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June 05, 2005
Reflections on MENA Region WB Economic Developments and Prospects from a practical point of view
There, I think this is better
After spending Saturday recovering from my Friday excesses, a fine if somewhat cloudy weekend spent with issues related to my recent acquisition of real property – thankfully largely outsourced to its main motivator who was very fetchingly dressed for her oversight duties with the contractors making the changes desired. Rather boring details in my experience, move door here, etc. In any case, my inputs were fairly useless.
Luckily I managed to be so entirely useless I was able to escape to a nice fashionable café to work, and observe the new spring fashions the local chicas have opted for. Quite challenging, one has to confess to the concept of public morality, or even the typical stereotypes of the region.
Between sketching my comments I was happy to enjoy the clique of chicas who passed so many times, all wearing the eastern style head scarf (hijab) but also some very fashionable and form fitting mixture of the abaya and slinky pants, along with some quite interesting footwear. Rather dominatrix style.
More common though was the somewhat Leb Slut fashion that the world got to see in full splendour during the Lebanese “intefada” aka “Cedar Revolution” among the gullible nit wits who got all excited about ‘An Arab Spring’ based on an ignorant, superficial reading of events.
Of course one has to be marginally tolerant given the same commentators only a few months before imagined all the region to be like Afghanistan so the Leb Slut Protestors in the knee high leather boots naturally turned their heads. They did not have my receptionists over the past several years with the too tight and rather full shirts to teach them that not everyone wears a burqa here.
This aside, rather than solely wasting my day watching the young things go by in their barely appropriate outfits, I thought I might turn my attention to the World Bank report.
Following on my prior comment a kind of in depth commentary on the World Bank “2005 Economic Developments and Prospects: Oil Booms and Revenue Management” something of a commentary, by page and section, from the ‘practical’ point of view as someone ‘in the market’ – with the positives and the negatives that implies.
Some comments then, by section and page, which represent my reflections on reading this – I note from my sense of issues on the ground and not from the policy perspective that World Bank must take.
Starting with the “Overview” (pages v-xi), a few comments
First, one item to retain from the entire document is the fairly stark differences between the three groupings they propose – labor rich and non-oil producing, labor rich and oil exporters and finally the labor importing oil exporters in my terms – and the relatively conservative response to the recent boom in oil prices. In the key phrase from page vii:
“During the current boom, roughly 25 percent of the additional export revenue has been spent. This compares with nearly 60 percent during the 1973 boom.”
Rather substantial difference that, implying a large amount of capital available. As the report notes later, several of the governments are aggressively paying down debts, although there is a boost in government consumption, but more on that later.
A moment then to comment on WB’s “fundamental and interrelated realignments” for structural reforms
“(1) from closed to more open economies, to create more competitive industries, benefit from international best practice, and gain access to new technology; (2) from public sector dominated to private sector led economies, providing the basis for improved efficiency and expansion of employment; and (3) from oil dominated to more diversified economies, to reduce the region’s dependence on volatile sources of growth, maintain fiscal stability, and preserve important social expenditures. Achieving this realignment requires interrelated policy actions on several fronts, including improved governance, particularly with regard to strengthening inclusiveness and accountability, as well as enhancing the inclusion of female labor in the private sector to increase the flexibility of the labor force and make better use of the region’s talents.”
A brief comment on these generally inoffensive statements. I remain rather unmoved by the fashionable obsession with female participation in the labor force as a “key” aspect of development. That is not to say I am personally in opposition to women’s participation, indeed I often state that given my druthers, I would staff a firm entirely with women here – not for the Leb Slut Fashion angle, although that could be a side angle – but rather simply due to the fact that the women here work harder and better. (And I recall an amusing conversation I overhead in the elevator on my way up to my office one afternoon with one low level worker bee type telling another that women should be banned from work force because they work too hard –i.e. in the sense of being nudges– and make men look bad Same fellow asserted unemployment would fall if women were banned since more men would be hired to replace women) In that context, women’s participation is a good thing, and I am happy for it.
However, I regard the frequent assertions that women’s rate of participation is a “key” aspect of development. Certainly Europe managed to develop during its industrial age with legal and other restrictions against women not so different from those found in the modern MENA region, suggesting the faddish underpinnings of the assertions women are key. Faddishness is not per se a problem, my concern here is that making women’s participation a fetish one can easily waste effort tackling head on an issue likely better tackled obliquely.
Finally on this point, I can only but agree
“Although each area of structural reform is important in its own right, the lack of progress in governance reform, and in particular public sector accountability reform, is of concern because of what it implies for the success of a broader economic reform effort. International experience with structural reform suggests that where reforms have been successful, there have been strong coalitions for change. But the ability for coalitions to press for reforms depends on access to information to formulate choices, the ability to mobilize, and the ability to contest policies that are poor, all areas of governance in which the region ranks poorly worldwide and demonstrates limited progress.”
Emphasis added. In particular access to information is a bloody pain, and not only something that makes realizing investments, as well as proper business planning difficult, but also of course contesting poor policies. The relative flourishing of the press in Morocco – quite extraordinary as compared to the rest of the region – and in particular in my opinion important because of the attention being paid to the issue of private sector development, and economic policy – is both unusual (one need only follow the turgid idiocy that is published in Jordanian and Egyptian papers) and extremely valuable. Nevertheless, ridiculous secretiveness rather typical of the region characterizes governmental treatment of data. Absurdly, for example, a recent McKinsey study of the economy taken for the account of the government remains a state secret – largely because certain key actors feel their “pet” areas of activity were not properly treated. Inane response.
Nevertheless, it strikes me that the key area where outside actors might be able to assist in terms of information is not pressing on direct “political-political” issues such as “democracy” qua “democracy” and specific political actions, but rather push for information transparency. This is hard to appose, and if focused on technocratic issues, harder to spin. Not impossible of course, certainly one can look to how the French have invented a clever double language in opposing liberalization internal to the European market (to use a non-regional example) as ‘social dumping’ and another interesting phrase I heard while following the Euro Constitution debacle, fiscal dumping. Double language to politicize and put in question already decided principles.
But leaving aside my bashing of French politics, let me jump ahead to the chapter one on “Recent Economic Outcomes in MENA” and reflect first on table 1.1: “MENA growth performance (1990-2004). A good breakout of the differences within the region and a caution on the overview throughout the remainder of the document on the groups the document names “Resource Poor – Labor Abundant” (RPLA) and I called earlier “labor rich and non-oil producing” versus “Resource Rich Labor Rich” (RRLA) or what I would call “labor rich and oil exporting” versus finally “Resource Rich Labor Importing” (RRLI) or what I would call the labor importing oil exporters.
Taking a look at their RPLA group:
Egypt,
Jordan,
Morocco,
Tunisia,
Lebanon,
Djibouti
- I have to say adding in Djibouti is a bit nonsensical. Djibouti is… well a silly little enclave that really does not belong to the MENA region, far less than Sudan for example, which doesn’t even figure here. Leaving aside this small compliant the primary item I would like to highlight (and this will go for each group) there is one 800 lb gorilla that naturally skews the group.
Egypt, purely by the size of its economy and its population – combined with its status as ‘the bad student.’ Throughout the document the references to this group are skewed by the weight of Egypt. In general a coherent and comparable group except that Egypt’s specificities as an outlier and its enormous weight naturally skew observations.
Looking at RRLA:
Algeria,
Iran,
Syria, and
Yemen
My first thought is “ Yemen?”
Yemen? Well, okay. I guess. It is a net exporter, although just barely, and certainly on a per capita basis it is a bit of a stretch to think of Yemen as ‘resource rich’ (oil exporter makes more sense here).
Regardless of this carping, here at least the group weighting is more or less equal. Iran and Algeria strike me as comparable peers, in terms of large population oil / hydrocarbon product exporters. Of all the groups here the generalizations make the most sense.
Looking at RRLI: this is in essence the Gulf. The only problem here – the economies really do have pretty similar structures and this is the most coherent group – is that KSA skews things, being so much larger than the rest.
Now, this is not criticism per se of the WB report or its observations, merely contextual notation for considering the report’s “group” observations, i.e. that two countries in particular by the giant size relative to their peer group skew things. Taking a look for example at the group characterization on that same table, the RPLA numbers – population, labor force, GDP per active worker are largely Egypt. Of the population e.g. taking the 90-2000 average, Egypt makes up 70 percent of that figure.
Obviously that tends to make Egypt’s real problems the group’s problem, which while not unreasonable somewhat skews things.
The following page (5) also attracted my attention:
“Though oil exporters have been the drivers behind MENA’s growth acceleration, the pace of growth among resource poor labor abundant economies (RPLA) in the region has also improved, having benefited from a recovery in agriculture, stronger growth in worker remittances and tourism, and a modest fillip to intra-regional trade. While performance has been partially hampered by weakness in European export markets, growth among the RPLA economies climbed slightly averaging 4.1 percent a year over 2003-2004, up from an average 3.6 percent growth over 2000-2002.
Jordan has been a net economic beneficiary of developments in neighboring
Iraq. Increases in transit trade and the establishment of local reconstruction and diplomatic operational headquarters there have underpinned economic activity to a 5.5 percent gain during 2004. Lebanon, as well, which experienced depressed economic activity prior to the war in Iraq, saw a recovery in growth over 2004 to 3.8 percent. Egypt has enjoyed increased tourism revenues and Suez Canal transit fees, which among other factors served to raise growth by a full point to 4.3 percent in 2004. Morocco and Tunisia, linked more tightly to Europe through trade in textiles, other light manufactures and tourism, have been harder hit by sluggish economic conditions in that market, resulting in the waning GDP growth during 2004.”
Emphasis added.
In re worker remittances, a small problem with them, because of poor systems for directing savings or enabling entrepreneurial activities (business start ups), these go far too much for boosting consumption at the expense of investment, with a penchant for supporting imported consumption.
On Jordan: there is a very good case for Jordan, if it addresses the problems at Aqaba port and continues to invest in its transport infrastructure (and liberalizes an abusively clannish “union” of transporters – again a hint of what looks good on paper ‘a union to protect the interest of drivers’ in reality is abused by clannism and allows practices such as that of refrigeration truck drivers disconnecting the refrig unit to make a gain at the expense of the business hiring him, something one can not punish because of the union, one has to eat the losses in the name of ‘workers’ protections.), a very good business as entrepot for Iraq. The port at Aqaba and if developed with Syria transshipments to Lebanon, Amman can be a real logistics center.
In re Egypt’s performance: keep in mind the Suez canal fees. Nearly pure rents, those fees, insofar as little added value service is added. The boost from these fees is purely from external factors and has really fuck all to do with internal reforms in Egypt. Rents, the game of Mubarek.
“Despite the historically strong MENA regional growth, on a per capita basis, economic growth over the last two years lags the strong growth experienced in other developing regions, a reflection of both the firming of GDP growth rates across developing regions and the MENA region’s high population growth. A number of positive factors have driven a broad acceleration in per capita growth across developing country regions worldwide during the first half of the 2000s. A rise in south-south trade, the realization of gains from past advances in economic reforms, buoyant domestic and foreign investment activity, and a supportive external environment have all contributed to global economic gains for developing nations.”
First, on high population growth, keep in mind that the Maghreb has seen a near collapse in population growth rate to slightly above European levels – implying really that while in the near term they will see a demographic bulge adding young workers, in the medium term there will be a real platform. This is far less the case in the East, where growth rates remains very high – thus the MENA region “high population growth rate” which is really “the Mashreq’s” high rate. Egypt in particular is alarming. I like to cite the figure, roughly a million new Egyptians a year with all that implies.
On the intra-regional trade, here I would like to highlight one of the most annoying issues I have faced in the region, the frustrating degree to which clear win-win regional level cooperative projects are fucked over by myopic screw-my-neighbor-for-the-sheer-pleasure-of-it policies. That is, decisions that can’t even be justified by the bad excuse of corruption or narrow interest, but pure idiotic power plays.
The best example I have in mind is a project I had some small part several years ago, which throws into light such idiocy, in this case Moroccan-Algerian-Tunisian rivalries. First, on the context, here we have an economic unit (the Maghreb) that actually makes quite a bit of sense and could be extremely interesting as a field of investment for its own growth dynamic and also in relationship to Europe (especially if the EU can get its act together). Algeria
with its massive hydrocarbon potential, above all in relationship to newly developing natural gas facilities and swaths of its Sahara that have yet to be fully explored for nat gas deposits, is a clear potential industrial power house, and source of capital. Tunisia and Morocco excellent platforms for light industrial and services oriented development – in short near-outsourcing for Europe and the Algerian monster. Rivalry is understandable to be sure, but the petty cut-off-my-nose-to spite-my-neighbor is less so, or as a Moroccan compatriot in private equity said to me (in discussing a deal torpedoed by his own parent financial house), “We don’t have to look far to explain our under-development.”
Regardless, the deal in question which I had a tiny part in was a regional power development project for export on to Spain and Italy with generation based off of a massive generation facility co-located with a natural gas processing facility in Algeria. Really actually pretty decently conceived. And in the context of transiting to Spain via Morocco and the Gibralter narrows, excellent idea, entirely commercially viable. But no, no, no. Rather than going ahead with a plan eminently financable in the private sector and completely commercially viable, the Algerians decided to propose instead undersea direct lines from their site to Spain and Italy – undersea power cables hundreds of km long boosting the costs astronomically (not to mention seriously impacting efficiency, etc as I understood the engineers, although frankly I am not an electrical engineer to treat such issues). Sheer madness, utter and sheer madness. The sole excuse was the supposed political risk that the Moroccans and Tunisians might shut off the lines. In reality, it was all about fucking over the Moroccans and Tunisians. Really, the “political” risk there was clearly far less than internal political risk in Algeria (and remains the case).
A beautiful project, fucked for no better reason than the Algerian generals who run the show have a completely childish, rentier view of economics and are more interested in fucking with their neighbors than making a bigger pie for all. One might say that some of them might have been seeing option for nice fat envelopes off of the direct sea development, which is not excludable, but a big percentage of zero remains zero. Dead letter.
Anyone having done business can of course recount such stories – MENA is not Mars of course, however the degree to which short sighted idiocy continues to trump reasonable developments here is utterly maddening. Cooperation remains poorly developed, on a comparative basis.
The next section, 1.2.2 “Labor Market Developments” also has some particular interest.
First, the graph “Figure 1.2 Unemployment in MENA 2000 and 2004” bears some reflection.
[graph omitted]
Tunisia and Morocco look like decent performers here, in terms of growth per labor. Algeria ’s reduction in unemployment is largely state driven and probably not ‘real’ in sustainable terms
Egypt ’s unemployment rate strikes me as utterly khayali. I have zero faith in those numbers.
Moving on, page 7 has some interesting items. First, keep in mind this: “Region wide, more than 12 million jobs were created over the last four years12, a 37 percent increase over the average yearly job creation over the 1990s.”
Not bad, not bad. However, the next note is discouraging. “Despite this good news, the degree to which the current reduction in unemployment is permanent is questionable. A large number of temporary jobs have been created under Algeria ’s Economic Recovery Program. More generally, the region exhibits artificially high employment creation relative to the recent growth upturn (with the elasticity of employment growth with respect to output growth averaging almost 0.9, well above international averages for longer time horizons). Over a sustained period, this level of employment creation relative to growth is not likely. Though the employment/output relationship varies from country to country, the elevated pace of employment creation in the region, relative to its output growth, suggests that the strong unemployment decline has been achieved, for at least a few countries, only temporarily.”
Artificial boosting. Regardless, looking at “Figure 1.3: Employment Growth versus Output Growth” I note again our middle performers Morocco , Tunisia and Jordan are well within the reasonable and sustainable.
The next paragraph also needs some comment:
“Furthermore, based on the World Bank’s analysis of the employment situation in the MENA region in 2003, the number of new jobs that need to be created over the next 20 years to keep pace with labor force entrants and absorb the current unemployed implies real economic growth rates averaging 6 to 7 percent a year for a sustained period of time. In the last year alone, growth has moderated to 5.2 percent, suggesting that the fundamental problem facing the region in terms of job creation remains unchanged with the recent surge in growth.”
Emphasis added.
This is a real problem, however an item that somewhat moderates the starkness of the problem is that it is skewed a bit by the weight of KSA and Egypt, with very high population growth rates and anemic private sectors.
The following section, 1.2.3 Sources of Higher Growth is important. I have little direct comment, but will quote two items I consider important.
“The factors underpinning growth in the region have also changed substantially since the 1990s, with growth over the last two years fueled increasingly by government consumption and investment. Prior to the recent run-up in oil prices, during the 1990s, the MENA region found support for 3.6 percent annual GDP growth from a more balanced set of factors. Domestic demand accounted for 79 percent of growth, led by personal consumption spending, which was the key driving force for growth (providing 1.6 points of overall growth, or some 43 percent). Government spending and domestic investment together provided another 1.3 percentage points to overall growth (or 36 percent of overall growth), reflecting cyclical influences stemming from the oil markets, as well as domestic conditions. Net exports, meanwhile, accounted for about 21 percent of growth, contributing 0.8 percentage points to overall growth (Table 1.3). “
The breakout from the super-regional level does show that the big oil exporters are the main villains here.
Over the section on export growth, this is fairly clear, the only item to retain is the structural difference between the Maghreb, where all flows are essentially European oriented and driven, while those of Jordan and Egypt are as attached to the Gulf as not.
The chart and discussion on exchange rate (as well as the discussion of the Dutch disease issue) strike me as highly discussable, however without deciding to play economist and digging into data I merely note I have reservations which require profound analysis to do justice to.
Now, on page 13 I draw attention to this in re Egypt: “Particularly strong gains in Egypt were partly the result of the upturn in tourism receipts (up 19 percent since 2002), but also came from Suez Canal receipts (up 44 percent), which have soared with rising oil prices as it becomes a more cost-effective transit route for exporters than circumnavigating Africa.”
In my opinion Egyptian performance remains rent driven.
Skipping ahead, over the Capital Flows and Iraq sections to intra-regional ties, I note (page 23) the following (“This has greatly buffered the sharp declines in tourists from Europe, which fell nearly 10 percentage points, from 38 percent of total tourists into the region in 1999 to 29 percent in 2002, and from the US, from which arrivals fell from a far lower initial share of 3.7 percent of total tourists in 1999 to 2.5 percent in 2002.”) is a bit inexact insofar as arrivals for the
Moving ahead, to page 38, I note an item of interest:
“This shift began in the 1980s and has continued through recent years. Also, beginning in the early 1990s, the expatriate labor force originating in the Levant, in Egypt, and to a degree, among the Maghreb countries, has given way to increased GCC importation of labor from South Asia and Southeast Asia. At present, the bulk of worker remittance receipts for the labor abundant countries in MENA now originate in
The shift to non-Arab origin labor of course was a strategic political choice, in essence the rentiers of the Gulf began to get worried that their fellow Arabs pan-Arabism might well imply that the princes and rentier families might come under pressure to share more of their rents, and stop treating their imported brethren like sub-human scum. Better then, for political purposes, to import Asians, either sub-Continentals or others, as the likelihood of believing they should be part of the club is/was lower. It’s worked fairly well, in a limited sense at least, although sadly the native population of the Gulf remains near useless spoiled idiots. On the next page there is some comment on the various programs to move more locals into private employment in the Gulf – as far as I understand (nota bene one has to count a bit of resentment here) from fellow Arabs, in general Khalijis – being largely hired for their nationality – operate at best at 50 percent of efficiency of their expatriate Arab confreres. Even taking into account the jealousy – resentment factor, I have to say that seems about right.
I note further, in relationship to this comment:
“Traditionally, oil rents have been used to consolidate the role of the state—they have enabled centralization and preservation of the state’s position. Now, at least notionally, all of the MENA oil exporters are in transition from large state-led economies to more private sector oriented economies in an effort to achieve greater efficiencies to improve economic welfare.”
Very notionally, in my opinion.
Next, some comments on Chapter 3: Structural Reform for Long-Term Growth.
A few key quotes:
“Although MENA economies have improved their market orientation, in general they have not kept pace with worldwide progress. Reform has tended to be piecemeal and lacking in coherence. In general, the MENA countries have made substantial progress on reducing tariffs on trade, but tariff barriers in many MENA countries remain amongst the highest in the world.”
“Despite the fact that the region ranks at the bottom in terms of public accountability and has the longest reform path to travel, virtually no country improved its worldwide rank in this area, and virtually every county showed a marked deterioration relative to the progress occurring worldwide.”
First, in terms of practical application, I am not particularly moved by the WB’s measure of relative movement. While I can see some utility in the concept in regards to having a sense of potential future progress, by my own gut I don’t find this particular measure convincing. I’d prefer they stick with the absolute comparisons, at least from the perspective of practical usage, although I suppose the political or policy user might find more utility, however dubious I regard their comparative – too much of the material noted is mere ‘headline reform’ (or sucker the Development Suckers reform) e.g. the Egyptian pound float, that doesn’t properly measure real implementation and thus for the practical investor or operator, doesn’t really reflect operation economic reality.
Moving ahead to the discussion of outward orientation, page 45 has interesting data to reflect on
“…the entire MENA region, with a population close to 320 million, has fewer non-oil exports than Finland or Hungary , countries with populations of 5 and 10 million respectively43. The per capita volume of exports of the resource poor countries in the region is small relative to that of other countries. In Egypt , exports amount to just over $100 per capita. Morocco exports are about $260 per person. This compares with exports of over $570 per capita in Turkey , $1200 in Poland and more than $3400 in Hungary . There remains tremendous opportunity for growth. But at the same time, the costs of inaction and falling further behind are likely to rise as countries such as China , Russia and Ukraine provide more intense competition in the narrow product areas in which MENA non-oil exports are concentrated.”
Stark numbers to be sure, but to retain from Figures 3.1: non-oil exports as a proportion of GDP 90-03
[graph omitted]
Only Morocco and Tunisia approach the average of lower and middle income economies. Jordan clearly has fallen behind – but one has to admit it’s not as if they’ve been well-positioned.
Jumping ahead to page 47
“Only a handful of diversified exporters, such as Jordan , Morocco and Tunisia , have developed non-oil export niches (with a high proportion of total exports in sectors with revealed comparative advantage, on par with the successful exporters in other regions). Oil exporters, by and large, have not found these alternative export niches, with non-oil exports scattered among product groups in which the economies do not demonstrate strong comparative advantage. A few exceptions exist, notably Bahrain and, to some extent, the UAE.
The region’s low level of integration is also reflected in the ratio of net FDI inflows to GDP (Figures 3.2a and b), which averages only a third of the average level achieved worldwide, this despite moderate increases over the last few years (noted in chapter 1). This weak exposure to foreign investment denies the region of potential efficiency gains from advanced management skills and technology.”
I note the aggregate data is a bit deceptive, as the FDI flows for Tunisia and Morocco again are right around those of East Asia and Latin American averages (my two little Maghrebine favorites emerge as interesting outliers throughout this story, don’t they?), although Lebanon and Jordan don’t do badly either. Qatar , I note, is boosted by one single project – the truly and incredibly massive RasGas natural gas project. I am fairly certain it would be right down with Kuwait otherwise. Not where Egypt is as well.
An important note to consider as well:
“Among them, protection remains high relative to countries elsewhere in the world. In addition, non-tariff barrier (NTB) coverage is still widespread. While the Gulf economies and Lebanon are relatively open, the majority of countries maintain protective import structures, primarily through tariffs. In addition, behind-the border constraints to trade are considerable. Transport, logistics, and communication costs are high, raising the cost of trade. Exchange rate management has also played a role in discouraging non-oil exports, with currency overvaluation hurting competitiveness. Finally, the overall business climate has played a role in hindering investment in potential export-oriented industries (discussed in section 3.4). “
Emphasis added:
I entirely agree, from an experienced environment point of view, the non-transparent non-tariff barriers, as well as what they term the behind the border constraints are deeply important. In particular the behind the border – poor transport and logistics infrastructure are particularly hurtful for the small start up operator and something that can have immense value add if administrative idiocies are removed and public investment directed to internal transport-logistics improvements. I place this, in personal opinion, well ahead of the tariffs issue if necessary.
You can lower tariffs to zero, but if you have brakes such as a broken port (e.g. my past comments regarding the utterly absurd practices at the local port here, all geared for the convenience of the clique of ‘workers’ in the formal section of the port services economy – leaving those in the informal entirely unprotected – solidarity Reg – and imposing disproportionate costs on the small would be exporter), that imposes crippling barriers on the new operator.
Returning a moment to the issue of implementation and real changes. (page 48) “Following the swearing in of a new cabinet in July 2004, Egypt reduced the number of tariff bands, annulled import fees and surcharges incompatible with the GATT, and instituted strong tariff rate cuts on most imports, resulting in a decline in average tariffs from 21 percent to 9.1 percent between 2000 and 2004.” I remain deeply cynical about how these changes will actually be implemented. As you have witnessed in the political sector, Mubarek’s government has a real flair for announcements that give with one hand, and implementation that takes back with the other.
Continued in part ii, bloody size restrictions.
Posted by The Lounsbury at June 5, 2005 04:03 PM
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Jan-July 2005
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