Lounsbury: Economic Progressivism: Left Things to Love in Islamic "Economics"

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May 27, 2006

Economic Progressivism: Left Things to Love in Islamic "Economics"

I ran across a press release from some US Uni by some anthro-sociology professors on 'progressive' features of Islam ironically pointed to by an 'Islamic Investing' website trumpeting it as Study Finds Muslim Scholars An Egalitarian Force For Economic Reforms, a fine illustration of the brainless lack of confidence among certain circles that they take anything with a remotely positive spin on anything "Islamic" and wave it around, saying "See Islam positive, Islam positive!!!!" like five year olds. Witless gits.

The site itself I came across from a decent arty on the diversity of fatwas and the general focus on small things in life although in fact although I am of the opinion that foolish fatwa shopping is a bad sign of a rather brainless 'islamisation' but that is probably my general snobbery and contempt for people running after ill-groomed 'religious men' for advice when half a brain and some reasonable reflexion would suffice.

However, let me get on to the silly stereotypically Left academics' silly PR note on "Progressivism" and Islam:

I am sure most readers I have immense contempt for Left "ecnomics" as a general matter, and in the particular when touted for developing nations, so it should be no surprise I find the conclusions or observations of an underlying study as summarised in this PR piece to be immensely irritating, although rather typical of the kind of scholarship that has justifiably gotten certain kinds of Uni scholarship contempt:

The "egalitarian face" of Islamic orthodoxy?
New study finds religious orthodoxy associated with support for progressive economic reforms

First, I am afraid we are stuck at guessing at what the authors meant in some instances (yes, one could write for the study, but that would lead to more irritation on my part):

In research based on survey data from seven predominantly Muslim nations, the authors found that Islamic orthodoxy -- identified as the desire to implement Islamic law (shari'a) as the sole legal foundation of their nation -- is associated in every country with support for such progressive economic reforms as increasing the responsibility of government for the poor, reducing income inequality, and increasing government ownership of businesses and industries.

"Progessive economic reforms" eh?

Well, "responsibility of government for the poor" is ... a vague generality that means hardly anything.

Reducing income inequality also a rather vague generality, which coudl cover everything from growth oriented policies to vampiric soak the companies to feed the bureaucrats under the guise of "progressive" social policies.

One rather suspects the later, and one rather suspects the authors likely think the later "progressive policies" would be "a good thing" and that an evil IMF is preventing the Arab states from achieving some neo-Socialist utopia in social spending, as this so-called "progressive" thinking and "analysis never seems to grapple with the reality of the vampire state nor the issues of paying for the imagined utopia.

My suspicion as to the meaning and content in the article (which again I have not read, nor plan to) is underlined in the phrase "increasing government ownership of business and industries" as "progressive."

Progressive being used to repackage and market failed old Left Vampire State solutions since socialism has gotten a bad name.

The authors rather clearly indicate they know fuck all about the region

Liberal here being the American sense meaning "Left" as in fact the attitudes cited are not liberal economics, but Left economics.

There is no surprise here - except to them - as in the past 60 odd years Arab Socialist ideas have been profoundly influential among Islamist circles and filtered even into more traditional Islamic scholarship as ways to "modernise" - one need look only at the Iranian Shia state, with its strange combination of old school Tiers Mondist State Socialism and Theocratic Dictatorship apparatus grafted onto a vaguely democratic apparatus. A strange monster that functions piss-poorly and is kept alive by hydrocarbon rents to the profit of the Vampire Class but to the impoverishment of most of society.

Of course, the Iranian Theocrats (and here the word is used avisedly, not in the weirdly illiterate way that American Right Bolshy commentators have taken to using it about the Islamic world generally - I saw an arty somewhat calling Dubai a "theocracy" which was such a surreal usage as to boggle the mind) are applying "Progessive" social rhetoric and policies that would much meet the approval I suppose, given the authors use positive language in the PR piece here. I would suspect the underlying report is the same.

Regardless, anyone who's followed the region for the past... well 60 years would be well aware that quasi-socialist thinking with at least partial roots in Arab socialism and Tiers Mondism of the 50s-60s (a la Franz Fanon) is quite prevalent among Islamist and generally currently Islamic religious scholars. Rather fuzzy overall with a sense that the religion requires social justice (it does, of course) and thus the response should be state or something similar interference in the economy to manage that.

And of course, the nice thing about marrying this with religious that is that the economically illiterate religious scholar has the pre-made "Oh they are sinners, real believers will rightly apply" response to data indicating these policies are immiserating disasters that have promoted progressive impovershiment and economic habits that are more in keeping with rent seeking and extraction than creating and expanding the wealth base.

Robinson and Nancy J. Davis, professor and chair of DePauw University's Department of Sociology & Anthropology, attribute the economic progressivism of the Islamic orthodox to the "communitarianism" that they have found among the orthodox of all the Abrahamic faith traditions or "religions of the Book." Orthodox Christians, Jews and Muslims, they argue, are theologically "communitarian" because they see themselves as part of a larger community of believers and as subject to the timeless laws and greater plan of God.

And?

Rubbish, in any even, the economic "progressivism" [aka old Left Vampire State solutions] are clearly echoes of the old Arab Socialist doctrines (which I will admit probably had an echo in appealing to underlying communitarian sentiment, as well as also attacking in the 50s-60s an economic structure dominated by ex-colonial interests that had all too often in the past gotten their position at the point of a gun, a realisation that always bounded by sympathy for colonial parties 'lost all' in the wave of nationalist nationalisations through the 70s. Ultimately bad policy, but the victims often were most unsympathetic characters).

If there is a point to pay attention to:

The authors also found widespread support in the Muslim world for the establishment of Islamic law.

That in combination with a realisation that, whatever the authors' support (or possibly not, I should admit the PR piece may give the wrong impression) for the so-called 'progressive' economic politics of "Orthodox" fatwa issuers, in fact a deep vein of support runs for the self-mutilating "progressive" policies among a large portion of the MENA region population needs to be a baseline for anyone thinking about political reform and solving the economic growth problem in the region.

My lessons are:
(i) the Islamist parties have huge support, and self-delusionally talking about a secular opposition merely leads one down blind allies - one has to deal with the Islamists and get them genuinely in the political game - not only if they lose.
(ii) Economic liberalism needs to be nativised just like democratic habits - selling it only through secular liberal technocrats insures that it is always seen as a Western imposition (and via that route, it is).

Both the political and the economic policy problems come back to the Islamists. If they come to power with anti-liberal ideas, it is a disaster. So, engage and sell some percentage of them on such. There is plenty of basis in Islam for doing so, do it.

As to the academic clowns:

Davis and Robinson's finding that religious traditionalists or orthodox in Islam are more supportive than modernists of progressive economic reforms follows up on their earlier studies of the United States, a number of European countries and Israel, which found that orthodox Christians (Protestants, Catholics and Eastern Orthodox) and Jews tend to be more economically egalitarian than modernists in these faith traditions, belying the notion in many countries that the orthodox constitute a "Religious Right."

All I can say is using American Domestic Political Referants to Try to Understand the World is Extremely Stupid and Superficial.

Of course, here "economically egalitarian" appears to mean "sympathetic to Old Left policies, renamed 'progressive.'"

Another note:

The data for their latest study came from national surveys in Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where altogether just under half of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims live. The surveys were conducted from 2000 to 2003 as part of the fourth wave of the World Values Survey, conducted by the University of Michigan and a consortium of investigators in over 80 countries. Some other key findings include:

Of these, Algeria and Egypt have explicitely 'Arab Socialist' origins to their basket case economies. Jordan, a strong tradition of governmental patronage to the East Bank tribes and communities that supported the Hashemites.

* Fully 88 percent of Saudi respondents in the study considered establishing Islamic law as the sole basis of the state to be "important" or "very important," as did 82 percent of Egyptians, 80 percent of Jordanians, 72 percent of Algerians, 62 percent of Pakistanis and 53 percent of Indonesians. Only in Bangladesh did less than a majority (45 percent) support establishing shari'a as the sole law of the land. Robinson observed that "The strong popular support in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria and Pakistan for implementing Islamic law suggests that were these countries to become more democratic, the democracies established might not adopt the economic policies or relations with the United States that President George W. Bush would envision."

As anyone knows, I have no love for Ibn Bush, but that line reads like a cheap partisan shot.

Of course, it is in some way true - see Iraq - that the Bush Administration political levels seem to have been afflicted with a rather naive approach to promoting economic liberalism, one predicated on a simple-minded assumption that Eastern Europe's history under the Soviets is somewhat extrapolatable to the rest of the world. A bit of self-delusion that seems to afflict much of the American right, sadly, leading them not to understand the sales job for economic liberalism elsewhere is entirely different.

* In the poorer Muslim countries they studied, Davis and Robinson found that orthodoxy is more strongly linked to a desire for progressive economic reforms than in the countries with medium or high standards of living. Also, within all of these countries, the poor and less educated are more supportive of economic reforms than the rich and well educated.

I do love the way language is being used there. Support economic reforms.... In each of the countries cited supra as part of the study, "reform" in its usual sense means moving away from the so-called "progressive" economic policies these Lefty twits cited, as historically all have had massive governmental interference in the economies, none with any kind of positive result in the long term (one should not exagerate, of course, early on MENA region did have decent returns from massive governmental investment, often in basic infrastructure as well as in State corporations, but these returns clearly petered away starting in the 1970s and very clearly in the 1980s - one should not be an Right-Wing Bolshy type ideologue and entirely deny the utility of the period and even some of the policies adopted. However, at the same time, it is clear that such policies ran their course.).

* Davis and Robinson see further evidence of the economic progressivism of the Islamic orthodox in the welfare networks that they have established throughout the Muslim world. Building on the mosque-centered model established by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1930s, other Islamist groups, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, Laksar Jihad (Holy War Brigade) in Indonesia, Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam) in Pakistan, and Hamas in Palestine, have created in their countries safety nets of welfare agencies, clinics and hospitals, factories paying good wages, day care centers, youth clubs and unemployment agencies. This "welfare Islam," according to the authors, has often shown Muslims that Islamist organizations can outperform corrupt or callous secular governments of their countries in providing much-needed social services.

What a weird conclusion.

Of course if anything the independent islamist social welfare organisations are an indictment of the 40-60 odd years of "progressive" economic / social policies in the region, and of the idea that the government best bears the burden in these areas (I note that again I am utterly impatient with the Right Bolshy ideologues' utter hostility to any governmental role; liberal economic purism should be for academics sitting in Chicago only, pragmatic compromise and practical use of government is the best way to see core liberal economic goals achieved). Indeed, if anything these networks support the economic liberals' observation that flexible, non-governmental private action (call it entreprenurial) is often far, far better than governmental action. Of course, there is a genuine issue of amount of resources to be leveraged, and in some instances when talking volume it seems clear to me that one has to accept governmental inefficiencies to get volume.

In any event, one can contact the authors for further information:

Davis can be reached at 765-658-4518 or ndavis@depauw.edu. Robinson can be reached at 812-855-2569 or robinsor@indiana.edu. For a copy of their article, contact Johanna Olexy at 202-247-9871 or pubinfo@asanet.org.

Posted by The Lounsbury at May 27, 2006 08:15 PM
Filed Under: Biz - Policy & Development , MENA Region General , Politics - Islam(ic) , Religion

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This attempt to throw all religious organizations/parties across the Middle East in one basket in order to conclude something tangible is obviously going to come with its flaws. Given what you quoted in your post, I can see what sort of examples they would like to co-opt from Turkey and what sort of counterexamples they would avoid mentioning. As someone who has his reservations about this Pious Middle thing aqoul seems to be embracing here*, I've often heard people refer to the economic sensibilities of the "Religious Right" in order to convince people of their "moderateness". Here though, the emphasis doesn't seem to be on "moderate" at all which is at least interesting.

*[aside]: I was somewhat amused by L's reluctance to employ his usual cynical caveats when mentioning Amr Khaled, and attribute it to his overriding concern of throwing "Right Bolshy ideologues" a bone. When I was reading the Khaled piece on NYT I was thinking "this guy sounds like another Fethullah Gulen," and then the piece said "this guy sounds like another Fethullah Gulen." Encouraging the Pious Middle might be a good idea in countries that are struggling with fundamentalist Islam, but otherwise it does run the risk of conflicting with secularism. Gulen amusingly tries to claim that the Ottoman era was secular and never a full-fledged theocratic state. Right. I don't have to exaggerate the flaws of the Ottoman era or deny its virtues in order to comfortably say I for one sure as shit don't want to go back to Ottoman rule. It's naive to think that one can support this sort of Pious Middle in one country without strengthening it in another country in the region. Painting this as "against religion" misses the point that some their definitions of secularism just don't make that much sense, and it doesn't mean I don't object to some of laws passed in the name of "secularism" in Turkey. Frankly, the Pious Middle thing makes more sense when there is no visible minority of securalists already mucking about, but like I said, you don't get to pick and choose where it spreads. [/aside]

Posted by: aegean disclosure at May 27, 2006 11:50 PM

what a depressing study. I wonder if they even define 'progressive economic policies' anywhere in their text. So much newspeak...

82% of all Egyptians? Shit. The beauty of democracy is to let such ideology fail by its own misdoings, letting change come from within. Would have loved to see the corresponding numbers from Iran.

Posted by: Klaus at May 28, 2006 12:00 AM

Klaus, I would guess they do probably make a nod to definitions, this is after all only a PR piece so I would not want to be unfair to the authors. I am equally sure I would not like said definition of 'progressive economic policies' as such.

Aegean:

Well Pious Middle is almost 100 percent Lounsbury, so I may as well step up to the plate and own it. I am not sure any of my co-authors share my enthusiasm.

Some comments then: I've often heard people refer to the economic sensibilities of the "Religious Right" in order to convince people of their "moderateness". In the American context? Here though, the emphasis doesn't seem to be on "moderate" at all which is at least interesting.

Perhaps. I personally don't see anything but old Left rubbish being repackaged.

I was somewhat amused by L's reluctance to employ his usual cynical caveats when mentioning Amr Khaled, and attribute it to his overriding concern of throwing "Right Bolshy ideologues" a bone.

Eh?

What the bloody fuck are you talking about?

What cynical caveats does one expect?

When I was reading the Khaled piece on NYT I was thinking "this guy sounds like another Fethullah Gulen," and then the piece said "this guy sounds like another Fethullah Gulen."

And?

Encouraging the Pious Middle might be a good idea in countries that are struggling with fundamentalist Islam, but otherwise it does run the risk of conflicting with secularism.

Well, I don't give a flying fuck about conflicting with secularism as such, as I have near zero respect for the current system's pseudo-secularism and consider it a lost game. In the context of the Arab region.

If you are referring to Turkey, I have but superficial opinions and try not to make myself ludicrous in commenting on situs where my knowledge strikes me as superficial, even if relatively speaking (to say 99 percent of the English speaking world) it might be informed.

Gulen amusingly tries to claim that the Ottoman era was secular and never a full-fledged theocratic state.

Well. That rather depends on how one defines "theocratic."

I have not read the fellow, but I would observe that using the word in English, I would not call the Ottoman state of necessity theocratic, any more than I would call the English state of the Tudors theocratic, for all that there was an official Church, the ruler was the head of the same, etc.

Now, that really underline a definitional issue - if one wants to call the Rennaissance European states like England 'theocratic' then fine, else, it strikes me analytically one should be careful in applying the word willy-nilly.

I personally would reserve the term for states where formal religious scholars/priests are the rulers, as in modern Iran.

Right.

I think the scorn is misplaced - but on the other hand I haven't read the text so....

I don't have to exaggerate the flaws of the Ottoman era or deny its virtues in order to comfortably say I for one sure as shit don't want to go back to Ottoman rule.

Well, it does have its charming aspects. Such as outrageous turbans. (Which reminds me of a comment made by an Iraqi friend of mine, and PhD student in history in response to some kid asking about those turbans: "They were Turks, they didn't know any better." Yes, yes, for the tedious among you it's a silly statement, but it is amusing.)

It's naive to think that one can support this sort of Pious Middle in one country without strengthening it in another country in the region.

Well, first the comment presumes that is a concern.

Second, I hardly think it is naive. It's an emperical question, and if one is talking about a contagion of Islamic revolution, well, it is one of the risks.

How one weights risks of course is a challenging question. Calling that naive strikes me as indicating a certain blindness.

Painting this as "against religion" misses the point that some their definitions of secularism just don't make that much sense, and it doesn't mean I don't object to some of laws passed in the name of "secularism" in Turkey. Frankly, the Pious Middle thing makes more sense when there is no visible minority of securalists already mucking about, but like I said, you don't get to pick and choose where it spreads.

This is a very typically Turkish thing to write.

Well, I don't share the framework of concern in the end.

Posted by: The Lounsbury at May 28, 2006 12:40 AM

82% of Egyptians really is a lot, considering that nearly 10% of Egyptians are Christians.

But I wonder if that number isn't skewed by the way the question is phrased. I've thought about this when reading about other attidude-to-religion studies, too:

Asking the average Egyptian Muhammad/Fatima whether he/she wants Islamic law, without defining it -- wouldn't that be almost certain to generate a 'yes'? Even someone who is unlikely to vote for an Islamist party would probably feel hard pressed to answer yes to a direct question, since Islamic law, in all its fuzziness, is, well, Islamic, and supposedly something you as a Muslim should support. There are of course people who are quite the believers and still unsupportive of really literally implementing the Qur'an as constitution, here and now. But how many could bring themselves to give a straight 'no' to someone asking them if they want what God said? Perhaps those are the people who said it felt "important" but not "very important".

Anyway, I don't expect a better question would yield radically different results. I'm sure the 'real' result would still be up there in its 70s somewhere. But still, it's worth thinking about.

Posted by: alle at May 28, 2006 01:07 AM

All, re your question, I think you've hit on an important methodological issue. I agree, given my personal experience over the past 15 odd years in region, asking the question in that manner I think generates a higher response than what the question is actually aiming for (support for Islamist / Ikhouan brotherhood type Sharia law rule).

Take my JV partner, a woman who is... well rather clearly not the sort to be sympathetic to the Brothers. A banker, in a JV with yours truly, in all my scummy corrupt splendour, etc.

However, ask her if she supports Sharia, I know she'll piously say yes.

What does she mean by it? She supports having the religion be the reference point for law, in a manner that most Christian Democratic parties would understand and approve of.

In terms of polling on this issue, in the Muslim world, at least the Arab world it is sort of like polling on race in America - no one wants to give a politically incorrect answer, but their real feelings are probably not best sounded out by the form of question.

Something more subtle and well-thought through is needed.

Posted by: The Lounsbury at May 28, 2006 01:30 AM

I've been meaning to ask this. What is a JV?

Posted by: Ali K at May 28, 2006 12:07 PM

"I was somewhat amused by L's reluctance to employ his usual cynical caveats when mentioning Amr Khaled, and attribute it to his overriding concern "of throwing "Right Bolshy ideologues" a bone.
...
What cynical caveats does one expect?

When you're cautiously optimistic or sympathetic to a certain position, you usually include asides on the possibility of such a position running amok (in the negative sense). At least, that is my impression.

I was not talking about pseudo-secularism in the hardliner Kemalist sense or Arab regime sense, I was talking about secularism proper. If I thought some of the purported go-to guys of moderate Islam (Pious Middle) were equivalent to Christian Democrats I would have no quarrels with this, my point however, is that when such candidates' politics are explored one by one the analogy occasionally turns out to be rather, well, inexact.

"Gulen amusingly tries to claim that the Ottoman era was secular and never a full-fledged theocratic state."

Well. That rather depends on how one defines "theocratic."

I have not read the fellow, but I would observe that using the word in English, I would not call the Ottoman state of necessity theocratic...if one wants to call the Rennaissance European states like England 'theocratic' then fine, else...

Well is anyone taking the idea of turning England back to the "good old days" seriously? It's interesting that you seem more concerned about a "definitional issue" regarding theocracy and not secularism. Do you agree with Gulen that the Ottoman rule was secular in what you regard as the correct meaning of the term? The practical reality was that there was a Sharia law system and a law system of the Sultan. My point is if someone employs Ottoman nostalgia frequently while being ambiguous about what aspects of it he would adhere to and what aspects of it he would strongly oppose, I would have to remain skeptical.

Trading one pseudo-secularism (non-religious) for another (religious) doesn't seem like a good strategy, frankly.

The Kurdish leaders in Iraq fought to have Islam as "a" source of law instead of "the" source of law. Are they in the Pious Middle, or are they way too liberal because of their secular seeming position?

"It's naive to think that one can support this sort of Pious Middle in one country without strengthening it in another country in the region."

I hardly think it is naive. It's an emperical question, and if one is talking about a contagion of Islamic revolution, well, it is one of the risks.

It's naive to think it is not a possibilty. Better? If the West chooses to endorse a certain movement, it has to at least consider the possibility of the movement spreading across the region, especially if expansion and influence happen to be on the movement's agenda.

This is a very typically Turkish thing to write.

ditto. Though I must say that when I or people like me do object to certain laws enforced in the name of "secularism," many a secularist here in Turkey tend to call us "Islamist apologists." Go figure.

Posted by: aegean disclosure at May 28, 2006 01:37 PM

First, a JV is a joint-venture.

Then regarding aegean.

I still have no idea what you're talking about, although it you're implying that I've ignored the downside of the Islamists, I simply have to shrug.

There are so many whooping up the downside I don't feel moved to waste my breath on the well-covered, although I hardly think I have written anything particularly positive about it either.

I see the Amr Khaled types as the force that has to be dealt with, period. Whinging on does nothing good.

I was not talking about pseudo-secularism in the hardliner Kemalist sense or Arab regime sense, I was talking about secularism proper.

An idea, a mirage. Idealistic whanking.

In the Arab region it's dead for the time being, and the sad remanants and self-deluded adherents a spent force.

If I thought some of the purported go-to guys of moderate Islam (Pious Middle) were equivalent to Christian Democrats I would have no quarrels with this, my point however, is that when such candidates' politics are explored one by one the analogy occasionally turns out to be rather, well, inexact.

Inexact or not, the pious middle masses are the only real game in town.

As a pragmatist, I prefer working with reality and not dreams.

Well. That rather depends on how one defines "theocratic."....

Well is anyone taking the idea of turning England back to the "good old days" seriously?

Who the fuck cares.

The word means what it means.

Calling something "theocratic" because one does not like the system is empty posturuing.

Do you agree with Gulen that the Ottoman rule was secular in what you regard as the correct meaning of the term?

I have no idea, I don't know what Gulen has written and Ottoman history is not my thing.

Theocracy, however, does not strike me as an accurate term, as I like words to have meanings, not be used according to political fashion.

The practical reality was that there was a Sharia law system and a law system of the Sultan.

And in England there was religious law of the Church and common law.

So?

My point is if someone employs Ottoman nostalgia frequently while being ambiguous about what aspects of it he would adhere to and what aspects of it he would strongly oppose, I would have to remain skeptical.

Well, you're talking about Turkish domestic politics, and I try not to comment on things where my knowledge is superficial.

However, in plain English meaning, theocracy has a meaning. I like to see that meaning used properly.

Trading one pseudo-secularism (non-religious) for another (religious) doesn't seem like a good strategy, frankly.

Well, again in re Turkey one is going to have to negotiate some difficult shoals. Digesting the Anatolian masses for example.

Regardless, the situation strikes me as generally rather different in its dynamics than the Arab region.

Iraq is descending into a three or more way civil war, there is no "middle" in Iraq, only the men with guns.

"It's naive to think that one can support this sort of Pious Middle in one country without strengthening it in another country in the region."

I hardly think it is naive. It's an emperical question, and if one is talking about a contagion of Islamic revolution, well, it is one of the risks.

It's naive to think it is not a possibilty. Better? If the West chooses to endorse a certain movement, it has to at least consider the possibility of the movement spreading across the region, especially if expansion and influence happen to be on the movement's agenda.

Domino theory?

If Egypt falls so do others?

State is plainly instead of dancing around.

Of course a revolution would have echoes, the question is how strong. My particular attitude towards Egypt is simply that the Egyptian system will collapse, now or ten years or so, whatever. I see zero chance of some mythical secular liberal opposition suddenly emerging. The Islamists of various flavours are the only real game in town besides the corrupt vampire state. I'd prefer to bet on some faction of the Islamists than be left holding the pot when everything blows up.

Bet on something real rather than the tattered remnants on the secularists which have near zero popular support.

Turkish secularists would do well to making sure they never end up like the Arabs.

Posted by: The Lounsbury at May 28, 2006 11:00 PM

Another quick question from the dimwit: What is the current attitude toward Israel in the Brotherhood? Peace, love, war? I seem to remember something about assassinating a president about something just like that.

Just wondering if the Brotherhood are going to play like Ahmadinejad: Promise material wellbeing and equality, then drag the nation into some kind of conflict that drains it, all the while passing religious laws that have nothing to do with the promised material wellbeing and equality.

Posted by: Klaus at May 29, 2006 12:04 AM

klaus - The people who assassinated Sadat were from Islamic Jihad, which is a militant splinter from the Brotherhood (and parts of which, under Ayman al-Zawahiri, has since gone on to join bin Ladin in his "World Front Against Crusaders and Jews"). As far as I know, the mainstream Brotherhood had no hand in that.

On Israel, certainly no love, but I find it hard to believe they would seek real, hot war, after gaining power peacefully. If for no other reason than that it would be devastatingly stupid and unpopular (lost wars always are), and most likely lead to their immediate downfall. I agree, though, that are likely to try to play on the Israel issue to gain political currency after seizing power, and that could of course easily lead straight to hell if they're not careful.

(Btw, I have a feeling Ahmadinejad's motives for entering into conflict with the West are rather more complex than what you describe. Hopefully, Aqoul will oblige us and expand on the subject soon enough.)

Posted by: alle at May 29, 2006 12:58 AM

Ahmadinejad seems just like a hothead with power. I'm sure someone can explain why what he's doing is incredibly cunning. Impulsive religious nationalist. Yay.

Khatami was cleverer, though...if indeed he had anything to do with their nuclear program. He just hid it. Just deny everything until it's too late, then say it's too late to change things now. Atsawaytodoit.

Posted by: Klaus at May 29, 2006 02:37 AM

May 27, 2006

Economic Progressivism: Left Things to Love in Islamic "Economics"

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