I would draw particular attention to Roy's advice and conclusion, which I agree with (although the Shia Crescent issue strikes me as overdrawn):

The key issue now is Hizbollah, which is positioning itself on three levels: first, it is appealing to Lebanese nationalism, by presenting itself as the pivotal element of Lebanese domestic politics. Second, it is fanning Arab anti-imperialist militancy against Israel and the US. Third, it is shoring up Shia solidarity with Iran. It triggered the conflict with Israel as an internationalist movement eager to relieve pressure on Hamas, but Mr Nasrallah’s recent “victory” speech presented Hizbollah as the champion of Lebanese interests and nationalism. Hizbollah will not be disarmed or marginalised; the only way to deal with it is to push for a new Lebanese polity in which it plays a central role, as a Lebanese party.

If the west wishes to avoid the synergy between Arab nationalism, Sunni militancy and the Shia crescent, which will link all the battlefields from Afghanistan to Lebanon, it must draw Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hizbollah further into the mainstream. This means encouraging a proper settlement in Lebanon by bringing together all Lebanese actors without interference from Syria or Iran, supporting democratisation of Syria, and negotiating with Hamas. It also means Israel must renounce its policy of “bunkerisation”, withdrawing behind a fortified border and hammering at any perceived threat.