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January 03, 2005
Think Again: Middle East Democracy
This article, brought to my attention by Zenpundit deserves some comment. I largely agree with the analysis and thrust, with a few quibbles here and there.
Think Again: Middle East Democracy
By Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers
Foreign Policy
November/December 2004
Set up as a series of questions and responses, highly useful questions above all.
“The Middle East Is the Last Holdout Against the Global Democratic Trend”
No. The Middle East is on the wrong side of the global democratic divide, but unfortunately it does not lack company. As Russia slides into authoritarianism, the former Soviet Union is becoming a democratic wasteland with only a few shaky pockets of pluralism, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Central Asia is no better off than the Arab world in terms of democracy. A depressingly large swath of East and Southeast Asia—from North Korea and China down through Vietnam, Laos, and Burma to Malaysia and Singapore—is a democracy-free zone that shows few signs of change.
Ah, well, I guess our man Putin rather pulled the mask off of the little faux democracy game, although Ukraine just might exit the prison. Just might although I would not count on that.
On Putin, I recently had a lunch with some State people - including a fellow I might add who has him and Repubie big wig pics, i.e. not a 'liberal' - where they mocked Bush for his Putin comments. Apparently he says similar things behind closed doors. Well, as my Big Wig man says, he voted for Bush holding his nose.
Skipping ahead.
Today, political reform is percolating again in the region, amid growing public frustration over chronic corruption, poor socioeconomic performance, and a pervasive sense of stagnation. The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks also created pressure for reform—from both the United States and some Arabs who began to question why their societies were so widely viewed as dangerous political cesspools. Talk about political reform and democracy is rife even in the Gulf monarchies where such issues had been taboo. The steps taken thus far in most countries, however, are modest. Although the Arab world is not impervious to political change, it has yet to truly begin the process of democratization.
Emphasis added.
I am not sure that 11 September changed that much within the Arab world... Well, let me rephrase, the above, I think is accurate but I hate the sensation of overplaying the degree of 11 September influence - a push in a direction that was already present. Leaving my quibbling aside, the underlined text: chronic corruption, poor socioeconomic performance, pervasive sense of stagnation are oddly in my opinion also the drivers of Islamism. I noted these three points of frustration as far back as 92, it was already evident that the combined issues of maladapted educaitonal systems, poor economic performance from the State driven economies, deeply corrupt rent seeking elites was producing a radical backlash.
Pressures for change - but what kind of change, and how and when.
I've expressed my suspicion in the past that there may be no way around much of the region going through quasi Iranian revolutions. At the very least, the tabou has to be broken such that Islamists have a chance at power and a chance at failure.
“Democracy in the Middle East Is Impossible Until the Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Resolved”
Wrong. Arab governments curb political participation, manipulate elections, and limit freedom of expression because they do not want their power challenged, not because tension with Israel requires draconian social controls. When the government of Kuwait refuses to give women the right to vote, it does so out of deference to the most conservative elements of its population, not out of fear that voting women will undermine the country’s security. Fear of competition, not of a Zionist plot, leads the Egyptian ruling party to oppose competitive presidential elections. When it comes to democratic reform, the Zionist threat is merely a convenient excuse.
Yet failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict prevents the United States from gaining credibility as an advocate of democracy in the Middle East. Liberal Arabs perceive claims by the United States that it wants democracy in the Middle East as hypocritical, pointing to what they see as American indifference to the rights of the Palestinians and unconditional support for Israel. For their part, many Arab governments do not take U.S. pressure to democratize their region seriously, believing that the need for oil and fear of upsetting regimes that recognize Israel will trump Washington’s desire for democratic change. U.S. credibility in the Middle East will not be restored—and the unprecedented level of anti-American resentment will not abate—until the United States makes a serious, balanced effort to tackle the conflict. Without such credibility, Washington’s effort to stimulate democratization in the region will be severely constrained.
Emphasis added. This comment is, I think, a near perfect description of the role of the I-P conflict.
The real role of the I-P conflict is undermining US street cred., giving something of an excuse for Arab govs - not directly which Marina unfortunately implies but indireclty as in, "they wants us to do X but look they allow Y to go by in Palestine." Logical? Not really in a strict sense, but let's be realistic and frank, popular politics works this way. Not only in the Arab world, but elsewhere as well.
Leaving this aside that issue, the underlined text is the most important. The key problem is not the Arab side problem - Arab popular interest in the issue and the popular view of the US as enormously hypocritical exists independant of any Arab government agitprop (and indeed has a basis in reality) - the core problem and key is on the degree to which it undermines US legitimacy and leverage. Of course other items do so as well.
“The United States Wants Democracy in the Middle East”
Up to a point. The democratic transformation of the Middle East emerged as a central objective of U.S. foreign policy during the Bush administration. This new policy is a sharp reversal of several decades of steadfast support for many autocratic regimes in the region, such as those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. It reflects the new post-9/11 conventional wisdom that Middle East democracy is the best antidote to Islamist terrorism.
Although this desire for democracy may be heartfelt, the United States has a lengthy laundry list of other priorities in the region: access to oil, cooperation and assistance on counterterrorism, fostering peace between Israel and its neighbors, stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preventing Islamist radicals from seizing power.
The newfound U.S. enthusiasm for democracy competes for a place in this mix. Fighting Islamist militants and safeguarding oil still compels the United States to cooperate with authoritarian regimes. People in the region watched as the United States took a tough line against Iran and Syria while failing to push Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, or other friendly tyrants very hard. The Bush administration launched new diplomatic endeavors and aid programs to support positive change, such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and the Middle East Partnership Initiative. But they consist of mild, gradual measures designed to promote democratic change without unduly challenging the authority of incumbent governments.
Moreover, despite the president’s conviction that democratic change in the Middle East is necessary, a great deal of ambivalence remains within the U.S. policy bureaucracy about the prospect of any rapid political openings in the region. This sentiment is particularly true of the State Department and the intelligence community. Some experts worry that, given the political mood of most Arab citizens—who are angry at the United States and sympathetic to political Islam—free and open elections could result in some distinctly unfriendly regimes.
Emphasis added. Of the various comments by Ottaway, I believe this is perhaps the one that is incomplete. The comment on the intel and State communities draws my atteniton, as well as a bit of distaste as I think it feeds into the Know Knothings' unfair attacks on my amigos in State and Agency. Unfair as the skepticism I think is not rooted in the simplistic idea of "the Arabists" not believing democracy is possible, but the sensation in informed circles that the issues are far more complex than the simple minded NeoCon vision of "transformation" a la that idiot Ledeen at the National Review, which fundamentally misunderstands the ability of the US to leverage change and force it - as well as the real consequences of their ideas on how to effect change.
Now, in regards to the nations cited supra, KSA is an understandable one: the US does not have real leverage with KSA to force change. It simply does not, and if there is one country where change is most dangerous and likely to be negative, it's KSA. In re Egypt, one can be forgiven for throwing up one's hands - how to effect change in the case of Egypt short of a bloody revolution, I have no idea. Sadly, we're playing a losing hand propping up Mubarek, but pulling away from him and his corrupt clan of rent seekers is not easy either. Catch 22. Tunisia, however, is a more hopeful case, where pressure might well be useful - yet the fear of the Islamists immobilizes. Certainly Tunisia is at a stage - decent economic progress, excellent macro-economic policy, economic fabric that is capable of responding to change, well-educated populace and knows it is getting wealthier - where political liberalization would be a very good thing to attack some of the problems cropping up, sclerosis in internal governance, corruption (although not bad, could be better), engaging the future.
Tunisia, in the end, is a real possible beacon of hope. However, it could also go very badly wrong.
“The War in Iraq Advanced the Cause of Democracy in the Middle East”
Not yet. The U.S.-led war in Iraq removed from power one of the most heinous, repressive dictators in the region and opened up the possibility that Iraq will one day have a pluralistic political system held together by consensus rather than violence. The actual achievement of democracy in Iraq, however, remains distant and uncertain. The path to that goal will be measured in years rather than months.
The war’s political effects in the rest of the region—especially the way it exposed the hollowness of Saddam Hussein’s regime—has contributed to increased calls for political reform in many Arab countries. Real progress toward democracy, however, is minimal. In addition, the war provoked some Arab governments, such as Egypt, to limit the already constrained political space they allow as a defensive gesture against public protests and as an excuse for prosecuting opponents.
Regrettably, President George W. Bush’s repeated justification of the war as a democratizing mission has discredited some Western-oriented Arab democrats in the eyes of their fellow citizens. Many Arabs have come to view democracy itself as a code word for U.S. regional domination. The unpopularity of the war and the abuses against Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison have further tarnished the reputation of the United States and fueled Islamist extremism.
Proponents of democratic contagion argue that if Iraq holds successful elections in early 2005, this example will resound loudly in the Arab world. But much of the Arab world will likely view such elections, even if they come off well, as highly flawed. Some parts of the predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq are not expected to participate in the elections, and many Arabs will inevitably accuse the United States of manipulation, because the elections will be held under U.S. occupation. Few Arabs will be dazzled into holding a new view of democracy on the basis of one election. Many countries in the region already hold elections of varying degrees of seriousness and importance, including one in Algeria earlier this year, which a Western observer described as “one of the best conducted elections, not just in Algeria, but in Africa and much of the Arab world.”
Promoting democracy throughout the Middle East will require doing away with fantasies of a sudden U.S.-led transformation of the region and taking seriously the challenge of building credibility with Arab societies. Moreover, if the United States is to play a constructive supporting role, it must seriously revise its cozy relations with autocratic regimes, show a sustained ability to apply nuanced diplomatic pressure for political change at key junctures, and back up this pressure with well-crafted and well-funded assistance. Washington must prepare to accept emboldened political forces, and eventually new governments, that are uninterested in doing the United States’ bidding. Embracing Middle East democracy in principle is easy; truly supporting it remains an enormous challenge.
Emphasis added. This paragraph is easily the most important of the entire piece.
In particular, the authors highlight here in the sections I have highlighted the idiocy of the "Transformation" view - which is based on wishful thinking and a simplistic, ignorant view of the Middle East: I suppose from a half-understood sense of the history and a underlying false analogy with Eastern Europe.
That being said, the issue of the challenge in actually effecting democratization - or rather helping democratization over the period of time actually needed, and potentially in conflict with other equally pressing, and more pressing in the short term, interests. Further, doing that in a context where even the generally pro-Western view the US in a highly skeptical light, if not in complete distrust. Expecting an election in Iraq to have some magical and mystical - the words are truly merited here - effect is dangerously ignorant, naive and self defeating.
“Islamists Are the Main Obstacle to Arab Democracy”
Think again. The standard fear is the “one person, one vote, one time” scenario: Islamists would only participate in elections to win power and put an end to democracy immediately. Hence, the argument goes, they should not be allowed to participate.
True, the commitment to democracy of even moderate Islamists is uncertain and hedged by the caveat that democratic governments must accept Islamic law. However, the chances of an overwhelming electoral victory that would allow Islamists to abrogate all freedoms at once is remote in the Arab world. During the last decade, Islamist parties and candidates have participated in elections in eight Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen), always with modest results. (These elections suffered from various degrees of government interference, but there is no indication that the Islamists would have won in a more open environment.) And Turkey, a country where an Islamist party took power with a large majority, is becoming an encouraging example of democratic success.
Although the prediction that Islamist electoral victories would lead to democracy’s demise in the Middle East have so far proved unfounded, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Fear of such takeovers remains in many Arab countries and the United States. Many Arab regimes use this fear to justify meddling in elections and placing restrictions on political participation. The presence of Islamist parties thus complicates the process of democratization.
But Islamist parties are also integral to democratization because they are the only nongovernmental parties with large constituencies. Without their participation, democracy is impossible in the Middle East. The future of democracy in the region depends on whether a sufficient number of such parties moderate their political views and become actors in a democratic process, rather than spoilers in the present autocratic states, and whether incumbent governments stop hiding behind the Islamist threat and accept that all their citizens have a right to participate.
This is a harder judgement call.
First, I largely agree that there will be no democracy or successful democratization if Islamists (by which we mean the spectrum of opinion in the [Sunni] Islamic world that desires a distinct reference in politics to religion, ranging from something not that different from Christian Democracy in a 19th century sense to something bordering on theocracy) are categorically excluded. The Islamist trend is a substantial one in the Arab world, and has a variety of sources, and much attraction comes from perfectly legitimate complaints (as well as some less so and not at all). Categorically shutting off an entire spectrum of opinion - above all one that is expressing a very legitimate frustration with the sclerotic old order - is dangerous and sure to fail, as the underlined section states.
Second, it is dangerous in the immediate term - one vote one time is a potential outcome. However, without some degree of participation, real participation and not stacked participation, democracy is a dead letter. So, risky route or failure. I add, however, that the Turkish case I think is in no way applicable to the Arab situation.
“Arab Countries Have a Historic Propensity Toward Authoritarianism”
Yes. But so what? Most societies have lived under authoritarian rule for some time, often for a long time. Democracy is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. Even in the United States and Europe it was only consolidated through universal suffrage in the last century. ..... [omitted] ....
To ascribe the lingering Arab absence of democracy to some unique historic affinity for authoritarianism, stemming from Arab culture, Islam, or anything else is thus factually incorrect. It is also politically defeatist, attributing a quality of inevitability that belies the experience of political change in other parts of the world.
Nothing to add here other than a good sense of history.
Now the next piece really required Marina Ottaway to write, as it is rather politically incorrect, but I entirely agree:
“Promoting Women’s Rights Is Crucial for Democratic Change”
False. This myth, a favorite of women’s organizations and Western governments, reflects the combination of correct observation and false logic. No country can be considered fully democratic if a part of its population (in some cases, the majority) is discriminated against and denied equal rights. But efforts to change the status quo by promoting women’s rights are premature. The main problem at present is that Arab presidents and kings have too much power, which they refuse to share with citizens and outside institutions. This stranglehold on power must be broken to make progress toward democracy. Greater equality for women does nothing to diminish the power of overly strong, authoritarian governments.
Arab leaders know this truth all too well. Many autocrats implement policies to improve women’s rights precisely to give themselves reformist credentials and score points with Western governments, media outlets, and nongovernmental organizations. These efforts, however, often amount to a trick of smoke and mirrors designed to disguise the governments’ refusal to cede any real power. In the last few years, several Arab states have appointed women to high positions and hurriedly implemented or proposed reforms concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other personal status issues. These are welcome steps, but they do not address the core issue of promoting democracy: breaking the authoritarian pattern of Arab politics.
Emphasis added.
As in a number of other secular reform moves, the reforms are part facade, part dupery and sadly because of this playing to Western liberalism, tend to bring discredit on themselves.
In many ways, because of the manner in which they are taken the reforms are not in fact welcome steps because in the long run one ends up with liberal values becoming discredited by association with cynicical grasping for power.
“Arab Democrats Are the Key to Reform”
Paradoxically, no. All Arab countries boast a small number of Westernized liberals who advocate respect for human rights, freedom of thought and speech, and democratic change. But democratic transformation requires more than the ideological commitment of a few individuals. In Western societies, a small democratic cadre sufficed in the distant past, when political participation was the preserve of public-minded intellectual elites and wealthy property owners. But the Arab world of today is not the United States or Europe of the 18th century. The political elite faces a growing challenge by Islamist movements, which are developing a popular support base. As a result, democratic transformation also requires broad-based political parties and movements capable of transforming abstract democratic ideals into concrete programs that resonate with a public whose main concern is survival.
Arab democrats have so far shown little capacity—and less inclination—to translate abstract ideas into programs with mass appeal. Because they talk to Western organizations and each other more than to their fellow citizens, opposition political parties with a liberal agenda find themselves unable to build broad constituencies. This failure leaves the field open to government parties, which can build a following on the basis of patronage, and to Islamist parties, which build their following in the best tradition of mass parties, with a mixture of ideological fervor and grassroots social services.
Government repression and, at times, co-optation have also undermined Arab democrats’ effectiveness. Some regimes—notably Saudi Arabia’s—move quickly to clamp down on any nascent liberal debate. Others are more tolerant, giving liberals some intellectual space to write and discuss issues openly, as long as their talk is not followed by action. Arab democrats in countries such as Egypt are not a persecuted group. Rather, they tend to be professionals comfortably ensconced in the upper-middle class. Therefore, they are hesitant to demand genuine reforms that might lead to a hard-line takeover and content to advocate democratization from the top.
Under such conditions, it would be a serious mistake for U.S. and European democracy advocates to focus on Arab democrats as the key to political change. These individuals will play a role if democracy becomes a reality. But during this period of transition, they have neither the inclination to push for reform nor the political clout to do so successfully.
Emphasis added.
Those who've been reading me for a while have caught my acerbic comments regarding, for example, Friedman's reliance on such people in forming his opinions. My disdain comes from precisely the emphasized connection. Now, Arab liberals make up a very large portion of my personal circle, but one has to understand
“Middle East Democracy Is the Cure for Islamist Terrorism”
No. This view is rooted in a simplistic assumption: Stagnant, repressive Arab regimes create positive conditions for the growth of radical Islamist groups, which turn their sights on the United States because it embodies the liberal sociopolitical values that radical Islamists oppose. More democracy, therefore, equals less extremism.
History tells a different story. Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country’s history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government’s promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region.
Moreover, democracy is not a cure-all for terrorism. Like it or not, the most successful efforts to control radical Islamist political groups have been antidemocratic, repressive campaigns, such as those waged in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria in the 1990s. The notion that Arab governments would necessarily be more effective in fighting extremists is wishful thinking, no matter how valuable democratization might be for other reasons.
The experience of countries in different regions makes clear that terrorist groups can operate for sustained periods even in successful democracies, whether it is the Irish Republican Army in Britain or the ETA (Basque separatists) in Spain. The ETA gained strength during the first two decades of Spain’s democratization process, flourishing more than it had under the dictatorship of Gen. Francisco Franco. In fragile democratic states—as new Arab democracies would likely be for years—radical groups committed to violence can do even more harm, often for long periods, as evidenced by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or the Maoist rebels in Nepal.
Here I a gree again, although I think the issue is a multipart one. "Draining the swamp" as it were requires political and economic evolution, and the process is long term, immediate payoffs not found.
Posted by The Lounsbury at January 3, 2005 10:30 AM
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Jan-July 2005
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