Alle's article is a classical case of overanalysis of the region. Strategies, games, etc. If people in power had a brain for such cunning, the Maghreb wouldn't be so screwed. Sometimes, policies in the region are much more basically driven: there are simply none.

Re integration: I came across an interesting article about MENA which was summing up the case for any integration through 1) economic gains through bigger markets and trade efficiencies 2) increased security 3) increased bargaining power relative to extra-regional issues (note: this doesn't exclude the existence of intra-regional issues). In the case of MENA (or any subset), it forms a relatively "natural" unit given language/religion/perceptions, which may provide it with some of the necessary socio-political conditions for cohesiveness and stability. Interestingly, the article didn't advocate taking any direct measure to integrate (not that it opposed it, but given the history of failures, another avenue was suggested). It was making the same point I made before in the context of Israel: focus on building capacity. The rest will follow.

Note that I do believe it is in the interest of the ruling elites of countries like Tunisia and Morocco to open up to each other. E.g. cross-border M&A strategies would give stronger elite controlled companies, both for MENA and external markets. It wouldn't threaten their fiefdoms - to a certain extent, if they do it the 21st century romantic way - not at all if they do it the pragmatic Euro medieval way (e.g. Oueld M6 marries Bent Sergent). But then again, what I said about Alle's article above: no vision, no policies, not even for their own personal interest.

shaheen -- Alle's article is a classical case of overanalysis of the region. Strategies, games, etc. If people in power had a brain for such cunning, the Maghreb wouldn't be so screwed. Sometimes, policies in the region are much more basically driven: there are simply none.

Yes, often true. Esp. on conflicts like W. Sahara (or Alg.-Mar. more generally) where the reality is that nothing ever happens, so people start imagining every tiny sign of movement as the start of momentous historical change. (Me too, often enough.) Same also w/ eg. Palestine, although there is more actual movement on the ground there.

... But: In this particular case, the border squabble, there is clearly politics behind it. Morocco has started raising the issue recently and very persistently, and Algeria is chosing a response out of several. There must be reasons for it, although (as I think I tried to point out in the original post) not necessarily good ones.

Algeria's attitude, in particular, might well be driven by regime inertia, clan interests, and other internal problems that prevent a more active approach than the present one (sulking). But I also think they believe the status quo is to their advantage, whether ultimately true or not.

As for L's argument, very interesting post, but out of time -- will get back to it a.s.a.p.

Same also w/ eg. Palestine, although there is more actual movement on the ground there.

I do know an extensive deal from first hand experience as well as personal contacts and connected insiders I know very well in Israel/Palestine. The Palestinian side, hopeless idiots, Maghrebi leaderships are very sophisticated in comparison (not to mention the Pali population whose "entrepreneurial" culture has been skewed towards exploiting their victims status for begging - that and the serious degenerative consanguinity level which I just haven't seen elsewhere). (Jewish) Israeli elite, aside from ethnic fascism inherited from a 1930s european nationalism they had the luxury not to question, are among the most sophisticated I know, everything being relative. French are peasants in comparison.

So to grossly simplify, the safe assumptions on I/P are: what happens on the Palestinian side is the result of pure randomness (put a tribe of monkeys and you get the same result). What happens on the Israeli side, though not always thought out probably has more brain into it than average (which is very low for homo sapiens, so this is not to be taken as an assertion that Israeli Jews are some kind of überhuman planners).

Again in a hurry, but very briefly:

Sh. -- In that sentence, I was referring more to how solidarity activists and analysts (on/of all sides) in the I/P confl. tend to overanalyze and overdramatize developments. But you seem to be about right about this too, although I do wonder what Israeli strategy could conceivably be at this point ... it seems totally reactive, stuck in old tracks.

L -- I consider the late 19th century idea of "national determination" to be a historical fiction, based on 19th century Romantic Ethnolinguistic nationalism...

On that, and the need to create some sort of working basis for a system of states. But I agree. Nevertheless, it's what we've got, and I see many reasons to try to uphold existing international law so far as possible. Even if, sometimes, it doesn't encourage an optimal solution in a particular conflict, the legitimacy of the system itself is worth preserving, for larger reasons of stability and the institutionalization of politics. Without, of course, ideologizing that legitimacy -- it's a legal instrument, a blunt yet necessary one, not the word of God.

As for W. Sahara per se, I agree that in the best of worlds, it (and Mauritania and various other nations) should be part of some larger entity, Aside from that, the best option in 1975 I think would have been a W. Sahara-Mauritania merger, which would at least have had some semblance of ethno-tribal logic to it. But shit happens.

As for an independent W. Sahara's viability, I agree it doesn't look all that great. It will be more or less puppeteered by someone, clearly, although I think Algeria would not be sovereign, rather forced to find a modus vivendi with Spain ... Already now, Madrid is dealing out citizenships to Sahrawis like candy, clearly having decided that they should retain a say in the region, and the Tindouf diaspora is very tightly linked to Spain. Falling under Morocco is not necessarily a stable situation either, though, looking at the present situation, and with Algeria seemingly determined to keep meddling forever; also, should a final solution ever come about, there is the question of what to do with POLISARIO Sahrawis and residual nationalism and/or tribal rebelliousness. So, while a Morocco autonomy solution might be most promising as of right now, it is not nearly as easy as the monarchy tries to portray it, and it also involves serious risks and obstacles (Algerian and POLISARIO resistance being just the first in line).

Got to go again, w/o checking what I just wrote, so I apologize in advance if it's incomprehensible. Btw, some more on Maghreb integration (economical or political) from you two would be great to read.

I do wonder what Israeli strategy could conceivably be at this point

Electoral politics.

Its very interesting theme you have raised here. I agree with author.