RSSAug-Dec 2004 Archives
December 30, 2004
Incestuous citations - but a nice quick overview to read
Via Zenpundit (ahem, do ignore the incestuousness of this) http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2004/12/recommended-reading-few-things-that-id.html
I found this
Think Again: Middle East Democracy
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2705.php?PHPSESSID=8cae212b897cd43d4c1106a612ade115
Very nice, I will have comments shortly.
Else, all that Seasons Greetings stuff to you all.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:47 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 29, 2004
Americans: Bad at Propaganda?
Zenpundit had a comment here that I thought was both true and not true. If I may, the comment was that " [exact quote here] "
I think this is probably, in large part, true. But the intriguing question is why? My answer is that it is not so much that Americans per se are bad at propaganda -which in a sense is merely marketing in its wide sense - but rather American institutions that engage in propaganda are bad at it. And I do not think that the perhaps immediate and standard answer that "Free Institutions" are not good at propaganda - that is both a pomposity and a falsity. One can look to Great Britain which can turn out decent agitprop when it wants to, as can France. Nor do I think merely looking to European cynicism counts either. At least not in its simple sense.
What do I see then? First, Americans are rather full of an inflated sense of goodness on a national level(*). This is charming at one level, and good at another. However, one can easily be blinded by it. A bit of cynicism, detachment even, is useful. One of the Neocons own, by the way, is fond of quoting Tallyrand: "Above all, not too much zeal." Now, the issue in regards to agitprop I think arises from the following: (a) instutionally, agitprop is indeed largely discouraged, (b) when it occurs it is often naive, and self-believing - we are truly and genuinely good, we must convey this , (c) outside certain restricted circles, Americans by virtue of the size of the country, its insulation from the rest of the word, the ability bumble around speaking English, the certain messianism in American thinking (the fault of my insufferable ancestors), a certain disregard and even hostility for the detachment and self criticism as well as engagement with other points of view necessary for really reaching other ideological markets, are not well prepared to do proparanda.
Now, at its heart, the act of good propaganda aimed at others is not really any different than marketing to a foreign market, except the barrier to penetration is higher. First, one has to understand the customers' real interests - not the marketeers perceptions of them, but knowing the real consumer. Second, one has to find a profitable (read effective) nexus of the consumers' interests and what the marketeer can promote. Very clearly unlike perhaps a strategic marketing executive in an innovative firm, one can not retool solely on the basis of the consumers' desires, as in the end state interest trumps this set of consumers. However, neither can one simply sell self-vision (which is what Americans tend to want to do - indeed the agitprop aimed at Iraq was painful in this sense, for all that it was easy to understand a good portion was domestic market aimed - one of the most painful and gross errors that continues to burn my stomach - although the football distribution agitprop could be amusing - as another aside when I met a mate of my up in London who happened to have been in Iraq for UK Treasury at the same time, although we did not know that at the time, we both independantly brought up the fucking footballs. His funny obs was they'd announce these things as if they were completed, which in the context of the near termism ongoing in CPA led to the project then languishing) for self-vision, if it were convincing would have already sold. There is already enough American media out there that if it were simply a matter of self-vision, everyone would be sold.
No, American self-vision can be actually quite irritating. Rather like my arrogance. It's well founded, it is not without reason, but too much, all the time leads to hostility and backlash.
Now, returning to the point, the key issue for American agitprop efforts is not to pimp their self image. (e.g. al-Hurra, Hi!) No, it is to treat the issue like a cold strategic marketing problem, when stuck with a certain set of unchangeable product parameters (US policy). There are numerous marketing strategies for this - earnestness is not one of them. Perhaps a bit of self mockery in product placement, self-depreciation. Certainly product placement and explanation has to respond to the regional markets' individual concerns and tastes. Detachment, as well, from the product is necessary. That does not mean hiring an outside agency - hiring a bunch of American ad executives or even western ad exs is not ipso facto hiring detachment, indeed quite likely the contrary. It means engaging someone... well like me but truly skilled in marketing, above all at a strategic level... to sit down with the problem. A team certainly as this type of effort requires at once localization and multiple views.
The second problem is political interference. I can easily imagine the cold blooded approach (and I am not even speaking to ... underhandedness and dark propaganda) getting shot down by Congress and at once Conservo ideologues and Antiglobo morons - a Popular Front of Know Nothingism.
Nevertheless, the issue at its heart is not an inherent American incapacity to engage in really good agitprop (although some things like Peace Corps are damned good agitprop, while idealistic at the same time) but rather a lack of will to clearly grapple with issue, from a rather sad combo of hard right pious righteousness and hard left self-contempt.
But perhaps I am fooled by my prediliction for ... what did someone here say, extreme pragmatism and cynicism?
(*: I remind everyone I am an American by birth and in part upbringing. However, too much time overseas immersed in others has rendered me an ambiguous person in perspective at times)
Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:39 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 22, 2004
Cole Roundup and a comment or two
http://www.juancole.com/2004/12/press-roundup-for-wednesday-1222-josh.html
In particular I draw attention to this paragraph and the final line:
"
The Guardian notes that the American Civil Liberties Union acquired documents about the treatment of Guantanamo Bay prisoners that suggest that torture was used, and that it was actually authorized by President Bush. The documents also reveal that one torture technique was to wrap a prisoner in an Israeli flag. I'm puzzled by that one (my readers, incidentally, allege that the New York Times omitted to mention this particular technique, which was reported by the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post). My guess is that the prisoners' pictures were taken while wrapped in the Israeli flag, as a way of humiliating and possibly blackmailing them. You just have to scratch your head and wonder if the Bush administration is determined gradually to give supporting evidence for every single one of the anti-American stereotypes current in the Muslim world.
Emphasis added. The answer is yes.
Otherwise, I note the pullouts continue. I am afraid we're really into Lebanon logic now. Have to say I am beginning to lose even the remotest sense of hope.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:47 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
US Slipping in For Students
A quick note, I assert that whatever the security concerns, barring students and the like at such levels is [security] penny-wise [security] pound foolish
A long term and non trivial loss.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/21/national/21global.html?ei=5090&en=3ee2e6351e33d817&ex=1261285200&partner=rssuserland&pagewanted=all&position=
Let me add the following, I recently heard from some officials here a illustrative (and I assure you true) story of how "security" concerns have trumped reason in visa granting for the USA: Embassy organized an AML (jargon in finance: Anti Money Laundering, the new whack off subject) for the Central Bank here. This took some arm twisting ( I can verify independantly that local CB peeps are not all that enthusiastic about USG AML efforts, which feel rather strong armish in a kind of blind of way per them, although given their complete opacity re off shores I think they complain perhaps too much), but then the visa section ... rejected the apps.
I have hard time understanding this. USG sets up prog stateside for local CBs and then USG... rejects visas. Chinese walls are great, but not when it makes one look like an incompetent chimp.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:01 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 21, 2004
Understanding Terror Networks
Article I was directed to by an email:
Understanding Terror Networks
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20041101.middleeast.sageman.understandingterrornetworks.html
A few comments.
First, the author seems to be unnecessarily and not necessarily entirely factually minimizing the Arab-Afghan roles and connexions. Minor point, and I may be wrong, but based on my prior knowledge this read as spin.
Second, although I have some reservations about the interpretation here, the author in this brief note has some interesting observations, one's that are not actually very well highlighted but useful, as for example this:
A very small subset of Salafis, the disciples of Qutb, believe they cannot create this state peacefully through the ballot-box but have to use violence. The utopia they strive for is similar to most utopias in European thought of the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries, such as the communist classless society.
Indeed the background of the violent fringe of the Salafiste movement is highly reminiscent of late 19th century European hard left movements. That is no accident.
Third, the information, or data presented is interesting but I find some analytical points defective - not entirely wrong but defective.
Taking this:
The 400 terrorists on whom I’ve collected data were the ones who actually targeted the “far enemy,” the U.S., as opposed to their own governments. I wanted to limit myself for analytical purity to that group, to see if I could identify anything different from other terrorist movements, which were far more nationalistic.
There is an issue here in this self limitation - there is a selection bias in terms of characterizing their motivations as different from the more nationalistic Salafi elements - there is an element of opportunity. I shall return to this in a moment.
Let me draw attention to the following:
Most people think that terrorism comes from poverty, broken families, ignorance, immaturity, lack of family or occupational responsibilities, weak minds susceptible to brainwashing - the sociopath, the criminals, the religious fanatic, or, in this country, some believe they’re just plain evil.
Taking these perceived root causes in turn, three quarters of my sample came from the upper or middle class. The vast majority—90 percent—came from caring, intact families. Sixty-three percent had gone to college, as compared with the 5-6 percent that’s usual for the third world. These are the best and brightest of their societies in many ways.
The data cited is unclear in terms of his characterizations of social class (I leave aside the "caring" families characterization, I have no idea how one gets data on caring in this context) and I am distrustful insofar as Upper or Middle Class in terms of MENA in my experience are slippery concepts when North American ideas are applied uncritically. The University attendance comment again raises some alarm bells for me insofar as in the Arab region Uni attendance is rather more extensive than say in Pakistan - although graduates churned out are very often unemployable.
However, returning to selection bias issue, in terms of the profile he is looking at, I suggest that there is a strong selection bias in this "international circuit capable of penetrating Western confines" to the profile he finds.
On this item:
Three-quarters were professionals or semi- professionals. They are engineers, architects, and civil engineers, mostly scientists. Very few humanities are represented, and quite surprisingly very few had any background in religion. The natural sciences predominate. Bin Laden himself is a civil engineer, Zawahiri is a physician, Mohammed Atta was, of course, an architect; and a few members are military, such as Mohammed Ibrahim Makawi, who is supposedly the head of the military committee.
Actually the French specialists in this area, Roy and Kepel, noted this phenomena a decade ago. The hard core, bloody minded puritans in the violent Salafi fringe are most frequently of a profile I would call the "religiously self educated, frustrated professional class" - frustrated not necessarily in personal terms of achievement, although whatever achievement one can register one has to put that in the context of aspirations - but in terms of what "their people" are achieving. Think back to the Left radicals of Europe and to a lesser extent North America of the 19th and early 20th centuries - leading elements were often Middle Class and above who were angered by the very real injustices and abuses of a system trying to adapt to new socio-economic realities. The same is true in my experience - personal as it is - in this region, 50 to 100 years later.
Here I want to return to the issue of poverty, achievement and motivation - and the proper analytical framework to understand this in. The market for radicalism is a complicated market, and one that is highly segmented in my opinion. I have noted in my rummaging about in the internet a distinct tendancy among our American "conservative" element to use comment like our present article to deny the issue of poverty and economic underdevelopment - for I would suppose a variety of inchoate reasons, among them religious bias (Xian maximists), simple minded 'capitalists' who some how fear frank economic analysis out of some misplaced sense that a recognition of distributional issues in economics is some commie issue rather than an emperical one that equally suggests (intelligent) market solutions - as a driver in generating people like Zaouhiri.
Anyone who has spent any time in Egypt, or even the region, but especially in Cairo - visit Eerie's little travelogue for a somewhat rapid view of the Dickensian nightmare that is Cario, although living there teaches profounder lessons [e.g. trying presenting a paper on water pricing to the Gov and hear their Econ advisor, Mubarek's econ advisor even, tell you in person, great but no way] - has no trouble understanding how general social frustration even among the successful - the so called best and brightest - can generate radicalism. The issue is, in the context of a system like that of Egypt (or Syria, or Iraq, or Libya, or as-Saudiyah .... you get the picture), that anyone who is bright and talented and has the vaguest sense of personal integrity has to be disgusted by the corrupt, venal, oligarchic, value destroying systems, and that since 1990 in the case of Egypt and the Gulf (and to a lesser extent, North Africa) has been supported by the West despite the fine speeches, well that person is as likely to become radicalized as not. Add that the "secular" systems in place are largely socio-political/economic systems that are not much more than neo-feudal theft/rent extraction and one has very nice ingrediants to see religious extremism.
I have often said to (sometimes shocked) interlocuters in my real life that my (quasi athiestic, unrepentant capitalist) self would easily be an Islamist had I grown up in these conditions.
I still believe that, however unfashionable it is post 11 September. And I agree at a level, if I may be unpolitically correct, for the underlying essential critique of the Islamists is correct. The secular regimes in the region, in their majority are (i) fake democracies, (ii) corrupt, (iii) "secular", (iv) immobile, (v) unjust.
Now, as in the case of my view of traditional Left critiques of "capitalism," they are not wrong (as in the case of distributional issues) in terms of issues but rather misplaced in terms of solutions.
The key issue which I hope our dear... I truly hate to use the word "conservative" - American Drooling Conservos (sorry to the rest of my right thinking readers, I have yet to hit upon a phrase that quite captures my frustration with the Know Nothings) ... grasp is that it is not the bloody internationally mobile terror elite that characterizes the issue, but the long term fundamental market drivers. The fundamentals are poverty and the underlying sensation of humiliation
I also know that as in the 19th century European hard Left model, that while the transient, mobile, and perhaps most bloody minded radicals are from the (rightly) morally outraged but more well-off classes
Only 13 percent were madrassa-trained and most of them come from what I call the Southeast Asian sample, the Jemaah Islamiyya (JI).
An important observation, actually, in the context of the idiocy of some "initiatives" by some Democratic Senators (or ignorant idiots) I have ranted about in the past.
However, let's recall the profile our man is looking at is likely to reflect strong, very strong selection bias to a profile that is internationally mobile in Western countries and one that likely uses the 'kharijine l-medressaat" as canon fodder and home region operatives.
As a psychiatrist, originally I was looking for any characteristic common to these men. But only four of the 400 men had any hint of a disorder. This is below the worldwide base rate for thought disorders. So they are as healthy as the general population. I didn’t find many personality disorders, which makes sense in that people who are antisocial usually don’t cooperate well enough with others to join groups. This is a well-organized type of terrorism: these men are not like Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, loners off planning in the woods. Loners are weeded out early on. Of the nineteen 9-11 terrorists, none had a criminal record. You could almost say that those least likely to cause harm individually are most likely to do so collectively
The interesting point here is the last. I refer back to the historical experience of Left radicals in Europe 100 years ago. I would hazard the opinon it is the same.
The problem is not insanity, evil or whatever.
At the time they joined jihad, the terrorists were not very religious. They only became religious once they joined the jihad. Seventy percent of my sample joined the jihad while they were living in another country from where they grew up. So someone from country A is living in country B and going after country C—the United States. This is very different from the usual terrorist of the past, someone from country A, living in country A, going after country A’s government. I want to remind that I’m addressing my sample of those who attacked the U.S., not Palestinians, Chechens, Kashmiris, etc.
In re the first two statements I am not sure are emperically true. The rest is not something I know about.
France happened to generate a lot of my sample, fourth behind Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco. Eighty percent were, in some way, totally excluded from the society they lived in. Sixty-eight percent either had preexisting friendships with people already in the jihad or were part of a group of friends who collectively joined the jihad together: this is typical of the Hamburg group that did 9- 11, the Montreal group that included Ahmed Ressam, the millennial bomber. Another 20 percent had close family bonds to the jihad. The Khadr family from Toronto is typical: the father, Ahmed Saeed Khadr, who had a computer engineering degree from Ottawa and was killed in Pakistan in October 2003, got his five sons involved: all of them trained in al Qaeda camps and one has been held for killing a U.S. medic. Their mother is involved in financing the group.
Items for the takeaway. Perso connexions are key - may I say as someone in the region, knowing the culture and the languages, well no bloody motherfucing shit, what the fuck does one fucking think? This is a perso driven culture. Perso in wide relations sense, not individualistic.
So between the two, you have 88 percent with friendship/family bonds to the jihad; the rest are usually disciples of Bashir and Sungkar.[Indonessia, likley selection bias in my opinion] But that’s not the whole story. They also seem to have clustered around ten mosques worldwide that generated about 50 percent of my sample. If you add the two institutions in Indonesia, twelve institutions generated 60 percent of my sample. So, you’re talking about a very select, small group of people. This is not as widespread as people think.
The added item I have to this that I think the underlying lesson is that yes, the real hard core radicals capable of circulating in international circles are a tiny minority.
In order to really sustain your motivation to do terrorism, you need the reinforcement of group dynamics. You need reinforcement from your family, your friends. This social movement was dependent on volunteers, and there are huge gaps worldwide on those volunteers. One of the gaps is the United States. This is one of two reasons we have not had a major terrorist operation in the United States since 9/11. The other is that we are far more vigilant. We have actually made coming to the U.S. far more difficult for potential terrorists since 2001.
I think this is right, and I also think that the Islamophobia in the States, the increasing tendancy to discrminate in a rather vulgar manner against foreign visitors of non-Xian extraction is a negative net benefit reaction.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:43 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Glimmers of Hope in the Arab World
Interesting article by Zakaria.
Glimmers Of Hope in The Arab World
By Fareed Zakaria
Tuesday, December 21, 2004; Page A25
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15132-2004Dec20.html
I am not sure I agree that extreme Salafisme is not gaining ground in the Arab region, however I do think the message that one should neither think Muslims and Arabs are easily sliding into al-Qaeda's arms is useful - the underlying message that a solid majority are more concerned with seeing things like corruption addressed is true - the issue is it has to be... well addressed, else the Salafi puritans begin to look good.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:28 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Ah, Translation in Finance
I am too swamped for substance, so I will merely moan at the incredibly piss poor translation I just got from our contractor. Now, I realize terms such as "back outs" - "fiscally advantaged lease backs" and other strange esoteric jargon are, let us be charitable and say not the easiest things in the world to render. However, at the rate paid, and given representations, I generally expect proper rendering of definate articles, to get the subject of the phrase right (not 100 percent reversed, such as to say precisely the opposite of what the marketing chimpanzees meant), and to have a modicum of formatting. A modicum.
I also find it irritating that I end up essentially retranslating an already shitty Chimpanzee Power Point. It's upsetting to see it in the original, forcing myself to re-render it only increases my sense of utter futility, driving home the fact that I work for slavering, incompetent, short-sighted and yet deeply irritating baboons who nevertheless think that they're better than the local offer.
I should quite, renounce my wordly possessions, default on some leverage positions and become ... some kind of herder. Goats would be the natural but I despise goats (which makes Eid al-Adha a trying time for me), don't care for sheep at all either and don't like camels.
Perhaps rats.
Well, sitting down in the AM for a breakfast with the official, perhaps he'll cheer me up.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:14 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 20, 2004
Lounsbury on Dubai: Various random degenerate observations
To open, I note I have a bit of a fever, having caught cold while travelling over the past week (the sick bastard coughing next to me hardly helped) and so I can not be held entirely responsible for the following. I also can not compare my comments to the more in depth, artful and sustained comments our dear Istara makes, as of course she lives there, but a few comments on Dubai. Not substantive comments, just random ones.
First, in terms of flights, I must say, and this is terrible but sadly true, that I strongly advise avoiding third world originating flights to Dubai. A lot of tediousness goes on, Dubai being an el Dorado and all that. In particular the large, fat market ladies who mysteriously are able to fly to Dubai should be avoided. They feel free to bump you, physically, even wearing their viels. A normal response such as slugging them or cursing just can't be done.
Second, I've come to note that the quality of North African girls in Dubai is startinglingly poor. I am afraid to say that unlike the more fashionable home end selection, the North African (essentially Moroccan) chicks are somewhat on the dumpy side, and invariably look like low-rent interpretation of Leabanese whores. It's very strange - since Moroccan girls are actually quite fab and fashionable as a rule, but it appears Dubai attracts the lowest rent, ghetto or country types from Beni Millal and Ain Diab. Either that or I have simply been in the wrong places. Puzzling. I should have thought Dubai would attract a higher class of gold digger, since one can find (by accident of course) the same kind of .... international commercial agents in say Amman. Maybe they're getting nudged out by the Russians.
Third, one has to wonder how profitable all the leathery (largely English, largely hooliganesque) European tourists are in general. They do seem to spend. I suppose the magic words "Duty Free" seem to do it, although if one looks rationally at the prices and prices in opportunity cost, I am not convinced that Dubai is that great a deal (it's an awesome deal if you live in the region with duties runing at 100 percent). Of course the announced flights to Manchester no doubt explain all. Direct flights to Manchester.
(As an aside, it always puzzled me why the Moroccans have failed so stunningly in leveraging their own situation. Close to Europe, social mores rather looser than the Gulf's on a good day, better weather overall. Take the shitty city of Agadir. There is no reason why Agadir is not bigger in the Hedonism market. One could always import Eastern Europeans to service the more debauched Scandinavian desires, so long as they paid taxes. Offshoring.)
Fourth, there are more paunchy middle aged European men with bored looking East Asian chickies some 20 years their younger than I recall; I am guessing Dubai is winning some more of the international transit to Thialand etc. business than in the past. Why not? Still, it somewhat sticks out. Or maybe I just hit the right season?
As an aside, I recall in graduate studies being moderately contemptous of the popularity of those specializing in East Asian activities (clubs, focus groups, blah blah), somehow the sex tourism angle was always just below the surface. Now, many years later and in the Middle East, sometimes I stop and think, "Well, I was also intrigued with Portuguese"
Fifth, leading from this, I am surprised at my cultural regression of late. I used to be a literate and urbane fellow, interested in cinema, art, museums and other such foofy things. I am fast regressing. I should reflect on this, perhaps when feeling better.
Sixth, returning to baser topics, I note the number of hot sub-Contintental chickies in Dubai intrigues me, above all in direct comparison with the North African selection - admittting for the moment that origin is not always immediately obvious, but taking my observation for face value. Thank whatever I do not live in Dubai, I suspect I might end up getting in some serious situation. But then this reflects on my ongoing cultural regression. I shall soon be an empty minded idiot and disgusting old expat whanker.
Seventh: Dubai remains a strange place. Certainly one has to admit the Emirates have hit on an interesting model, and while one might ask if there is a real return on the massive amounts of capital being invested by the Emirates in Dubai and to a lesser extent Abu Dhabi. However, at least in the case of Dubai, I have to admit that it seems likely that this is a better use of the Emirates money than offshoring it in other investments or pissing it away in pure consumption. Dubai, at some level, does seem to work. I remain suspicious of it, but in many ways it is providing a free market example for the region. Let's leave aside the fact that many of the things it is doing are not directly replicable and as a model, it is about as relevant as Hong Kong is to China (which is to say relevant, but indirectly). Leaving this aside, it provides an Arab (ahem, let's abstract away from the large non-Arab professional presence in key areas) example to the rest of the region on the benefits of (reasonably) good standards (relative to rest of region - Istara, keep in mind the fucked up things you see are ever more fucked up elsewhere) and perhaps best of all, a perceived sense of (i) something Arabs (ahem) have got right, (ii) a talking model / contrast point for the rest of the region, something that is clearly working better on many levels than most of the rest of the region (monied or not).
None of this is to deny, I may add, the weirdly transparently superficial nature of Dubai society. Dubai is transience. That is clear. In the long term the varied masses are all going to go somewhere else. The Dubai Indians (and the especially hot Dubai South Indian girls.... well snapping out of my feverish reverie), the Dubai Lebanese, etc. are never going to be permanent in the sense of say North American immigrants (which is good for their home countries insofar as there is a natural transfer of capital and expertise - somewhat trivial in the sense of the Western population since they learn little, see little and are merely pampered gastarbeiteren). The question is how long does the game last? One of Dubai's problems is that unless its own hinterland progresses, develops, opens up, it can not really survive in the long term. The Hong Kong or Singapore play only really works if there is an attractive hinterland. As a mere pass through point on commerce that is passing from Asia to the West, it will be surplanted when it ceases to be able to subsidize such activities - that is when the hydrocarbons stop doping the regional economy, it had better hope that not only itself but its neighbors have gotten something right, else it will wither.
Among the key questions in looking at these questions, and I note this is looking at a 50 year time horizon- enough time that I will be quite an old man if not dead, is what is the real potential for change and "getting things right" in the region and beyond that, can the region overcome the natural handicaps, meaning water.
In short, the region, from the Maghreb to the Mashreq, faces two key binding constraints: fresh water and .. population growth, relative to opportunity especially. While I am a great believer in the ability for innovation to solve problems, and I also note that most Malthusian disaster scenarios to date have proven overblown, at the same time the sheer size and scope of the water issue in the Middle East make it hard to see a decent solution emerging. Certainly at small scales it is easy to see, but frankly it is hard to see where the investment capital (and where the returns) will come from for truly massive water reclamation projects needed in the long term to avoid system collapse in many areas where current reliance is on extracting fossil waters.
Of course, in saying this it's important to make distinctions between places in inexorable water traps (Transjordan region, Arabian Peninsula down to Yemen, Egypt to an extent, potentially Iraq) and those that are not (Lebanon, the coastal north of North Africa ex-Libya, Syria's West, the small Gulf States except of course the cauldron of KSA will boil them if it boils over).
Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:40 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Iraq Debt Write Off
US writes off $4.1bn in Iraq debt
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4106581.stm
Hypocrisy.
USG's recent conversion to the utility of debt relief is both unbalanced and opportunistic. Opportunism if fine however, the rather clear hypocrisy of the US position vis-a-vis Iraq and Iraqi debt is corrosive. Above all as there are solid reasons for a cautious approach to debt relief (moral hazard most importantly). While State Interest trumps moral hazard concerns in this situation, the incoherent approach of the current administration (and its clumsiness) are the wrong approach.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:25 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 08, 2004
Dollar, MENA and OPEC
An interesting development, as reported in The Financial Times
Opec sharply reduces dollar exposure
By Steve Johnson and Javier Blas in London
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/67f88f7c-47cb-11d9-a0fd-00000e2511c8.html
Published: December 6 2004 21:12 | Last updated: December 6 2004 21:12
Notable development that I missed earlier:
Oil exporters have sharply reduced their exposure to the US dollar over the past three years, according to data from the Bank for International Settlements.
Members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries have cut the proportion of deposits held in dollars from 75 per cent in the third quarter of 2001 to 61.5 per cent.
I note, however that OPEC and MENA are not the same, so the remainder of the article confuses the issue a bit. Nevertheless, the motors are Middle Eastern.
So of note
Middle Eastern central banks have reportedly switched reserves from dollars to euros and sterling to avoid incurring losses as the dollar has fallen and prepare for a shift away from pricing oil exports in dollars alone.
Interesting development. I note that this is an ongoing process and likely to accelerate as the dollar depreciates. Euro pricing might emerge within the next several years, probably incrementally.
I also wish to note this:
Private Middle East investors are believed to be worried about the prospect of US-held assets being frozen as part of the war on terror, leading to accelerated dollar-selling after the re-election of President George W. Bush.
I note that I began warning (on the SDMB) about this quite a bit back - and I recall with a degree of amusement that the arguments that it was impossible that private investors would reduce their exposure to the US because the US is just inherently too attractive, that my warning that there were economic implications to unbalanced "terror financing/business" reaction was off base. It would appear I was right:
Opec officials also point to political motivations after the 2001 terror attacks on the US.
Middle Eastern foreign exchange reserves are relatively small - those of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar are estimated at $61bn by BNP Paribas - but any switch may be seen as indicating the mood of private investors in the region, who control far greater wealth.
I am not sure CB ForEx position decisions are of necessity reflective of private investors, but in this case I do believe they are.
Hans Redeker, global head of foreign exchange strategy at the French bank, said the Patriot Act, introduced after September 11 to stop US financial institutions being used by terrorists to launder money, was worrying private investors.
"If you trade with what the US regards as a 'dodgy' bank, you are at risk of your assets in the US being frozen," he said. "After the re-election of George Bush, the Middle East started to sell dollars like crazy due to the fears of assets being frozen."
The BIS report also showed that, in spite of oil prices having risen 85 per cent since the fourth quarter of 2001, overall OPEC bank deposits have barely risen. "Oil reserves have not been channelled into the international banking system in the most recent cycle," the report said.
One school of thought is that Middle Eastern businesses and individuals increasingly prefer to invest at home, leading to sharp rises in real estate and equity prices in many countries. Another argument is that many Opec governments are having to increase public spending to support rapidly growing populations.
The underlined sections are interesting. First, in re the dodgey bank issue, my sense is the US authorities are being quite aggressive in characterizing "dodginess" and so the risk faced by asset holders or dollar holders with potential "terror association" exposure (even indirect) is not trivial, and above all is perceived as being non-trivial. I could be wrong given I have not studied the matter, but that is my sense.
Second, the non-recycling of the revenues is of no small interest. I would say the two schools of thought are non-exclusive. Certain there is much more investment in region by regional actors; the multiple regional bulls while perhaps in part reflecting new consciousness of economic reforms undertaken in the past ten years or rather their results, I suspect very much reflect a new fear in the region that MENA capital passing through or residing in the US, and Europe to a lesser extent, is in real danger of being siezed/frozen. In short, for a MENA or perhaps even a Muslim investor, US and even Europe looks less like a safe haven, while improved protections in the region for investors make re-investment more attractive - in fact feasible rather than unfeasible.
Now, one item I have noted is that not much seems to be going into new business creation. A lot is going into real estate, a goodly portion into the stock markets in grosso modo, some percentage of liquidity seems to be going into the ever deep (relative to the other markets) government debt markets; I don't get the sense of a lot of new business creation as of yet. It is possible that we will see this - something that bears thinking about. With continued reforms it may be Gulf and North Africa may actually become interesting investment destinations with local capital helping create a virtuous circle. Not a story I am necessarily going to buy into right now, but something to keep on the agenda.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:47 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Worrisome: Intel - Interrog abuses
The following article in The Washington Post is worrisome. I am not inclined to abusive "evil America" blather, and neither am I inclined to think that the real necessity to engage radicals in the region can be done with kid gloves, however what is cited in this article is worrisome on many levels:
Report to Defense Alleged Abuse By Prison Interrogation Teams
Intelligence Official Informed Defense Dept. in June
By Barton Gellman and R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, December 8, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45373-2004Dec7.html
The worrisome aspects are the clear indications of an abusive, out of control of real intel officers system of torture. This is a losing game to be engaged in.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:16 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
FT: Wolf on Dollar
I am not going to have time to comment on these in the near future, let me simply draw your attention to Wolf's articles and the underlying economic papers.
Martin Wolf: A dangerous hunger for American assets
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/810ada20-4883-11d9-9162-00000e2511c8.html
| Martin Wolf: America’s switch to a weak dollar policy |
Wolf has some nice obs in re the issue with the weakening dollar is really very much also an issue of how it is happening.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:16 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Dollar, Dollar
A short note. Economist and FT (Wolf esp) have some important comments on the dollar. Read them. Will try to comment on this shortly. Nothing new, per se, but some items to reflect on in re current political issues, and where things will play.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:16 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Islamic Democracy [edited to clean up coding]
Very interesting essay in The New York Times which shows a greater sophistication in addressing the issue of democracy and Islam than is ordinarly in the case. I don't beleive it has attracted much attention as of yet, so I'll permit myself a few moments to run through this with some comments.
An Islamic Democracy for Iraq?
By IAN BURUMA
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/05/magazine/05ESSAY.html?pagewanted=all&position=
Published: December 5, 2004
First, I have to say I find the underlying question silly:
Is ''Islamic democracy'' really possible? Or is it something meaningless, like ''Jewish science,'' say, or contradictory, like ''people's democracy'' under Communism?
The term is really like Christian Democracy, as it emerging in Europe in the 19th century in Europe when transition from authoritian traditions to democracy began to emerge.
But granting that the question is being posed, the more interesting points
The more interesting points
The ayatollah insists that an Iraqi constituent assembly must be chosen through direct elections and that ''any basic law written by this assembly must be approved by a national referendum.'' He makes only cursory reference to Koranic law as the basis for that legal code. .... It is the duty of the Shiites, according to the ayatollah, to protect Sunni and Christian interests as well. And although he opposed a plan to allow Kurds, who make up 15 to 20 percent of the Iraqi population, veto power over the constitution, he has not squelched Kurdish hopes of preserving some degree of autonomy under a new government. All these are fine words, of course, yet to be tested in reality. But they are remarkable words for a Shiite cleric born in Iran and should be taken seriously.
Quite right, although I would say that the fact he was born in Iran is rather irrelevant insofar as pre-Khomieni, it was Sistani's approach that was dominant.
Despite the recent surge of conservative Christian activism in the
A very able set of comparisions. Keep them in mind, the fishbowl manner which we tend to look at the Middle East can often be decieving, exagerating differences, obscuring similarities.
Now, some excellent observations on the history of secularism in the region (after the author draws attention to my old man Wolfowitz and our favoriate historian Lewis - who as you all know I genuinely like in the context of keeping in mind his weaknesses - penchant for Kemalism):
Similar revolutions happened or were tried elsewhere. After the Meiji Restoration in
Unfortunately, what came out of all this secularizing zeal was not democracy but militarism, absolute monarchy, fascism and variations of Stalinism. The religious revolution that now stalks the Muslim world has come as a reaction, in part, to the failure of modern secular politics. And yet many Middle East analysts sympathetic to the Bush administration, like Daniel Pipes, see a secular strongman, along the lines of Ataturk or Chiang Kai-shek, as the best option in Iraq, since elections in the short term would bring ''Khomeini-like mullahs'' to power. Neoconservatives are not alone in their distrust of clerics. This distrust split the left-leaning anti-Communist opposition in Poland too. It was hard for some dissidents to support the priests against the commissars. As Jerzy Urban, one of the last spokesmen for the Communist regime there, once remarked, it's either us or the Black Madonna of Czestochowa. But does it always have to be one or the other? Is the choice in Iraq really between Ataturk and Khomeini?
As those of you who have been with me for a while, the bold and underlined argument has long been my argument. Of course, you also all know my extreme contempt for Pipes. I rather like comparision with the Polish situ, even if it is of necessity inexact. Nevertheless, the contrast is useful, is the choice actually between Ataturk and Khomieni? I say, as you all know, no.
The following note is also useful for keeping on context the history of secularism as we normally approach it and to a warning to fetishizing a certain constellation of political arrangements as the one and only approach. Of course that does not mean either that any given alternative is actually better, only that a bit of critical thinking about processes and means of efficiently getting "there" from "here" is badly needed.
The idea that modern democracy has to be secular in its ethos is, of course, rooted in European history. The Enlightenment was partly an assault on the authority of the church, especially in France. Political arrangements were to be subject to reason, not to theology. To be modern was to reject religion, or ''superstition,'' and to believe in science. It was not enough, in the view of Voltaire, among others, to put organized religion in its place; it was necessary to ''wipe out that rubbish.'' The belief in science as a solution for all human problems became a kind of superstition itself. Scientific socialism, a la Stalin and Mao, for example, led to all manner of crackpot experiments that caused the deaths of millions.
Again, valuable and useful points, and not simply on a political science level, but rather on a practical level. Rather like transplanting a series of business processes from one firm to another, transplanting a certain set of political operational frameworks does not really work unless one adapts to how people really use the tools, and that means understanding where they are actually coming from. Erecting a certain process method as the way of doing things without grappling with the potential changes needed from one firm or culture to another means failure.
Of course, not all rationalists were so extreme. Many typical Enlightenment thinkers, like John Locke, were convinced that a political system based on enlightened self-interest could not survive without a strong basis in religious morality. The kind of anti-clericalism that inspired Stalinists and other authoritarians was more a product of the French Revolution than of the pursuit of democracy in itself.
Really nothing to add to this other than it is an interesting, I think correct, and valuable observation.
I may add that I immediately began thinking of my half sarcastic phrase for the Neo Con movement, as Right Bolshevism. I think there is perhaps more to that than my sarcasm.
However, the following is a more important observation, in relationship to a point I have hammered away at ever since I began making my semi-useful commentaries on MENA.
In fact, anti-clericalism, much more than a history of religious zeal, formed the basis for many of the Middle East's bloodiest political failures: Nasserism in Egypt, Baathism in Syria and Iraq, the shah in Iran. These regimes were led by secular elites who saw religion as something that held their countries back or in a state of colonial dependence. The fact that a number of iron-fisted reformers, like Nasser himself, were routinely the objects of assassination attempts by religious zealots showed the gap between the secular ''progressive'' elites and the people they ruled. When organized religion is destroyed, something worse often takes its place, usually a quasi religion or personality cult exploited by dictators. When it is marginalized, as happened in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East, it provokes a religious rebellion.
Important observations, again saying rather more clearly and succinctly what I have tried to convey. Kemalism in the Middle East has been tried and it went badly. Turkey kinda sorta got it right, but the Turkish case is too different to truly rely on.
This is not to say that Muslim clerics are naturally disposed to democracy. But, as Michael Hirsh pointed out in a recent article in The Washington Monthly, a number of Middle East scholars -- Richard Bulliet, author of ''The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization,'' among them -- have argued that religion for many centuries actually acted as a constraint on tyranny in the Muslim world. The destruction of traditional Muslim institutions, like religious schools and mosques, in the name of modernization left a social void in which extreme, political Islam would eventually thrive.
Well, you know I did not care all that much for Hirsh's article nor his interpretations, but Bulliet I know and like to an extent although I will commit some degree of heresy in stating the 'fellow traveller' accusation has a tiny grain of truth, that is I think his interpretations are somewhat overgenerous (although I admit I have read more Lewis than Bulliet, and in some ways like Lewis more.... despite the problems I see with him, above in re his conclusions).
If religion acted as a constraint - it did I grant that - it was not historically all that brilliant of a constraint. True, the Islamic world until "modernization" did not generate the absolutisms of the same nature as Europe, but I am not very convinced this was so much Islam qua Islam as perhaps the constellation of political and economic structures. Taking, however, as a given that Islamic doctrine does mitigate against fascist type ideologies (Keppel and Roy certainly argue in this vien), making the term Islamofascist rather wrong headed in many ways as it gets much of their thought in an entirely wrongheaded context, that is not necessarily enough to truly mitigate against the emergence of nihilist Talebanesque regimes either.
Om the underlined point, I would say that this void emerged as much because of the economic failure of the Arab Socialist experiment, and its closely allied Great State (Conservative) Arab Nationalist bretheren as much as the religious angle. The one thing the State got right was State security organs, which in their repressive efficiency have generated the only response possible in a society where the secular is associated with a kind of clownish version of Stalinism.
Ayatollah Khomeini was not acting as a traditional Shiite cleric but as a modern revolutionary who took power as a political strongman. And in the eyes of many believers, his worldly dictatorship in Iran undermined his stature as a religious figure, since mullahs are not supposed to act like politicians. Osama bin Laden is an amateur priest with more knowledge of Swiss bank transfers and media manipulation than of the intricacies of Islam. It would be hard to find a serious Muslim cleric or scholar who respects him.
Fair statements, but I think the last one on ObL is overdone, depending on what one means by serious Muslim scholar and respect. I would say there are a goodly number of reactionaries who do regard him as a useful idiot, which is a kind of respect in the context of not denouncing him.
However, it is true those with a theological bent seem not to respect ObL as himself.
On the other hand, insofar as what counts for a Muslim religious leader is attracting followers, being a second rate scholar, novice bricoleur in radical theology and some vulgar propagandist in the eyes of the more refined, is perhaps of secondary importance.
The strength and weakness in Islam is the lack of central authority or even particularly clear standards for who is a "cleric" (as low church Protestantism).
It may be useful to reflect for a moment on how the West itself has coped with religion. The separation of church and state was indeed a necessary condition for democratic development in
Excellent observation, and gets us back to the question of how do we (they) get there from here? The Maoist or Bolshevik New Man style thinking does not strike me as particularly useful. But then I don't believe societies or people transform. That has largely been an extreme Left conceit. Nor do I particularly believe in civilizing missions or what not (something of a general conceit). Achieving enough change to create a modus vivendi with one's neighbors is quite enough and yet quite a hurdle.
This paragraph is equally important:
I do not believe this. It is always tricky for an agnostic in religious affairs to argue for the importance of organized religion, but I would argue not that more people should be religious or that democracy cannot survive without God, but that the voices of religious people should be heard. The most important condition for a functional democracy is that people take part. If religious affiliations provide the necessary consensus to play by common rules, then they should be recognized. A Sharia-based Shiite theocracy, even if it were supported by a majority, would not be a democracy. Only if the rights and interests of the various ethnic and religious groups are negotiated and compromises reached could you speak of a functioning democracy.
I tend to regard the very religious as dupes, simple minded fools and other kind thoughts, however the reality is they are the majority of humanity. Pretending one can change the world is nice little Quixotesque game to play, but it is far more useful to be a pragmatist.
Achieving some idealized transformation of Middle Eastern society along the lines of what the highly urbane, literate, largely agnostically secular and generally old school liberal Western Urban Elite think is the Holy Grail of social standards is a bit of magical thinking (for all that I may add that as a member of the same "elite" I largely fully subscribe to our values). Creating enough space so there is a modus vivendi so our values can continue to exist, so that there is a positive engagement rather than a clash of cultures
Skipping ahead I note the following important point
The views of devout Shiites on the rights of women and other social issues may not be shared by most voters in the United States, but devout Shiites do claim to want popular sovereignty based on elections. The question is whether Sistani and his followers maintain this position because they are the majority in Iraq and elections would favor them, not the Sunnis, or whether they want an electoral system on principle. We will not know the answer until it is tested -- that is, until one faction or another loses an election and has to give its consent to being ruled by an alternative party. Sistani has worked hard to create a unified Shiite coalition, but Shiites are far from being united. A coalition between Chalabi and the radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr could siphon off a number of Shiite votes.
I add however, I find the analogy drawn to Indonesia to be far off base. It could have been true before the CPA drove off a cliff. In the longer run, however his points, which I have skipped have some weight. (As an aside, I am not convinced that the views of devout Shiites in Iraq are so strange to social conservatives in the US of A - taking into account social structure differences, they're actually merely differences of degree in my view, although I confess being equally contemptous of all 'true believers' in any given religion)
Regardless, a key hidden point is that whatever cheap outrage about how local society does not look like some idealized Western objective, what one actually needs to focus on is what is doable, what is achievable and what has real returns on the effort invested.
As even the slightest reflection on one's own native society tells one that "outside" interference in familial/social issues is an area that generally provokes heated, emotional and above all violent opposition. Economic relations are easier to work with, above all inthe context of supporting incipent change and to the extent possible, the upcomers versus the established interests - which as I have oft noted are largely rent seekers, not wealth creators.
Above all the issue is understanding what are the achievable goals, be they in Iraq or elsewhere. Among the grave errors, in re Iraq and playing off the implicit observation contained in the underlined phase, was to seek to impose ("encourage") a late 20th century secular Western view of women's roles in society on a society that already felt 'under attack.' Bad politics (well good domestic American politics), not even a good business considering one should first win over one's market.
The core issue is absolutely not remaking the target society over into "our" image, like some moralizing twits or in the old "civilizing mission" model, but working to neutralize those aspects that present real and present threats to current interests. If the Arab Islamic world wants to evolve in our image, super, if not, well, their choice. I am a liberal, in the old sense. I dislike imposed social models, even "liberal" ones - although I grant that under certain circumstances I find it acceptable for a democratic society to make a choice to "move" less-than-optimal social views by "force." In this context I point to racial issues in the US - being a conditional and reluctant supporter of some forms of Affirmative Action having encountered via intimate and professional relations the real but oft hidden racism of too many of my pale confreres - that is an internal choice driven by internal decision making: even in this case it remains controversial and while I find my "white brothers" outrage over affrimative action generally childish, overdone and often highly suspect (no small amount of crypto racism I think is involved in much AA opposition in the US and Europe, principled opposition I do however largely agree with in theory although pragmatism leads me to go counter to abstract principles).
The side track on AA is not by accident I add, I mean to highlight the issue of internally driven change versus what is perceived as "outside" agitation. While there is a place for outside agitation, on such highly sensitive and 'intimate' issues, my experience in the region (and elsewhere - an error we can make is to look at MENA as if it were some alien world, in truth much of what occurs in the MENA region is found in other degrees elsewhere, e.g. the machismo - an aside the undergrad blog I was referred to is replete with this kind of error, besides being rather pedestrain) it has always struck me that the Left centered idea of "improving" social relations is usually a failed piece of business. The most outre relations - e.g. apartheid, slavery, etc. should be punished, but issues such as domestic violence, hijab wearing: these things are best dealt with through the envy factor rather than inevitably clumsy, misplaced direct pressure.
On the otherhand, relations based on interest - shared interest - are rather more amenable to change. Economic - Business relations. When I refer to Economic - Business relations, I refer to productive, wealth generating relations, not the extractive, rent-based relations say of the Gulf. Here, you can make real changes (although issues of social justice etc. can generate strong responses, so ideally - and this is indeed based on
Returning to the essay:
Radical Islam, promoted and financed by Wahhabists from Saudi Arabia [*], began to attract a growing number of Indonesians for the same reason it appealed to Iraqis under Saddam Hussein: when all political opposition is crushed by autocrats, the mosque becomes the only place of political refuge. After an economic crisis led to the downfall of Suharto's dictatorship, the chaotic start of a new democracy created room for radicals, calling for an Islamic state, to operate more freely. Secular politicians refused to criticize the Islamists for fear of being accused of being anti-Islam, and moderate Muslims tried to ignore them. This pretense was no longer possible after a group named Jemaah Islamiyah, loosely linked
to Al Qaeda, killed more than 200 people in a disco in Bali. Indonesians had to acknowledge that they had an Islamist terrorist problem.
First, addressing the bolded section with the [*] let me note that the Saudi pretext is overused. Salafisme existed in Indonesia before and without Saudi influences. Saudi financing and the interim influence (and here let me stress an important observation) by the wealth=prestige effect of Wahhabi-Salafisme alliance certainly helped the reaction.
Second, however, I emphasize that the author identifies the right drivers here. The bolded and underlined section tells you much of what you need to know.
The remainder of the comment strikes me as rich, correct and as applicable to the MENA region as Indonesia.
When the only space for criticism of a corrupt regime in religion.... reflect.
You might conclude from this that Suharto had it right. His rule may have been harsh and corrupt, but at least he kept the Islamists in their box. Democracy is resulting in terror. Yet this would be the wrong conclusion. Not only were Suharto's authoritarian methods largely responsible for the birth of religious extremism; democracy is proving to be the best cure -- for moderate Muslims, still the majority in Indonesia, are so appalled by the bloody mayhem caused by the terrorists that they won't vote for any party associated with them. This has forced the Islamist parties to publicly reject the extremists.
Decompression.
In re the underlined section, I think this somewhat overstates things. Religious conservatism - which I am perhaps wrong in confounding with extremism in this context - certainly existed before in Indonesia (viz Aceh), but I largely agree the nihilistic and terroristic form was likely doped (not created nor entirely responsible for) by the secular dictatorship of Suharto. As in Turkey, however, Indonesia managed to create just enough progress (perhaps a function of natural conditions one has to admit - an item that renders the MENA region difficult are the severe natural restraints on economic development. Jordan, a fine little country, allows -abstracting away from its neighborhood problems - precious little error in terms of developmental policy) to avoid the nihilistic spiral of the MENA region, as in Egypt.
The author is quite right in emphasizing the utility of democracy - at least some reasonable resemblance of democracy - in allowing popular feeling to move, to ebb and flow, and in that context, turn popular opinion against extremism.
Let me take Morocco as an example, anectdotal to be sure, but a country I know well, having a long and very intimate connexion with it. In particular, I point to the popular reaction to the terror attacks of May 2003. The mass - and above all spontaneous! - demostrations against terror, demonstrations that my Moroccan friends tell me were joined or supported by all segements of society except the al-Qaedah types, (i) could only have occured under the limited democratization (but rather more extensive liberalisation of expression) since the new King came in, (ii) were highly instrumental in 'suppressing' the extremists, and turning otherwise sympathetic types away from them. Somewhat less useful, and in some ways perhaps mildly counterproductive (although I note likely necessary economically) state security responses I found less important than the spontaneous outpouring of outrage.
In reality, in terms of real "Western" interest, we should be less interested in forcing changes in how Muslim men and women interact - as an old school liberal (in the 'libertarian' sense) I dislike although am willing to admit limited intervention here - but rather in supporting what is likely to be the locally, internally desired seeds of what "we" want to achieve, both in the near term and the long term.
Finally, let me highlight some important items in the closing:
It is very difficult to build a democracy as pupils of foreign tutors who arrived in bombers and tanks. Even though the foreign occupiers say they want an Iraqi democracy too, anyone or any party believed to be on the side of foreigners is discredited from the start. The more those foreigners insist on secularism, the more the local people may turn to radical Islamism. And the more violence the Islamists unleash, the less likely it is that Iraqis can vote in safety. This is particularly true of the so-called Sunni triangle north and west of Baghdad. It is all very well for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and for leading Shiites and Kurds, to say that it would still be better to have elections, even if many people can't take part, but that won't do. ''There is no perfect election in the world,'' Sa'ad Jawad Qandil told The Boston Globe. Qandil is a senior official in the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, a major Shiite party better known as Sciri. ''If there are some minorities who cannot participate because of security, that is not a reason to cancel the decision of the majority.'' Well, yes, it is. For if the Sunnis can't vote, Iraqi democracy won't work, because without the consent of this minority, the majority can never govern in peace.
I admit that I am torn. Whatever my (almost boundless) contempt for the Bush Administration, I have a hard time imagining any way around holding elections "on schedule" - given the Shiite insistance, given Kurdish views and given the issues re the Sunni. I would suggest that the sole way out of the Catch-22 is engage a post election declaration aimed at the Sunnis that in "troubled districts" another election can be held and set up a mechanism to try to engage the Sunni - even those who have killed Americans.
I note, by the way, that the desire, understandable of course, for American blood to be made "good" by refusing "killers" entry into the political realm is self defeating - it is cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. The Sunni side, for example, must feel rather similarly in re its losses - why should it accept Americans who have killed so many of their own?
In short, this is an area where long term State Interest has to rule over the domestic political sentiments of the families of dead soldiers - much as it should have happened in re the families of American Viet Nam dead (in my opinion a scandalously stupid derogation of larger state interest to the often irrational interest of a few. No doubt understandable in the context of the mythology of 'necessary victory' (aka the idocy of the "one hand tied behind our backs" argument, that mistakes the total war model of WWII as universally useful) but not useful in advancing the general interest).
Finally, I find this historically sensitive observation to be among the most useful:
It is also true that the religious, in Europe, the United States or anywhere, often do what their priests or mullahs tell them to. Until not so long ago, many people in countries with Catholic or Protestant parties did just that. But at least they voted, and by consenting to the democratic rules, they managed to live together without going at one another's throats. If Shiites and Sunnis can do so in a future Iraq, by voting for religious parties, then so be it. But first they have to be able to vote without getting killed. That is the issue, and not religion per se. The answer will be shaped by a foreign occupation, which made democracy possible, but then, by its very presence, might help to snuff it out.
I rather suspect we are watching the opening of decade long civil conflict, that will engage the US in a senseless cycle of violence for much of the decade (this very much the fault of the Bush Administration, you morons who voted for him under various justifications carry this weight, but then, what the fuck, the fuck up with the dollar and fiscal and monetary policy in many ways outweight this - all in all my dear Bush voters, go to bloody hell.)
Now, have to finish my fucking payment systems readings so I can follow tomorrow's meeting. Can't win clients without being able to pretend to know their business, above all bankers.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:49 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 07, 2004
Civil War
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/05/weekinreview/05wong.html?pagewanted=all&position=
Quickly, not really news. I said it months ago, the logic of power struggle is almost inexorable now, but there it is.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:50 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 04, 2004
Baghdad Hwy: Breaking the Back of the Insurgency (or is it the other way around?)
Thanks to hotel wifi and a somewhat improved health situ, I bring you:
U.S. Embassy Bans Use of Airport Road
Employees in Baghdad Will Travel Increasingly Dangerous Route by Helicopter
By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, December 3, 2004; Page A20
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29731-2004Dec2.html
What can I say? It only gets better.
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November 29, 2004
Regime Change: minor but intriguing. (edited)
So Abdullah ditched his little half bro (whose wedding last year seriously inconvenienced me, as my house was, unbeknowst to me, near the celebatory palace): Jordan crown prince loses title http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4050231.stm.
This may not have a larger meaning, but I am intrigued. As I will be in town tomorrow, will listen.
[added title to throw you all a bone]
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Friedman: or his more rational twin
| often have a hard time figuring out Friedman, for just when I think I can utterly write him off, he reaches out and touches rationality for a second.
OP-ED COLUMNIST
The Last Mile
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: November 28, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/28/opinion/28friedman.html?8hpib
Of note in his comments
Consider one small example. Last week, The Times's defense correspondent, Thom Shanker, wrote about a study conducted by the Defense Science Board, which found that nearly two years into the war in Iraq, America's institutions charged with "strategic communications" - about what we are doing in the world and why - are broken. The study found that "the United States today is without a working channel of communication to the world of Muslims and of Islam."
No kidding. We are losing a public relations war in the Muslim world to people sawing the heads off other Muslims. But this is only one dimension of a larger problem, which cannot be allowed to continue.
An amusing turn of phrase that.
But his analysis, for the sheer novelty value, makes sense:
Here's why: The Bush team early on compared the fall of Saddam's statue in that Baghdad square with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Wrong. The Berlin Wall was a completely artificial barrier that had no organic connection to the society it was repressing. Once that wall was removed, the free-market, civil society and democratic traditions that were already there in places like East Germany, Poland and Hungary could resurface. All we had to do was get out of the way.
In Iraq, and in Palestine, when Saddam and Yasir Arafat toppled over like walls, their disappearances did not leave behind civil societies yearning to be free, united and democratic. Saddam and Arafat were products of their societies more than we want to admit - not artificial impositions.
While overstated (one has to make allowances for the brief format of such pieces), he does capture an essential difference between the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the issues in the Midle East.
In the long run their departures are huge opportunities. But in the short run they have left behind two pots that are boiling over - two highly tribalized societies, full of pent-up problems, with few civil society institutions or consensus leaders. They left behind two huge rebuilding challenges. The Bush team helped remove the lids off both these pots. But the first rule of cooking and warfare is: Never take the lid off a boiling pot unless you also have a strategy for turning down the heat. President Bush had a lid-removing strategy only. He's been improvising on the heat part ever since.
Well the turns of phrase are not fellicitious but there is a clear point there.
Improv time is over. This is crunch time. Iraq will be won or lost in the next few months. But it won't be won with high rhetoric. It will be won on the ground in a war over the last mile.
Right, right..... it's already lost on its original precepts, rather about managing downsides.
Here is a good obs:
Wars are fought for political ends. Soldiers can only do so much. And the last mile in every war is about claiming the political fruits. The bad guys in Iraq can lose every mile on every road, but if they beat America on the last mile - because they are able to intimidate better than America is able to coordinate, protect, inform, invest and motivate - they will win and America will lose.
Indeed.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:15 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Private Equity in Emerging Markets, opening note
A question of some interest to me, but not just personally.
It pops into mind because the latest Economist highlights private equity in its Finance special section. Having my little role in the emerging markets, on one hand I like to say that it is here, in these rather rough and messed up markets where the model of direct, active investing with a view to shepherding a firm tomaturity or turning inefficient firms has the most attractiion. However, the wrinke is that are there the returns necessary to justify the effort (I think often there are, but that's an assertion), and second what are the returns that justify such a model?
I believe some of my readers here are not innocent of business and finance, and so I thought that I might see if others have thoughts.
http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3398496
EDITED: I note I will out of touch for a week.
Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
A commentary on Lewis: Washington Monthly art
After some delay, some comments on this article. Let me note that this (despite the delay) is an off-the -cuff commentary. I have not bothered to research, etc. You may take this as my gut reaction based on relatively extensive but incomplete reading of Lewis. In particular I have not bothered with Lewis' newspaper comments etc. My overall sense is that this falls into the category of the (fallacious) search for the "true" fathers (and mothers) of the benighted misunderstanding of the region and Iraq that led to the failure that is Iraq. While Lewis may bear some part in this,
Bernard Lewis Revisited
What if Islam isn't an obstacle to democracy in the Middle East but the secret to achieving it?
By Michael Hirsh
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0411.hirsh.html
Let me preface my commentary by saying that it strikes me that the author is placing a bit much on Lewis' shoulders, even allowing for Lewis writing (I have not read them) silly articles for WSJ etc. I also note that I have read Lewis' academic and popular writings extensively, and as long time readers know, I rather like Lewis' historical works, as far as they go - although I always like to note that Lewis is the type of historian who is very much bound by a high culture 'formalism' by which I mean he takes the formal, normative versions of Islam (to take an example), and tends to ignore the less legalistic things that are harder to find in texts and high culture commentary; I think he under estimates popular Sufism for example. However, as I have noted in the past, even before reading this article which rather dovetailed with my own conclusions based on simply his works, Lewis does not understand the modern Arab world. He is a mediavalist by training, nature and knowledge, and both by learning and I think by nature, he simply does not grasp the colonial and post colonial world. I've observed this before, and find it interesting to see my observation seconded by others, who I was unaware had reached the same conclusions. I feel all warm and fuzzy.
This, by the way, is not a condemnation nor even a particularly biting criticism. I would very much expect that if in some alternate universe of say an Asia that played Europe's role in modern times, that if we had the case of some mythical Asian specialist focused on Medieval Europe speaking to why a (bizarro alternate universe) backwards (relatively) Europe was so, that this mythical specialist would make the same kinds of analytical errors. Seeing Islam or Asia or whatever through the lens of an epoch long gone, and not having training, engagement nor it would seem particularly deep understanding of modern events is bound to skew one's analysis.
Thus, before jumping into my annotations and commentary on this article, let me reiterate my opinion that Lewis, even his modern focused works, is a good scholar, and good observer and well worth reading. I also warn that his commentary on the region in its modern form is seriously skewed by his lack of understanding of the colonial and post colonial periods, but nevertheless contains valuable insights if one keeps in mind the issue of him seeing things through a medieval lens. I also note that I would never say the same about a Daniel Pipes, who I consider a loathsome if polite bigot and political opportunist trying in a shabby and farcical manner to recreate the life of his father the anti Communist.
Now, as to the article:
America's misreading of the Arab world—and our current misadventure in Iraq—may have really begun in 1950. That was the year a young University of London historian named Bernard Lewis visited Turkey for the first time. Lewis, who is today an imposing, white-haired sage known as the “doyen of Middle Eastern studies” in America (as a New York Times reviewer once called him), was then on a sabbatical. Granted access to the Imperial Ottoman archives—the first Westerner allowed in—Lewis recalled that he felt “rather like a child turned loose in a toy shop, or like an intruder in Ali Baba's cave.” But what Lewis saw happening outside his study window was just as exciting, he later wrote. There in Istanbul, in the heart of what once was a Muslim empire, a Western-style democracy was being born.
Well, first, I am not sure I would go to New York Times reporters for characterizations of academics. He's certainly a leading historian; one would wish that one not confuse the work of historians with current commentators, but let's leave that aside (as well as the somewhat dodgey characterization of Lewis as the first Westerner allowed in the archives, I may be wrong but I seriously doubt this is true).
The hero of this grand transformation was Kemal Ataturk. A generation before Lewis's visit to Turkey, Ataturk (the last name, which he adopted, means “father of all Turks”), had seized control of the dying Ottoman Sultanate. Intent on single-handedly shoving his country into the modern West—“For the people, despite the people,” he memorably declared—Ataturk imposed a puritanical secularism that abolished the caliphate, shuttered religious schools, and banned fezes, veils, and other icons of Islamic culture, even purging Turkish of its Arabic vocabulary. His People's Party had ruled autocratically since 1923. But in May 1950, after the passage of a new electoral law, it resoundingly lost the national elections to the nascent Democrat Party. The constitutional handover was an event “without precedent in the history of the country and the region,” as Lewis wrote in The Emergence of Modern Turkey, published in 1961, a year after the Turkish army first seized power. And it was Kemal Ataturk, Lewis noted at another point, who had “taken the first decisive steps in the acceptance of Western civilization.”
Father of the Turks, not all Turks, but leaving that aside, as well as the issue of Arabic vacab (Turkish retains quite a lot, although less than before), I note one thing:
The guys who do stuff like you are always quite seductive (and I am a Kemal Attaturk fan), but that does not mean they're the right model. Above all in the current historical circumstances. The Attaturk model worked more or less for Turkey at the time. But that time has passed, the dynamics are different, the history of failed secularism (even if it failed for reasons seperate from secularism per se) in the Arab world has at least partially posioned that well. Ignoring this reality and approaching the Middle East with the utterly backwards and wrongheaded idea that secularization is "new" to the region is simply going to lead to the kinds of clumsy failures and idiocies that we have seen in Iraq (and I hope you all recall the pious mouthings regarding the secularity of Iraqi society, and similar outdated blather. I also hope those who have read my commentary for a while recall my noting this was a badly outdated idea).
Or as I have quoted a business colleague before, "Don't be fooled just because he speaks good English."
Today, that epiphany—Lewis's Kemalist vision of a secularized, Westernized Arab democracy that casts off the medieval shackles of Islam and enters modernity at last—remains the core of George W. Bush's faltering vision in Iraq. As his other rationales for war fall away, Bush has only democratic transformation to point to as a casus belli in order to justify one of the costliest foreign adventures in American history. And even now Bush, having handed over faux sovereignty to the Iraqis and while beating a pell-mell retreat under fire, does not want to settle for some watered-down or Islamicized version of democracy. His administration's official goal is still dictated by the “Lewis Doctrine,” as The Wall Street Journal called it: a Westernized polity, reconstituted and imposed from above like Kemal's Turkey, that is to become a bulwark of security for America and a model for the region.
I find it moderately unfair to place this on Lewis' shoulders. He no doubt is a contibutor, but I hardly think the vision of an... Atturkization of the Arab world really derives from him. He may have helped legitimate it, although given what I know about Wolfowitz and his cohort (and recall, I do know some of them include Wolfie - although hardly well I add) I very much doubt this is key to their decision process.
Rather, it strikes me the vision derives naturally from navel gazing, a poor level of knowledge of the Islamic world even among the well-educated, a certain and natural presumption that being 'just like us' or better 'just like our self vision of what we are' is obviously the way another, weaker or defeated culture has to go for success.
Of course the concept of a Western polity with imposed democracy as a workable model quite simply ignores colonial and post-colonial history (and post Great War Turkish history); not perhaps surprising if one gets the sense that the people speaking to this kind of model know literally nothing about the secularizing and even top down attempts at democracy in much of the Arab world starting from the 1920s forward, and the failures of the same. A lot of commentators seem to think this is the first time this has been tried.... But then far too many commentators in the United States seem to think the entire region is best characterized by Saudi Arabia.
Iraq, of course, does not seem to be heading in that direction. Quite the contrary: Iraq is passing from a secular to an increasingly radicalized and Islamicized society, and should it actually turn into a functioning polity, it is one for the present defined more by bullets than by ballots. All of which raises some important questions. What if the mistakes made in Iraq were not merely tactical missteps but stem from a fundamental misreading of the Arab mindset? What if, in other words, the doyen of Middle Eastern studies got it all wrong?
Again, it strikes me the author is making Lewis carry too much water, and if Lewis, as is I think the case, fails to understand transformations in the Islamic world since 1800 and above all since 1900, that hardly means he gets it all wrong. I suppose he 'got it all wrong' in regards to Iraq, presuming he wrote as claimed, but it is an unfair statement in its sweeping nature.
Lewis's basic premise, put forward in a series of articles, talks, and bestselling books, is that the West—what used to be known as Christendom—is now in the last stages of a centuries-old struggle for dominance and prestige with Islamic civilization. (Lewis coined the term “clash of civilizations,” using it in a 1990 essay titled “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” and Samuel Huntington admits he picked it up from him.) Osama bin Laden, Lewis thought, must be viewed in this millennial construct as the last gasp of a losing cause, brazenly mocking the cowardice of the “Crusaders.” Bin Laden's view of America as a “paper tiger” reflects a lack of respect for American power throughout the Arab world. And if we Americans, who trace our civilizational lineage back to the Crusaders, flagged now, we would only invite future attacks. Bin Laden was, in this view, less an aberrant extremist than a mainstream expression of Muslim frustration, welling up from the anti-Western nature of Islam. “I have no doubt that September 11 was the opening salvo of the final battle,” Lewis told me in an interview last spring. Hence the only real answer to 9/11 was a decisive show of American strength in the Arab world; the only way forward, a Kemalist conquest of hearts and minds. And the most obvious place to seize the offensive and end the age-old struggle was in the heart of the Arab world, in Iraq.
Well, let me first confess I have never read his old essay, "The Roots of Muslim Rage", which puts me at a disadvantage.
Now, I grant in the context of the reporting above, very clearly Lewis' call regarding the structure of the al-Qaeda - West battle gets things wrong in a number of ways. Certainly the concept of "decisive show of strength" gets things very wrong - although it was parrotted around quite along among American conservative circles rather mindlessly.His buying into the concept of a Kemalist transformation of Iraq, presuming the interviewer understood him right simply reflects the degree to which, as I have observed in the past, that Lewis simply does not understand the modern Islamic world, seeing it through the eyes of the Classical one. The success of Kemalism was the success of native Turkish nationalism. No one who understands nationalism and the Arab region's history would think that an outside invader would pull off what an insider like Attaturk had a bloody hard time doing, and that in the context of an Islamic world where the shock of the colonial intrusion was leading many to turn to secularism - not an Arab or Islamic world that about a century later has already experienced a failure of secularism (for reasons I would suggest largely exogenous to secularism per se, but endogenous to the manner in which it was executed in the Arab world).
Now, the issue of lack of respect of American power is not entirely a false one, but it is one easy to exagerate. Certainly there has been the paper tiger argument, but in my experience this has, with the exception of among a few wild eyed radicals, a bravado argument, not one people actually believe. Rather, in my experience, the conspiratorial, "Americans and Israelis (as one) as all powerful" story has always been rather stronger. The ability of US forces to crush any given Arab army I doubt has ever been in doubt. The ability of the American forces to occupy an Arab country and defeat insugents - a la Somalia is another matter - but that is not an image problem that destroying Arab armies addresses, and in fact the analysis is correct - such engagements are losing engagements, in my opinion the Iraqi situation is almost certainly a case of a losing engagement.
This way of thinking had the remarkable virtue of appealing powerfully to both the hard-power enthusiasts in the administration, principally Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, who came into office thinking that the soft Clinton years had made America an easy target and who yearned to send a post-9/11 message of strength; and to neoconservatives from the first Bush administration such as Paul Wolfowitz, who were looking for excuses to complete their unfinished business with Saddam from 1991 and saw 9/11 as the ultimate refutation of the “realist” response to the first Gulf War. Leaving Saddam in power in '91, betraying the Shiites, and handing Kuwait back to its corrupt rulers had been classic realism: Stability was all. But it turned out that the Arab world wasn't stable, it was seething. No longer could the Arabs be an exception to the rule of post-Cold War democratic transformation, merely a global gas station. The Arabs had to change too, fundamentally, just as Lewis (and Ataturk) had said. But change had to be shoved down their throats—Arab tribal culture understood only force and wa