to add to this other than it is an interesting, I think correct, and valuable observation.
I may add that I immediately began thinking of my half sarcastic phrase for the Neo Con movement, as Right Bolshevism. I think there is perhaps more to that than my sarcasm.
However, the following is a more important observation, in relationship to a point I have hammered away at ever since I began making my semi-useful commentaries on MENA.
In fact, anti-clericalism, much more than a history of religious zeal, formed the basis for many of the Middle East's bloodiest political failures: Nasserism in Egypt, Baathism in Syria and Iraq, the shah in Iran. These regimes were led by secular elites who saw religion as something that held their countries back or in a state of colonial dependence. The fact that a number of iron-fisted reformers, like Nasser himself, were routinely the objects of assassination attempts by religious zealots showed the gap between the secular ''progressive'' elites and the people they ruled. When organized religion is destroyed, something worse often takes its place, usually a quasi religion or personality cult exploited by dictators. When it is marginalized, as happened in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East, it provokes a religious rebellion.
Important observations, again saying rather more clearly and succinctly what I have tried to convey. Kemalism in the Middle East has been tried and it went badly. Turkey kinda sorta got it right, but the Turkish case is too different to truly rely on.
This is not to say that Muslim clerics are naturally disposed to democracy. But, as Michael Hirsh pointed out in a recent article in The Washington Monthly, a number of Middle East scholars -- Richard Bulliet, author of ''The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization,'' among them -- have argued that religion for many centuries actually acted as a constraint on tyranny in the Muslim world. The destruction of traditional Muslim institutions, like religious schools and mosques, in the name of modernization left a social void in which extreme, political Islam would eventually thrive.
Well, you know I did not care all that much for Hirsh's article nor his interpretations, but Bulliet I know and like to an extent although I will commit some degree of heresy in stating the 'fellow traveller' accusation has a tiny grain of truth, that is I think his interpretations are somewhat overgenerous (although I admit I have read more Lewis than Bulliet, and in some ways like Lewis more.... despite the problems I see with him, above in re his conclusions).
If religion acted as a constraint - it did I grant that - it was not historically all that brilliant of a constraint. True, the Islamic world until "modernization" did not generate the absolutisms of the same nature as Europe, but I am not very convinced this was so much Islam qua Islam as perhaps the constellation of political and economic structures. Taking, however, as a given that Islamic doctrine does mitigate against fascist type ideologies (Keppel and Roy certainly argue in this vien), making the term Islamofascist rather wrong headed in many ways as it gets much of their thought in an entirely wrongheaded context, that is not necessarily enough to truly mitigate against the emergence of nihilist Talebanesque regimes either.
Om the underlined point, I would say that this void emerged as much because of the economic failure of the Arab Socialist experiment, and its closely allied Great State (Conservative) Arab Nationalist bretheren as much as the religious angle. The one thing the State got right was State security organs, which in their repressive efficiency have generated the only response possible in a society where the secular is associated with a kind of clownish version of Stalinism.
Ayatollah Khomeini was not acting as a traditional Shiite cleric but as a modern revolutionary who took power as a political strongman. And in the eyes of many believers, his worldly dictatorship in Iran undermined his stature as a religious figure, since mullahs are not supposed to act like politicians. Osama bin Laden is an amateur priest with more knowledge of Swiss bank transfers and media manipulation than of the intricacies of Islam. It would be hard to find a serious Muslim cleric or scholar who respects him.
Fair statements, but I think the last one on ObL is overdone, depending on what one means by serious Muslim scholar and respect. I would say there are a goodly number of reactionaries who do regard him as a useful idiot, which is a kind of respect in the context of not denouncing him.
However, it is true those with a theological bent seem not to respect ObL as himself.
On the other hand, insofar as what counts for a Muslim religious leader is attracting followers, being a second rate scholar, novice bricoleur in radical theology and some vulgar propagandist in the eyes of the more refined, is perhaps of secondary importance.
The strength and weakness in Islam is the lack of central authority or even particularly clear standards for who is a "cleric" (as low church Protestantism).
It may be useful to reflect for a moment on how the West itself has coped with religion. The separation of church and state was indeed a necessary condition for democratic development in
Excellent observation, and gets us back to the question of how do we (they) get there from here? The Maoist or Bolshevik New Man style thinking does not strike me as particularly useful. But then I don't believe societies or people transform. That has largely been an extreme Left conceit. Nor do I particularly believe in civilizing missions or what not (something of a general conceit). Achieving enough change to create a modus vivendi with one's neighbors is quite enough and yet quite a hurdle.
This paragraph is equally important:
I do not believe this. It is always tricky for an agnostic in religious affairs to argue for the importance of organized religion, but I would argue not that more people should be religious or that democracy cannot survive without God, but that the voices of religious people should be heard. The most important condition for a functional democracy is that people take part. If religious affiliations provide the necessary consensus to play by common rules, then they should be recognized. A Sharia-based Shiite theocracy, even if it were supported by a majority, would not be a democracy. Only if the rights and interests of the various ethnic and religious groups are negotiated and compromises reached could you speak of a functioning democracy.
I tend to regard the very religious as dupes, simple minded fools and other kind thoughts, however the reality is they are the majority of humanity. Pretending one can change the world is nice little Quixotesque game to play, but it is far more useful to be a pragmatist.
Achieving some idealized transformation of Middle Eastern society along the lines of what the highly urbane, literate, largely agnostically secular and generally old school liberal Western Urban Elite think is the Holy Grail of social standards is a bit of magical thinking (for all that I may add that as a member of the same "elite" I largely fully subscribe to our values). Creating enough space so there is a modus vivendi so our values can continue to exist, so that there is a positive engagement rather than a clash of cultures
Skipping ahead I note the following important point
The views of devout Shiites on the rights of women and other social issues may not be shared by most voters in the United States, but devout Shiites do claim to want popular sovereignty based on elections. The question is whether Sistani and his followers maintain this position because they are the majority in Iraq and elections would favor them, not the Sunnis, or whether they want an electoral system on principle. We will not know the answer until it is tested -- that is, until one faction or another loses an election and has to give its consent to being ruled by an alternative party. Sistani has worked hard to create a unified Shiite coalition, but Shiites are far from being united. A coalition between Chalabi and the radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr could siphon off a number of Shiite votes.
I add however, I find the analogy drawn to Indonesia to be far off base. It could have been true before the CPA drove off a cliff. In the longer run, however his points, which I have skipped have some weight. (As an aside, I am not convinced that the views of devout Shiites in Iraq are so strange to social conservatives in the US of A - taking into account social structure differences, they're actually merely differences of degree in my view, although I confess being equally contemptous of all 'true believers' in any given religion)
Regardless, a key hidden point is that whatever cheap outrage about how local society does not look like some idealized Western objective, what one actually needs to focus on is what is doable, what is achievable and what has real returns on the effort invested.
As even the slightest reflection on one's own native society tells one that "outside" interference in familial/social issues is an area that generally provokes heated, emotional and above all violent opposition. Economic relations are easier to work with, above all inthe context of supporting incipent change and to the extent possible, the upcomers versus the established interests - which as I have oft noted are largely rent seekers, not wealth creators.
Above all the issue is understanding what are the achievable goals, be they in Iraq or elsewhere. Among the grave errors, in re Iraq and playing off the implicit observation contained in the underlined phase, was to seek to impose ("encourage") a late 20th century secular Western view of women's roles in society on a society that already felt 'under attack.' Bad politics (well good domestic American politics), not even a good business considering one should first win over one's market.
The core issue is absolutely not remaking the target society over into "our" image, like some moralizing twits or in the old "civilizing mission" model, but working to neutralize those aspects that present real and present threats to current interests. If the Arab Islamic world wants to evolve in our image, super, if not, well, their choice. I am a liberal, in the old sense. I dislike imposed social models, even "liberal" ones - although I grant that under certain circumstances I find it acceptable for a democratic society to make a choice to "move" less-than-optimal social views by "force." In this context I point to racial issues in the US - being a conditional and reluctant supporter of some forms of Affirmative Action having encountered via intimate and professional relations the real but oft hidden racism of too many of my pale confreres - that is an internal choice driven by internal decision making: even in this case it remains controversial and while I find my "white brothers" outrage over affrimative action generally childish, overdone and often highly suspect (no small amount of crypto racism I think is involved in much AA opposition in the US and Europe, principled opposition I do however largely agree with in theory although pragmatism leads me to go counter to abstract principles).
The side track on AA is not by accident I add, I mean to highlight the issue of internally driven change versus what is perceived as "outside" agitation. While there is a place for outside agitation, on such highly sensitive and 'intimate' issues, my experience in the region (and elsewhere - an error we can make is to look at MENA as if it were some alien world, in truth much of what occurs in the MENA region is found in other degrees elsewhere, e.g. the machismo - an aside the undergrad blog I was referred to is replete with this kind of error, besides being rather pedestrain) it has always struck me that the Left centered idea of "improving" social relations is usually a failed piece of business. The most outre relations - e.g. apartheid, slavery, etc. should be punished, but issues such as domestic violence, hijab wearing: these things are best dealt with through the envy factor rather than inevitably clumsy, misplaced direct pressure.
On the otherhand, relations based on interest - shared interest - are rather more amenable to change. Economic - Business relations. When I refer to Economic - Business relations, I refer to productive, wealth generating relations, not the extractive, rent-based relations say of the Gulf. Here, you can make real changes (although issues of social justice etc. can generate strong responses, so ideally - and this is indeed based on
Returning to the essay:
Radical Islam, promoted and financed by Wahhabists from Saudi Arabia [*], began to attract a growing number of Indonesians for the same reason it appealed to Iraqis under Saddam Hussein: when all political opposition is crushed by autocrats, the mosque becomes the only place of political refuge. After an economic crisis led to the downfall of Suharto's dictatorship, the chaotic start of a new democracy created room for radicals, calling for an Islamic state, to operate more freely. Secular politicians refused to criticize the Islamists for fear of being accused of being anti-Islam, and moderate Muslims tried to ignore them. This pretense was no longer possible after a group named Jemaah Islamiyah, loosely linked
to Al Qaeda, killed more than 200 people in a disco in Bali. Indonesians had to acknowledge that they had an Islamist terrorist problem.
First, addressing the bolded section with the [*] let me note that the Saudi pretext is overused. Salafisme existed in Indonesia before and without Saudi influences. Saudi financing and the interim influence (and here let me stress an important observation) by the wealth=prestige effect of Wahhabi-Salafisme alliance certainly helped the reaction.
Second, however, I emphasize that the author identifies the right drivers here. The bolded and underlined section tells you much of what you need to know.
The remainder of the comment strikes me as rich, correct and as applicable to the MENA region as Indonesia.
When the only space for criticism of a corrupt regime in religion.... reflect.
You might conclude from this that Suharto had it right. His rule may have been harsh and corrupt, but at least he kept the Islamists in their box. Democracy is resulting in terror. Yet this would be the wrong conclusion. Not only were Suharto's authoritarian methods largely responsible for the birth of religious extremism; democracy is proving to be the best cure -- for moderate Muslims, still the majority in Indonesia, are so appalled by the bloody mayhem caused by the terrorists that they won't vote for any party associated with them. This has forced the Islamist parties to publicly reject the extremists.
Decompression.
In re the underlined section, I think this somewhat overstates things. Religious conservatism - which I am perhaps wrong in confounding with extremism in this context - certainly existed before in Indonesia (viz Aceh), but I largely agree the nihilistic and terroristic form was likely doped (not created nor entirely responsible for) by the secular dictatorship of Suharto. As in Turkey, however, Indonesia managed to create just enough progress (perhaps a function of natural conditions one has to admit - an item that renders the MENA region difficult are the severe natural restraints on economic development. Jordan, a fine little country, allows -abstracting away from its neighborhood problems - precious little error in terms of developmental policy) to avoid the nihilistic spiral of the MENA region, as in Egypt.
The author is quite right in emphasizing the utility of democracy - at least some reasonable resemblance of democracy - in allowing popular feeling to move, to ebb and flow, and in that context, turn popular opinion against extremism.
Let me take Morocco as an example, anectdotal to be sure, but a country I know well, having a long and very intimate connexion with it. In particular, I point to the popular reaction to the terror attacks of May 2003. The mass - and above all spontaneous! - demostrations against terror, demonstrations that my Moroccan friends tell me were joined or supported by all segements of society except the al-Qaedah types, (i) could only have occured under the limited democratization (but rather more extensive liberalisation of expression) since the new King came in, (ii) were highly instrumental in 'suppressing' the extremists, and turning otherwise sympathetic types away from them. Somewhat less useful, and in some ways perhaps mildly counterproductive (although I note likely necessary economically) state security responses I found less important than the spontaneous outpouring of outrage.
In reality, in terms of real "Western" interest, we should be less interested in forcing changes in how Muslim men and women interact - as an old school liberal (in the 'libertarian' sense) I dislike although am willing to admit limited intervention here - but rather in supporting what is likely to be the locally, internally desired seeds of what "we" want to achieve, both in the near term and the long term.
Finally, let me highlight some important items in the closing:
It is very difficult to build a democracy as pupils of foreign tutors who arrived in bombers and tanks. Even though the foreign occupiers say they want an Iraqi democracy too, anyone or any party believed to be on the side of foreigners is discredited from the start. The more those foreigners insist on secularism, the more the local people may turn to radical Islamism. And the more violence the Islamists unleash, the less likely it is that Iraqis can vote in safety. This is particularly true of the so-called Sunni triangle north and west of Baghdad. It is all very well for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and for leading Shiites and Kurds, to say that it would still be better to have elections, even if many people can't take part, but that won't do. ''There is no perfect election in the world,'' Sa'ad Jawad Qandil told The Boston Globe. Qandil is a senior official in the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, a major Shiite party better known as Sciri. ''If there are some minorities who cannot participate because of security, that is not a reason to cancel the decision of the majority.'' Well, yes, it is. For if the Sunnis can't vote, Iraqi democracy won't work, because without the consent of this minority, the majority can never govern in peace.
I admit that I am torn. Whatever my (almost boundless) contempt for the Bush Administration, I have a hard time imagining any way around holding elections "on schedule" - given the Shiite insistance, given Kurdish views and given the issues re the Sunni. I would suggest that the sole way out of the Catch-22 is engage a post election declaration aimed at the Sunnis that in "troubled districts" another election can be held and set up a mechanism to try to engage the Sunni - even those who have killed Americans.
I note, by the way, that the desire, understandable of course, for American blood to be made "good" by refusing "killers" entry into the political realm is self defeating - it is cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. The Sunni side, for example, must feel rather similarly in re its losses - why should it accept Americans who have killed so many of their own?
In short, this is an area where long term State Interest has to rule over the domestic political sentiments of the families of dead soldiers - much as it should have happened in re the families of American Viet Nam dead (in my opinion a scandalously stupid derogation of larger state interest to the often irrational interest of a few. No doubt understandable in the context of the mythology of 'necessary victory' (aka the idocy of the "one hand tied behind our backs" argument, that mistakes the total war model of WWII as universally useful) but not useful in advancing the general interest).
Finally, I find this historically sensitive observation to be among the most useful:
It is also true that the religious, in Europe, the United States or anywhere, often do what their priests or mullahs tell them to. Until not so long ago, many people in countries with Catholic or Protestant parties did just that. But at least they voted, and by consenting to the democratic rules, they managed to live together without going at one another's throats. If Shiites and Sunnis can do so in a future Iraq, by voting for religious parties, then so be it. But first they have to be able to vote without getting killed. That is the issue, and not religion per se. The answer will be shaped by a foreign occupation, which made democracy possible, but then, by its very presence, might help to snuff it out.
I rather suspect we are watching the opening of decade long civil conflict, that will engage the US in a senseless cycle of violence for much of the decade (this very much the fault of the Bush Administration, you morons who voted for him under various justifications carry this weight, but then, what the fuck, the fuck up with the dollar and fiscal and monetary policy in many ways outweight this - all in all my dear Bush voters, go to bloody hell.)
Now, have to finish my fucking payment systems readings so I can follow tomorrow's meeting. Can't win clients without being able to pretend to know their business, above all bankers.
Posted by The Lounsbury at December 8, 2004 01:49 AM
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Aug-Dec 2004
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