Jan-Jul 2004 Archives

July 26, 2004

Mortgage securities

Following on a convo last week, can anyone point me to data on who is holding US mortage securities?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:08 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 23, 2004

A further near final note: on labor rigidities.

Just reading "La VieEco" wherein there is an article complaining about the lack of employment growth despite a relatively good macro-economic performance (see http://www.lavieeco.com/Economie/Lacroissancesemaintientsansquilyaitcreationdemplois ).

I was moderately annoyed to see the fixation with the rural sector and its archaic organization. Perfectly correct, of course, but in some ways not at all. Among the more severe issues here is the extreme rigidity of the labor laws - as well as the moves towards the 35 hour week which are simply madness. Copied and pasted from the French code, things are poorly adapted to local conditions (rather typical actually for the region, and one reason I am so contemptious of those addled brained fools ranting on about 'fair trade' for they would impose this sort of nonsense on the developing world).

These labor laws are a real serious break. Even in my position, we're hesistating in re adding staff (although it is badly needed) insofar as there is an issue that once hired it's bloody impossible to fire without paying massive fees and the like (relative to total employment cost). Now of course currently employed labor loves this for it looks like a good deal for them. In fact, of course, it is not. It pushes much of the economy into the black or grey informal sectors, meaning little to no protection, but also meaning that the corporates themselves exist in a grey zone that tends to inhibit access to finance and the like (multiple books, etc. of course tax and other law are more influential here). It also pushes down growth, insofar as it is difficult for a start up to deal with these rigidities, and tends to raise the investment bar rather higher than the local economy can genuinely support.

However, the labor code is sacred since it "protects" the workers, and the upcoming anti-globo (Alternate Globalization movement as they were called in the press) are going to whinge on and on like morons about "imperialist" interests (such as myself I imagine) pushing for liberalization and "hurting" local workers.

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Iukos

A brief thought: what the bloody hell is Putin thinking?

He's squashing the boss, but now clearing siezing assets through forced sale? Not good for FDI. I should think one has to think long and hard about putting money into Russian assets.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:31 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On Dezinformatsia and al-Qaeda

I remain astonished (although upon reflection this simply means that my cynicism is not yet thorough enough) by the fact that articles like this still need to appear:
 Analysis: The Hussein Question
'Operational Relationship' With Al Qaeda Discounted

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, July 23, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7336-2004Jul22.html

What kind of bleeding idiot still believes in a Sadaam-al-Qaeda link, I do not know.

Well, I do, it's a rhetorical statement.

I remain contemptuous of the Iranian issue being pimped around, and highly sceptical of the claims - at least the more lurid ones.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:25 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Pantom

Quick note, left a note on the economics

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:16 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Halliburton

I know this may make me unpopular with the people who often read here, but I have to say it is my sensation that Halliburton is not getting a fair rap.

See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7115-2004Jul22.html

While I do not doubt, given the situation, that abuses occured, as cited, I rather feel that Halliburton is getting a political hammering and in truth, in the context of the fucked up mess that is and was Iraq, and the fucked up mess that is and was USG logistics/policy and administration, I do not blame them one iota. Indeed accounts suggest they may be losing money on this debacle (although one should take accounts with a grain of salt as well given the US DOD's fucked up payment schedules).

Of course, I do not blame the Democrats for going after this. It's a good political issue, and if positions were reversed, Republicans would do the same. Pity, but that's politics - easily saleable imagery.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Wolf: On Prostitution

An example of why I like him so much, catch the FT today for his column on prostitution.

My favorite paragraph:
To see the absurdity of how prostitution is currently handled, imagine that, under the influence of animal-rights campaigners, the eating of meat were to become illegal. A black market would spring up. The quality of the meat supplied would pose a danger to health. Criminals would soon add meat to their range of illegal wares. In time, 'meat-dealers' might be viewed with as much opprobrium as pimps or drug-dealers are today.

Meat dealers.....

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al-Arabiyah and Moore

Al-Arabiyah had an interesting piece on the Michael Moore film, series of interviews of Arabs (including Jordanians, I recognized the theater, my favorite one) exiting the film. Interesting reactions. I rather dislike Moore I confess ahead of time, in fact I rather have no small contempt for him, however leaving this aside, the reactions were interesting. The viewers exiting commented several times that they felt that American people on seeing the film would understand (variously the sins/errors/lies) of the government, and (to quote one) “especially in America” this would not (be tolerated/stand/similar sentiments).

Interesting. Of course, the selection (by the background it was clear) was on upper end theaters, meaning there was a skew in the potential audience – the Amman theater (really an excellent one, Century – if you’re ever in Amman and bored, this is the place. Lined walls so no cell phone disturbances! And an ‘adult’ audience that does not whistle or otherwise bleat on if there are ‘adult’ scenes. Very tedious).

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:29 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 20, 2004

Global Economic Issues

I wanted to draw attention to two important commentaries in The Financial Times (I believe today's print edition). One, The asset economy is a house of cards by Stephen Roach, Morgan Stanley chief economist, and the companion by my favorite man, Martin Wolf, entitled "Strong world growth masks medium-term risks both draw attention to important imbalances and indeed bubbles in the asset economy, and in international exchange in the case of Wolf.

In particular, I would note that both feel the asset prices, housing notably, are well out of line with sustainable valuations, and in the case of Wolf and in re dollar, its level must come down.

As for me, I see some real serious risks for me to hold dollar assets, given my exposure to Eurozone and indeed most of my consumption is euro tied.

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In other matters: the 35 hour week

Leaving aside our fellow with the challenges in literacy and logic, I am pleased to note that the tide is turning against the 35 hour week. Perhaps we shall see more labor market rigities chipped away in the near future (although the Bosch vote is perhaps being overread here).

I remain puzzled then that the government here adopted the 35 hour week for the summer for (and I quote) "climactic reasons."

I suppose the relevant minister is looking to achieve new lows in productivity.

Oh yes, why the importance of the French event? Because it's a benchmark around here.

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July 19, 2004

A Comment on A Comment on Air Strikes

I thought I should respond to this highly peculiar comment in main text, insofar as it, well, puzzles me. And amuses me in the way a fairly poor clown does.

Now the odd fellow who left this first tells me:
Intelligence is not an exact science, thank you so very much for the news flash!

I suppose excellent, then that I need not argue that using hammers where needles are preferred due to imprecision, I presume. Although from the comments that follow it appears that I do.

This next section is just, well, bizarrely nonsensical:
Lets back up a bit, had the previous administration not cut the budget so drastically or put policies in place to incapacitate the intelligence agencies or acted on previous intelligence or made it a priority to build a God like military 100% efficient then perhaps we would never have gotten where we are.

Primo: I do not give one fucking dime of care about idiotic partisan blather about what X or Y American Administration did in regards to theater and global intelligence spending. It (a) has fuck all to do with battlefield tactics, (b) fuck all to do with the lack of American capacity in regards to the Arab region. An empty and idiotic bit of moronic posturing. I further note that the reduction in Cold War structured military and intelligence budgets are not signs of failing to grapple with terrorism, indeed they are indicative of at least some redeployment (it would appear insufficient) of assets, assets that remain largely inappropriate to the job to my best understanding. Neither the Bush I nor the Clinton Administrations strike me as particularly to fault regarding failing to grapple with al-Qaeda per se, so I leave aside the partisan idiocy.

Secundo: the second clause is just… well impossible to parse. God like militaries have nothing to do with this, appropriate tactics and strategies do. Of course, better intel would be laudable, but given that is difficult to change, appropriate tactics given poor data is highly advised.

For the irredeemably dim, that means not using airpower against urban targets which may (or given the record to date) or may not contain insurgent targets. It is, again for the irredeemably dim, to be clear, a losing proposition.

Finally, let me reemphasize, for the irredeemably dim, the entire point of my commentary was the recognition of flaws, that is when one has fairly decent reason to believe one’s intelligence is shit (and given the utter failure to date to deal in an appropriate manner with the insurgency, the constant mischaracterization, which seemed largely based on wishful thinking – I mean the entire dead-ender rubbish – as well as similar failures in Afghanistan), tactics should reflect that.

Hind sight is 20/20, isn't that wonderful.

Again, nonsensical and rather a non-sequitor. The comment is what not to do at present, given as noted supra, a reasonable conclusion given the extent data. That is, learning lessons from past errors.

This is so one sided that it really doesn't even deserve to taken seriously.

I presume that this sentence is in regards to my commentary, although given a lack of a clear antecedent perhaps the confused commentator realized that his own commentary is fairly bizarrely nonsensical.

Regardless, insofar as my commentary is my own fucking point of view, I feel no need to balance it against the ignorant maundering bleating of people who think Iraq is going well or other such nonsense.

Where is the side of the story that points out the advantages of these tactic, there have to be some or they wouldn't be doing it this way?

In your imagination, I presume. The advantage is of course ‘force protection.’ But then that’s already been addressed, penny wise, pound foolish in my considered opinion. Save a few soldiers lives in any given encounter, at the cost of alienation of the population, increasing sympathy for one’s own enemy and increasing the depth of resources upon which the insurgency can draw. Rather clear in the progression of opinion polls in Iraq by the CPA that this has been precisely the result of American military and reconstruction efforts, a population (Iraqi) that turned against the ‘liberator’ – from indifference to widespread hatred and dislike.

Insurgencies are not defeated by turning the population toward them.

So, again for the dim witted, the point at hand is whatever perceived advantages on the side of the military, the cold calculus of cost versus benefit, on a strategic level, indicates the excercise in the use of air strikes in the context of poor intelligence and an urban insurgency is a loser. Pyhrric victories and all that.

I may add that I disagree with Kaatib that insurgencies can not be defeated with sheer might. They can, but at the cost of engaging in total savagery and the total alienation of the population. It is rather clear in the context of what the Ibn Bush Administration pretended to be seeking in Iraq and in the region (democracy and all that), such a military policy would indeed be self-defeating, in short, Pyhrric. As a parenthetical, this is precisely the point missed by the maundering gits who ramble on about how the United States could have "won" in Vietnam if not for "fighting with one hand tied behind its back." Or similar nonesense, a point of view that entirely forgets that one fights wars(in the modern world, at the state level) to achieve discrete political objectives, not simply to achieve battlefield victories, which may or may not achieve the political goal required. Wiping out the North Vietnamese state was of course possible, doing so of course would have set back global political goals (I note the discredit achieved in 'winning' badly in Iraq.).

Oh yeah there it is, because their "weak" and "fearful", what a contradiction to the overall emphasis.

I am afraid I do not follow this at all, although there is little surprise in that given the muddled thinking here.

On consideration, I think the writer means 'because they [the US military] are weak and fearful,' apparently in response to my side comments on perception of the US being all too willing to kill at a distance, not willing to take casualties, with the side note that there is perhaps some truth in the perception.

First, of course, the source comment was on the perception - I should think I can say globally, not just in the Middle East - of the US as huge bully unwilling to sustain real pain. I do not see anything particularly controversial in noting this perception exists, indeed I should think it is widely acknowledged that after Lebanon, Somalia, etc. the perception is there. Now, the comment there is some truth in the perception, that is somewhat controversial I am sure, but it does strike me that the American military puts such a premium on force protection, that it has generated rules of engagement in the context of insurgency that are counter productive - that is indeed go too far in allowing massive firepower to be used in ambig. situations. I note further that per reports, British military commanders and other Western military concur. What is appropriate, I may add, in regards to posture during a conventional war situation (as in the March-April period), is likely not to be appropriate in a non-conventional, urban insurgency context.

Now, the commentator appears to prefer unthinking "me right" sort of masturbatory commentory. All well and fine, it gets you nowhere fast.

This is exactly whats wrong with journalist, wannabe journalist, and journalism today, facts and objectiveness are conveniently absent, its more about making a statement and taking a position.

Another rather confused statement. What my commentary has to do with “journalism” I have no fucking clue as I am not a fucking journalist, nor do I desire to be a fucking journalist. My field is finance, and I rather like it.

But let us abstract away from that, and even presume that the confused and muddled commentator is addressing Dickey’s commentary.

Of course, primo, Dickey’s commentary is just that, commentary. The voice of the writer is analytical, not reporting.

Leaving that aside, it appears the commentator has an issue not with the “facts” (and certainly not with objectivity, insofar as the commentator seems to feel objectivity means reporting what he wants to hear), but with the discomfort of cognitive dissonance between what is desired and what is actual.

It is so transparent and the general public is realizing how disrespectful to them as the readers and recipients not to be given the credit of the capability to decide for themselves and given the full set of facts.

Again a non-sequitur. What the fuck this has to do with my fucking commentary or even Dickey, I have on bloody fucking clue.

Since I am neither journo nor anything related to journo, I will just say I find the comment moronic. “All the facts” appears to really mean “give me a story that does not provoke cognitive dissonance.” See next sentence:

Check the FOX ratings if you think its not so.

I don’t live in the fucking States and I care fuck all about Fox. Bloody mindless trash, but well, if your taste for news is in your ass, feel free.

I should note that if the commentator feels that he is getting "all the facts" from Fox, my best understanding is this is hallucinatorily stupid. Of course, I do not live in the States and do not watch Fox, however to my best understanding Fox appears to play the non-analytical, emotive, rah-rah line, in short agit-prop. As I recall from nonesense being cited to me from Fox, it tried to sell the line that things were going better than "the media" was reporting up until everything clearly went to hell. I would then hazard the opinion to watch the channel appears to mean not that one wants all the facts, but rather one wants a nice diet of self-indulgent navel gazing.

One last note, the illustration offered by a poster is so simplistic only a child like mind would claim to have redeemed some value from it.

Interesting. Well, considering the logic to date, I must bow to the commentator’s typically muddled and confused analysis, insofar as I no fucking clue as to what this refers to.

If your going to point out a problem, at least offer a solution, until you can do that its really just a bunch of propaganda.

And here we have the final confused nugget.

Of course, critiquing a problem but “not” offering a solution is not “propaganda” – this for the edification of the dim witted. It is, well, critiquing a problem. Now, if the critique is off base, if it has spun the facts in a political manner to support a particular political agenda (I may point the readership to any of the fine bizarro extreme left sites rambling on about stealing Iraqi oil and the like), then that is propaganda. Else, it is not under any ordinary English language usage (again, note to the dim-witted, that which makes you feel uncomfortable is not ipso facto propaganda, sometimes reality does not match conception you know.).

Second, of course, I do suggest a solution: abandon the use of air strikes in an urban insurgency context, use other force, as of course ground forces. Painful and expensive, yes, imperfect, yes. Better, well, worth a shot.

Of course application of force is important as well, again taking lessons from less-than-complete failures in other contexts (and nota bene, one should look to examples that are actually applicable, in re foreign forces).

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:33 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 16, 2004

Lovely and Rambling a bit about current MENA policy and Iraq

There was a fine report on the news, I think it was Euronews but perhaps BBC World in regards to the claims of Garzon (if I am spelling the name right, and excuse the accentlessness, far too lazy) re northern Morocco as haven for al-Qaeda type activities.

I am not sure I credit this entirely - on the other hand I am not sure I do not - but it certainly is ill-timed for me.

In other matters, via some site or another I stumbled upon Chris Dickey's latest comments on Iraq and the like. I like Chris a lot, not only for his commentary but for the fine Philipinno restaurant that he and his son showed me in the bowels of Jebel Amman some time back. It went out of business, unfortunately, not long thereafter.

Regardless, let me point readers to this:
Dickey responding to questions from readers:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5431483/site/newsweek

First there is this comment by Dickey:
In Iraq today, the United States is playing the role of Israel in 1982, claiming to be fighting terrorism while in fact trying to remake the country to fit our specifications and imaginations. The results in Lebanon were not good for Israel, and for the same reasons the results in Iraq won't be good for us: the ethnic and sectarian friability of the state, the suspicion of outsiders, the role of religious fanaticism, and, not incidentally, the roles of Syria and Iran.

I think it spot on and worth reflecting on.

Then there is this:
"[O]ne of the great failings of the United States is its inability to read foreign cultures, and figure out how to do that. Many of our psy-ops, alas, are really aimed at the U.S. public, not the Iraqis. How it plays in Peoria, or better yet, along the Potomac, is more important than the impact in Mesopotamia."

I believe I brought up just this point relatively recently in re the idiocy that is State and general USG communications strategies, e.g. that fucked up idiotic navel gazing al-Hurra effort.

Question is, is there any way to change such? The ever more extreme bubble world the US is setting up for itself, I think not.

Then a few notes on this:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5326366/site/newsweek/

On this opening, I wanted to convey my amusement (it is a bit unfair perhaps, but entertainingly so):
"Iraqis don’t grow bananas, but why should that keep the Bush administration from treating Iraq like a banana republic? The overwhelming invasion, the ill-conceived occupation, the obliviousness to what’s thought of as native culture, and the tendency to trust only those folks who know how to talk and act (and make us think they think) like us—hey, that’s the way we’ve been coming and going in the fever ports of Central America and the Caribbean for well over a century."

Emphasis added. This is, I may add, a key observation.

First, let me note that it is a hard thing not to fall into to some degree, above all over the long term. The guy who knows your social cues, he (or her) is easier to trust than the fellow who does not (and vice versa, of course the reality is the number of Arabs who know Anglo social cues exceeds the inverse). However, there are matters of degree, and a bit of critical thinking can be helpful to pull you up from the bad habit of believing the posturing uncritically. Unfortunately, that is badly lacking in American circles in re the Middle East. Private sector example. I was, several months ago, chatting with a Director of a financial firm in New York who was apparently just getting into the Middle East, and he asked me what I thought about Dubai. I gave some observations, including that the economy is something of a black box and sometimes it is hard to shake the sensation that a portion of the economy is doped, or not quite real and legit. I mentioned the issue of money laundering for example. This guy responds surprised, he's been assured that "they" take the issue seriously, blah, blah, and he's just joined the board of the DFM. I was truly incredulous, essentially I took away from the ensuing convo that this sucker bought everything the Dubai authorities sold him, like a teenager at a used car lot. Such fine English.

(I know weak anectdote, but the more substantial points are not really shareable per se)

Second, Dickey's further point:
So, too, the handover of paper sovereignty yesterday, which took place ahead of schedule and in semi-secrecy, as if departing pro-consul Paul “Jerry” Bremer was embarrassed by what he’d done for the last year, or afraid for his life, or both.

Of course this is a few weeks back. Why quote that? It also amused me. I am afraid I disagree, I don't believe Bremer is capable of being embarrassed, although he should be.

Now Dickey comments:
"Allawi is best understood as the anointed dictator in waiting. His job is to do whatever needs doing to impose order on the current chaos. Martial law, ruthless repression, you name it. With American firepower to back him up, he’s more than ready to take the blame for any rough stuff. Allawi’s defense minister proudly vows to chop off the hands and heads of terrorists. As Franklin Roosevelt is supposed to have said about an infamous Nicaraguan dictator, “He’s a son of a bitch, but at least he’s our son of a bitch.”

Bingo, and no other real choices I may add. None, nada, zilch, zero, walo, wlaishi....

Now, keeping in mind the context that there are no other choices other than a disguised dictatorship - what I have been calling Egypt on the Euphrates for I suppose a year now (remind me, my old readers, when did I start calling it the best possible option of a bad set of choices?), Dickey opines:
Problem is, these SOBs, once they’ve solved our immediate problems, create new ones. They aren’t ours at all. They’re in this for themselves. And they become the vehicles of disillusionment with everything that we Americans think we represent.

There is some following text on the fruits of our SOB policy in the past, I am not sure I entirely am in accord with the specifics, but the overall analysis is spot on.

The issue is, are there better choices? All well and good (and indeed salutory and helpful for realistically pursuing a strategy) to note the unpleasant aspects of the strategy, the negatives, but then one has to put it in the context of the overall costs and benefits of the actually available and realistic menu of options. Again realistic. To take a business analogy, it is all well and good for me to design say a competitive financing strategy for a new product and just assume I have cheap capital access that will allow me to beat the competitors, but if I can't actually achieve that in any real world sense, it mere fantasy to assume that. Such is the Ibn Bush Administration's MENA strategy now, should I need to be more explicit. Wishful thinking, pretending they have access to some magicla machinery that allows them to transform raw materials at no cost into a fancy product that they read about in a SF novel, but oops, the actually available commercialised technology can't do. Phatom widgets to respond to a market that they have imagined up.

So, this realistic menu of actually available options, sure our SOB may have real severe long term costs, but do the other options have worse costs? It would be great to have a magical production line that takes no energy inputs, for example, but if it doesn't exist, well imagining it up doesn't get us anywhere.

My own opinion, there is no way that a non SOB policy will fly, because it will involve a menu of risks that noone is willing to try. It means allowing Iraq to become an Islamic Republic of some kind, because that is what elections would produce. Don't fool oneself, real free elections at present in the region would invariably produce largely anti-Western, largely Islamist governments. Now, on a personal basis, I don't think that is a bad thing. As in Iran, the events would take away the "grass is greener" effect that leads people to yearn for this option, becuase the current options are so bloody fucked. However, the near term risks will be deemed unacceptable - my judgement is that Islamic revolutions would be long term positive for the reason just stated and given the Iranian example of discredit but it is a big gamble to take. No is going to take it. Maybe not even me, if I were in the position to make the judgement and see it become policy.

So, we're left with the SOBs.

However, there are a menu of SOBs and it may be somewhat better informed selection of SOBs can make a difference. Chalabi, in my mind, would have been a disaster (and still may be). An SOB that is reaonably restrained, and a policy that keeps in mind longer term interests of winning over Iraqis to some extent, and making them wealthier through real economic activity (not oil rents) might have a better value than an SOB like the Shah.

Hard calculus, and not clear to be sure.

Now, a final section to comment on
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5431857/site/newsweek
Of which I wanted to focus on the following:

A first priority of the new government is to make the capital city safe and restore public services. That's obviously what you'd want to do, right? But Proconsul L. Paul Bremer, based in the American city-within-the-city known as the Green Zone, lived in a world of self-serving denial every bit as delusional as that of his betters in Washington. His constant blather about free markets and democracy, mouthed in Iraq but meant to be heard inside the Beltway, was matched by a persistent failure to stabilize and revitalize Baghdad itself.
Emphasis added.

I rather like the underlined section, delusional self serving denial. That rather captures present engagement with Iraq.

Deeply frustrating.

I might add one could insert "incompetent and ineffectual."

Dickey adds the following:
Iraqis remember too well that their capital city was surrendered virtually intact, and only destroyed in the days after the Americans rolled into town. The troops stood back while liberated looters stripped the infrastructure of the city to the bone. Since then, Baghdadis have watched with sheer incredulity the Americans' inability to restore regular electrical service. They've learned to fear the ferocious, random firepower of the American soldiers patrolling their streets. At the same time, they've seen criminal gangs turn kidnapping into an industry. "People say the Americans wanted to make us suffer," an Iraqi doctor who works in the air-conditioned Green Zone told me before going home to her sweltering, lightless home.

Noted a number of times, but well worth re-emphasizing. The incompetence displayed so far in reconstruction (even being generous and allowing for the problems of the insurgency which was rather helped along by that incompetence) is a major black eye for Americans. It truly has done much to sap credibility and indeed respect.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:06 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Airstrikes and Insurgency

The uselessness of airstrikes as a counter insurgency method

I remain stunned that the American military seems so entirely incapable of learning a simple lesson – airstrikes against urban targets in the context of an occupation and counter-insurgency are counter productive. I am sure it makes sense in a very limited sense in the context of ‘force protection’ and minimizing direct American casualties, however this limited sense is rather like the corporate finance head who makes every effort to meet the quarterly ‘guidance’ from analysts, at the expense of the long term goals and health of the company.

First, the appearances are at once of callousness – air strikes against a house in an urban area, however precise, can never be without ‘collateral’ effects and the use of heavy bombs simply adds to the impression of disregard. Imagine ‘surgical’ strikes in one’s own neighborhood and one’s own reaction – regardless of the legitimacy or not of the strike, I would say anyone honest with themselves will admit their feelings would turn against the people behind the air strike.

Second, it adds to an appearance of fear. It says that the Americans are too fearful to engage, too fearful of casualties, and have to use their air power rather than close engagements. It is, and I think there is an element of truth here, an expression of weakness in strength.

Third, the imagery is losing imagery. A house turned into a crater – this past evening on al-Arabiyah we were treated to the imagery of children’s clothing mixed in the crater that was the remainder of a house struck by US warplanes in Fallujah. These are images that lose you allies, increase your enemies. In the case of an insurgency, this is the way you lose the war, not win it.

Fourth, without close up engagement – and the fairly numerous errors in Afghanistan also illustrate this – one does not really know if one’s ‘intelligence’ is in any way correct. This is a serious problem, given the clearly piss-poor human intelligence the United States has on the ground – I would wager stemming as much from their complete inability to properly filter what intelligence they are generating as from a lack of proper sources – that is not knowing language or culture or indeed very much about Iraq period, the Americans are piss-poor judges of the information they are generating. Hitting the wrong house, hitting a house because someone wants to get back at a neighbor and perhaps as an added bonus give the Americans yet a worse name – these are all scenarios not just likely but to be considered as the likely default. Foreigners as suckers.

It strikes me that much of this, this idiotic blindness that I would say seems to have characterized American interventions from Vietnam through Somalia, stems from the blindness of self-righteousness and too much self-regard.

This is not to accuse the United States of any particular evil – as most know I rather do take it for granted that the United States is a fairly good actor on the international stage, imperfect and self interested of course but that is life – but rather of a particular blindness arising from a true yet exaggerated sense of being right, and a related incomprehension of other points of view (and perhaps the need to address those points of view even if perceived to be wrong).

Having, I may add stumbled upon Dickey’s related comments, let me illustrate here:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5431857/site/newsweek

Dickey writes:
"A key to the problem was the U.S. effort in March and April 2003 to kill individual Iraqi leaders with precision munitions. The smart bombs were guided by dumb people, as it turned out, who dropped them on the basis of execrable intelligence. ... .... Human Rights Watch has since blamed the stupid use of smart bombs, as blunt instruments of assassination, for killing many of the innocent civilians who died during Operation Iraqi Freedom. It appears they killed few or none of the targets they were supposed to hit.

One incident was worse than the others, however, because it turned the course of the long-term war against us. On April 11, two days after American Marines pulled down the statue of Saddam in the middle of Baghdad, the United States tried to kill Saddam's half-brother, Barzan al-Tikriti, by dropping six J-Dam guided bombs on a large villa about 11 miles outside of the city of Ramadi.

They didn't get Barzan, if he was ever there, but they did kill Malik Al-Kharbit, a tribal leader who had worked with the Americans and Jordanians since the mid-1990s to try to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In addition to Malik, another 21 members of his family died under those bombs, including a dozen children.

War is war, with all its collateral implications. But some actions in war are more foolish and self defeating than others. Members of the Kharbit clan are considered the leading figures in an extended tribe called the Dulaym, who number as many as two million. Their strongholds are in Fallujah, Ramadi, Ka'em, Rutbah—places now well known to the U.S. public as "The Sunni Triangle," where so many Americans have gone to die since that precision strike on the wrong target in April 2003.

How do you fix a screw-up like the killing of Malik Kharbit and his family? The Americans never did figure that out. In fact, they've made things worse. A few weeks ago, after Malik's brother Mudher refused once again to cooperate with the United States and rein in the insurgents, eight members of his family were thrown into Abu Ghraib prison, including one brother who'd lost all his children in the April 2003 bombing.

"We are looking to the future," Mudher told me when I saw him in Jordan over the weekend. He doesn't trust Allawi. But he doesn't want to fight the central government forever. He'd like to work with it, have his tribe have a place in it. If Allawi can find a way to accommodate the Kharbit clan, then once again he may be moving his country from war toward peace. An amnesty for those who've killed Americans is one way to start.

Of course, when you think of all the blood and money we've spent here, all this could seem pretty demoralizing. But given the mess we've made of this place, it's surprising how reassuring it is to see the Iraqis reverting to their old ways."
Emphasis added.

Well, I believe this is illustrative of my point, as well as the general point of incomprehension of how to work within the context of reality.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:06 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 10, 2004

On Martial Law, Allaouie and Iraq

Another aged comment: To Collounsbury, and everyone that wants to speak up -- What do you feel about the new laws being passed in Iraq regarding the ability to declare martial law? Do you think it's mostly the new government doing some saber rattling and increasing its power, or a necessary step versus the insurgency? I'm truly undecided on it.

It's realism.

The pissing and moaning in the American press in re authoritarianism is silly. There is no way democracy is going to function during a civil war, and frankly little chance that any democracy will function in Iraq in any real sense, so where is the fucking problem? Losing the illusion of virginity? Without martial law, this simply drags on. The only real question is can Allaouie establish an independent sense of legitimacy, because we have already seen, the American authorities as presently constituted are utterly incapable of grappling with the problem successfully. They pissed away all their opportunities and managed to make themselves hated.

I have a note, by the way, to finish off on this moronic policy of using air power to strike urgan targets in an insurgency. Possibly the stupidest, most self-defeating "force protection" measure yet concieved. Amazing. Amazingly stupid that is. Air strikes in urban areas against an insurgency. Why that is just the recipse for winning over the population and seperating it from the insurgents.

The collosal amount of idiocy that is American Iraqi policy sometimes staggers.

Or better, "penny wise, pound foolish" as if one intends to spend soldiers lives, do not

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:16 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Regarding Embassies

A comment was made a bit back in re the "attack" on the Embassy in Amman:
In the future it's highly likely the US will purchase large plots of country land on the outskirts of foreign capitols and develop embassies that have the look of a small liberal arts college campus or magisterial walled estate.

The reason is twofold. Urban landscapes are too prone to creating, as we saw in the Oklahoma city and in Beirut bombings, a perfect environment for shaped charges. The distance of the embassy proper from the outer perimeter negates that possibility ( assuming the terrorists don't drive up with the equivalent of a small nuke) Secondly, we can put more of the damn thing underground and more effectively control access without aggravating the locals.

Zenpundit

I have to say, it's rather besides the point.

First, the Castle in Amman was already done on that basis. It's a monster with set back fortress like walls (the side facing the main street has doubled stone walls, with a five meter dead zone, and then the main, and yes, campus like complex set back again. It is, by design, a fortress. And likely subterranean I would image. When built, it was indeed far from the city, the city grew out to meet it.

The already fortress like nature evidently still does not stop concern, for after the truck bomb incidents, the entire city blocks around the monster were blocked off (cutting off some main thoroughfares I may add).

The proposed line of action in my opinion is futile - unless a vast swath of land even beyond the site is condemned (I suppose a few venal governments might actually opt for that option).

Further, the Fortress America model, is in my opinion, an utter waste. Isolating American diplomats in an inaccessible castle, far from the action of the capitol in which they are located utterly defeats the purpose of having them in the bloody country. Already I can see that with the new security restrictions on them, and the American prediliction to comfort, these guys barely understand their environment. Little getting out and about, and then only under controlled circumstances, little interaction, and by this, little understanding of what they are in effect there to do.

Recipe for yet more pitifully incompetent engagement. Might as well fucking close the fucking embassies then.

At a certain point one either accepts a risk and works with it, or one engages in a fruitless quest for security through ever more self-defeated measures.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:05 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 07, 2004

From private sources

I am told a car tried to breach the wall of Fortress American in Amman. Amazing it could even get near since a whole city block around the damn place is blocked off. Not clear the nature of the event, I am told.

However, let me take the opportunity to note that since the Iraq war, the security perimeters around American goverment establishments was become ever and ever wider. I think this speaks to the real "return on investment" from this policy. Ever and ever wider, and even in friendly countries at that.

These are not good signs, might be tolerable if the underlying policy was well-conceived and successful, but it is not.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:57 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 06, 2004

Iraq: Air strikes as a means of fighting a guerrilla war in urban areas.

I remain amazed that the American military thinks this is useful to do, airstrikes against houses.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:39 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 05, 2004

Ridiculous CPA (Oops, 'Project blah blah fucking idiots office)

In touch with these drooling morons who first
(a) refer me to a secure server for information. (Oops)
(b) refer me to a server that no longer exists
(c) stop responding to my messages when I ask them if they could kindly point me to the relevant information they promised via means that are actually accessible.

Bumbling idiots.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:32 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 04, 2004

Again, Iraq Reconstruction, criminally stupid incompetence

A rather sad and clear statement on the utter lack of seriousness that characterised the occupation to date:

U.S. Funds for Iraq Are Largely Unspent
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, July 4, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A26310-2004Jul3?language=printer

BAGHDAD, July 3 -- The U.S. government has spent 2 percent of an $18.4 billion aid package that Congress approved in October last year after the Bush administration called for a quick infusion of cash into Iraq to finance reconstruction, according to figures released Friday by the White House.

Well that is just fucking super.

(On the other hand, the slow pace of my steel project makes me feel better - not just us, they're just fucking incompetent)

But then there is this:
The U.S.-led occupation authorities were much quicker to channel Iraq's own money, expending or earmarking nearly all of &dol;20 billion in a special development fund fed by the country's oil sales, a congressional investigator said.

Only $366 million of the $18.4 billion U.S. aid package had been spent as of June 22, the White House budget office told Congress in a report that offers the first detailed accounting of the massive reconstruction package.

Well, have to dig into this, might have useful info for me, but else, super. Super. Super. Of course the usage of Iraqi money before US tax dollars is not precisely the best PR one can achieve.

Thus far, according to the report, nothing from the package has been spent on construction, health care, sanitation and water projects. More money has been spent on administration than all projects related to education, human rights, democracy and governance.

Surprise, surprise.

What can I say, if my experience with the Steel project is indicative (and from this one suspects that it is), then it's no fucking wonder they have spent nothing.

Of $3.2 billion earmarked for security and law enforcement, a key U.S. goal in Iraq, only $194 million has been spent. Another central objective of the aid program was to reduce the 30 percent unemployment rate, but money has been spent to hire only about 15,000 Iraqis, despite U.S. promises that 250,000 jobs would be created by now, U.S. officials familiar with the aid program said.

No comment.

U.S. officials involved in the reconstruction blame security concerns and bureaucratic infighting between the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House for delays in the allocation of funds. By the time the Pentagon's contracting office in Baghdad began awarding contracts, the risk of kidnapping and other attacks aimed at foreign workers was so dire that many projects never began. Several Western firms that won contracts have summarily withdrawn their employees from Iraq.

They might also blame it on the sheer incompetence of the CPA / Pentagon PMO office (the contracting office).

Officials with the contracting office contend the amount of money actually spent does not reflect the full scope of work being performed. A more accurate figure, they said, is the amount of money allocated for reconstruction work. Just over $5.2 billion had been allocated as of June 22, according to the White House budget report.

Yeah, right.

Well insofar as I know from personal comms that at the present risk level, most contractors are trying to minimize upfront outlays because of the risk and exposure, I think you can safely conclude little of the $5.2 billion allocated but not disbursed is really moving.

"The money that is disbursed is typically not disbursed until the work is completed, so it doesn't give the best picture of what's going on," said John Proctor, a spokesman for the contracting office. "Some of our projects take months, or even years, to complete."

Guess what chucklehead, you don't got fucking years, and frankly not much fucking work is occuring because of the fucking bombs and kidnappings.

I'll leave the rest of the article for the readers to follow, it is far too frustrating to comment on. Fucking pissing away opportunities.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:58 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

More on communications: al-Jazeerah and Fox

Kristof of The New York Times had an interesting set of commentary that dovetailed with my own a few days ago re the present American Administration's strange inability to even pretend to sell its own point of view in the proper venues in the Middle East, preferring its own special little echo chambers. Let me quote and comment then on this

OP-ED COLUMNIST
Al Jazeera: Out-Foxing Fox
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
Published: July 3, 2004

First, the opening, of course:
If President Bush wants to rescue his Iraqi adventure, here's a suggestion: Spend less time with C.I.A. sycophants like George Tenet and more time watching Al Jazeera television.

The Bush administration's central intelligence failure was not that it failed to tap enough telephones. Rather, it didn't bother to understand the mind-set in Iraq or the larger Arab world — and it still doesn't.
Emphasis added.

Let me leave aside the phrasing CIA sycophants re Tenent and focus on the last sentence as well as the issue of watching al-Jazeerah.

First, on the last, nothing could be more correct. I have yet to see the slightest sign that the present Administration has anything like a glimmer of an understanding that getting a solid conception of the mind-set of your "enemy" as well as those who you wish to engage is not wishy-washy liberalism but good, solid realism. It helps prevent idiotic own goals.

Kristof adds:
The transfer of sovereignty is a useful moment to look back at what went so wrong in Iraq. As I see it, the root problem was hubris born in a Washington echo chamber, and a resulting conviction that Iraqis would welcome us with flowers.

When I visited Iraq in the run-up to the war, I met another foreigner by the pool of the Rasheed Hotel, where we hoped our conversation couldn't be bugged, and we spoke of our bafflement. Senior U.S. officials seemed genuinely convinced that our invading troops would be hailed as heroes, while ordinary Iraqis often talked about fighting U.S. troops with guns, grenades and suicide bombs. Iraqis typically hated Saddam, but also hated the idea of an invasion.

But the neocons refused to hear it. From their Washington and New York cocoons, they insisted that ordinary Iraqis welcomed an invasion. Ahmad Chalabi had told them so. Or they read it in The Weekly Standard.

Emphasis added.

I believe I raised these points precisely over the past year and just recently.

Among the more severe issues is believing one's own propaganda. In some very strange ways the Washington Bolsheviks seem to be echoing the habits of the old Soviets, in sincerely believing the oppressed classes must clearly welcome with open arms the (foreign) liberators.....

Strange the symetry. But then these new Bolsheviks seem to share the same conviction that ideology must trump pragmatism, that purity is the truth. Irrealism of the worst kind.

I should nuance the above (Kristof) comments by noting that there was some basis to have a genuine belief that in the initial aftermath a good percentage of Iraqis would... well not throw flowers at the feet of the invaders, but be favorably disposed. Very, very briefly favorably disposed before the nationalist reflex took over. Again, our Washington Bolsheviks, as the original Bolsheviks seem blissfully unaware of the reality of other national feelings - although they have a tender concern for their own, although dressed up in 'universalist' messianism.

They even mangled the country's name — Mr. Bush called it Eye-rack — yet they bet American lives that all would go well. That's "the arrogance of power," as Senator William Fulbright termed it when Democrats made similar blunders in Vietnam. (An excerpt is at www.nytimes.com /kristofresponds, Posting 505.)

Such arrogance has a long and sad lineage. The Wolfowitz of World War I was Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander who launched an offensive that cost the British 420,000 casualties. "It naturally pleased Haig to have carefully chosen and nicely cooked little tidbits of `intelligence' about broken German divisions, heavy German casualties and diminishing German morale served up to him every day and all day," Prime Minister David Lloyd George wrote. "He beamed satisfaction and confidence. His great plan was prospering. The whole atmosphere of this secluded little community reeked of that sycophantic optimism."

Sound familiar?

leaving aside the somewhat unfair jibe at Ibn Bush's lack of speaking skills - not directly relevant although hard to resist - the phrase sycophantic optimism is well placed.

"We know that Al Jazeera has a pattern of playing propaganda over and over and over again," Don Rumsfeld complained during the war. "What they do is, when there's a bomb that goes down, they grab some children and some women and pretend that the bomb hit the women and the children. . . . We are dealing with people that are perfectly willing to lie to the world to attempt to further their case — and to the extent people lie, ultimately they are caught lying and they lose their credibility."

Good point.

Irony there at the end. In case you miss it, Rumsfeld's accusations directed at al-Jazeerah rebound upon him.

Kristof directs attention to this documentary - I have not had the occasion to see it so I have no direct sense as to its quality:
The gulf between the American and Arab realities is the subject of "Control Room," a powerful documentary by Jehane Noujaim, an Egyptian-American. She looks at Al Jazeera's coverage of the war, offering a sobering reminder that there are multiple ways of perceiving the same events.

President Bush's narrative for the war was: "Altruistic Americans risk their lives to topple evil dictator and establish democracy and human rights." The Arab narrative was: "The same Yankees who pay for Israelis to blow up Palestinians are now seizing Iraqi oil fields and maiming Iraqi women and children."

Emphasis added:
Rather more to the point, regardless of the quality or accuracy of either perception or either narrative, if (as is clearly in my opinion the case) winning one's goals or achieving one's goals requires at least some modicum of convincing or at least neutralising perceptions, then whinging on about how "inaccurate" or "biased" the other side's media are does little to no good. The Arabs have played that game for a good thirty years or more - whinging in the place of effective strategies for communicating with the target audiences (in their case, the American public), and for the pure delicious symmetry, I note that they (the various Arab points of view) have had every bit as much success as the present Administration. Again, the problem faced is symmetrical as are the goals, from an Arab point of view there is no way for them in say a year or five to utterly change the point of view of the average American, largely hostile to them and largely incomprehending (for some very valid as well as not so valid reasons I may add), but one can aspire to limiting one's downside and achieving a modicum of a turn around. Miracles, no, modest change, limiting the negative side, yes. But as in the case of the present Administration, Arabs have preferred to wallow in their own discourse, their own echo chambers, and have generally made little effective effort to communicate in a way that might aspire to success.

Symmetrically, the present Administration of Ibn Bush is engaged in the same fiasco. Wonderful, they take their "lessons" from possibly the least politically successful interest group on the entire planet (allowing for available resources and the like). Speaking to itself and its home audience, with no sense of how to engage and turn around their image in a region where it is desperately needed - and no sense of how even to communicate in a manner that might limit the downside. Radio Sawa and TV al-Hurra (the name itself speaks to idiotic hubris and is needless and ineffectually insulting, never mind as I noted some time back its programming is American navel gazing- unlike BBC Arabic I note, or the private American venture, CNBC al-Arabiyah.).

Kristof adds:
I'm not a big fan of Al Jazeera, which tends to be emotional and nationalistic. As U.S. Lt. Josh Rushing astutely notes in "Control Room," Al Jazeera is the Arab version of the Fox News Channel: "It benefits Al Jazeera to play to Arab nationalism because that's their audience, just like Fox plays to American patriotism, for the exact same reason — American nationalism — because that's their demographic audience and that's what they want to see."

If the Arab world is going to break out of its self-pitying self-absorption, it's going to have to understand American attitudes — and it could do worse than switching its televisions from Al Jazeera to Fox. And if the Bush administration is going to turn Iraq around and engage the Arab world effectively, then it must try harder to escape the echo chamber and understand the Arabs — and it could do worse than switching from the reassuring euphony of Fox to Al Jazeera.

On the first paragraph, I note that I agree. al-Jazeerah is emotional, yellow journalism. Yet, unlike state journalism here, it is real journalism. That is to say, they are effectively free to report (given on the ground limitations on information gathering) and effectively free to respond to their customer basis. The quotation above is spot on in regards to the symmetry of patriotic pandering. Yellow journalism.

The second paragraph of course touches on my point supra, and I note as a general matter that if American Administrations wish to have some modicum of success in the region, they will have to engage the reality, not the wishful thinking and deeply inappropriate analogies to Eastern Europe that have characterised rather too much discussion on the right end of the spectrum. That does not mean, I add forcefully, sucess requires pandering or kowtowing to the prejudices of the Arab region as one sometimes gets the sense from commentators on the Left feel is required, quite the contrary, but it does require an intelligent design of an engagement to sell one's own goals. That is to say, the company has to understand its market and what products can be sold directly, what needs to be done to prepare the terrain for future products and what products will just have to stay on the shelf, realistically. One cannot simply assume that one's bright and shiney democracy products are just going to leap off the shelves and run around telling the Board that the customers just "have to" get it.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:53 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

New Month and Fourth of July: The Usual 'Survey' of Readers and an introductory note

My "tradition" as it were.

However, as we near the first annivesary of this little commentary, I think I perhaps should take a moment to introduce myself again to the 'new' readers who have had the misfortune to stumble upon my acerbic self.

First, although it is a regretably common misperception, I am not a Colonel nor have I ever had anything to do with the military - best I can do is a brother who was in the Marines. Col is short for Collier. The collounsbury moniker arises from the typical shortening of Collier many seem to prefer.

Second, who am I? Well, some people have met me in person and can vouch I actually exist, but otherwise I am deliberately vague for a number of important professional reasons - which is to say no need for people who deal with me professionally to run into this and read my comments. Yes, by the way, collounsbury is my real name, but only part of it. Vagueness is a virtue in this respect.

Otherwise, professionally I presently work in the financial sector after several years in pharma (although in ip and strategic issues, not the science end, which was only a hobby). I largely work in areas related to risk capital and direct investments, although I have done and do consulting on a broader range of activities, when people unaccountably are duped into thinking I know more than I do. As many have discerned, I have a certain penchant for the region, and I guess about a decade worth of experience in and around the region. I do speak 'fluent' Arabic, several dialects, read and write as well. I put fluent in 'quotes' as one should always acknowledge that an adult learner is never truly 'fluent' in the proper sense of the word, but in the ordinary sense I am fluent. Which is to say, it often takes even native speakers some time to figure out I am not an Arab - and if I am in certain regions I can go a good long time at it.

This aside, I began this "blog" (I hate the word) or journal after getting myself booted off a message board which I tended to express myself rather ... well like I do here. I believe the key event was telling someone they could respond properly or "else, fuck off." Given the person in question was an idiot, I felt it was well-desevered. In any case, the medium has grown on me, although I despise livejournal, but am too lazy to migrate to blogger. I should, and fully intend to do so in some mythical time when I get either the time or the gumption to see about transfering my "archives" - also might drop the collounsbury moniker, it comes to mind that my 'cover' is uncomfortably transparent.

This aside, I should say that I long eschewed commenting on the Middle East in the online world - only sheer frustration and contempt for the idiocies often pronounced on the region led me to do so. I suppose there is a place then for commentary on the Middle East from my own particular point of view, neither academic (although as anyone can tell, I have what some characterised as a moderately academic style, too much education I suppose), nor journalistic, nor political pundit. I like to think of myself as a hard core centrist although I suppose this may put me to the right of many, but in any case, I am I think, correctly, characterised as a pure pragmatist, as for example in the case of free markets and the developing world (for all that I enjoy sincerely castigating the idiotic leftist anti-globos for their naive vision).

Well, enough of this, some substance shortly.

Back to work then.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:41 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 30, 2004

Further to the disaster, on Media and Incomprehension

A well-done article on the Arabic media on this - I only caught parts on al-Arabiyah that morning but this analysis strikes me as on target:

Nagm is a cautious man, and his "if there is a ceremony" spoke volumes. By Sunday, the escalation of violence and the persistence of rumors that the handover might be moved up had journalists here and in Baghdad ready for fast-breaking news. But the timing of the handover -- which took place Monday, two days ahead of schedule and without warning or advance notice -- not only took al-Arabiya by surprise, it left the network scrambling for "visuals." No one, it seems, had bothered to call the Arabic-language channel that says it has the largest viewership in Iraq. Their cameras were not even in the room when Iraq was reborn as a sovereign nation (or "so-called sovereign" in the local parlance).

"I don't know what they were thinking -- they didn't tell anybody," said Abdul Kader Kharobi, an assignment editor at al-Arabiya, a few hours after the transfer at 10:26 a.m. local time. There was no frustration in his voice, just disgust and a lot of weary irony. The Americans have been all but incompetent in manufacturing images, he said, and yet what does it matter? After Abu Ghraib, and after what he believes was a sham investigation into the March 18 killing of two al-Arabiya journalists in Baghdad by U.S. soldiers, who believes the Americans anyway?

Emphasis added.

Again and again, needless stumbles.

"It doesn't look promising," he said. "Like some people in a bunker doing something illegal."

Later, it was announced that Bremer had left, but it took time to get images of the man (whose "reign" was widely criticized by Arab media as a failure) touching terra firma in Iraq for the last time in his trademark boots and suit. Richard Nixon, skulking out of Washington after his resignation, looked more exultant.

The paucity of images on Arab television, and lag time during the first hours after the handover, contributed to a sense that the American part of this moment was a bit furtive and sad. Al-Arabiya, which spent the day interviewing notable political and cultural leaders, often split its screen, returning again and again to a tape loop of Bremer, at the handover, looking exhausted and almost dazed. For much of the afternoon, Arab leaders talked over him, plunging into all the problems the new nation faces, the violence, the debts inherited by the new government, the question of the interim government's legitimacy. They talked, and Bremer listened, or so the juxtaposition of images seemed to say. A neat reversal of who dictates to whom, and perhaps a last dig at a man sometimes referred to on Arab television as a "dictator."

and

The most striking aspect of Monday's coverage -- besides the fact that channels al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera were left on the outside of an event that one might have expected the Americans to spoon-feed them -- is how quickly everyone moved on. Although an al-Arabiya journalist, doing man-in-the-street questions, asked a group of Iraqis, "Is this a government of stooges to the United States?" there wasn't a lot of obsessing about the meaning of the actual transfer. Rather, the handover itself was nudged to the side, and the conversation turned to the future: money, police, safety, foreign affairs, the future of Saddam Hussein (taking possession of, and prosecuting him, may be the first items of business attempted by the new government).

I still do not understand the childish peevishness of the present American govenrment in regards to the Arab Sats. Yes, they are hostile to you, but this is not Soviet TV, this is not State TV, the Arab Sats are more or less genuinely free - some limits exists due to their home bases, but then their home bases are tiny insignificant and comfortable countries - but most of their reporting is "market driven" for all the idiotic gnashing of teeth in America regarding Jihadi propaganda (which the Arab Sats are not). They respond to what their viewers tastes are - largely speaking.

For that, one has to talk to them - excluding them, not talkiing to them merely means one's own voice is not heard at all, and one talks to oneself in an echo chamber. That appears to be the sole concern of the present Administration, and it is dangerous. It is indeed true there is no convincing much of the prospective audience of the goodness of one's overall aims, above all when policy re Israel is so Sharon-centered, but damage control is often about limiting the down side, not turning a bad event into a good event.

(all from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13301-2004Jun28.html)

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:19 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Further Reflections on the Iraq Failure: Ignatius of WP

Rather busy at the moment (who knew setting up an office was such a bloody nightmare), but a quick note on this:

After the Handover
By David Ignatius
Tuesday, June 29, 2004; Page A23
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13503-2004Jun28.html

Ignatius has long been my favorite American commentator on Iraq, and I may add a richer and more interesting one than Freidman's idiotic bowlderizations of the latest nitwit observation spoonfed him by the pampered elites.

In particular I want to draw attention to this:

"The invasion also helped spawn a wave of anti-Americanism in the Islamic Middle East and around the world. Bremer's departure from Baghdad yesterday may ease those divisions, but the damage to America's reputation is significant. In Europe and Asia, as much as in the Arab world, the United States is seen as the god that failed.

As with any policy reversal, the essential question is whether its architects have learned from their mistakes. "

Precisely, and I note that working for an American firm I am seeing the hesitations, the resistance. Doing business, as I have noted several times, is becoming harder - where only two or three years ago, to take a North African example - you heard things like "We're sick of being captive to the French [business] interests, we want to work with Americans" now you hear rather snide jokes about Iraq, skepticism that American products are worth the trouble.... One can do business, but clearly the mental barriers are up, the reflexive skepticism has increased.

There is a real price, then, to the political angle. Now, sometimes prices have to be paid, but it is painful to see this price being paid for an incompetent folly, and administration one that continues to muddle along blindly, without any real sense of how to turn things around, and yet incapable either of learning from the mess. Only seeking to push off real accounting until after the elections.

I also note the following for its entertainment value as well as its sardonic truth:
"Ahmed Chalabi smiled contentedly at the thought. L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator who ran Iraq like a viceroy for more than a year, was reduced to a hasty exit with a stealthy helicopter ride to the airport, seen off without fanfare by no one higher-ranking than a deputy prime minister. "Bremer put his hand in his pocket and went to the airport ignominiously," Chalabi chortled Tuesday, the day after Bremer's departure. "And Dan Senor with him," he added, referring to Bremer's spokesman, who had denigrated Chalabi on television."
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16002-2004Jun29.html)

I confess some guilty pleasure in Chalabi laughing at Senor.

But here is a more useful nuggest:
"Iraq has a long history of Arab nationalism and support for Palestinians against Israel, dating from before Hussein's Baath Party took over in 1968. As a result, its foreign policy, if tradition and popular sentiment are followed, could end up being adversarial with that of the Bush administration."

Could? It will, if of course popular sentiment is followed. But then the real model is the Egyptian one - the faux democracy covering a vampire state. Not even one that brings economic progress like Tunisia, but is a convenient lap dog.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 29, 2004

Among the effects of transfer, adieu oh useless CPA

The CPA site is suddenly silent, although they continue to send me their useless press oriented blather.

No more updates on cool things like what fucking things are not working and other fine things that enabled one, if one wanted to, to track how fucked up everything is. (Although I am amused to note that at some point they stopped posting the security reports for "security reasons" - never noticed when that stopped)

Good planning opportunities of course.

Now the route seems to be Iraqi ministerial. Have to probe on that. Investment memo proceeding apace, but pain in the ass to work on when I am also looking for a new damned apartment.

Should try to find some time to comment on the transition and the like - wonder how this will play in the US?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:42 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 22, 2004

Reconstruction Articles: indictments of the CPA

The Washington Post has been running a rich series on the "reconstruction" of Iraq, which I find rather confirmatory of my own observations and explanatory of why reconstruction has been such an abject failure.

In the current edition, the following article has some interesting gems:

An Educator Learns the Hard Way
Task of Rebuilding Universities Brings Frustration, Doubts and Danger
washingtonpost.com
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, June 21, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56414-2004Jun20?language=printer
Second of three articles

The article focuses on a certain John Agresto, responsible for the "reconstruction" of the university system. Without meaning to sneer, the naivete recorded rather explains the failures.

A few quotes: "Like everyone else in America, I saw the images of people cheering as Saddam Hussein's statue was pulled down. I saw people hitting pictures of him with their shoes," said Agresto, the former president of St. John's College in New Mexico. "Once you see that, you can't help but say, 'Okay. This is going to work.' "

Well, I should hope some minority in American paid attention to the wider context, which was there, of vast and deep distrust for the US and ambiguous feelings regarding the toppling of "their president" by a foreign army. Fool.

Although he notes:
""I'm a neoconservative who's been mugged by reality," Agresto said as he puffed on a pipe next to a resort-size swimming pool behind the marbled palace that houses the occupation authority.

"We can't deny there were mistakes, things that didn't work out the way we wanted," he added. "We have to be honest with ourselves.""

This is perhaps the key to understanding why he and his ilk when so wrong:
He knew next to nothing about Iraq's educational system. Even after he was selected, he did not pore through a reading list. "I wanted to come here with as open a mind as I could have," he said. "I'd much rather learn firsthand than have it filtered to me by an author." He did a Google search on the Internet. The result? "Not much," he said.
...
None of that fazed him. He assumed, he said, that Iraq would feel like a newly liberated East European nation, keen to embrace the West and democratic change. "

Blindness and hubris, fundamentally misunderstanding the situation and the problem. It strikes me the idiotically misplaced, utterly ahistorical analogies with the Cold War and Eastern Europe indeed informed most of the CPA-Iraq ideologues understanding of Iraq. It is little wonder they failed to understand what was going on around them, and failed to respond in practical manners.

It rather does behoove one, I would add, to learn something of the country you are trying to remake, if only to understand what the real basics you are working with actually are, so as to avoid the silly idiocy of believing some selective, distorted TV images, and thinking like a naive fool that your invasion is going to be like Praque 1989. The differences should have been obvious to anyone who knew even a modicum about the history of the region, never mind the culture and the religion. Leaving aside, however, the Islamic versus outsider issue, one need only look to the rather more ambivalent Russian attitudes compared with Eastern European to understand Eastern Europe, under a foreign empire's domination, was/is in no way a sociological model for understanding a post-Sadaam Iraq.

This particular passage amused and annoyed me, I may add:
"While acknowledging American mistakes, Agresto aimed some of his most pointed criticism at Iraqis. In his view, the Americans toppled a dictator and prepared the ground for democracy, but Iraqis have not stepped up to build on that start.

"They don't know how to be a community," he said. "They put their individual interests first. They only look out for themselves.""

Well, no shit. There has not been a community and a modicum of reading regarding Iraqi sociology would have taught him that Iraqi society has remained highly tribalized, and indeed regreseed along those lines in the 1990s. A modicum of preparation, rather than trying to "learn" on the ground, wrapped in a bubble.

I would like to note I consider this statement to be pure rubbish and deeply hypocritical:
"Had it been someone different than Agresto, the possibility of that would have been so much better," said Keith Watenpaugh, an assistant professor of Middle East history at Le Moyne College in Syracuse, N.Y., who traveled to Baghdad last year to assess Iraq's university system. "The politics of the occupation were so divisive, and the American academy felt so disempowered by the way things were happening, that when such political creatures like Agresto came asking for things, it was too difficult to put aside those politics. If the administration had really been committed to rebuilding Iraq's education structures, they wouldn't have sent Agresto."
Emphasis added.

American academy felt disempowered? Oh poor whinging ineffectual babies. Bloody twit: at least Agresto is honest - a fool but honest - this whinging twit would have me believe he would have let go of his attachment to "the Academy" (one of those idiotic pomposities that I so despise from this kind of academic), and his politics to work on Iraq? I should think not.

Agresto was a mistake, to be sure, for his lack of background in the region and his idiotic lack of preparation on that, but his past fights with "The Academy" strike me as irrelevant except to highlight the self-indulgence and navel gazing.

Now, more naivete:
Agresto, who was inside the palace and heard the blast, assumed that the attack would provoke widespread revulsion at the taking of innocent life, and would rally popular sentiment against the insurgency and in favor of the goals of the occupation.

"What I expected was the Mothers March for Peace or the Don't Kill Our Kids movement or somebody to come out and say: 'Stop this. We want democracy,' " he said. But that never occurred. Iraqis held funerals and went on with life. U.S. troops erected even larger concrete blast walls in front of the gate.

When he asked Iraqis working for the CPA why there was not more outrage, he sensed apprehension. Everyone he talked to was too scared to condemn the insurgents in public.

"I saw people still afraid," he said. "I saw how easy it was to speak against the Americans and how dangerous it was to speak for democracy and liberty."

The aftermath of the bombing led Agresto to rethink some of his most fundamental assumptions about the American effort to transform Iraq. Suddenly, a goal that had appeared attainable seemed so far from reach. Perhaps, he concluded, U.S. planners should have settled for something less than full democracy.

A mother's march for peace? Well, that has some entertainment value - although it sadly displays how much he and his ilk have been living in a fantasy world disconnected from the realities of Iraqi society,

He reasoned that the occupation's chief goal should have been to restore security, and only later to begin other work in earnest.

"We're trying to establish a democratic government without a democratic people," he said. "I don't know how possible that is."

Here, here at least we have some realism. It is not possible, is the answer, first one has to create the conditions necessary. .

Now, perhaps a dose of realism:

"Later in the meeting, Agresto distributed copies of a revised education law written by the CPA that included the rights document. He said the CPA had decided not to promulgate the law and instead was giving it to the ministry with the hope that it would be approved by the university presidents and the minister. The changes would have more legitimacy, Agresto figured, if they were enacted by the new minister, rather than the occupation authority."

Well, at least a tiny bit of realism regarding what they can achieve.

Now regarding the prior article,

Mistakes Loom Large as Handover Nears
Missed Opportunities Turned High Ideals to Harsh Realities
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A54294-2004Jun19?language=printer
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, June 20, 2004; Page A01

Bloody long and very much worth reading, although if you have been reading my ranting about my experiences with the CPA since May of 2003, none of this is a surprise.

Some key items

First, this one line summary: "The ambitious, 15-month undertaking stumbled because of a series of mistakes that began with an inadequate commitment of resources and was aggravated by a misunderstanding of Iraqi politics, religion and society in occupied Iraq, these participants said."

Well ain't that beautiful. What truly irritates me, however, as this was painfully obvious a bloody year ago, and to anyone with the least sense, the combination of an occupation administration that knew literally nothing and had no resources, was a recipe for disaster (although I note we had the usual suspects in the mindless cheerleading camp try to pimp that idea everything was going fine off of some senseless neo-Con journo morons quick trips through safe zones. Indeed, let me point out the importance of "loyal criticism and its utility over mindless sycophantic cheerleading. Should the USG morons have heeded well placed criticisms, they would have avoided massive errors.

But more on this later.

"We blatantly failed to get it right," said Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution who served as an adviser to the occupation authority. "When you look at the record, it's impossible to escape the conclusion that we squandered an unprecedented opportunity."

Squandered is bloody right. Nothing had to be this bad. Not even after the looting, but again, the current Administration's blind mendacity, its extreme preference for sycophants over skilled and pragmatic operators is deadly. Martin Wolf had it right, opposition to this Administration is a duty for anyone who cares about competency. I am not pleased with the concept of a Kerry White House, but I would rather have the occasion to vote out a mediocre Kerry than suffer through the disasters these incompetent fools are wreaking out of pure blind hubris.

I note this is rich: U.S. reconstruction specialists commonly complain of ungrateful Iraqis. What the fuck these idiots think the Iraqis should be grateful for I don't know, but certainly merely toppling a dictator is not enough, the motherfuckers in Iraq know bloody well that toppling dictators does not make the fucking pie in the end, so no reason to congratulate the Chef for simply having bought the motherfucking ingrediants, he's gotta fucking make the pie in order to fucking congratulate him. Mindless idiots, these stupid fucking American "reconstruction" idiots in the CPA, full of their bloated farts of empty pompous "liberation" posturing.

In many ways, the occupation appears to have transformed the occupier more than the occupied. Iraqis continue to endure blackouts, lengthy gas lines, rampant unemployment and the uncertain political future that began when U.S. tanks rolled into Baghdad. But American officials who once roamed the country to share their sense of mission with Iraqis now face such mortal danger that they are largely confined to compounds surrounded by concrete walls topped with razor wire. Iraqis who come to meet them must show two forms of identification and be searched three times.

Emphasis added. I rather think that says all there really needs to be said about this "liberation."

The Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. entity that has administered Iraq, cites many successes of its tenure. Nearly 2,500 schools have been repaired, 3 million children have been immunized, $5 million in loans has been distributed to small businesses and 8 million textbooks have been printed, according to the CPA. New banknotes have replaced currency with ousted president Saddam Hussein's picture. Local councils have been formed in every city and province. An interim national government promises to hold general elections next January.

These are successes? Five fucking million? And replacing Sadaam on the currency?

Most telling:
About 15,000 Iraqis have been hired to work on projects funded by $18.6 billion in U.S. aid, despite promises to use the money to employ at least 250,000 Iraqis by this month. At of the beginning of June, 80 percent of the aid package, approved by Congress last fall, remained unspent.Electricity generation remains stuck at around 4,000 megawatts, resulting in less than nine hours of power a day to most Baghdad homes, despite pledges from U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer to increase production to 6,000 megawatts by June 1.

Incompetence.

Pure and simple. Incompetence.

And these people sneered at the UN. With more potential resources they have done a far worse job and squandered vast amounts of political capital.

And of course, my fucking steel project is still fucking stuck.

Yeah, that pisses me off still. But beyond the personal angle, rather emblamatic of who these incompetent fools can't get out of the fucking starting gate.

AS for the political system and that shining beacon of democracy that would transform the region (in their masturbatory dreams of course, naive idiots), well we're going to have an Egyptian style "democracy" as a I long predicted, if not a civil war (I note al-Hayat reports this AM 22 June 04 that Turkey has warned the Kurds not to move into Kirkuk or face consequences).

Of course the following is not surprising at all in the context of the abject failure of the CPA. : On the eve of its dissolution, the CPA has become a symbol of American failure in the eyes of most Iraqis. In a recent poll sponsored by the U.S. government, 85 percent of respondents said they lacked confidence in the CPA. The criticism is echoed by some Americans working in the occupation. They fault CPA staffers who were fervent backers of the invasion and of the Bush administration, but who lacked reconstruction skills and Middle East experience. Only a handful spoke Arabic.

What I always found strange, I may add, is that although I knew a goodly number of CPA Staff, and knew they desperately needed persons like myself, no one tried to recruit me. Now, I am sure it was really quite clear that I am no partisan of Ibn Bush, that I was highly critical of what was going on, however one should think that my skills, language and business, would have been of some interest to an Administration that was grappling with an ever deteriorating situation and, to be frank and perhaps a bit arrogant but I think accurate, desperately needed people like me.

Now, maybe I would have said no. Maybe not. I certainly am glad I did not get all covered up in the shit so far, but I find it strange, bizarre that I was never approached, not even obliquely. I need not even have been that good, in the final analysis, considering what a cock up things have been, to have added some value, I can not but assume that not being a partisan, that being a critic (and of course they don't know about this site) was a show stopper.

Ideology over all.

Now this little piece on Bremer, it is rich. In an interview last week, Bremer maintained that "Iraq has been fundamentally changed for the better" by the occupation. The CPA, he said, has put Iraq on a path toward a democratic government and an open economy after more than three decades of a brutal socialist dictatorship. Among his biggest accomplishments, he said, were the lowering of Iraq's tax rate, the liberalization of foreign-investment laws and the reduction of import duties.

Well, since Iraq is not on a path to democratic government, but sliding dangerously between trumped up democracy masking authoritarianism and open civil war, looks like point one down, "Ambassador" Bremer. An open economy. Well, insofar as no law truly obtains, I suppose I don't even know how to judge this "accomplishment" since I doubt it will survive intact. Lowering the tax rate is an accomplishment? He clearly exists in the same la la land that the rest of his sycophantic incomptetent stooges do, when they think such things really fucking matter at this fucking stage, or that will survive whatever emerges from this mess. Same for liberalization of investment laws and import duties. Bloody idiocy. Bloody self-regarding un-realistic idiocy. It is truly stunning how stupidly removed from reality these idiots are.

As to this, let me quote the following
Several current and former CPA officials contended that key decisions by Bremer favored a grandiose vision over Iraqi realities and reflected the perceived prerogatives of a military victor. Critics within the CPA also faulted Bremer for working to advance a conservative economic agenda of tax cuts and free trade instead of focusing on the delivery of basic services. "There was this grand idea that we were going to turn Iraq into a model nation, a model democracy, with an ideal constitution and an ideal economy and an ideal military," said a State Department official who spent several months working for the CPA. "It was just naive."
Emphasis added:
Indeed. indeed, indeed.

On the underlined part, well, I will say, I like low and stable taxation, I like open and free trade and I think that the overall "grandiose vision" would have been a fine thing to achieve, in an ideal world.

The problem I have had, and always had with their idiotic transformation talk and bloody idiotic self-indulgent political messianism is that this had no relationship with what could have been realistically achieved under the best of conditions, given Iraqi society, given economic realities and given the resources. One does not "transform" societies - that is bolshevism and these idiot Neo-Cons and their so called "conservative" supporters are engaging in right wing bolshevism when they engage in such bloody nonsense.

There was no way that any of these reforms were going to take when the country was prostrate and without services. I, I may add, ranted on about this throughout the summer, fearing, as I think they have done, that they have by their bolshevism managed to discredit many fine reforms, and went too far beyond what Iraqi social consensus would support. There will be a backlash, mark my words, and these self-indulgent twits have discredited necessary reforms.

Naive and stupid.

Now, on staffing:
The CPA also lacked experienced staff. A few development specialists were recruited from the State Department and nongovernmental organizations. But most CPA hiring was done by the White House and Pentagon personnel offices, with posts going to people with connections to the Bush administration or the Republican Party. The job of reorganizing Baghdad's stock exchange, which has not reopened, was given in September to a 24-year-old who had sought a job at the White House. "It was loyalty over experience," a senior CPA official said.
Emphasis added.

My experience more or less. What to say about this other than this is purely incompetence. Deep and bloody incompetence.

Mind you, I happen to know that they have more or less simply translated American rules and documentation into Arabic with little to no regard for the local context, and despite a fine model next door in Jordan for a reasonable Arab framework for an exchange (although I believe later inputs have included Jordanians).

Now let me quote the following in whole:
Economic Miscalculations
The Daura Power Plant in southern Baghdad was supposed to be a model of the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq. Bombed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and neglected by Hussein's government, the station could operate at no more than a quarter of its rated capacity, leading to prolonged blackouts in the capital.

After CPA specialists toured the decrepit facility last summer, they vowed to bring it back to life. German and Russian firms were hired to make repairs, and it was placed atop a list of priority projects intended to achieve a 6,000-megawatt goal for national electricity production. More power, Bremer hoped, would improve the economy and daily life enough to reduce violence and stabilize Iraq.

Today, the Daura plant is indeed a model -- of how the U.S. reconstruction effort has failed to meet its goals.

The German contractors fled for their safety in April. The Russians departed in late May, after two of their colleagues were shot to death by insurgents as they approached the plant in a minivan.

Inside the facility, parts are strewn on the floor, awaiting installation. Iraqi technicians in blue coveralls lounge around, smoking cigarettes and waiting for guidance. In the turbine room, graffiti on the wall reads: "Long Live the Resistance."

The CPA intended for the Daura plant to be producing more than 500 megawatts of power by June 1. But the best it can do at the moment is 100 megawatts -- half of its output of last summer.

"We were supposed to have improved," said Bashir Khallaf, the plant director. "But we have gotten worse."

The failure to fix Daura and other plants, coupled with sabotage attacks on power lines, have renewed the debilitating blackouts that plagued Iraq last summer. The situation is not much better for other services. Attempts to fix water-treatment plants and oil refineries also are far behind schedule, forcing the country -- which has the world's second-largest oil reserves and two large rivers -- to import gasoline and bottled water. Recent attacks on fuel convoys and pipelines have depleted stockpiles, resulting in lengthy gas lines.

Several CPA officials said the Bush administration has long underestimated reconstruction costs. In its war planning, the administration devoted $900 million to reconstruction despite reporting by the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations that depicted a far greater need. In the first months of the occupation, an additional $1.1 billion was committed by the White House. It was not until September that the administration asked Congress for billions more.

No news here, just a sad illustration of the errors.

Although the $18.6 billion reconstruction aid package was approved by Congress in November, the Pentagon office charged with spending it has moved slowly. About $3.7 billion of this package had been spent by June 1, according to the CPA. Many projects that have received funding have slowed or stopped entirely because Western firms have withdrawn employees from Iraq in response to attacks on civilian contractors.

CPA officials contend the money should have been earmarked and spent far sooner. Had that happened, they argue, the CPA could have retained much of the goodwill that existed among Iraqis after the U.S. invasion and possibly weakened the insurgency.

"The failure to get the reconstruction effort launched early will be regarded as the most important critical failure," said one of Bremer's senior advisers. "If we could have fixed things faster, the situation would be very different today."

Not very different, too many fuck ups.

By starting late, the adviser said, the CPA got "caught in a security trap." More than $2 billion of the aid package will be spent hiring private guards for contractors, buying them armored vehicles and building secure housing compounds, CPA officials estimate. "If we had spent this money sooner, before things got bad, we could have spent more of it on actually helping the Iraqi people," the adviser said.

Because many of the 2,300 projects to be funded by the $18.6 billion are large construction endeavors that will involve foreign laborers instead of Iraqis, they will result in far less of a local economic boost than the CPA had promised, another senior official involved in the reconstruction said. The projects were chosen largely without input from Iraqis.

"This was supposed to be our big effort to help them -- 18 billion of our tax dollars to fix their country," the senior reconstruction official said. "But the sad reality is that this program won't have a lot of impact in it for the Iraqis. The primary beneficiaries will be American companies."

Well, wasting tax payer dollars. Why not? The whole cock up has been a waste, why go for any novelty value by stopping pissing away on the electric rail now?

On Sadr and political confrontation:
The sympathy for Sadr today at the Rafidain station -- on Fridays, officers pin his picture to their uniforms before going to the mosque -- suggests that the odds of getting the police to resist the cleric's militia have not improved. The scope of the confrontation could have been smaller, according to several CPA officials, had U.S. forces moved against Sadr in August, when an Iraqi court issued an arrest warrant for him. Instead, they allowed him months to build support for his anti-occupation views.

By April, with the CPA's internal polling showing 80 percent of Iraqis holding positive views of Sadr, the CPA should have sought a political solution, the officials contend. At the very least, they argue, CPA strategists and military commanders should have realized that many Iraqi security officers would side with the cleric.

"The Americans misunderstood us," Kadhim said. "We will fight for Iraq. We will not fight for them."

I doubt moving in August would have been much better, but certainly when your data tells you your opponent is massively popular and you are hated or at best regarding with moderate dislike, you might want to adjust strategy.

I shall quote this section as well, in extenso, for it is both amusing and appalling to me:

Out of Touch

Life inside the high-security Green Zone -- what some CPA staffers jokingly call the Emerald City -- bears little resemblance to that in the rest of Baghdad. The power is always on. Shiny shuttle buses zip passengers around. Outdoor cafes stay open late into the night.

There is little effort to comply with Islamic traditions. Beer flows freely at restaurants. Women walk around in shorts. Bacon cheeseburgers are on the CPA's lunch menu.

"It's like a different planet," said an Iraqi American who has a senior position in the CPA and lives in the Green Zone but regularly ventures out to see relatives. "It's cut off from the real Iraq."

Because the earth-toned GMC Suburbans used by CPA personnel and foreign contractors have become a favored target of insurgents, traveling outside the Green Zone -- into the Red Zone that defines the rest of Iraq -- requires armored vehicles and armed escorts, which are limited to senior officials. Lower-ranking employees must either remain within the compound or sneak out without a security detail.

Although the CPA has tried to bring Iraqis into the CPA headquarters for meetings and other events -- there has even been an "Iraqi Culture Night" in the Green Zone -- the inability to mingle with Iraqis has isolated the Americans. "We don't know the outside," the senior adviser to Bremer said. "How many of us have gone out to buy a bottle of milk or a pair of socks?"

Instead of building contacts at social events in the city, CIA operatives in Baghdad drink in their own rattan-furnished bar in the Green Zone. Instead of prowling local markets, CPA employees go to the Green Zone Shopping Bazaar, where the most popular items are Saddam Hussein memorabilia.

Limited contact with Iraqis outside the Green Zone has made CPA officials reliant on the views of those chosen by Bremer to serve on the Governing Council. When Brahimi, the U.N. envoy, asked the CPA for details about several Iraqis he was considering for positions in the interim government, he told associates he was "shocked to find how little information they really had," according to an official who was present.

The CPA official who got around the most was Bremer, who travels with an entourage of private guards, most of them former Navy SEALs, equipped with helicopters and a fleet of armored vehicles.

Bremer's willingness to travel and to work 18-hour days has won him respect within the CPA. The chief criticism of his tenure within the former Hussein palace that serves as CPA headquarters was that he failed to recruit enough seasoned diplomats with experience in the Middle East.

In the final days of the CPA, many officials have succumbed to bitterness. Some blame military commanders for not asking for more troops to stabilize the country. "They had enough soldiers to ensure that Saddam's men didn't come back to power, but there were nowhere near enough to make the country safe enough for us to do our work," a CPA reconstruction specialist said.

Military officials say CPA personnel spend too much time in the 258-room headquarters. "Nobody has any idea what they do back in that palace," a senior Marine commander in Fallujah said recently. "We certainly don't see any results."

Several veterans of other reconstruction operations characterized civilian-military relations in Iraq as the worst they have encountered. "It has been poisonous," the reconstruction specialist said.

The other major conflict within the occupation bureaucracy has set the legions of young staff members chosen for their loyalty to the Bush administration against older, more liberal diplomats from the State Department and the British Foreign Office. Several of the diplomats said they regarded the young staffers as inexperienced and eager to pad their résumés during three-month tours.

These diplomats singled out the Office of Strategic Communications as unsuccessful in its efforts to disseminate information to Iraqis. Instead of creating an all-news television station that would compete with other Arab broadcasters that the CPA deemed anti-occupation, the communications office, with several employees straight from Republican staff jobs on Capitol Hill, set up a channel that aired children's programs and Egyptian cooking shows.

"It didn't put any effort into communicating with the Iraqi people," a British CPA official said. "Stratcom viewed its job as helping Bush to win his next election."

If the underlined sections are not a complete and utter indictment of this effort as deeply corrupted by short termist facile politics, by temporizing and incompetence, by idiotic sycophancy in the face of a clearly world-imporant event, then I do not know anything.

The question is, what can be salvaged from this utter cock up?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:34 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 20, 2004

Iraq, encore [edited to correct link]

Some recent conversations about Iraq and opportunities, we kept coming back to the widespread sense around here that Iraq is tipping into civil war. Speaking with a Jordanian business man this morning, I gave a 30 percent chance I would be back next year to work on an improved Iraqi menu of opportunities. That is, of course, a 70 percent chance Iraq is still a mess. He thought I was being too optimistic.

I may be, news as the following leave a strong sense that the ethnic pot can not but get into a boil:
Kurds Advancing to Reclaim Land in Northern Iraq
DEXTER FILKINS
Published: June 20, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/20/international/middleeast/20KURD.html?hp=&pagewanted=all&position=

I also wanted to draw attention to
As Handover Nears, U.S. Mistakes Loom Large
Harsh Realities Replaced High Ideals After Many Missed Opportunities
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A54294-2004Jun19?language=printer
[EDIT: Oops, earlier provided incorrect link]

Interesting article. Will have more comments later.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:54 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Entertainment Value with "secret sewer" projects

A beautiful, amusing little story:

But the next day the First Cavalry Division, which is charged with guarding sites like the sewage plants around Baghdad, agreed to transport two visitors to another plant, using a three-vehicle convoy laden with weaponry.

Inside, under the blazing afternoon sun, was a scene that perhaps only the combination of occupied Iraq and a secret sewage plant could produce � a Turkish site manager who did not seem to speak either English or Arabic, Iraqi engineers with strict orders not to show anyone the treated sewage without permission from the front office, and a compound mostly deserted except for some low-level staff members and managers and the few engineers.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/international/middleeast/19SEWA.html?hp=&pagewanted=all&position=

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:48 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 18, 2004

Another Beheading

Poor bastard. al-Arabiyah reported this not long ago.

Unlike Berg, who bumbled around, this fellow was righteous in terms of what he was doing.

Poor bastard.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:25 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 16, 2004

Iraq: The Popularity Contest

Juan Cole unearthed the following tidbit:
Poll: 55% of Iraqis Would feel Safer without US Troops
67% Support Muqtada al-Sadr
http://www.juancole.com/2004_06_01_juancole_archive.html#108736144801952076

Which can be viewed directly here:
http://wid.ap.org/documents/iraq/cpapoll_files/v3_document.htm

Odd, I didn't get an email from the CPA about this one. I get it for every other inane fucking thing. Footballs and Dan Senor shitting, but this...

Well, what can one say but off a fucking cliff.

More commentary later, bloody hard to read the original documentation.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:44 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

News Flash? al-Qaedah and Iraq not connected....

It really is a sad statement to the depths to which the U.S. Government has sunk under the current administration that this is news.

See
Sept. 11 Commission Report Says Iraq Rebuffed Al Qaeda
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
The New York Times
Published: June 16, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Sept-11-Commission.html?hp
and
9/11 Panel Finds No Collaboration Between Iraq, Al Qaeda
By Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, June 16, 2004; 9:00 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45853-2004Jun16.html

I should say it is transparently clear that Bush and Cheney's mendacious and grossly misleading statements re Iraq and al-Qaedah are aimed at the gullible fool segement of the American voting population that is unable to distinguish between Arabs and Muslims, and for whom all of "them" are the same. It is a real pity for it does a real diservice to actually addressing the al-Qaedah issue, as well as Iraq.

Mendacity when done right, and competently has its place in government. When done stupidly and incompetently, it is rather like scoring an own goal. Of course, the current Administration seems to specialise in this.

Now, some key notes from the articles:
From the WP version:
"Although Osama bin Laden briefly explored the idea of forging ties with Iraq in the mid-1990s, the terrorist leader was hostile to Hussein's secular government, and Iraq never responded to requests for help in providing training camps or weapons, the panel's report says.

The findings come in the wake of statements Monday by Vice President Cheney that Iraq had "long-established ties" with al Qaeda, and comments by President Bush yesterday backing up that assertion..... "There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan [in 1996], but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," the report says. "Two senior bin Laden associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States." "

The NYT art. rather brief merely notes:
"Bluntly contradicting the Bush administration, the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks reported Wednesday there was "no credible evidence" that Saddam Hussein helped al-Qaida target the United States. .....

Bin Laden made overtures to Saddam for assistance, the commission said in a staff report, as he did with leaders in Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere as he sought to build an Islamic army.

While Saddam dispatched a senior Iraqi intelligence official to Sudan to meet with bin Laden in 1994, the commission said it had not turned up evidence of a "collaborative relationship."

The Bush administration has long claimed links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida, and cited them as one reason for last year's invasion of Iraq.

On Monday, Vice President Dick Cheney said in a speech that the Iraqi dictator "had long established ties with al-Qaida." "

Electoral gain, of course, not any respect for policy making is what is driving that.

However, in my opinion more relevant and interesting is the following:
" "Contrary to popular understanding," the report says, "bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses," and he never received a $300 million inheritance. "Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fundraising network developed over time," the report says.

.....

Since the Sept. 11 attacks and the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, "al Qaeda's funding has decreased significantly," the report says. But the group's expenditures have decreased as well, and "it remains relatively easy for al Qaeda to find the relatively small sums required to fund terrorist operations," the report warns.

Now, the organization is far more decentralized, with operational commanders and cell leaders making the decisions that were previously made by bin Laden, the panel found.

Yet, al Qaeda remains interested in carrying out chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attacks against the United States, the report says. Although an attempt to purchase uranium in 1994 failed -- the material proved to be fake -- "al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic objective of obtaining a nuclear weapon," according to the report.

By any means possible, it warns, "al Qaeda is actively striving to attack the United States and inflict mass casualties." "

Emphasis added.

I note the following:
First, some time back I opined that Bin Laden's wealth, according to my understanding, had been exhausted, and that people were unnecessarily obsessing about "Saudi" wealth when more pedestrian funding, including quasi criminal, were more important. It is important to understand this to avoid falling into the trap of fighting a mirage (the great benefactor Bin Laden / the Evil Saudis).

Second, I would hazard the opinion that al-Qaedah funding and recruitment has seen a huge rebound since the fiasco that is Iraq has been underway, making the United States look very much like the giant with clay feet. This is a dangerous perception, and the staggering incompetence in this area desperately needs to be addressed.

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June 15, 2004

Clumsily, Clumsily

Rather more important, in my opinion than the unfortunate deaths of the GE contractors, or the bombing of the oil terminal (Go long in oil?), but perhaps on the level of the assasination of shiite truck drivers are the following tidbits: (from The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/international/middleeast/15CND-IRAQ.html
" Adding to the tensions, the American and Iraqi governments clashed over several contentious issues in what appeared to be the first major test of power for this country's new interim government.

Iyad Allawi, the prime minister, called for the Americans to hand over all detainees � including Saddam Hussein � to the Iraqis by June 30, when Iraq will gain limited sovereign powers. Mr. Allawi also said through a spokesman that foreign contractors should be subject to all Iraqi laws. The president, Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, demanded that the Americans hand over Mr. Hussein's Republican Palace, a prominent symbol of power, to the Iraqi government after June 30.

American officials said they did not have to meet any of the demands and were in discussions with the Iraqi government over them. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt said the resolution passed earlier this month by the United Nations Security Council granted the Americans final authority over detainees, while President Bush said he wanted to make sure there was "appropriate security" before handing over Mr. Hussein.

"We also do not have to hand him over until there's a cessation of active hostilities," said Dan Senor, a spokesman for the occupation. "Hostilities, unfortunately, continue."

On the issue of American contractors, Mr. Senor said such workers would answer to Iraqi laws if they committed criminal acts, but that an order signed by L. Paul Bremer III, the top American administrator here, gave contractors immunity from legal prosecution over any incident involving their work.

As for handing over the Republican Palace, he added, "we need substantial space, property, for the U.S. mission here." The palace is being used by the Coalitional Provisional Authority as a headquarters building and will likely become an annex for the American embassy due to open here after June 30, Mr. Senor said."

Emphasis added.

I suppose I should give up hope of the Americans in Baghdad ever adopting phrasing or public statements that will not unnecessarily rile up people and confirm their clumsy arrogance. Have to... Well "have to" in the legalist terms is probably not the most relevant issue. What is probably far more relevant is rescuing some tiny piece of your influence and some tiny bit of an ability to achieve something approaching your original goals. The public response could be far more... helpful in its phrasing.

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The Long Term Decline (Iraq again)

Again, an elderly article, but one which I desire to point out:

washingtonpost.com
Iraqis Put Contempt For Troops On Display
By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, June 12, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35558-2004Jun11?language=printer

" Since U.S. forces drove to Baghdad and overthrew President Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the 138,000 American soldiers stationed here have lost their status as liberators in the eyes of most Iraqis. Polling by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority has chronicled a steady souring of opinion, with the most recent surveys showing about 80 percent of Iraqis with an unfavorable opinion of U.S. troops."

Inevitable really. I recall military friends of mine early on in conflict complaining bitterly about the understaffing and undertraining for the military units in Iraq.

However, the happy talkers one out....

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Wolf: On Bush

This is a rather aged article by Wolf, but I wanted to convey it and comment at the same time. As it is in archives, I will not bother with a link.

I mostly wished to convey it as I rather agree with the reasoning and heartily agree with the point of view.

Bush is not up to the job
The Financial Times
By Martin Wolf
Published: May 11 2004

First, Wolf opens:
I am a huge admirer of the US. Freedom and democracy survived the 20th century only because of American actions and values. Without the US, Hitler or Stalin would have emerged as undisputed winners of the second world war. Thereafter, the US turned defeated enemies into allies and undertook the long - and ultimately successful - task of containing and defeating the Soviet empire.

I am also neither hostile to Republican administrations nor opposed to the use of force. On the contrary, I was heartened by Ronald Reagan›s efforts to liberalise the US economy and oppose the Soviet Union. I preferred Richard Nixon to George McGovern, in 1972, and George H.W. Bush to Michael Dukakis, in 1988. I supported the first Gulf war, though I opposed the one in Vietnam.

For my part I was rather deeply ambivalent towards the First Gulf War, feeling it less-than-necessary although I now think it was largely a positive endeavor. And of course, I myself am "neither hostile to Republican administrations nor opposed to the use of force, although insofar as wars are expensive and often wasteful of resources, I rather prefer they be avoided if possible. If possible. And of course I have voted for a good many Republican administrations (although not the present one).

Wolf then adds:
"This personal history is of no intrinsic importance. But if I find the Bush administratio's foreign policy disturbing, so must the vast majority of humanity. If I feel Tony Blair has
allied the UK too closely, then sympathy for this alliance must be perilously low."

I concur. I very much concur. While no Government should be prisoner to foreign popularity, when one's account is so low with so many otherwise staunch friends, and one's not otherwise inclined to be harshly critical, one has to ask, is there not something wrong? Or another way, to use Machiavelli's observation that it is better to be feared than loved, but one should also not be hated.When one's natural allies fear and begin to loathe you, then one can guess that the remainder of the world may have well passed through fear into hatred, or be on that path.

Wolf then adds:
"So what is wrong with this administration? Put simply, it fails to understand the basis of US power, mis-specifies US objectives and is incompetent in executing its intentions. As a result, the position of the US - and so of the west - is worse, in significant respects, than it was the day after September 11 2001. Then, a huge proportion of humanity viewed the US as the victim of an outrage. Today, after the revelations of the treatment of prisoners in Iraq, it is seen as a perpetrator of them. Then it had the support of all its allies, now it can rely on the public›s sympathy in very few."
Emphasis added.

I rather agree and have argued this, I think, consistently. The revelations now that the current Bush Administration engaged in legalistic searches for justifying the use of torture, in clear contravention of the international accords the American government had long supported further these somewhat aged comments. As some who read my comments on the old "SDMB" message board know, I did not unalterably oppose... recourse to unpleasant methods in case of dire need. However, it has always been my view that this should be exceptional and something that remained shameful and indeed illegal. The current administration, as some commentators (I believe it The Washington Post editorial page) noted, has followed the logic and reasoning of rogue regimes where the rule of law does not obtain but rather the rule of the personal power of the ruler obtains. This is dangerous. Very dangerous, and very damaging to American standing. The revelations in this area have diminished American standing to (rightfully) comment on human rights abuses across the globe, and to further its own agenda for greater democratisation and greater respect for human rights - in short the very values said to be at the core of the country. Clumsy, naive cynicism for clumsily executed short term gain, and utterly unnecessary across a number of fields.

In short, gross incompetence.

Wolf adds then:
Let us start with the administration's faith in the application of US military power. This is a double error. The first lies in its exaggerated belief in force. The US was able to defeat the armies of Saddam Hussein, but a civilised occupying army cannot coerce the obedience of a population. The second error lies in its belief in the irrelevance of allies. A country containing 4 per cent of the world›s population cannot impose its will upon the world. It needs permanent allies, not reluctant stooges, willing acceptance of its leadership, not sullen acquiescence. The contempt shown by leading members of the administration for those who disagree with it is now matched by the hostility of those whipped by their scorn.
Emphasis added:

I have long called this the Napoleonic error. Shining belief in one's own rightness is rarely all that convincing to others, above all foreigners whose values are not in entire congruence with one's own.

Clumsy incompetence.

Wolf amplifies this:
Without military power, victory would not have been achieved in the second world war. Nor would the Soviet tanks have been kept at bay for more than 40 years. But the cold war was won not because the US had a bigger army than the Soviet Union, but because it offered a more attractive model. The more the US plays the unilateral bully, the more its attraction fades.

Precisely, the pole of attraction is a powerful tool.

Turn then to definition of US objectives. Terrorism is a technique of the powerless adapted to the age of mass communications. A war against terrorism is as empty a slogan as one against crime, drugs or disease. But proclaiming a war against terrorism justifies the indefinite suspension of the rule of law, allows every thug on the planet to ally his repressive policies to those of the US, spawns new enemies and foments a war psychosis in the US itself.

I believe this passage rather takes on a great deal of weight in the context of the revelations regarding the legal memoranda on torture, on the strange lawlessness (rather unnecessary as well as self-damaging) in regards to detainees. I note the strange collapsing of the Padilla case, the incident of the arrest of the Oregon lawyer, etc. I would note that this article in The New York Times Commander Swift Objects is instructive and interesting.

"As David Scheffer pointed out in the Financial Times last Thursday, the behaviour of the guards at Abu Ghraib is the natural, almost the inevitable, consequence of the position in which the administration has - in its pursuit of its war on terrorism - put detainees.These are neither prisoners of war nor criminal suspects. Instead, they are in a legal limbo for as long as the US decides that this so-called "war" continues. Interrogators have absolute power and, as Lord Acton pointed out, absolute power corrupts absolutely. Nobody, not excluding Americans, is immune to the temptations such power creates."

There is little to add to Wolf's observation than to draw the line to the legal memoranda regarding torture.

Wolf notes re competence:
Now let us turn to the question of competence. In the short history of the war on terrorism, only one institution has shown its effectiveness - the US armed forces in "shock and awe" mode. Almost everything else has been a humiliating shambles. Afghanistan is, once again, in the arms of the war lords whose behaviour led to the Taliban invasion. The outcome in Iraq now looks far worse than that. "

Indeed, and a month has not changed that, other than my feeling that the new Iraqi of the moment probably represents a sureptious slide to re-Baathification, which is to say, not long before one sees a new Iraqi dictatorship, but one dressed up a little better to meet simple minded tastes for the appearance of democracy - Potemkin or Egyptian democracy.

"The decision to wage a war of choice, not of necessity, was a great risk. It could be justified only by discovering the weaponry Mr Hussein was alleged to hold or by leaving the country, if not a Jeffersonian democracy, at least in a reasonably stable condition. Having been so resoundingly wrong on the first point, the US must now succeed on the second. Always difficult, the chances of such an outcome now seem vanishingly small. What will Iraq be a few years from now - a military dictatorship, a theocracy, a divided country, an anarchy, or a permanent US occupation? Any of these, except the last, seems more plausible than stable democracy."

I would lay my bets on a military dictatorship rather like Egypt. A ticking bomb.

"It is impossible to exaggerate the dangers attendant upon a US failure in Iraq: jihadis would conclude that they had now defeated a second superpower; friendly regimes would be shaken; and US prestige would be destroyed. Iraq is not another Vietnam. It is far more dangerous than that. While this venture was never going to be as militarily perilous as that war, this time dominoes could well fall. An incontinent US withdrawal could be a deciding moment in the relationship between the US and the Arab, if not the entire Muslim, world."

I would add that in fact American standing has already been badly, badly damaged by the clear, indeed gross incompetence shown in Iraq to date. No one, not even a cynic such as myself, expected things to go this badly, so quickly. I recall stating on the SDMB that I expected car bombs by Spring. I did not even think by the past Fall that such utter incompetence would have generated what it did.

Wolf adds
"The US has, rightly or wrongly, staked its prestige not just on getting rid of Saddam Hussein, but on leaving behind a thriving country. If, instead, it leaves behind despotism or chaos, it will be a grievous defeat, with huge long-run consequences. Responsibility for such a failure must rest with the White House. It cannot be blamed on any subordinate department, not even the defence department. This is the president's policy and responsibility. The buck stops there."

Precisely, and precisly why this current president must go. Incompetence of this magnitude can not be tolerated.

Crafting a foreign policy for a new era is hard. The last time this had to be done was in the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman more than half a century ago. The
institutions they established and the values they upheld were the foundation of the successful US foreign policy of the postwar era. Now, a task even more complex has fallen on this
president. He is not up to the job. This is not a moral judgment, but a practical one. The world is too complex and dangerous for the pious simplicities and arrogant unilateralism
of George W. Bush.

Emphasis added. My feelings exactly.

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Interim Thoughts, A Local Editorial on the "Greater Middle East Initiative" [edited - comments added

Unfortunately a rebound in the nastiness from the Chicken Biryani has me down again - I am beginning to suspect the old iron stomach is getting delicate in its old age (well not old age yet, but my woman tells me I have a grey hair, first one, so there.).

Nevertheless, a brief comment on this, which I will quote in full as there is no online archive. Emphasis added at the key points, in my opinion of course, with [Key Point Markers] in brackets for ease of reference.

Jordanian Perspective
Reform — need and conviction
Musa Keilani
I have just returned from Qatar, where the Gulf Studies Centre held a conference on Democracy and Reform in the Middle East. The former prime minister of Sudan, Sadeq Al Mahdi, Prof. Sadd Eddin Ibrahim, who was recently released from a Cairo jail for his human rights activism, Dr Hasan Mohammed Al Ansari from Qatar University and nearly 80 Arab intellectuals discussed the chronic question of democracy and reform in their respective countries and wondered why decision makers abide by Washington's recipe for economic reform, through the International Monetary Fund, but refrain from applying a parallel political recipe for reform, and consider it a violation of their territorial imperative and sovereignty.

[Point A]We know that it is not exactly the great desire to see democracy prevail in the Arab world that is behind America's Greater Middle East Initiative. The US wants the Arab governments to eliminate local groups opposed to the American policy in the Middle East and Washington's approach to the Muslim world in general. The only way the US could think of achieving its objective is to insist on “democracy” and “reform” in the Middle East as a pressure point and leverage against the governments.

The equation is quite simple: [Point B]the world knows that if there were to be Western-style elections in the Arab world today, the winners would be those who are described by Washington as anti-US hardliners and extremists — Islamists, the very party that the US is targeting for crackdown. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the American explanation that the root of all troubles in the Middle East is lack of democracy and that is why the US is pushing for it.

The Arab countries expressed their rejection of the American drive to impose reforms on the Arab world. No externally imposed reform is going to work in the Arab world; it would only result in chaos and confusion and that is something we, Arabs, could ill afford. Reforms in the Arab world have to take into consideration many factors, including history, culture, traditions, politics, tribalism and indeed the ground realities.

Several Arab countries, including Jordan, accepted the American invitation to the Group of Eight summit in Georgia, but their attendance does not signal an endorsement of the US plan. [Point C]If anything, they took advantage of the marked absence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to emphasise the Arab rejection of the US proposals and managed to dilute it. Instead of the Greater Middle East Initiative, it became “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa”. It is obvious that the changes did take into consideration the Arab reservations over the first draft prepared by Washington, although the amendments did not go far enough.

[Point D]The prevailing feeling in the Arab world over whatever the US does in the region is scepticism. Rightly so, because Washington has done little to convince the Arabs that it is interested in a fair, just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, the American track record has nothing but open bias in favour of Israel.

Therefore, the feeling is that Washington is again trying to hoodwink the Arabs into believing that it has a genuine intention to find a just, fair and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention the original American draft of the reform initiative, which reeked of a grand design to reshape the Arab region to suit American and Israeli interests.

The endorsement of the “amended” US plan by the G-8 has given it an international look. Why should other members of the group worry about the impact of the US plan on the Arab world, anyway? They signed on the dotted line and lined up behind the US in this context, while refusing to let the US have the full Iraqi pie. [Point E] Again, we Arabs find ourselves and our future being judged by others. No one is disputing that the Arabs need reform; that the Palestinian problem remains unresolved and the Arabs were unable to respond effectively to the Iraqi crisis are the best indicator of the dire need for reforms in the Arab world. However, the American way is not the answer, since its objective is not reform, but serving American interests.

The need of the day is for the Arabs to look inwards and find out for themselves where they have been going wrong and what should be done to correct things. It needs a sea change in mindset. The Arabs have to be convinced of legitimacy regarding the areas where they need reform and they need to come up with realistic and feasible ideas to usher in the changes. It has to be done gradually and in phases. Those who do not want to share power should be persuaded to understand and accept that changes are inevitable, and it is much better if they come from within rather than being imposed from the outside.

Sunday, June 13, 2004

Coming Soon, my reflections on the above.
[EDITED ADDED ANALYSIS]

A bit late, but here it is:
Comments

Well, an interesting article. It reflects fairly common thinking, some of it dead on in my opinion, some of it rather whinging on.

Now as to my "Point A", as I identified it, it strikes me that the author is correct in writing "The US wants the Arab governments to eliminate local groups opposed to the American policy in the Middle East and Washington's approach to the Muslim world in general." There is no doubt about that, although how one defines "opposed to" (tightly, widely) changes the meaning of this in some respects. The author, I know, means this very broadly. I doubt that is entirely fair (although it is not so off the mark in some respects. Certainly there is a dangerous and clumsy tendancy in certain quarters to identify any opposition to the United States with terrorism - e.g. the accusations of al-Jazeerah spreading jihadi agitprop when al-Jazeerah is really just more or less plain vanilla pandering to inchoate Arab nationalist sentiment. I would grant then the author has a real point here, despite the implicit exageration.

He adds, on this same line, "The only way the US could think of achieving its objective is to insist on “democracy” and “reform” in the Middle East as a pressure point and leverage against the governments." Hard to say how I would characterize this analysis. Certainly on its face (leaving aside the "only" which is mere hyperbole) it is hard to say this is an incorrect analysis. Certainly the insistance on democracy and reform is indeed intended to pressure Arab governments along some path the United States believes best, although I would qualify this by saying it is not at all clear that the current American Administration has anything approaching a clear, analytical view of what that path is, what it should and can entail and what trade offs between near term and long term goals need to be made given limited resources.

Certainly, while the author implies here and later on rather more clearly that the focus on democracy and the like is utterly cynical, I would argue that from what I have seen, I would be happier if it were, for sadly it appears naively sincere. That is to say, the present Bush Administration seems all-too driven in its Middle Eastern policy (as probably other policies, but I don't care very much about anything but my turf), by airy, pie-in-the-sky thinking and cotton candy analysis of what "democracy" can achieve - one can understand this as the sort of childish, amateur bar=room analysis of "democracy good, autocracy bad" and the equally childish and simplistic analysis that if one simply brings "democracy" to a country, why all will just turn fine and dandy.

Which is to say, that frighteningly this current Bush Administration is not cynical enough in the right ways, and deeply off-track in its approach to practical matters - as we have seen in my ... bloody hell over a year of commentary on the CPA-Iraq. The senior officials no doubt really mean it when they say, in their blithe and childish ignorance of the real world over here, that they consider the "European" position that one cannot just drop in democracy into the region (mis-stated in their hazy cotton candy thinking to be that democracy is impossible - full stop - in the Middle East) to be "incredibly condescending" etc. Of course they are blissfully unaware that their naive and childish assumption that the rest of the world thinks, acts, reacts exactly as they do, and I mean that very precisely not merely in a general sense, is itself the actually condescending view. I note again that few of us specialists - I say few as I imagine there are always exceptions - believe democratic, free market states are impossible in the Arab world, rather I would say that "we" (I and people like me) understand there is a hard row to hoe in terms of near term material and cultural conditions before you can create healthy democratic polities in most of the Arab states. The socio-economic stresses are just too high.

Now as to "Point B," the author is largely right in stating: " the world knows that if there were to be Western-style elections in the Arab world today, the winners would be those who are described by Washington as anti-US hardliners and extremists — Islamists, the very party that the US is targeting for crackdown. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the American explanation that the root of all troubles in the Middle East is lack of democracy and that is why the US is pushing for it."

Indeed, he is perfectly correct in pointing out the fundamental contradictions in the new US policy, and the reason why it is viewed so. I think the implication, however, that the new push for reform and democracy is utterly cynical is off-base. Rather, it is not cynical enough, in my opinion, and as I states supra, in my opinion more informed by cotton-candy, wishful thinking than clear-headed analysis. Regardless, in my opinion, the first portion of the statement is perfectly correct. Now, the second half, with the implication that lack of democracy is not at the root of issues, is a bit more problemetic. I certainly would agree that there are issues more important than democratisation in the immediate future, such as economic reform and opening up opportunities for the huge demographic bulge coming up in the Arab region.

I note that "Point C" actually surprised me, but his statement that attending Arab countries "took advantage of the marked absence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to emphasise the Arab rejection of the US proposals and managed to dilute it" rather clearly reflects hostility towards the Saudi and Egyptian regimes. I am not sure where to place that. Probably both as ineffectual toadies of the Americans, or perhaps panderers. Hard to place, but an interesting comment.

Now, as to "Point D" where the author writes that scepticism towards the US rules, well that is quite clear. His explanation, in terms of local perceptions or rather regional perceptions is spot on: "Rightly so, because Washington has done little to convince the Arabs that it is interested in a fair, just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, the American track record has nothing but open bias in favour of Israel." The loss of the pretence, the plausible deniabilty - rather typical of the artless foreign policy of the present Administration - was incredibly damaging. The transparent adoption and discarding of policies for near term domestic political gain, or rather childishly cynical adoption for achieving "next week goals" at the expense of longer (and I speak only of months or years) term goals seems all too typical, and rather indicative of the tedious idiocy of this present American Administration in its clumsy lurching about.

This comment, regarding Israeli designs in particular should not be too quickly dismissed: Therefore, the feeling is that Washington is again trying to hoodwink the Arabs into believing that it has a genuine intention to find a just, fair and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention the original American draft of the reform initiative, which reeked of a grand design to reshape the Arab region to suit American and Israeli interests.

There is much to Iraq planning that suggests to me that certain personnages in the present Administration confused American and Israeli strategic interests in regards to Iraq.

Finally, regarding "Point E" it rather appears to me correct on one level, that the Arabs need to move and generate their own reforms - certainly with outside help as appropriate, but only as far as they wish to go. Islamophobes such as the 'blogger' Tacitus and others with a desire to see the entire world turned into a little America (or a big one as the case may be) are simply going to be disappointed and frustrated with their messianic transformational dreams. Transformation does not happen without massive bloodshed and war, something that I doubt is worth the cost on either side, and frankly trying to 'transform' other cultures was already done - colonialism was its name, and it worked rather poorly as the incetive incompatibilities are too great. This is not to emptily moralize against "change" in the region or maunder on about imperialist imposition, blah blah blah. Rather it is simply to accept the reality of what is actually achievable, and what the reality of social reaction is to outside penetration, above all by people like this Tacitus who are so clueless as to write about the false consciousness of the Xian elite in this region, because their views on Israel match those of their fellow Arabs and not his. That is to say, all this "tranforming" the Muslim/Arab worlds talk is largely driven by deep-seated ignorance and misconceptions regarding what the cotton candy thinking dreamers "understand" of the region. Incremental change on the margins, in key areas, above all economic are the points which are most likely to help, and indeed are least controversial and most likely to succeed. Not a matter of idealizing the culture, but mere practicality, economics is easier.

However, even here there is controversy and the work is hard. An example to ponder: recent conversation with an Ass't GM of a bank here, the AGM opined that there was "too much" competition and that it would be better to restrict the number of authorized companies so as to provide more stability.

This the AGM of a bank, and someone otherwise well versed in economics of some kind.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:11 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 12, 2004

The benefits of getting poisoned by Chicken Biryani.

Why order such a thing, at a Five Star. You know the chef has probably made it twice, lord knows how much turnover there is, ... etc.

So, the benefits? None, really, except being laid out all Friday (non-working day you know out here), and having the opportunity during my in and out of consciousness moments, to watch the (in)famous al-Hurra, the US Propaganda Channel in Arabic.

First time I subjected myself to it.

Likely the last.

Let me say, lame does not quite capture the effort.

Primo, the format was "chatty" American style joke-around TV anchors. Completely alien format to the region, and my read of my friends reactions (some amigos dropped in to make sure I was not dead) tells me it went over like a lead balloon. Not to say people like the local State TV "Living Dead News Caster" format, but the more formal European style of news reporting (e.g. BBC) is clearly rather more appreciated. One amigo sarcastically remarked "all they're doing is translating American TV."

Secondo, choice of topics. Again, it was... well as if I was watching American TV translated into Arabic. I mean, carrying Reagan's funeral live with color commentary? How the fuck is that speaking to Arab audiences? Cover the damn thing, yes, but carry it live? The rest of the newscasting was similarly bizarrely parochial (i.e. American focused). They could have at least tried copying BBC Arabic, which is highly appreciated and manages to promote a certain British POV without being staggeringly parochial.

I was left with the sensation that maybe, just maybe this might appeal to Arab Americans, but for Arabic speakers in the region (never mind the agitprop aspect) it simply will be passed over in total bemusement. What a stupid idea and waste of money. Bloody navel gazing idiots in the States who know nothing of the ground here.

Reminds me, last week having dinner with some American VC guy from Arizona, who starts loudly talking about the Jihadi propaganda on al-Jazeerah (misprounounced of course).... where do people like this get this crap? Jihadi propaganda indeed. Corrected that.

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June 05, 2004

The Amazing Ability of American Consultants to Reach Sweeping Conclusions on a data point.

I am not sure if I impressed or not, but I thought I would share my continued bemusement (arising from a recent conversation) at this. Nothing new here, no news, but I was bemused to hear, after a meeting wrapped up, one of the financial consultants praising the "entreprenurial energy" that he sees in Jordan, after holding some meetings with some SMEs that are anything but SMEs, and hearing a bunch of nice English packaged up to dupe him.

I would rather think that sitting in a conference room, one might think, "Perhaps I should validate the glurge I am hearing?"

More on this later, re specific financial matters and the stunningly stupid comments.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:31 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

A Damn Good Decision: POW lawsuit thrown out [edit, additional comment]

I know this will be yet another item to make me unpopular in many quarters, but the following is an excellent development.

U.S. Gulf War POWs Denied Settlement
By Hope Yen
Associated Press
Saturday, June 5, 2004; Page A15

"An appeals court panel threw out a $959 million judgment yesterday for U.S. prisoners of war who say they were tortured by the Iraqi military during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, ruling that Congress never authorized such lawsuits against foreign governments.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned a lower court's ruling that said 17 former POWs and 37 family members were entitled to the damages under a federal statute allowing suits involving countries that financed or aided terrorists.

The three-judge panel said the statute allows lawsuits for pain and suffering only if they are filed against agents and officers of those foreign states responsible for the torture who are not acting on behalf of their government. So, even though the lawsuit also names Saddam Hussein, he is immune because the POWs sued him for his alleged activities as Iraq's president.

"We are mindful of the gravity of the allegations in this case. That appellees endured this suffering while acting in service to their country is all the more sobering," Judge Harry Edwards said. "Nevertheless, we cannot ignore . . . its impact on the United States' conduct of foreign policy where the law is indisputably clear that appellees were not legally entitled.""

I note the underlying judgement was a default judgement.

Rather simply, while suing another government for abuses etc. sounds all nice and touchy feely, it is, like the Belgian courts, something that opens a pandora's box of problems... an inappropriate mechanism. Of course, one can only imagine how a similar Iraqi lawsuit might go in re Abu Ghrieb.

EDIT Added:
Further to this point, I note the following comment from here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/05/international/worldspecial/05court.html

"David Eberly, an Air Force colonel, now retired, whose F-15 fighter was shot down over northwest Iraq and who says interrogators repeatedly pointed a gun at his head and pulled the trigger on an empty chamber, described himself as confused by the administration's priorities. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has expressed support for compensating Iraqi detainees who suffered abuse by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison, Colonel Eberly noted, even as the government fought the former prisoners' suit.

"I can't believe," Colonel Eberly said, "that the government is willing to spend U.S. tax dollars to compensate Iraqis when they are not willing to allow us to pursue this judgment against Iraqi dollars. And they have fought it with U.S. dollars."

Reasons of state, simple fellow, reasons of state. The compensation for the Iraqi detainees is not justice, it is bribery, it is face saving. And of coruse trivial in comparision with the ridiculously large judgement won against the Iraqi state. I note further that use of private lawsuits in matters of foreign policy is recipe for chaos and self-defeating disasterous posturing. The spectacle of (relatively) wealthy Americans winning nearly a billion dollars from an impoverished country for abuses/torture, while US soldiers commit the same is bad politics and harms US interests. As soldiers, their personal interests fell behind interests of state.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:25 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Tenet

At present I do not have a view on this, but let me share some phone calls I got from "friends" here:

"Hey, you're director resigned" [I.e. my personal director, not ambig. in Arabic)

"Your boss resigned."

Etc.

I note that the convos suggested more people than I thought really do think I am not what I am. Fucking irritating.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:25 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 02, 2004

Possibly the lamest item I yet from CPA

The following, besides being senselss, is just silly. They're doing PR for "nameless" officials "on the record." Fucking waste of human flesh, these fucking useless ass idjits.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BACKGROUND BRIEFING

SUBJECT: NEW IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT

ATTRIBUTION TO A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

LOCATION: BAGHDAD, IRAQ

DATE: TUESDAY, JUNE 1, 2004

(Note: Because the briefer and questioners were off mike, this transcript contains numerous inaudible portions.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (In progress) -- against the armed opponents of democracy in Iraq.

So this new cabinet which has been announced today along with the presidency is, we think, deeply committed to democracy. And their willingness to take these responsibilities in such difficult and dangerous times is inspiring, I think, to all of us who love freedom.

So with those comments, I'm happy to take your questions. If you could identify yourselves, I'd be grateful. (Off mike.) Okay, so I'll just -- I'll spread them around as best I can.

Yes.

Q (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think you'll have to use the mike. Begin again.

Q As far as the interim --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Can I have somebody -- (inaudible.)

Q There had been an agreement with the Governing Council and with the women -- (inaudible) -- for a quarter of the new government to be women, and this looks like you have six of 33. That's less than a quarter. Could you talk about that?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, this was -- the outcome was the result of enormously intense and complex discussions. As you know, the political geometry in Iraq is complicated, so there are many, many factors that were balanced one against the other. I think as you get a chance to see the biographies of these women, you'll be impressed.

Why don't we go to somebody on the side of the room. Okay. (Off mike.)

Q (Off mike) -- with the Washington Post. The U.N. released a statement earlier today saying that Dr. Pachachi was offered the position of president, but declined for personal reasons. And then Dr. Pachachi at a press conference just a little while ago said that the reason he had declined it was because there were people inside the Governing Council who didn't want him to be the president. Can you talk to us a little bit about the process of the selection of the president and how we, you know, got from Pachachi to Ghazi Yawar?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to intrude on Ambassador Brahimi's purview. He'll, I think, explain the latest events in that respect -- (off mike) -- in the statement that you mentioned.

I will say several things. We had, as we went through this process in this (four-cornered ?) way, many, many suggestions of who ought to be the president of Iraq. About -- now about a week ago, the list was narrowed and -- (off mike) -- the cabinet -- (off mike). And -- but the -- (off mike) -- just explain the process, but it was narrowed; however, really up until yesterday, other names started appearing. So someone would say, "Well, that's good, but have you thought of so-and-so?" So this was evolving really right on up through yesterday -- (off mike) -- including the presidency where there were some other names that came up late in the process.

But I think it was clear that Sheik Ghazi and Ambassador -- Minister Pachachi had the most significant support, so the preoccupation was centered on them, both of whom I think are exemplary.

One thing I did want to say in that regard is, I noticed -- you all are in that -- (off mike) -- but I noticed that several days ago, somebody wrote that Pachachi was the American choice; some of you wrote it, maybe even somebody in this room. And then every other story said this. I think this is -- (off mike). It's not true. In the middle of last week, when it looked as if these two were the strongest contenders -- (off mike) -- were those two gentlemen, Ambassador Bremer and I went back to Washington for guidance. We asked our -- the top of the administration -- these are the two; please express whatever preferences you might have. And fairly rapidly, within, indeed, I think, several hours, the answer came back, either of them would make an excellent president of Iraq, and we don't have a favorite.

And therefore, as these discussions went on, we lobbied for either one. You won't find any of these people that we talked to who will tell you -- truthfully, anyway -- that we went to them and said you should choose A or B.

By the way, there were some other stories, although they're fewer in number, that had exactly the opposite argument. We didn't lobby -- (off mike.) We said that we thought either one of them would make a fine president of Iraq. So I've corrected that, for what it's worth.

Yes?

Q (Name off mike) -- from -- (off mike) -- newspaper. Yesterday we heard about the -- (off mike) -- with Sheik Ghazi and Mr. Pachachi. Can you describe to us -- (off mike) -- nominate and how has he been chosen -- how the Governing Council or the -- (inaudible) -- Sheik Ghazi -- (off mike)?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not, of course, going to name who else's name came up, not least because they didn't get the job. (Chuckles.) I don't think that would be (smart ?).

But I think I've just said all I need to say about the process that produced these decisions. And essentially, it was Ambassador Brahimi put out the statement, and you would want to talk to him, and you ought to ask him about it.

Sir? (Off mike.)

Q (Name off mike) -- from National Public Radio. Thank you. Do you expect the Governing Council to dissolve? There's been some discussion --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: My best understanding is it did.

Q (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think it dissolved this morning.

STAFF (?): Yes, they dissolved this morning. (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Okay. It dissolved this morning. It dissolved itself, I believe, if I'm not mistaken. It dissolved itself.

Q Did they make a statement or anything?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I'm --

STAFF (?): (Off mike) -- we can set up --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Okay. I know I -- (off mike) -- you'll have to -- (off mike).

Yes, sir?

Q (Off mike.) So who is running things on the Iraqi side -- (off mike).

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The prime minister and cabinet.

Q They've actually taken (things over ?)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, there's a ceremony today, as you know, which we all, if we can, will go see, at -- this afternoon at 4:00. And then, they're the interim government of Iraq until the election.

Hi.

Q (Off mike) -- today, and what's the difference between today --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, from now until June 30, the sovereign authority in Iraq, on behalf of the Iraqi people, is the CPA. And between now and June 30, you have an interim Iraqi government, which will prepare to acquire that full sovereignty on the 30th of June. And that -- that's -- under international law, until June 30th, the CPA is the sovereign authority in Iraq. And then, on the afternoon of June 30th, this interim government, led by the prime minister and the cabinet that you've seen, will take control of sovereignty and begin to exercise it.

Sir?

Q (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: But I said that Ambassador Bremer and myself went to Washington and said these are the two final candidates, (most liked ?); do you have a preference? Because we get to have our opinion, too.

Q Did you go to Washington?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Oh, no, no, no, I didn't go -- (inaudible) -- not that. I meant --

Q You talked to -- (off mike).

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah. (Inaudible.) That would have been dramatic, into the night, fly off -- you didn't even miss me -- (inaudible). As I say, I don't know where that story started. (Inaudible.)

I better go over here. Yes, sir? But I'll be back.

Q Eddie Sanders from the LA Times. In the cabinet, do you know what the ethnic breakdown is? And were you looking to hit any specific targets in terms of --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You should -- I'm not going to comment on that. There are many complexities -- geographic, ethnic, religious. So you just have a look and see what you think.

Q Can you talk about whether or not that was one of the factors in your determinations?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, balance of various kinds. Where are they from? Are they from -- (inaudible) -- all of us to have all of the various dimensions of Iraq that we could reflected in a cabinet, and I think you can see. So it's got --

Q And I would ask one tag-on to that. Were you specifically looking for people that were not part of the GC now in trying to round out that cabinet?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we were looking -- yes, the answer is we were looking for new faces, and we were looking for people, individuals who had indigenous roots and support. We were looking for excellence. And of course, some number of members of the Governing Council qualify on all those accounts. Some of them -- I'm not going to announce which ones -- some of them took themselves out of the interim government, didn't wish to participate in it, and so forth. So, but yeah, we were looking for essentially a new team. And as you look at the names, you'll see it's a new team.

I'll go back over here. Sir?

Q (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q How do you see that -- (off mike).

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Of course, that's the most fundamental question that's been asked so far. We think it's an extremely strong, talented group. And of course they have, as we've seen today, even around where we are, what a daunting, difficult task they have. But we think that they are up to it, and we think that they will perform well. We think that they have the qualities, the talent, the strength, bravery, now and historically -- (off mike) -- I suppose, bravery. They know that the new security situation -- (off mike). So we think this is really quite an extraordinary group of people that Brahimi's come up with, and think that they're up to the task. And we'll do our best to support them.

Sir.

Q Larry Kaplow with Cox Newspapers. At the beginning of the process, I think Ambassador Brahimi said he felt that there would be a conflict of interest for people in this interim government to put themselves up for election to the transitional government. So have any of these people pledged not to run for election? And what kind of oversight or restriction would there be on them not to abuse their powers given them, absent of any Congress, absent of any kind of -- (off mike) -- holding the purse strings to make sure that they don't use -- (off mike)?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I think those are two different questions. I'll try to take them seriatim. The first one is no, there's no prohibition on running for office. And I think, if I may ask -- (inaudible) -- to ask questions about what Mr. Brahimi thinks, (you can direct it to him ?).

Q Well -- (off mike).

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah. (Off mike.) But anyway, the answer is no. I think there are other countries where serving members of the government can run for reelection. (Off mike) -- think of one.

Q (Inaudible) -- congresses and --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That was what I was going to say next, which is the issue of checks and balances. If you look at the TAL, you will see that the creation of the presidency -- (off mike). And if you'll also look at the TAL annex, (which we don't have to look at ?), there will be a supreme court. And then of course there will be this council, this interim council that will be stood up probably in early -- about mid-July by the time we do it. So I think there will be oversight of -- (off mike).

Let me try and pick someone I haven't -- (inaudible.)

Q Yes, Mark Jolley (sp) from Reuters. There's a widespread perception in the street of Iraq that all of these politicians you've talked to or appointed since day one, the whole process has been signed and sealed by the Americans. How much time did you actually go out and spend with people in the street asking them who they want versus these various organizations you talked with and women's groups?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, this is, of course, always a problem when one -- I'm a social scientist, so I actually know something about databases. This is a problem in democracies, if you -- the talent to try to understand what votes who aren't organized think. And we did give our best at doing that.

But as always in these exercises, we mostly speak with representatives. So you try to find women's groups and you talk with women about how they see Iraq and so forth. So you mostly -- (inaudible) -- I don't know exactly practically how (you go to ?) any other. And by the way, if I may be tedious -- the tedious professor here, in social science terms, anything you discover in such anecdotal encounters -- (inaudible) -- it really depends on who you (drop ?) into. So can't meet with 10 people.

So we did what people do. We (engulfed ?) as broad a -- as a matter of fact, all together thousands and thousands of people, maybe even some of them were ordinary Iraqis. I know who you think the street is, but thousands of people, thousands of people. And that process -- which as I say, took the last month -- won't satisfy everybody. I suppose in democracies, you can't.

But what happened as the process went on is some names begin to be mentioned more and more and more. And so we -- and I'm not saying -- the U.N. was extremely entrepreneurial in itself going out. They didn't just sit and wait, "Well, who wants to come and see?" They were out soliciting -- "Who should we talk to? Who should we talk to" -- all the time, and we were as well.

I guess over here, sir.

Q Dexter Filkins with The New York Times. What promises did you receive from the members of this government on -- that they wouldn't amend the interim constitution and they would not -- (inaudible) -- political freedom -- (inaudible) --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No.

Q And if you didn't, then why didn't you?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't exactly know how we would require them to -- (inaudible) -- promises. On the first point, of course, there's the TAL, and if you read the TAL, that answers your question.

On the second -- well, maybe --

Q I mean, so many groups have said that they -- (inaudible) --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I know, but the problem is that it wouldn't be legal if they did, so I don't think that's going to happen. (Inaudible) -- they run into the law of the land here someplace.

On the second point, we didn't ask for any such, "Raise your right hand, do you solemnly swear," because we didn't have a government. And one of things we'll want to do in June, now that -- starting from, I guess, 6:00 tonight, we'll have an Iraqi prime minister, an Iraqi defense minister, interior minister. At some point -- I don't know when, but not too far -- we'll start having discussions with them about the security arrangements -- (off mike). So, we couldn't do it beforehand because we didn't have an entity with which to do it. But that will be fairly soon, I think. They'll have to settle in to some degree, of course, because there are so many new people that (define their ?) ministries, and so forth. But once they get their feet on the ground, we'll start having that discussion.

Sir?

Q (Name off mike) -- with the AP. Ambassador Brahimi -- (off mike) -- to us. What are the differences between this government today and the government you gave Iraq after the invasion? What's the main --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think that that invites you to make invidious comparisons between -- directed at a group of people, some of whom lost their lives by carrying out their responsibilities as members of the Governing Council. I think that's your (applicable ?) job; you do it, you look at it and make your judgments. But I'm not going to say anything critical of these people in the Governing Council. They did the best they could under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and some of them died. And all of them were under threat all the time; there were close calls, and so forth. So I take my hat off to them. There's nobody -- nobody forced them to do this; they kept at it, and I take my hat off to them. I think it was an extremely difficult situation that they faced.

Yes?

Q (Name and affiliation off mike.) I'm just still a little bit unclear about how the president was chosen. I know you said that you -- (inaudible) -- Washington; they said either one would be fine. But what happened from there? How did -- (off mike)?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, there were -- these were discussions -- again, this is something that you should ask Ambassador Brahimi about. He released a statement today. So have a word with him about the naming -- (off mike).

Yes?

Q (Name off mike) -- from Knight Ridder. Besides Adnan Pachachi, were there others who were offered positions who declined? And if so, what were the reasons?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I don't -- I think there were a couple, and I think they were basically personal -- (off mike).

Q Security?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, no, no. Personal. That I have a sick somebody or other that I -- (off mike).

STAFF: We have time for one more.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Most said yes, most of them. There were a couple.

(Off mike) -- I think two more, two more.

Q (Off mike) --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm sorry can you -- (off mike)?

Q (Off mike) -- spoken for the past few weeks and said -- (inaudible) -- this process, not just, you know, the presidency, but all along, and how -- (off mike). Can you comment on that? I know you say -- (off mike) -- but how much -- (off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We have -- (off mike). We were one of these four -- (off mike) -- and we were expressing views and we were coming up with names. But it was collaborative. I can't speak to whether we conducted ourselves -- (inaudible) -- manner. There are people, if I might say, and it's completely natural and fine, who are disappointed their particular favorite didn't make it across the finish line, or their -- by the way, the one thing I would just point out to you all if I might, maybe this will show up as a -- (inaudible). What's been happening here, including in addition to the presidency, is a process that's called whoa, politics.

What is politics? People going out and saying -- (inaudible) -- I have to have seven ministries or I shall not this and this, or I -- and this is what happens with -- (inaudible) -- politics. It's exciting. It's never happened here before, by the way, in how many millennia? Ever. Okay? I know that may be too long a time span for your readers. (Laughter.) I'd like to start my lead with Mesopotamia -- (off mike). But it's true. I mean, I know maybe it's hard -- it's certainly hard for me -- (off mike) -- step back and say, this is actually sort of out of control. And so -- (inaudible). Oh, he's getting so -- (off mike). But I could just (feel it ?) that through -- (off mike).

Oh, it's not as good as elections, and you will find that people on the street in January get to make the definitive. It's not as good as elections. We could have had elections earlier, but we're -- (off mike) -- not to -- (off mike). But given what happened, I -- (off mike) -- see these people emerge from this process.

Okay, last question.

Q (Off mike) -- the president and the prime minister --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: This sounds like a hypothetical -- (inaudible) -- (briefer's name) didn't give -- (off mike).

Q (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No hypotheticals. No -- (off mike). If I were (wonderful ?), I'd answer that question.

Q Okay. (Off mike.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (Off mike.)

Q Do the president and the prime minister have the right to say whether --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, this is -- what I'm trying to say is they have full sovereignty. They're just -- they're a country. They have full sovereignty. And we have had -- I'll just say this: We've had more than 50 years of successful security arrangements with nations and governments that face similar threats. And how do we do that? You get that by talking to them and then reaching arrangements. And that's what I think will happen. We haven't been able to do that before because we didn't have the entity. We now have a prime minister, Defense minister, just like that. And so we'll be talking to them soon about this. And let me say -- let me give you a prediction: It'll work out fine. And the reason it'll work out fine is that the threat to those characteristics that I began with about what do people want, they want security, personal, all relatives; they want kids to be able to go, leave the house and home; they want economic development, prosperity. They want what Homo sapiens want. And on the security side, they can't do it themselves now. But they'll be working hard with us to create the capabilities where they can do it all themselves. And when that moment arrives, the coalition leaves. They can't -- I don't know of any Iraqis who is arguing that they can do it themselves. So that will occur, this discussion, in the next month or so, and I think it will work out between ourselves and this interim government which will take full sovereignty on June 30th.

(Inaudible cross talk.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (Off mike) -- that was one of the last acts -- (off mike) -- CPA.

Q They did that today?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah, sworn in.

(Inaudible cross talk.)

END

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:05 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

The US Dubai prog

I had a chat with one of the officials behind this. Regarding the language. Senior guy, told me that US Treasury, who are the real movers, had written even MORE aggressive language, the text quoted was "toned down.,"

So, State did look at this, and that arrogant idiocy was the best they could do.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 31, 2004

A bit chatty for a Gov. Comm.

In the mailbox:

"Okay, okay, okay, so I’m asleep at the wheel today…..thank you to the 150 people who sent me emails gently reminding me that today is in fact, Monday, May 31st, not June 1st. Nonetheless, there is a Kimmitt/Senor briefing today (May 31st) @ 6:00pm"

Well, lord knows I would not want to miss my daily dose of clumsy dezinformatsia. Pity I had meetings.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:50 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Canaries

As someone noted, canaries in mines:

" It is too early to determine whether Western companies will begin pulling employees out, though some American companies are already reducing their presence in the country. Citigroup, for example, ended nearly a half century of activities in Saudi Arabia last week when it said it would sell its remaining stake in the Samba Financial Group."
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/31/international/middleeast/31OIL.html?hp=&pagewanted=all&position=

However, I note that Citi had plans to oper on its own in KSA, as licensing for fully owned foreign banks should be available soon.

They may, however, be rethinking that. Still, it is a large and lucrative market, with the High Net Worth princes and all.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:02 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 30, 2004

On Chalabi

Ah, well, a fine evening doing expense reports. I hate fucking expense reports. I suppose they're necessary (well, they are clearly) but bloody hell, I gots them in multiple currencies and the evil bitch of a controller wants a daily accounting on FX fluctuations, blah blah blah. Fucking Goldie trained bitch. Two hours and I only got two out of four done.

Well, on Chalabi:
This fine article from the Kevin Drum site I think, or something like that:
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/040607fa_fact1

Of which I focus on the following:
"After attending boarding school in England, Chalabi went to America to study math. Upon finishing his Ph.D., which was in the rarefied branch of geometry known as knot theory, Chalabi moved to Lebanon, to teach math at the American University in Beirut. In 1977, however, Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan invited him to found a new bank in the country, whose financial sector was largely dominated by Palestinians. With the help of royal patronage and of innovations previously unavailable in Jordan, such as consumer credit cards, computerized banking, and A.T.M.s, the company created by Chalabi, Petra Bank, grew impressively. [Interj: mild exageration there] Within a decade, it had become the second-largest bank in Jordan, and Chalabi became a rich and well-connected man in Amman. Like his father and grandfather, he extended easy credit to important benefactors. He boasted to an American friend that he had personally made Prince Hassan, the King’s brother, “a wealthy man.” (Prince Hassan, who continues to regard Chalabi as a friend, declined to be interviewed.) Chalabi lived with his family in the suburban hills outside Amman, in a house of his own design, surrounded by a collection of modern art. His children rode horses with the royal family. .... [omitted]

In 1989, however, Chalabi’s comfortable life collapsed amid allegations of criminality. Jordan’s Central Bank, facing a liquidity crisis, demanded that the country’s banks place thirty per cent of their foreign currency in its accounts. Petra balked, prompting an emergency audit. Chalabi betrayed little outward concern about this sudden turn. Patrick Theros, a former Ambassador to Qatar, who was then stationed in Jordan, had dinner at Chalabi’s home during this period. “He was completely charming, particularly to the ladies—he could talk about any subject,” Theros recalled. Two days later, Chalabi, who had apparently been tipped off about his impending arrest, fled. He forfeited many of his family’s assets, and resettled with his wife, Leila, and their four children in London.

On April 9, 1992, a military tribunal in Jordan delivered a two-hundred-and-twenty-three-page verdict, which concluded that Chalabi was guilty of thirty-one charges, including embezzlement, theft, forgery, currency speculation, making false statements, and making bad loans to himself, to his friends, and to his family’s other financial enterprises, in Lebanon and Switzerland. The Jordanian docket shows that Chalabi was sentenced to serve twenty-two years of hard labor, and to pay back two hundred and thirty million dollars in embezzled funds. An Arthur Andersen audit commissioned by Jordanian authorities found that the bank had overstated its assets by more than three hundred million dollars. In addition, a hundred and fifty-eight million dollars had disappeared from its accounts, apparently as a result of transactions involving people linked to the former management. (Swiss documents obtained by the Newsweek correspondent Mark Hosenball show that Socofi, an investment firm in Switzerland run by the Chalabi family, also collapsed under suspicious circumstances, leading to pleas of no contest by two of Chalabi’s brothers, Jawad and Hazam, in 2000.)

After Chalabi arrived in England, he claimed that the Petra affair had been a political frameup. He said that he was targeted because he had been an outspoken critic of Saddam (an assertion that is not unlike his recent defense in Baghdad), and claimed that he was indicted because the Jordanians were beholden to Saddam for oil and other economic aid. Chalabi, like many Iraqi exiles living in Jordan, had indeed opposed Saddam openly. However, a well-informed American friend of Chalabi’s could not recall other instances of Saddam forcing Jordan to clamp down on his critics there.

John Markham, a lawyer representing Chalabi, recently forwarded to me a previously undisclosed letter, which Chalabi claims is “the smoking gun” that proves his accusers are lying. During the trial proceedings, the Jordanian military prosecutor wrote to the country’s authorities that “the method of dealing with the Petra Bank and its liquidation was the result of personal hatred and envy.” The prosecutor blamed Said Nabulsi, the head of Jordan’s Central Bank. According to Markham, Nabulsi was complicit with Saddam.

In Jordan, banking officials scoff at Chalabi’s claims of innocence. Petra had opened a subsidiary in Washington, D.C., in 1983, and after the bank’s collapse, according to a top Jordanian finance official, investigators combed America for forty-five days, trying to locate the bank’s hidden assets. Almost all the assets listed on the books, the official said, were worthless, except for an auxiliary office that was listed as a repository for valuable bank records. The investigators soon discovered that the “office” was a country estate with a swimming pool, in Middleburg, Virginia. It belonged to the Chalabi family, which was charging the bank a monthly rent. “There was not one business record in the whole place,” the official said. “This man is a vicious liar. There is no end to it. It’s like you find someone killing with a gun in his hand, and he says he’s innocent. He just wears you down.” The official declined to be named, because he feared Chalabi’s influence. “He has more powerful friends in Washington than you or me,” he said, adding, “Really, some of your people are such suckers.”"

Emphasis added. On the very last line, oh yes, oh yes indeed. Just be polished, speak English well and you can so easily charm the fuckers who get all starrey eyed about Arab reform and blah blah.

I note that I know Nabulsi, personally although not well. He is presently in the private sector as the chief executive of a major financial institution here. I have never heard of him being connected with the Sadaam regime and per representations from people I know close to the key principals on this, while there was a personal angle in Nabulsi absolutely loathing Chalabi, it had nothing at all to do with politics or Sadaam, everything to do with personalities.

What I rather found interesting about the article was the items re Chalabi's motivations - i.e. the obession (cited in the article) with recovering the ancient feudal properties. One rather finds this rather more believable than the "democratization" pap that the gullible idiots among the Neo-Cons and their conservative fellow-travellers have lapped up with such enthusiasm.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:55 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Iraq: The Surreal - Revisions to the Traffic Code

I am glad that the CPA and its Iraqi lackeys are concentrating on important things, like the following:

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SUMAIDA’IE ANNOUNCES REVISIONS TO IRAQ’S TRAFFIC CODE

Baghdad, Iraq…May 30, 2004 – Iraq’s Minister of Interior, Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaida’ie has announced recently-completed revisions to Iraq’s National Traffic Code.

The revised Code includes provisions requiring operator licenses as well as vehicle registration, licensing and safety inspections.

The Code stipulates that fines for violations of the Code be paid directly to an accounts officer at the police sector headquarters.

“Citizens often complain to me about the traffic conditions in Iraq – especially in Baghdad,” said Minister Sumaida’ie. “This revised Code will go a long way toward improving traffic and, more importantly, the safety of Iraqi drivers and pedestrians.”

Vehicle licensing and inspection stations will be established at various traffic police offices throughout Iraq. The Ministry of Interior will notify Iraqi vehicle owners of the time and place of their vehicle inspection and registration.

The provisions of the Code will be enforced by Iraq’s traffic police officers. Those vehicle owners and/or drivers who fail to comply with the Code are subject to punishment in Iraqi courts.

The revisions, implemented by CPA Order Number 86, were requested by Baghdad’s Director General for Traffic. The revisions are the first since 1972.

The revised Iraq National Traffic Code is available in Arabic and English at www.iraqcoalition.org.

Emphasis (underline) added.

Of course this is just the kind of asinine posturing that fools the Americans but does nothing to change the situaiton on the ground. When is it going to sink through their fucking thick heads that it's not the laws that are the main fucking binding fucking constraints around here, it's the motherfucking practices on the ground! The issue is not an out of date traffic code - who the fuck pays attention to the fucking laws in this goddamned region anyway you silly ignorant idealistic twits! - the issue is (i) lack of enforcement of what exists, (ii) lack of an idea on the rule of the legal text over the negotiated practice with the police man (the institutionalized (x) dinar 'fee'), (iii) the lack of respect for the system generally! Bloody hell, will these rubes, these wide-eyed do-gooding rubes never learn?

Bloody idiots. Bloody goddamned idiots getting taken to town like fucking innocent virgins right out of bloody damned school.

New goddamned traffic code indeed. Spanking new traffic code, to be ignored just like the old decrepit ones.

Fuck, it isn't fucking Kansas Dorothy.

Edited to Add:

And you wonder why I am supporting the Cuban economy. It's because of arrogantly naive crap like this. Drives me bloody batty.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:39 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Berg Again

I wanted to note the following:
(a) I found it strange and disgusting to see all the lefty blather around the internet re CIA killing Berg and a great deal of poorly informed "analysis" of the video making mountains out of mole hills (e.g. color of hands, white plastic chairs, orange jumpsuits. As if (i) near identical if not identical orange jumpsuits are not in fact used here by the cleaning crews, (ii) plastic lawn chairs are not the staple of cheap sidewalk cafes....).

(b) The continued reporting led me to conclusively conclude that Berg, well, he was asking to be killed the way he was fucking around a war zone with no security, with a fucking Israeli stamp in his fucking passport and no language. One item I found truly bizarre was his coming in through Tel Aviv. I have no idea what the hell he was thinking. All in all, a twit who may as well have had a fucking kill me sign on his back. Idjits like this make my life more difficult, bloody moron.

(c) A little vanity search turned up a number of hostile comments on myself on this subject. I was amused. Well, sugar and spice I am not. I guess the antiwar blog link brought in some naive tender suckers.

Otherwise, I wonder if a bet on hydrocarbons might not be useful.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:17 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Saudi Arabia: Mea culpa, Mea Culpa

I thought I would take the occasion of yet further instability and attacks in Saudi Arabia to acknowledge my analysis of the Saudi situation in the past year was wrong.

While I can point to the perniciously negative effects of the Iraq situation, which in conjunction with the seemingly unbounded and pointless bloodymindedness of the Sharon Administration and the spineless acquisence of the Bush Administration, as new drivers to radicalism, my analysis was wrong.

I have written in the past year that that Saudi system was unlikely to be in danger, confidently stating that the tribal relations and patronage networks the Ibn Saud have installed in the KSA would keep things in place.

Given the sustained and bloody operations in KSA, which is something of a tribal police state, I confess I may have seriously misestimated the degree to which current radicalism is placing the old Ibn Saud networks in question, rendering fluid otherwise solid bounds.

There is a direct and serious implication, I may add, for the rest of the world. Given that militants continue to be able to operate with great impunity in the KSA despite Ibn Saud efforts to crack down, one has to lower the discount factor on the possibility of a truly serious incident in the country with the potential to cripple oil production. Given current market circumstances, that would have very, very serious effects.

I already expect the risk premium on oil to rise another couple of percentage points, an actual attack on the infrastructure (the hard production infrastructure, the present attacks are on the soft human infrastructure, more easily replaced) will cause that to leap. Very serious risk factor with very large unknowns (known and unknown unknowns, to use Rumsfeld's much maligned but actually quite astute phrase).

So, there it is, I believe it likely that I misread the circumstances and have to revise my estimation of Saudi stability from high to moderate, with a clear potential for catastrophic incidents.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 29, 2004

Americans, They never do learn. Or how USG manages to sound imperalistic. [Edited]

An extract from something I recently recieved from the US SEC regarding a confrence on financial security in Dubai in about two weeks. The [key], and stupidest, paragraph: [edited to correct accidental deletion]

Case presentations are required: In advance of the program, and no later than June 14, 2004, officials from participating organizations will be expected to prepare and submit to the U.S. SEC a one-page case study related to an enforcement or market surveillance problem/violation that has occurred in their country. On the first day of the program, the case studies will be distributed to participants so that they will have an opportunity to read them and prepare for discussion. During the program, participants will present their case studies, which should include how the issue was resolved or proposals to address the problem/violation.

Emphasis original. Let me draw your attention to the following (this is a conference sponsored by the US SEC, the new "Middle East Partnership Initiative", in English, focused on the Arab world): "officials from participating organizations [supervisory] will be expected to prepare and submit to the U.S. SEC a one page case study related to an enforcement or market surveillance problem/violation that has occurred in their country..

How much more badly concieved this phrasing can be, never mind the issue that outside the Gulf the level of English mastery even at high finance levels drops off radically, and as such expecting people to "prepare and present" for criticism by the US SEC is bloody obnoxious and stupid, I have a hard time emphasizing.

Do these guys have no clue as to how bad their image is in the region, or how this bloody phrasing is going to really fucking irritate people who already think you're pushing, self-centered, arrogant imperialists who think far, far too highly of themselves.

Bloody hell, is there no one in the fucking State Department who knows enough to fucking read this fucking idiocy over and say, "Whoa mates, this is not particularly well conceived mode of expression, why don't we revise it to read a bit better." Or say perhaps the Agenda, which is all the SEC going on and on about how they do things in the US, with the implication that financial institutions and supervisory organisations here don't know fucking jack (which is not that far from the truth, but bloody hell this is diplomacy).

I am consistently stunned by how incompetent US communication skills are in re this region, it's often stunning. This document is being sent to top level financial officials and actors (and a few schmoes such as myself, evidently by accident), who do not particularly care to be lectured at. Some mild tweaking would have led to this reading much, much better, and at little to no extra cost.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:34 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 25, 2004

A Quick Note on Dar Fur

In seeing Dar Fur coverage over the past month, I have been consistently annoyed with the characterizations of "Black" or "African" with the meaning of black versus "Arab."

I suppose I should despair of the international media getting this right, but these "Arab" militias are not significantly different in skin color or physical type from the Fur -often they are of similar background, except the nomads seem rather more "Arabized" than the settled people. (For all that the name cited for their militia is hardly Arabic) This is ethnic not racial warfare, and deeper than that, settled versus nomad strife over declinging water resources, tied into of course the larger political conflict.

Ah well, no stupider than those conspiracy theories I have seen of late on the Lefty websites re Berg killing being faked by Americans, because the people involved were "too white." Ignorant twits. Bloody well should visit Jordan and Lebanon before fucking rambling on about "too white."

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:32 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 23, 2004

Bloody Hell: A little too close - Paris

At Least 5 Killed in Roof Collapse at Paris Airport

Fuck, 2E. I just missed this. It must have collapsed after I left.

Damn.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:10 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 16, 2004

In reply to a comment: Trust in Dangerous situs

A comment said:

He displayed a faith in humanity common to all of us who
travel in dangerous places and sometimes must entrust our lives to
strangers.

Speak for your bloody self. I have little to no faith in humanity and placing trust in strangers is about having a realistic appriasal of the situation, and a realization that their interests are NOT aligned with yours.

Humanity, including myself, is a bloody cesspool of selfish hypocritical, survival oriented instincts, some of which also accidentally or by design lead to situational cooperation and trust.

Placing blind trust is a way to get reamed, time and time again.

People like you and him get the suckers reputation, and that ain't the way to survive in these situs, except on the pity basis and I don't do business on the basis of pity.

Bloody hell. Common to all of us indeed.

However, I was entertained by the following from the linked article in the comment:
I suppose Mehdi felt compelled to push the two Anglos together. He said Mr. Nick was a regular who had been coming for weeks, and he seemed to enjoy shouting the American's name: "Mr. Nick, Mr. Nick, Mr. Nick," as if singing an Arabic melody. "Mr. Nick good, Mr. Nick very good."
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/637487341.html?MAC=765715adaf4ec871308735e39fdca4a3&did=637487341&FMT=FT&FMTS=FT&date=May+15%2C+2004&author=JAMIE+FRANCIS&printformat=&desc=A+jolting+awareness+that+I+crossed+paths+with+Nick+Berg

I may observe that the "Nick" in Arabic means "Fuck." (nik, to fuck, the sexual act only, not the expansive English sense).

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:36 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 15, 2004

A Quick Note: On investment in Iraq

I am dead, long bloody flight, meeting, eating. Dead.

I was however, in a quick scan, amused by this:
U.S. Companies Put Little Capital Into Iraq
Many Firms Interested, but Are Held Back by Security Concerns, Lack of Political Stability
By Ariana Eunjung Cha and Jackie Spinner
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, May 15, 2004; Page A17
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28157-2004May14?language=printer

Of course, I told you all about these issues ages ago, but I draw your attention to the confirmation in re the unstable political risk environment, the degree to which people more familiar with the region / environment can profit over outsiders, and the idiotic pimping that the DoC fool does in re his having walked around Baghdad - athough I suppose bec. of the Berg angle he interjects with the bit about the "security consultant." A polite term for body guards.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 14, 2004

Last Items on Berg: An UltraMaroon. [Edited to Add link, and comment on art on Arab reactions]

Again, I am sure there will be a a storm of protest, statements that I lack compassion (true enough, I do. For idiots.)

The more detial I read on Berg, the more I think, "What the bloody fucking hell was he fucking thinking?"

Reports have him:
(a) Flying into Tel Aviv then Amman, apparently picking up an Israeli stamp (not at all necessary and a real liability) in the process.
(b) Taking Taxis/Services around, both to get to Baghdad and to travel around Iraq. As if he's travelling in Morocco in the laid back 1960s, and not in a country that had by January already seen most NGOs evacuate most staff for fear of assasination.
(c) Staying out late in Baghdad, until 10 pm, coming home with beers. Taking public transport to the Green Zone and meeting with Americans.
(d) Sporting a short military style cut, looking like, well an American toughie travelling about in Civies.
(e) Shrugging off increasingly dangerous encounters (robberies, detentions) as if they were adventure.
(f) Declining Consular help and urging to get the fuck out of Dodge.

Let me say then that no one deserves to be slaughtered like a cockamamie sheep by an incompetent butcher, as he was, but fucking hell, he might as hell have been walking about with a bloody sign saying "Hi Kill Me, I want to be a Martryr to Cluelessness!"

Why am I so fascintated and horrified by this? I must say it is because having spent the past two years here, sitting on the powder keg, I am keep meeting clueless European and American youth coming through dangerous areas with nary the slightest sense of their own idiocy. I am not talking about simply visiting Jordan, which is not that dangerous (although fucking around in Maan wearing shorts as if you're in fucking Cali is fucking stupid), but rather heading into the territories (yes, yes, I did so, but I was taking a nice fat fee for that. Pity the fucking check did not fucking clear, lying piece of shit. But at least it was, except the detention part, first class).

I was recently reflecting that I think I saved a kid's life when I tore into him just a few weeks ago, perhaps three, for his dumb ass idea of "hitching" to Iraq to look for part time work and see the country.

What is it about these American kids? Now, I like that they're coming out here to learn (as opposed to one whinging little snot who is out here to "learn the language and ways of his enemy" and per his teacher who I know, petitioned the Embassy for armed guards for his little self. What a fucking weak little piece of garbage. I am sure he will return to the States an "expert" on a Jordanian culture he's had no contact with because he was so fucking afraid of the evil Muslims - Pipes profile by the way.), but bloody hell, someone has to teach people the middle route. A bit of fucking attention to one's life. Now, having been to some quite fucked up places, I am not pretending that I have not gambled a bit, or a lot even, but it was at least for money, and bloody hell, I wasn't stupid about it. And at least I blend, and I really fucking blend. That takes the danger down a lot. But these all so American wheat fed fools....

Well, in any case, we have the wonderful folks with the nice shiney new m16s out now, and the funny, fancy comms gear. It's WEF time, and that means the Royal Army is out in force. Not the bloody conscripts with their shoddy shit, or even the Boys in Blue, nope, we gots the Red Berets out every where, with real live ammo in the mag.

Gov't is worried, things are simmering, a little more heat, and ... well I guess the King got his letter in re Palestine for something. Hopefull the DoD morons have been sidelined for the Agency in re comming the danger.

Added:
Obs above, largely but not entirely derived from:
"Loved Adventure"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25401-2004May13.html
as well as CNN and other reporting.

Added:
Morley of the WP has this:
The online media in the Islamic world reacted with revulsion to the videotaped beheading of American businessman Nick Berg. "
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A26698-2004May14?language=printer

He only deals with English lang., but I can say the mainstream Arabic language press reaction was substantively similar to the characterizations he gives in the linked art. Mainstream. I don't bother buying the whack shit, so...

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:33 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 13, 2004

Upcoming Subjects: Iraq and Economics

First, on the Iraq front, we have this beautiful piece of news:

80% in Iraq Distrust Occupation Authority
Results of Poll, Taken Before Prison Scandal Came to Light, Worry U.S. Officials
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, May 13, 2004; Page A10
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22403-2004May12.html

Do note before the Abu Ghrieb scandal.

" Four out of five Iraqis report holding a negative view of the U.S. occupation authority and of coalition forces, according to a new poll conducted for the occupation authority.

In the poll, 80 percent of the Iraqis questioned reported a lack of confidence in the Coalition Provisional Authority, and 82 percent said they disapprove of the U.S. and allied militaries in Iraq.

Although comparative numbers from previous polls are not available, "generally speaking, the trend is downward," said Donald Hamilton, a senior counselor to civilian administrator L. Paul Bremer. The occupation authority has been commissioning such surveys in Iraq since late last year, he said. This one was taken in Baghdad and several other Iraqi cities in late March and early April, shortly before the surge in anti-coalition violence and a few weeks before the detainee-abuse scandal became a major issue for the U.S. authorities in Iraq. "

Emphasis added.

Silent majority eh? Isn't that the favorite thing that Freidman and the idjits at Tacitus, and others desperately grasping at straws were claiming. Note the timing. Now, care to take a guess as to where the ratings are headed now.

Well, I find some small pleasure in this confirmation of my micro-on-the-ground read of things, but a much larger sense of .... what? It can hardly be said to be disappointment, other than I think the Steel Project is now unalterably fucked, unless we go for a really purely Iraqi angle, but then is the money there? Well, we know some major players with real wasta (connexions of the best kind), but is that enough? And can it swing OPIC risk coverage?

But leaving aside the project, this is rather bad. Rather bad indeed.

No surprise though. I can still hold out the bittersweet hope that a sudden and rather uncharacteristic rush of competence will sweep through the CPA-Iraq (by the way I have a funny CPA idjit story to relate, re a watch and his getting ripped off here, and throwing a hissy fit - his 'rights' and all that. Fuckers never learn. Not in motherfucking Kansas anymore.) however that is something as fantastical as perhaps the CPA's own grasp of the situ.

I said what, a few weeks ago? Off a goddamned bloody cliff. Unfortunately, this ain't Hollywood, and those rocks, they're real.

Well, here's to not getting my head sawed off by a dull blade yet. However, the whole spy joke, not funny now, not funny at all.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:18 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Our fine little Friedman wakes up

I am thoroughly amused by Friedman, first one has to recall his old column where he saw Iraq as a long ball attempt to transform the region. Only a fool believes in transformation, and his long clinging to the Iraq fiasco's mirages rather confirms his foolishness. Now there is this precious article.

Dancing Alone
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: May 13, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/opinion/13FRIE.html

It is time to ask this question: Do we have any chance of succeeding at regime change in Iraq without regime change here at home?

Really? I rather thought the time came sometime in September or October of 2003 when it was painfully clear that the Bush Administration did not have a clue as to what it was doing, nor the ability to question itself to reform its failures.

" .... My mistake was thinking that the Bush team believed it, too. I thought the administration would have to do the right things in Iraq — from prewar planning and putting in enough troops to dismissing the secretary of defense for incompetence — because surely this was the most important thing for the president and the country. But I was wrong. There is something even more important to the Bush crowd than getting Iraq right, and that's getting re-elected and staying loyal to the conservative base to do so. It has always been more important for the Bush folks to defeat liberals at home than Baathists abroad. That's why they spent more time studying U.S. polls than Iraqi history. That is why, I'll bet, Karl Rove has had more sway over this war than Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Bill Burns. Mr. Burns knew only what would play in the Middle East. Mr. Rove knew what would play in the Middle West. "

Why he would have thought that, given the record in the run up to the war, I have no idea, but wait, he is frank:

I admit, I'm a little slow. Because I tried to think about something as deadly serious as Iraq, and the post- 9/11 world, in a nonpartisan fashion — as Joe Biden, John McCain and Dick Lugar did — I assumed the Bush officials were doing the same. I was wrong. They were always so slow to change course because confronting their mistakes didn't just involve confronting reality, but their own politics.

A valid set of observations, from start to finish - although again, one had to be a bit slow to assume anything positive about Bush.

Why, in the face of rampant looting in the war's aftermath, which dug us into such a deep and costly hole, wouldn't Mr. Rumsfeld put more troops into Iraq? Politics. First of all, Rummy wanted to crush once and for all the Powell doctrine, which says you fight a war like this only with overwhelming force. I know this is hard to believe, but the Pentagon crew hated Colin Powell, and wanted to see him humiliated 10 times more than Saddam. Second, Rummy wanted to prove to all those U.S. generals whose Army he was intent on downsizing that a small, mobile, high-tech force was all you needed today to take over a country. Third, the White House always knew this was a war of choice — its choice — so it made sure that average Americans never had to pay any price or bear any burden. Thus, it couldn't call up too many reservists, let alone have a draft. Yes, there was a contradiction between the Bush war on taxes and the Bush war on terrorism. But it was resolved: the Bush team decided to lower taxes rather than raise troop levels.

Now, as much as I despise Friedman, this is an interesting set of observations, above all in making the connexion between the issue of starving the War (On Terror against the US) to feed the personal, short term goals.

Why, in the face of the Abu Ghraib travesty, wouldn't the administration make some uniquely American gesture? Because these folks have no clue how to export hope. They would never think of saying, "Let's close this prison immediately and reopen it in a month as the Abu Ghraib Technical College for Computer Training — with all the equipment donated by Dell, H.P. and Microsoft." Why didn't the administration ever use 9/11 as a spur to launch a Manhattan project for energy independence and conservation, so we could break out of our addiction to crude oil, slowly disengage from this region and speak truth to fundamentalist regimes, such as Saudi Arabia? (Addicts never tell the truth to their pushers.) Because that might have required a gas tax or a confrontation with the administration's oil moneymen. Why did the administration always — rightly — bash Yasir Arafat, but never lift a finger or utter a word to stop Ariel Sharon's massive building of illegal settlements in the West Bank? Because while that might have earned America credibility in the Middle East, it might have cost the Bush campaign Jewish votes in Florida.

Leaving aside the silliness re Arafat, n.b. the sacrifice of long term interests to the political campaign.

And, of course, why did the president praise Mr. Rumsfeld rather than fire him? Because Karl Rove says to hold the conservative base, you must always appear to be strong, decisive and loyal. It is more important that the president appear to be true to his team than that America appear to be true to its principles. (Here's the new Rummy Defense: "I am accountable. But the little guys were responsible. I was just giving orders.")

Amusing last line that.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On the video and on the comments.

I did watch it. It was, as one might expect, awful and one can only be happy that the sound was too bad to fully appreciate the horror.

A thought, I found the chanting of Allahu Akbar peculiar. It rather felt like even these criminal murders had to really work themselves up to do what they did. It certainly is not in any way normal to just shout/chant Allahu Akbar like that, over and over again. Indeed, it strikes me they were chanting to keep themselves going.

In some ways I hope this video is widely seen in the region, it will only reinfoce the conclusion that Zarqawi's people are well-outside Islam, very sick.

Of course the Salafi overboard al-Qaeda types will only get excited about this, but the majority will not - one doesn't even slaughter a goat that way, let alone one's enemy (or let alone an innocent bystander, if a stupid idiot of one).

Of course, as the odd little orgy of bigotry in the comments last night shows, this also feeds into the bigot gallery as well. I wonder where they all came from.

I should add (and I am puzzled this anti-war site links to me, I am no leftist and care not for their stupid neo-communist posturing) that the comments painting the poor bastard as having deserved to die because he was there to "exploit" Iraq as a "capitalist" are equally as inane and stupid as the bigots. The reality is that in a well-run and well-executed occupation of Iraq, people like him (well less clueless to be sure) would have done good, bringing expertise and capital to the table, and helping Iraq build a better future. The mere fact that the CPA is an incompetent, ideological mess does not say in any sense anything to the deep need for Iraq to shed the quasi-socialist mess of an economy and build a positive, free market system. The fact that Bush and Company have badly executed this on a "faith based" system is not "capitalist exploitation" it is simply incompetence of a quite generic kind - well the incompetence of the blind ideologue, be it Right or Left. In general, on the Right we tend to be rather more competent, after all competence makes money, incompetence does not. The extreme Left can indulge itself in its wanking as it wants.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:32 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Further to Berg - Family

From The New York Times:

U.S. Officials Failed to Protect Slain Civilian, Family Says
By RICHARD LEZIN JONES and JILL P. CAPUZZO
Published: May 13, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/national/13BERG.html?hp

"The family of Nicholas E. Berg challenged American military officials on Wednesday, insisting that the man beheaded by Islamic terrorists in Iraq had earlier been in the custody of federal officials who should have done more to protect him."

This is just plain silly. He went to Iraq, Iraq was clearly a mess, US officials are supposed to baby sit fools? It is hard enough to protect people who know what they're doing, let alone idiots wandering around a war zone without any real connexions or knowledge.

As to this:
"The Iraqi police took Nicholas Berg, 26, into custody on March 24 and held him in a jail that he described in the message as managed by Iraqis with oversight from United States Military Police forces. He wrote that federal agents had questioned his reasons for being in Iraq, whether he had ever built a pipe bomb or had been in Iran.

"They can detain him and deny him his basic civil rights of a lawyer, a phone call or even a charge for 13 days, but they can't get him" on a plane, David Berg said."

Well, if he is in a danger zone, in a foreign country, it seems a bit precious to be speaking to civil rights - although if there was USMP oversight then perhaps we can at least say that procedues were followed:

"Apparently in a response to the accusations that the actions of the military in Iraq exposed their son to worsening danger, the F.B.I. released a statement saying that Nicholas Berg had not heeded warnings and that he had declined assistance in leaving Iraq.

The conflicting accounts continued to swirl around Mr. Berg's detention and release. In Baghdad, a senior adviser for the Coalition Provisional Authority, Dan Senor, repeated that Mr. Berg had never been in military custody.

"My understanding," Mr. Senor said of the Iraqi police, "is that they suspected that he was involved/engaged in suspicious activities. U.S. authorities were notified. The F.B.I. visited with Mr. Berg on three occasions when he was in Iraqi police detention and determined that he was not involved with any criminal or terrorist activities. Mr. Berg was released on April 6, and it is my understanding he was advised to leave the country."

It pains me to say this, but I rather credit our dear Senor, the family needs a bit of a reality check, Iraq is not fucking Kansas.

"The Iraqi police is mentioned frequently, which is, of course, absurd, because there is no Iraqi government right now," David Berg said. "And if you think about it, to be detained by the Iraqi police without the U.S. government's knowing would be tantamount to kidnapping."

Officials did acknowledge the presence of the military police at the jail but said their sole function was to "monitor his treatment."

As for the family contesting that it was the detention's fault that he did not leave in time, well, the idiot had plenty of time and two visits to get over the long distance propaganda, he was an idiot through and through:
The F.B.I. statement, though, said that coalition authorities had offered "to facilitate his safe passage out of Iraq," but that Mr. Berg refused their help.

Recalling his brother's independent personality, David Berg said such a refusal would not surprise his family, although he said he had no way of knowing whether Nicholas Berg had declined help. He had traveled to Iraq, in part, to generate business for his fledgling telecommunications company, which specializes in servicing radio towers. After an earlier visit, Mr. Berg returned to Iraq on March 14.

No excuse, pity the family is deluded on what could be done, but frankly I see no responsibility for his death (ex the silly agitprop from the CPA re investing, but frankly if you pull them aside in private, as I noted in my journal back in Aug and Sep, they will give you a pretty accurate threat assessment) on the part of US authorities, ex of course the generic responsibility for having so badly messed up the entire Iraq fiasco through the gross incompetence.

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May 12, 2004

Final note on the beheading

I thought I might note that my Iraqi maid, not known for her delicate sensibilities or deep seated concern for American blood (you may ask why I employ a maid who cheers when the TV shows Americans getting killed, but she loves me like a mum - truly a bizarre connexion and perhaps worthy of some study of the rule of the personal over the abstract), found the murder of our innocent fool a bit much. Indeed, unlike the murders of the contractors, she expressed some regret that the "meskine" got whacked.

Of course, she also agreed that the guy not knowing Arabic and wandering around was an act of hamaqa.

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Beheading, follow on.

In re the Jewish angle noted in the arts by his parents, if the video does not play it up (not clear) they can pretty well count that the Zarqaouie people did not know.

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On the Beheading, my somewhat cold comments

My comments here will probably offend, but here it goes.

First, let me say that it gives me no pleasure to see this, nor to learn of it, nor would I wish it upon the poor bastard.

At the same time, let me quote this from The New York Tiimes:

" Nicholas E. Berg wanted to help rebuild Iraq. Far from having opposed the war, he believed that the American presence there was a positive thing, his family and friends said. And he saw it as a business opportunity as well.

So defying State Department warnings, Mr. Berg, 26, traveled to Iraq late last year in search of work for his small company, which builds and maintains communication towers and is based in Pennsylvania.

He did not find a job but instead was taken captive by Islamic terrorists. His decapitated body was discovered by American soldiers on a roadside in Baghdad on Saturday. "
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/12/national/12berg.html?pagewanted=all&position=

and this from The Washington Post
The persistent violence contrasts sharply with U.S. officials' optimistic calls for private companies to invest in Iraq. Over the past year, the Commerce Department has conducted a three-continent campaign to promote investment and reconstruction opportunities.

It was at one of those conferences that Berg was inspired to go to Baghdad, his family said. He dreamed of building radio towers in Iraq that would beam reports from a free press.

According to his family, Berg met businessmen at the conference who asked him to inspect radio towers damaged in the war. Berg hoped to make a bid for his company, Prometheus Methods Tower Service Inc., to provide parts and repair services.

Berg's mother said she had begged him to change his mind about the trip.

But Berg, whose family described him as a bit of a rebel, decided that the potential business was worth the risk. He took a flight from New York to Amman, Jordan, on March 14 and then traveled on to Iraq. He did not have a security guard, translator or driver lined up, his mother said, and he decided to stay at smaller hotels not frequented by foreigners.

His e-mails were optimistic, his mother said, but weeks into his trip he still had not found new business. The only trouble he reported to his parents was that he had been detained in Mosul for several days by Iraqi police who were suspicious because he was traveling alone.

The incident forced him to push back his original departure date of March 30, he wrote his parents.

Berg last called his parents on April 9. He told them that his flight home was from Jordan but that a violent insurgency erupting in western Iraq had made driving there impossible.

Hearing nothing further, Berg's family spent the next few weeks searching frantically for information. They opened his e-mail account and sent notes to his business associates. They requested his cell phone records from Iraq. No one had any leads. The next time they heard any news was when the consul called.

According to a clerk at Baghdad's Al Fanar Hotel, on the east bank of the Tigris River, Berg checked in on March 22, left for Mosul the next day, returned to the hotel on April 6 and checked out on April 10.

Berg said he was going home, the clerk said, and walked down Saddoun Street, a major artery, because the road was closed to vehicular traffic. He left behind in his room a yellowed and folded page from a book by Jon Burmeister, a South African writer of thrillers who died in 2001.

The page carries a short prose poem titled "The War That Wasn't." It describes a man named Jericho, who is awakened by machine-gun fire, "his heart hammering thunderously against the ribcage as though trying to escape."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A19048-2004May11?language=printer
Emphasis added.

With the caveat that no one deserves to have their head cut off, nor on camara above all, this guy was a fucking fool. Reminds me of that Tacitus and his idiotic simple minded trip through the region (and his neo-Bolshevik commentary on the "false consciousness" or "dhimmitude" - as if he even understood the term, which he does not). Look at me, I'm going to the Middle East to learn about the Islamic savages....

Let me put it this way, this fellow was a moron. Sorry, sounds cold, but anyone wandering around as described above in Iraq, given the news post Summer 2003 is a fucking moron. I recently had to tell some idealistic kid here, an American engineer, fresh graduate, who wanted to hop a fucking taxi from Amman to Baghdad to look for work that if he did so, he should write a motherfucking will. Fucking clueless motherfucking Americans waltzing around like dumbass do-gooders in motherfucking Kansas. Wake the fuck up, Dorothy, there are a good (if minority) number of cold ass people who are far too happy to cap your innocent, "oh I'm an American and we do good" ass.

What did this clueless idiot do wrong?

First, he obviously did not speak the langauge, did not know the region. But the good old US of A was bringing democracy and all that, time to teach the natives. Wonderful fucking idealism. But this is not fucking Kansas, this is a fucking dangerous region, and it is not for amateur hour to fucking wander around a country you don't know, that you have no support in, and that you don't know people in, that you have no goddamned connexions to keep you fucking safe. Bloody hell, staying in low-end hotels, no connexions, no saftey.

I can do this sort of shit, but I know the fucking place, and I also know that you need to get protection. Good bloody fucking Lord, what kind of clueless git does this? And in motherfucking March?

What is it, does no one in the fucking States have a fucking clue that, hey, guess what, being an American does not get you the love nowadays, and fuck, you should before wandering into a fucking war zone, have some support?

Bloody hell, I just got an offer to go to Baghdad for some consulting with a Fund there, and while for the right money I migth do it, I would not fucking take a motherfucking taxi from Amman, and not have any gooddamned support.

Emblamatic of the utter cluelessness that is American engagement with the Middle East.

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May 11, 2004

Convoy from Amman whacked, Iraq

So say the Sats.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:15 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On Torture

I continue to think of that line from The Battle of Algiers, by Col. Mathieu. Interesting.

True. Accept the consequences or not.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:14 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Airstrikes for Airstrikes sake?

I remain utterly puzzled as to why the American forces believe that airstrikes in urban areas is (a) useful and (b) acceptable. The destruction of the as-Sadr HQ strikes me as use of force in the absence of a real strategy.

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A positive note re the prison issue

I thought I should note that in a number of recent conversations that I have had, in re the prison issue, that in addition to expressing outrage, etc. re the events, Arab interlocutors of various stripes have also commented favorably on the US system allowing this to be debated, etc., and drew unfavorable contrasts in re their own system.

I would not go as far as to say this chain of events is or could be truly positive, or the "example" blather of President Bush is in fact effective, but there is a chance here, a real chance, of rescuing something from this. That is, if the rot is rooted out, then some face may be saved. Iraq is still a bloody accident, but perhaps some face to be saved.

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May 10, 2004

The Battle of Algiers

For a rather long time I pimped this film as a key and accessible document to understand what could happen in Iraq. It appears with the latest revelations that sadly that was all too prescient.

This quote sadly expresses the situation:
" "Beyond abuse of prisoners, there are other photos that depict incidents of physical violence towards prisoners, acts that can only be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel and inhuman," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "There are many more photographs and indeed some videos. Congress and the American people and the rest of the world need to know this.""

Well, perhaps the Pentagon learned the wrong lessons when they finally screened that film, or rather Wolfowitz had already learned the wrong lessons,

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May 09, 2004

CPA-Iraq Achieving New Levels of the Surreal

Just to prove that the fearless PR machine that is the CPA has its finger on the pulse of the news cycle and really understands exactely how to communicate:

BREMER MEETS WITH IRAQI WOMEN

EDUCATORS AND ATTORNEYS

Baghdad – Iraqi women educators and lawyers met with Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Friday morning to discuss security and the role of women in the political process. During the meeting, Bremer advised the members of the Future Society for Iraqi Women to participate in the nomination process for the upcoming Independent Electoral Commission. He also encouraged the group to educate women on the importance of getting involved in the economy by taking advantage of micro loans which could be used to start small businesses.

“The meeting was perfect. We appreciate his advice to nominate women to be a part of the Electoral Commission. Now the most important part is for us to follow through,” said Hanna Murad, Deputy President of the Future Society for Iraqi Women.

The Future Society for Iraqi Women is composed of lawyers and educators who have come together to provide legal assistance for women who have been victims of abuse and torture. They conduct information and education programs for women in the area of legal rights, promote women in government work to reduce discrimination against women, and fight against the imposition of religious law. The group has organized a Legal Defense Fund for women and has become involved with the Transitional Safe House for abused women.

Wonderful, a bunch of marginal liberal women met Bremer, and were impressed. I can sleep well at night.

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In more practical matters - CPA has 'prioritized' its reconst work

I am told in this press release that the PMO (That is the DoD's "Project Management Office" aka the place that never returns phone calls from practical investors):

PMO PROJECTS PRIORITIZED WITH IRAQI PARTICIPATION

BAGHDAD, Iraq (May 7, 2004) – As the Program Management Office begins the $18.4 billion program of constructing and restoring Iraq’s infrastructure, it does so through a long-standing partnership with the Iraqi people.

In September of 2003, PMO leadership began outlining the work of revitalizing the essential services of the country. PMO representatives met with local Iraqi officials and area governing councils to create an initial list of projects.

Since that time, dozens of meetings have taken place in pursuit of this goal. Director David Nash and team have met with tribal leaders, governorate leadership, provincial councils, ministers, city officials, local chambers of commerce, business leaders, and community activists in order to seek their help in identifying those crucial projects that would benefit the highest number of Iraqis in each region of the country. Each of the projects fall into one of the following six sectors: security and justice, water resources and public works, electricity, buildings/health/education, transportation and communications, and oil.

In addition, Director Nash has traveled to 16 of the 18 governorates thus far to meet local officials in their home cities to continue the coordination of this historic effort. The final two Governorate meetings are expected to occur within the next several weeks.

“Each of these meetings has given me and the rest of the staff here at the PMO a better idea for the specific priorities for each of the governorates,” Director of PMO David Nash said. “Without the participation of the Iraqi people, these efforts to rebuild their country would fail. Iraqi participation is a vital component to our work as it is to Iraqi’s who live here and understand what needs to be done to improve their lives.”

Well, don't I feel so fired up I could just go out and round up some innocent Iraqis and molest them for fun and profit.

Glad they spent the time "prioritizing because lord the fuck knows they had plenty of fucking time to do so. Vital work and all that.

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May 06, 2004

Thoughts on the Iraqi prison torture scandal

Last night I had a long convo with a local business magnate (the sort of fellow who the royal family comes to his birthday parties) about Iraq.

He had an interesting comment to make in regards to the issue: "Why did they take pictures"? Going on to say everyone understands occupying armies are abusive, that things will happen in violence and war, however it struck him, fellow Arabs as particularly heinous to take pictures, like cheap porn.

There may be a key gap that pushes the issue to a higher level of disgust - the pictures and the style of the pictues playing into the worst characterizations of American society as depraved.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 02, 2004

And in the realm of the surreal again

While I can't get my hands on data from the CPA, at least I can rest easy knowing that they are distributing footballs:

to honor the birthday of the prophet muhammad

(may peace be upon him), the coalition gives soccer balls out to children

Hilla, Babil Province, Iraq. In support of the national holiday honoring the birthday of The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the Coalition Provisional Authority is giving more than 950 soccer balls to Iraqi children, schools, and sports clubs in South Central Iraq. The soccer balls are being distributed through the Democratic Iraqi Gathering, the Polish Coalition Forces, and the Coalition Provisional Authority.

As friends of the Iraqi people, the Coalition wishes Iraqis the very best for this holy occasion and a memorable day for the Iraqi children. We will continue to support the Iraqi people as they move toward a sovereign and democratic Iraq.

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May 01, 2004

Off the bloody cliff

Exhausted, rather too much to do to comment properly. I was unaware of the Iraqi prisoner story for a good two days after the CBS News broadcast. Have not had the occasion to see the Arab Sats directly, but am led to understand that it is a frenzy.

This is nothing short of a disaster, and will be a long term problem.

The climb down in Fallujah is ambiguous, but frankly after the bluster, the posturing, it looks weak, it looks like a capitulation.

I am frankly amazed at the bumbling incompetence that the US has reflected in the past few weeks, even by the standards I saw with CPA over the past year or somewhat more.

While an invasion of Fallujah would have been madness, but speaking loudly and carrying a small stick which proved unusable, the Americans have come off as fools, weak fools. This will indeed embolden the opposition.

I sometimes ask myself, can the present Administration engage Iraq in ways that are any worse? The answer is of course yes, but this mish mash of strong talk, ambiguous action (weak then strong then weak) is making a hash out of policies that might, just might have worked. Spoilers.

I note that this is having blow back in the business world. This past week I had trouble getting meetings, for all that there was prior interest. Spoke to a local origin comrade, tells me he spoke with the same people, who told him they did not want to deal with Americans now. Sensation is there, the US is in the process of truly and substantively damaging its real interests, not the airy theoretical ones but real interests.

I am really getting frustrated, having a hard time seeing how to get around this fiasco. Perhaps should work for the Dutch.

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April 28, 2004

Gratitious Stupidity, the Iraqi Flag.

You may see The Washington Post for this http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43438-2004Apr26.html

All I can say is the stupidity of this move really is breathtaking.

I wonder whose idea this was.

I hope that this was done by someone working against the American Occupation as a deliberate move, because if it is being done with all sincerity, I can only say that the political incompetence (not to mention artistic idiocy) is of such a level as to leave me dumbfounded.

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A comment on Iraq

A comment on Iraq that I left with the Washignton Monthly in re this convo:
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_04/003782.php

"There seems to be a large scale incomprehension here of the actual menu of choices available in Iraq.

First, the Arab League does not have the institutional capacity to even be a player, regardless of the fact that it is so badly divided at present that it could not possibly achieve any kind of effective operation in Iraq, or the fact that the Kurds would never accept an Arab League focused 'administration.'

Second, in regards to elegant federal state solutions and the like, the commentators are presuming that constitutional arrangements will have some meaning. There is quite simply not the institutional capacity to make a tripartite administrative structure work. However elegant, the reality will follow actual adminstrative and governmental norms - which in the Arab region are centralizing and authoritarian.

Third, in regards to population, commentators here are presuming that lines can be drawn - ex-the extreme Kurdish north and the Western central region, most of Iraq is rather mixed - e.g. the Baghdad area is mixed Sunni and Shiite, and that holds to the south of Baghdad. No clear line can be drawn there, so speaking to a presumed "Sunni" state makes no fucking sense at all. Then, of course, the Arab (Sunni and Shiite, largely Sunni) / Turcomans (Shiite and Sunni, apparent majority of Shiites) / Kurd (Sunni and Shiite, majority Sunni, but largely adhering to somewhat heterodox Sunni Sufi orders "line" in the North in the Kirkuk region is not at all clear. And again note that even in the North, with a majority Sunni Arabs as the non-Kurdish population, there are the largely Shiite Turcomans complicating the picture. The simplified imagery many of you have of the ethnic map is simply erroneous.

Fourth, de facto seperation has a different political logic than de jure seperation. De facto allows for looseness and fudging, de jure will create a political dynamic further favoring civil war as each ethnic group will have incentives to push for the maximalist position to lock in gains, and with little to no tradition of mediated and peaceful conflict or problem resolution, and in a situation where legitmate authority of any type does not obtain on the national level, there is almost no chance that civil war would be averted.

In short, one needs to get some realism before even pretending to think about what is possible here.

I may add that the comment supra about Arabs not being capable of democracy is pure bunk. What is true is that the socio-economic system and conditions prevailing in the region is not favorable to the instant creation of a fully operative democracy. Mass unemployment, dysfunctional economies and little recent indigenous experience with consultative decision making all preclude "instant democracy." It is not a question of an existential incapacity but rather the socio-economic conditions that obtain at present.

Finally, the commentator who felt Egypt is a positive model clearly doesn't know Egypt. Egypt is a fucking time bomb waiting to explode. If Iraq ends up as Egypt on the Euphrates, you've just made another pressure cooker of an about to be failed state. Open society my fucking ass, bloody "blue tin cans" security armor rolling around picking up "militants" in broad daylight is what Egypt is, although the ignorant Westerner traipsing around for a Pyramid visit may be duped into thinking all is just fine."

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April 25, 2004

"You Travel A Lot in the Middle East, Why?"; New York, Moroccan Bombs; Iraq; Cyprus and EU idjits

Wonderful coming through JFK. I am beginning to hate coming back to the States. The hassle, is well, a real hassle - perhaps I should get that second passport not only for Israel but the United States?

Well, then I might miss the occasion to miss the interaction with the ever surly Customs and Immigration staff, who seem inclined to treat any and all travellers - including someone like myself (expensive suit, anglo name and looks) like bloody criminals. Now, I am not talking about doing their job, which is to say, be aware and ask questions. But demeanor. I hardly expect someone such as myself should be challenged and questioned in a hostile manner, no matter the number of Arab / Middle Eastern stamps in my bloody passport. A bit of training in proper manners would go a long way. Of course, having been in a foul mood, I rather risked a body cavity search and gave as good back, however this can hardly be said to be particularly good manner in which to treat business travellers.

In any event, gave me the occasion to reflect on what a fucking horrible airport JFK is. Really, it is a fucking awful airport and that fucking airtrain is just about the stupidest piece of work I have seen. Bloody awful design, leading to two inconvenient subway stops and confusingly laid out such that they need fucking porters to guide people. The whole fucking airport should be levelled and rebuilt properly. Bloody hell it's New York, one should think New York should have a proper airport (yes, actually it does, Newark, for all that I despise Jersey.)

This aside, the horror that is JFK's completely disorganized madness of a transport infrastructure gabve me the opportunity to share a ride into town with the Provost of Univ. of South Africa. Interesting fellow, nice ride, although we both ended up having to badger the cab into respecting the rate. (As an aside The Economist has a fine article on the idiocy that is the New York medalion auction. Well done, exposé of the idiocy of the medallion system. New York's faux liberalism of corruption.

This aside, I forgot to mention that on Thursday past the Moroccan authorities discovered a bomb making factory outside of Casablanca. Quite accidentally, as reports had it - afraid I do not have online links this was radio - brought in on a domestic dispute next door to the factory - bomb makers panicked. Take this as another sign of the results of the fiasco that is Iraq to date, as well as the sheer idiocy of the Palestinian policy. Not terribly confident I must say in Moroccan security procedures, their airport relies more on hand checks than screenings. The Jordanians are far better at it. Wonder if I might not run a bigger chance of becoming little bits and pieces over the Atlantic there than in Jordan? Ah well,likely to happen one way or the other.

I also note that Sharon's going back on his "pledge" not to harm Arafat provoked no public response of any merit from the Americans. With allies like Sharon, one hardly needs enemies. I am hard pressed to understand what assasinating Arafat gains anyone but some cheap revenge fantasy that Sharon - well make that expensive, the fat corrupt whore doesn't do things cheaply - likes to engage in. The assasinations of the Hamas leadership having produced nothing but a regain in Hamas support (See http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/international/middleeast/25HAMA.html?pagewanted=all&position= ).

Of course short term we seem to have a disruption of Hamas operations, although I note that after the assasination of their bomb maker in 2002 saw a several month pause between the event and the Hamas riposte. It is hard to tell what level of disruption has actually occured. However, the longer term, the secular PA and Arafat's secularists are losing out to the hardline jihadist views of the Hamas people. The Israeli model on this, or rather the Sharonista model for this is based on policies and understandings of Arab societies derived from the 1950s and 1960s, a different era when tribal leaderships and the like had more power and Palestinian society, less modern in terms of fluidity and less stressed.

Unfortunately Sharon and the people who think like him think that if they kill off the radical leadership they will be able to "choose" Palestinian quislings. They may - although Arafat is actually their best chance at that, but it will not hold. Since the 1980s this model, as seen in the Territories and in Lebanon has failed, again and again. However, the rather racist nature of much of Israeli thought on Arabs prevents them from seeing the changes - mind you I add I fully understand the origins and reasons for this thought - it's certainly not hard to become contemptously frustrated with the state of Arab societies at present and indeed it is that same frustration that drives much youth - middle class to impoverished - into the arms of the radicals. Socieity is clearly ill, but the wealthy elite of the "secularists" that the US likes to deal with have no real answers at present - nothingthat would overturn their cushy position.

Now, this aside, I am afraid that after stepping back from the brink, we are about to roll back into Fallujah. The question, and it is not at all clear what good answers are available, is what can one actually do. On one hand, backing down in front the insurgents is a grave error, yet at the same time so is confrontation given the present circumstances. A rather no win situation at present. The problem that obtains is there are not very good options available in Iraq, due to the incompetence of the occupation to date, the progressive alienationn of the Iraqis and the lack of any real substantive progress. Backing down emboldens a set of operators that are indeed "bad guys" in the unfelicitious phrase of President Bush - whose dimwittedness seems unlimited. On the other hand pushing into Fallujah given present circumstances will certainly inflame Iraqis against the occupation once again. The reality is that, well, no one -of any substantial numbers- loves, likes or even particularly respects the Americans at present, and hatred and loathing clearly outweigh fear. The command of Machiavelli, to feared rather loved, but not hated, apparently was lost on the Rumsfeld - Cheney axis.

Now as those of you who waste your precious time reading my funny little notes know that I rather like The Economist's analyses in general. Sadly they have been consistently wrong on Iraq, very wrong. I find this commentary from 7 April 2004 worrying:
Once the Iraqis have elected their own government, the danger of replaying Vietnam in the sands of Iraq should recede. Even if such a government were later to prove deadlocked or unstable, its emergence would permit an honourable enough American exit. That is to say, a President Bush or Kerry could in conscience declare at such a point that America had given Iraq its democratic opportunity and summon the troops back home. So in practical terms, the question of whether the Americans can “succeed” in Iraq boils down to this. Is America willing and able to hold the ring for the year and a half or so until that election takes place?
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2572254
This is abdication. Withdrawing with a faux government that will collapse, with no realistic chance of success is not leaving, i n conscience, it is in fact a longer term disaster. It suggests to me that the editorial writers have looked ahead, and as I noted last week, seen that the Bush Administration has driven off the motherfucking cliff.

I note the 15 April 2004 editorial:

Iraq
Another intifada in the making
Having stepped to the brink, America would be wise to step back

15 Apr 2004
The Economist
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2598976

"The past fortnight has shown that a shocking number of Iraqis are indeed willing to take up the gun, and that most of the Iraqi policemen and soldiers recruited since the fall of Saddam Hussein prefer to lay theirs down than to fire on fellow citizens. This has left the job of pacifying Fallujah and other restive parts of Iraq to an American army that is stretched too thin and shows every sign of having reacted with excessive force. By some estimates the Americans have over the past fortnight killed 500 or so Iraqis in Fallujah. Slaughter on this scale cannot credibly be described as a policing operation designed to rid Fallujah of criminals and terrorists." .... "The best hope in Iraq is that America's tough talk against the rebels of Fallujah and Mr Sadr in Najaf is a bluff designed to incentivise its foes in both places to negotiate their way out of a showdown. Though at midweek Mr Sadr denied talking to the occupiers, mediators seem active behind the scenes. Best of all would be a signal from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Shias' paramount spiritual leader, that the Shia mainstream disapproves of Mr Sadr's antics. But for that the coalition may need to strike some face- (and life-) saving deal with Mr Sadr. As a rule, it is a pity to let armed groups defy authority and get away with it. But Iraq is hardly a normal place right now, and Mr Sadr's is only one of many armed militias. Better, if possible, to co-opt such an enemy than risk a wider conflagration by killing him in a shrine."

I note The Economist's note:
Is there a way out? Optimists argue that the bloodshed must have concentrated minds. It has given America a better idea of which Iraqis wield real influence. Most members of the Governing Council bleated from the sidelines during the fighting, but a few won popular credibility by acting as mediators or organising relief programmes. The groups that showed the most gumption include Mr Jaffari's Dawa party and Mohsen Abdel Hamid's Iraqi Islamic Party, which is backed by some Sunni preachers. The ayatollahs in Najaf, led by Ali Sistani, have sent their sons to soothe Mr Sadr, only to hear Mr Sadr's aides brand them American spies
and hope there may be some grain of truth to the optimistic interpretation that some portion of that gaggle of incompetent self indulgent ideologues in the CPA to actually wake up to reality (rather than engaging in the sort of idiotic, ideological posturing one sees among "conservatives in the United States pissing their pants about "theocrats" and rather unfelicitious and indeed idiotic "islamofascists" (I rather thought that conservatives disliked abusing the phrase "fascist" although I suppose ideologues of all stripes are at heart whinging hypocrites of the worst stripe - and I do note that the new conservative... wing? so hot to trot over Iraq is rather Bolshevik in its mentality, so perhaps it is appropriate they have adopted the language of the Bolsheviks and the twaddlesome left.))

Finally on Iraq, a story in The Independent
Americans believe Saddam terror link
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=514681
drew my attention to this:
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqReport4_22_04.pdf

Fundamentally depressing, the stupidity or laziness of the American public in regards to foreign affaires as illustrated in these the following:
Only around 40 percent of respondants correctly noted Iraq had no connexion with al-Qaeda or had minor intermittan contacts. A staggering 37 percent think Iraq gave substantial support to al-Qaeda, but not involved in 11 September, while a further 20 percent of ill-informed morons think Iraq had connexion with 11 September in addition. I note 45 percent of this subset of ill-informed drooling idiots believe the US has some proof of an al-Qaeda link.

Further, a majority has some belief that Iraq had either substantive NBC weapons (38 percent) or significant (22 percent) programs. It is hard to give credit to actual literacy and holding such beliefs.

I leave you to read the full analysis, depressing as it is.

Finally, on Cyprus, the Greek Cyproites showed once again they are self-indulgent, short sighted fools of the worse kind, as well as having less political maturity than the Turks in fact. How else to explain the significant intervention of that mafia, the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, with interventions saying a vote for the UN plan would damn voters to hell. I note by the way that the Islamophobes out there would have taken a similar intervention by a Muslim Imam as signs of the evilness of the Islamic world, etc. etc.

Returning to Cyprus, well, this really was no surprise if one has ever spent any time in Cyprus - and in some ways it begins to build on my sensation that the EU really is not ready for prime time. I do not say this as someone philosophically or constitutionally opposed to the EU. Indeed, I have long been a fan of the idea, in theory, of the EU as a closer Union. However, the execution of expansion has been, I have to say, a dismal and peurile excerise in a sad combination of wishful thinking and a sort of namby pamby quasi-leftist 'we'll all just get along"ism without a real sense that in fact there are people who will not, in the end, want to get along. (I note I have noted in online fora that this tends to emerge among American and Euro leftists engaging in wishful pandering about the Iraqi resistance)

Anyone who has spent any degree of time in Cyprus should have been able to note the degree to which the Greek Cyproites had not truly grappled in any meaningful manner with their role in the division of the island, nor were they apparently willing to. One could see a clear contrast between the attitude of the average Turk - who rarely fulminates against the Greeks, and seemed in the conversations I had over the years, willing to "throw the Greeks a bone." In contrast, the Greek Cypriotes (a) usually wallowed in a very much misplaced sense of victimhood (yes the Turkish army grabbed a huge share of the Island, but it hardly was without warning, months of warnings, and had the Greeks not tried unification with Greece against Turkish Cypriot wishes the Turkish army would not have had the excuse to intervene.), (b) an unreconstructed sense of a right to dominance - take for example the present change over on the Greek side the change over from the old licence plate plan based on the British system - timed in just for the EU ascension - to a system using Greek rather than Roman characters. A small but subtle sign of the degree of political attention to unification with the Turks - who after all have adopted the roman character system for their langauge, (c) showed little to no sign in my conversations with them of having any sense of recognizing the Turkish point of view or of their legitimate grievances dating from the period when Greek partisans spread terror in the Turkish communities. That is, in the 1960s-1970s, both sides were dirty, both used violence and the main difference was indeed, the Turkish Republic had a kick ass army and the Greek Cypriotes and Greek army did not. I can't say I ever heard on the Greek side any realistic political commentary, but a whole lot of whinging on about how the Brits and the Americans were plotting against them, the Greeks - with little recognition of their role in why their politicla POV was not entirely adopted - given their theocratic politics I suppose this is unsurprising.

The Economist's note:
A chance for peace and unity wasted
25 Apr 2004

"The UN’s plan for ending three decades of conflict and reuniting Cyprus has been rejected by the Mediterranean island’s Greek-Cypriot majority—to the anger of the world powers that backed the plan. The Turkish-Cypriot north of the island will be unable to join the European Union next month even though its people voted in favour"

They should, of course, get the chance now. Why not? Not their fault the Greeks are more immature and backwards politically. Worthy of the Arabs, their political instincts.

"The simultaneous referendums held in both parts of Cyprus on Saturday April 24th could—if all had gone well—have put an end to one of Europe’s most poisonous conflicts. Since the island was divided 30 years ago, when a Greek-Cypriot coup prompted an invasion by Turkish troops, Greece and Turkey have several times come close to war, despite both supposedly being allies in NATO. Since 1974’s bloody events, a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone has divided Cyprus in two—running right through Nicosia, Europe’s last divided capital. Past attempts to resolve the conflict and reunite the island have failed. But in recent months, enormous diplomatic effort has gone into putting together a UN-sponsored peace plan which would see the island reunited as a loose federation. It seemed Cyprus’s best chance yet of ending the conflict. But it has been thrown away.

Turkish-Cypriots voted 65% in favour of the UN plan—even though it meant their having to give up some land and homes to the Greek-Cypriots, and in spite of the call for a “no” vote by their veteran president, Rauf Denktash. But the plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek-Cypriot side, which voted 76% against it. Perversely, the result means that only the rejectionist Greek-Cypriot part of the island will join the European Union (along with nine other countries) on May 1st, while the Turkish-Cypriots will be left out. This is because only Turkey recognises the small, impoverished Turkish-Cypriot republic in the north of the island, while the rest of the world has since 1974 regarded the Greek-Cypriot government as though it represented the whole of the island."

I should hope that the representation issue shall change, and soon.

This section is of particular interest:
"The Greek-Cypriots’ rejection of the plan was met with dismay and anger among the world powers that had pressed both sides to accept it. Günter Verheugen, the EU’s commissioner for enlargement, said the Greek-Cypriots would join the Union under a “shadow”. America’s State Department expressed its disappointment, while praising the Turkish-Cypriots for their courage in voting for peace and reconciliation.

For a short while earlier this year it had begun to look like Cyprus was on an unstoppable course towards unity. In February, leaders of the island’s two communities agreed to start talks under the UN’s auspices. If they could not reach a final agreement by late March, Greece and Turkey would enter the talks. If a deal still could not be struck, the UN would fill in any remaining blanks in the peace agreement and put it to both sides in referendums. Until the past few weeks, it was the Turkish-Cypriot side that had been portrayed as the more stubborn negotiator. But the Turkish-Cypriot government (minus Mr Denktash) accepted the proposal put to both sides by the UN, while the Greek-Cypriots, led by Tassos Papadopoulos, refused to accept it. This infuriated Mr Verheugen, who last week said he felt “cheated” by Mr Papadopoulos."

Well, if the EU had had its fucking eyes open, they should have noted long before the political gamesmanship on the Greek Cypriot side (the Greek mainlanders having played, one should note, a fairly positive and mature role).

Further note the media control - everything I heard from foreign friends their supported the accusation of deliberate intervention.
"Diplomats and “yes” campaigners last week accused Greek-Cypriot broadcasters of focusing on the plan's potential disadvantages, while denying EU and UN officials airtime to put the case for accepting it. Last Wednesday, Britain and other backers of the plan tried to pass a resolution at the UN Security Council, which would encourage a “yes” vote by strengthening the UN peacekeepers’ role in verifying all sides’ compliance with the plan. But Russia (which has longstanding links with the Greeks and shares their Orthodox Christian religion) vetoed the resolution, saying it there had not been adequate debate."

"Mr Papadopoulos had suggested to his people that they could turn down the UN plan with no ill consequences, in the expectation that a better deal will be offered in the near future. There does not seem much chance of this. By rejecting the proposal the Greek-Cypriots will have gained nothing other than the resentment of their fellow EU members; they have lost the moral high ground they enjoyed in the 30 years in which the Turkish-Cypriot side continually resisted a deal. The UN has now said its role in seeking a peace deal is over. Though there might be an effort to get the two sides back to the table for one last try, the chances do not look good. Turkey’s foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, said after the vote that the Greek-Cypriot rejection meant partition was now “permanent”."

I should say that in my opinion they never should have enjoyed the moral high ground, given that the Greek Cypriots never grappled with their own terrorism and terrorists, and have instead done their best to instill anti-Turkish revanchisme in the population.

"The EU and America have made it clear that the 200,000 Turkish-Cypriots—about a quarter of the island’s population—will not lose out from the Greek-Cypriots’ intransigence. The economic and diplomatic sanctions that have crippled the Turkish-Cypriot economy may now be eased. Turkey is likely to press the world powers to grant recognition to the Turkish-Cypriot republic."

I hope there is follow through.

Finally: "The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told a meeting of his ruling party on Saturday that: “This is the most successful event in the last 50 years of Turkish diplomacy.” He might have added that it was also the Greek-Cypriots’ biggest diplomatic disaster in 30 years."

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:49 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 22, 2004

Basrah, Baghdad

I would like to observe two items:
(a) the Basrah bombings suggest to me Saudi based al-Qaedah types are operating. I note the news coming out of KSA (the bombing claimed by al-Qaedah) suggests that the situation there is not good, to say the least. Results, hard to tell. But put in the context of Jordan and other infos I have heard suggests the al-Qaedah people are feeling energized. Recruitment is probably better than it has been in years. I note for the record, by the way, the gross hypocrisy of the anti-Brit demos after the Basrah bombings. Sadrist hypocrites. They really are the worst sort of folks and deserve to be squashed like insects, but the Coalition doing so probably, given the context, is probably net negative. Did not have to be that way, but the sheer clumsiness so far makes it so.
(b) Baghdad - assasinations suggest that the present quasi calm is a false calm, both the Americans and the Resistance are taking a breath.
(c) Fallujah - looks like its going to open up again. The question is, what about the Shiite zone and will the flash of solidarity at the start of the month rebound or not? Will the Cowboy types decide to go after Najaf?

In other items, Steel is Stalled. No fucking data, no fucking response from CPA. Fuck em, they don't fucking want our motherfucking money, they can go to fucking hell the incompetent posers. Worst part, is these fucking assholes are going to go home rapping about their experience in the Arab world, Fucking idiots. Real fucking idiots sitting in fucking villas without any real idea of what it is going to take to get things done.

Final item, got me hands on US plans for a special financial vehicle for the region, a sort of MENA IFC funded by the US. Document talks about getting other peeps to come in, but bloody hell, what kind of cheap crack are they smoking? Europeans and WB are not going to come into the structure they're proposing where Presidential appointees have vetoes. Still, need to give this a close read. Might be some money in it for me - I'm counter cyclical after all. I make money out of your policy makers errors. Except when they get too fucking bad, like Iraq. Assholes.

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April 19, 2004

Hot off the CPA Presses - well it looks like they are not passing to the offensive.

Well, someone blinked. Sort of.

I see little chance of this leading to anything substantive, but it appears to me that CPA has realised that leveling Falluja is a Phyrric victory.

"Agreed Statement of 19 April
Following the initial meeting on 13 April 2004, the parties met again on 16, 17, and 19 April 2004 to consolidate progress made towards the achievement of a full ceasefire and a peaceful resolution of the situation in Fallujah.

All parties welcomed the improved situation in the city and committed themselves to take all possible measures, with all relevant parties, to implement a full and unbroken ceasefire, which they call on parties to faithfully observe. They recognize that in the absence of a true ceasefire, major hostilities could resume on short notice.

The parties agreed, that as a sign of goodwill, and to improve the humanitarian situation in Fallujah, Coalition Forces will allow unfettered access to the Fallujah General Hospital, to treat the sick and injured. The parties also agreed to arrange for the removal and burial of the dead and the provision of food and medicine in isolated areas of the city. The hours of the curfew will also be shortened so that the curfew will begin at 2100, rather than 1900 each night so that believers may fulfill their religious duties. Measures will also be put in place to facilitate the passage of official ambulances through the city, especially through checkpoints. Steps will also be taken to allow security, medical, and technical personnel access to the city to work. In due course, consideration will be given to allowing additional civilians to enter the city, beginning with fifty families per day commencing on 20 April.

In an initial effort to restore security in the city, the parties agreed to call on citizens and groups to immediately turn in all illegal weapons, illegal weapons defined as mortars, RPGs, machine guns, sniper rifles, IED-making materials, grenades, and surface-to-air missiles and all associated ammunition. This collection has begun and the parties discussed ways to turn the weapons over to the Coalition. Those who give up their weapons voluntarily will not be prosecuted for weapons violation. Unarmed individuals will not be attacked.

The parties also agreed on the pressing need of restoring regular and routine patrols in the city by joint Coalition Forces / Iraqi Security Forces. The parties will oversee the reformation of the Iraqi Police Force and ICDC in the city on an urgent basis. These forces will be bolstered and improved. They will be formed primarily from residents of Fallujah, who are best placed to guarantee security in the city. The Police and ICDC, supported by the residents of Fallujah and Coalition Forces must move to eliminate remaining foreign fighters, criminals, and drug users from Fallujah, in order for stability and security to occur.

The parties agreed that Coalition Forces do not intend to resume offensive operations if all persons inside the city turn in their heavy weapons. Individual violators will be dealt with on an individual basis.

The parties reaffirmed the absolute need to restore law and order in the city as quickly as possible, to rebuild the judicial system, and to initiate thorough Iraqi investigations into criminal acts committed in the city in this period of instability, which includes the killing and mutilation of the four American contractors and the attack on the Iraqi Police Station in February.

To implement these undertakings in a practical, efficient manner and to avoid any misunderstandings, the parties expect to intensify their consultations on security issues. These consultations will include leaders of the city, local security professionals, and representatives of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. For a reasonable period of time, the progress on the agreed upon issues will be monitored on a daily basis. Progress must be clearly demonstrated and the return to law and order observed. Time to settle this crisis peacefully remains extremely limited. The status quo is not acceptable.

The consultations began on April 19 and will continue daily to resolve issues. The parties in attendance agreed to remain in constant touch and reconvene as necessary, but in no case later than April 25."

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April 18, 2004

More of the try not to get killed on our watch items

Straight from the Embassy.

Warden Message

In reaction to the death of Hamas leader Dr. Rantissi last night in Gaza, public demonstrations and emotional outbursts by groups and individuals may occur in Jordan. We note some commentators have linked erroneously the U.S. to the Israeli Government decision to strike Dr. Rantissi. The Embassy is aware of at least one demonstration late on April 17, and we expect others may occur over the coming days, culminating at Friday noon prayers. Americans should exercise caution in their movements and avoid areas where demonstrators may gather, including areas near refugee camps, city centers, large mosques, and universities. Areas such as Shmeisani and El Rabiah have been the scenes of demonstrations in the past.

Americans should closely monitor developments via the news media over the next several days, and access the following websites for additional information and public announcements: http://travel.state.gov/ and http://amman.usembassy.gov/
We draw your attention on these websites to the latest Worldwide Caution Public Announcement and the Middle East/North Africa Public Announcement.

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WP: Iraq situ, ah they think it's bad. Finally.

Well, this article is important on a number of grounds. Among which, validating critiques.

Revolts in Iraq Deepen Crisis In Occupation
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karl Vick
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, April 18, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A20690-2004Apr17?language=printer

Some excerpts.

BAGHDAD, April 17 -- In the space of two weeks, a fierce insurgency in Iraq has isolated the U.S.-appointed civilian government and stopped the American-financed reconstruction effort, as contractors hunker down against waves of ambushes and kidnappings, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials.

No, no everything is fine. Absolutely fine. Really. Turning the corner, a sign of success, reason why the "dead enders are lashing out.

Isn't that the story line. I hate to hear reality.

...

Now here is the important part:
U.S. officials said they are reconsidering initial assessments that the uprisings might be contained as essentially military confrontations in Fallujah, where Marines continue their siege of a chronically volatile city, and Najaf, where the militant Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr has taken refuge in the shadow of a shrine.

"The Fallujah problem and the Sadr problem are having a wider impact than we expected," a senior U.S. official involved in Iraq policy said. In Baghdad and Washington, officials had initially concluded that addressing those problems would not engender much anger among ordinary Iraqis. "Sadr's people and the people of Fallujah were seen as isolated and lacking broad support among Iraqis," the official added.
Emphasis added.

The saddest part here is how the fuck they "concluded" such a thing. It strikes me they could only have concluded that a large military action against Fallujah and Sadr would not draw Iraqi sympathy if (a) they have no clue as to Iraqi nationalism, (b) have no decent intelligence, (c) do not understand the dynamics around them. In short, one could only conclude this if one really does not understand, at all, the environment.

This, this is what is causing Iraq to fail.

And it is failing.

Instead, the official said, "The effect has been profound."

Gee, you don't say.

What a motherfucking surprise.

The violence has brought the U.S.-funded reconstruction of Iraq to a near-halt, according to U.S. officials and private contractors.

Thousands of workers for private contractors have been confined to their quarters in the highly fortified Green Zone in Baghdad that also houses the headquarters of the U.S. occupation authority. Routine trips outside the compound to repair power plants, water-treatment facilities and other parts of Iraq's crumbling infrastructure have been deemed too dangerous, even with armed escorts.

Compounding the problem is a growing fear that insurgents will seek retribution against Iraqis working for private contractors and the occupation authority. Scores of Iraqis have stopped showing up for their jobs as translators, support staff and maintenance personnel in the Green Zone, even though there is a lack of lucrative employment elsewhere.

Pay attention to the last part. Let's call is a market signal of the reality of American positioning.

The security situation "has dramatically affected reconstruction," said another U.S. official in Baghdad. "How can you rebuild the country when you're confined to quarters, when only small portions of your Iraqi staff are showing up for work on any given day?"

Well, I guess that chances of me getting data are fucking low now. Idiots. Fucked Iraq and fucking my fucking project.

Among the firms that have restricted the movements of their employees are the two of the largest private contractors in Iraq: Bechtel Corp. and Kellogg Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton Co. The Research Triangle Institute, a North Carolina-based firm that has been helping set up city councils across Iraq, has sent 80 staffers -- about 40 percent of its non-Iraqi workforce -- to Kuwait as a precautionary measure.

Security concerns also have hindered the implementation of a &dol;6 billion, U.S.-funded wave of construction projects intended to help improve security by putting legions of unemployed young men to work.

"We want to offer people opportunities that compete with the financial incentives they get" from insurgent leaders, an American official said. "But it's a Catch-22. We can't start the work that's supposed to help improve security until security improves."

Everything is fine. Just keep saying that.

The insurgency also appears to be generating new alliances -- and tensions -- among the major sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq.

The most visible leader of the resistance is Sadr, a firebrand whose appeal long appeared to be limited to the young, unemployed Shiites who made up his militia, the Mahdi Army. However, in a surprising development, his poster began appearing this month at Sunni mosques that previously showed little interest in his activities.

Such displays of unity have dampened fears of a clash between the Sunni minority and Shiite majority communities. But worries about a different kind of civil war have been generated by reports that Iraq's ethnic Kurds are fighting alongside U.S. Marines and against the insurgency.

Guerrillas coming out of Fallujah have complained bitterly that Kurdish militiamen known as pesh merga are deployed against them. The Kurds are members of the 36th Battalion of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, built from several exile-based militias that supported the U.S.-led campaign against Saddam Hussein. Commanders of another, overwhelmingly Arab Iraqi army battalion refused to fight alongside the Marines.

"Worse than pigs, thieves and tramps," read lines in a poem circulating on fliers in Kirkuk, a city in northern Iraq where Kurds are accused of pushing Arab families off land claimed by both groups. The fliers condemned the leaders of Iraq's two Kurdish parties. It is not known who produced the fliers, which were also seen in Baghdad.

The Kurdish leaders were condemned in chanting that followed Friday prayers at a major Sunni mosque in Baghdad.

Let me make a prediction. In the long run, the Kurds are going to deeply regret that George Bush toppled Sadaam. Very deeply.
..

The American confrontations with Sadr and in Fallujah also have roiled the political landscape by further isolating members of Iraq's U.S.-appointed Governing Council from the Iraqi population.

In the first few days after Sadr's militiamen clashed with U.S. forces and the Marines surrounded Fallujah, council members -- usually a publicity-hungry lot -- had little to say in public. Although most of them regard the insurgents and militiamen as just as much of a threat as U.S. officials do, few wanted to risk the fallout from condemning a cleric or advocating tough counterinsurgency measures.

But on Baghdad's streets, many Iraqis said they equated the silence with tacit agreement with U.S. policies. In their sermons, clerics lambasted council members, many of whom the Bush administration had hoped would emerge as Iraq's new leaders. At one mosque in Baghdad's Sadr City slum, where streets run with wet garbage, council member Mowaffak Rubaie, a Shiite physician who was recently named national security adviser, was derided as a traitor and "the minister of sewers."

The crises have helped boost the standing of more radical Shiite and Sunni political leaders. Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, a Shiite tribal chief who led guerrilla attacks on Hussein's army in the 1980s and '90s in the southern marshes, gained stature in many Shiite neighborhoods after he suspended his membership in the council because of a disagreement with U.S. policy. Although U.S. officials selected Muhammadawi to sit on the council last summer, they have soured on him in recent months because of his support for an armed militia in southeastern Iraq.

Mohsen Abdul Hamid, the leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, has emerged as the council's most influential Sunni member because of his attempts to broker a peace deal in Fallujah. But Abdul Hamid had also been written off months ago by U.S. officials -- for alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist Sunni movement that is banned in several Arab nations.

"The politicians the Americans wanted to become popular have lost out to the guys the Americans didn't want to become popular," said an Iraqi adviser to the occupation authority. "It was exactly the outcome they did not want."

Emphasis added.

Is this a surprise? It should not be but rather it seems that effective Iraq policies are something too much to aspire to.

The fighting has clearly widened the chasm between the government appointed by the U.S. administration and Iraqi society. In Baghdad, ambulances and hospitals that report to the Ministry of Health took in the wounded from Fallujah but then spirited them to smaller, private hospitals and homes amid rumors that U.S. soldiers were sweeping through major medical centers arresting the injured.

"We must protect them -- we must," said Riad Mohammed Saleh, a receptionist at a public hospital in the capital's Yarmouk district. "We figure they are regular citizens."

The extent of popular support for the resistance is unclear. But in nationwide surveys taken before the sieges of Fallujah and Najaf, a growing percentage of Iraqis said they saw the U.S. forces as occupiers, not liberators. The standing of the Americans was particularly low in the restive towns of Fallujah and Ramadi.

"Whenever the Americans increase their attacks on these areas, the people there become stronger and more willing to fight," said Sadoun Dulame, director of the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies, an independent Iraqi research center. "I think if the Americans break into Najaf there will be a real problem, because they will be affected by the people of Fallujah."
.....

Finally

No less sobering, commanders said, were new reports of children playing roles in guerrilla attacks. In Baghdad Tuesday, a girl about 6 or 7 years old dropped an explosive from a highway overpass onto a convoy. A commander was killed in a similar incident outside Fallujah, when a convoy was ambushed after slowing for a girl leading cattle across a highway.

Great.

Just great.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:30 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 17, 2004

Final thought: Gambling on CPA

Have to make another call, likely fruitless, to try to get the promised steel information out of the CPA fuckers, tomorrow.

Now you would think these incompetent [I thought of several obscenities then decided here I should just say CPAers] would be ready to bend over and grease themselves for the opportunity for actual real live serious investment to come in. However, they do not seem to want to do anything to actually enable actual investment. Good fucking lord, they are stupid. I mean, I am now led to understand we will not be able to get any shipping north of the port of Basra because private carriers just consider the routes too dangerous. That is to say, a good 50 percent of the habitable areas of Iraq are now utterly no go for any sane commercial venture. Given that the CPA is always rambling on about "turning corners" and the opposition is emerging because they're doing so well (a truly surreal claim that if they believe it, and I am afraid it may be the idiots who say these things actually do), one should think that these developments are... good news. Up is down. That sort of thing. You know, always been at war with East Asia...

Oh yeah, I have been led to understand by well-placed sources that "for around US $5 thousand [paid to] an Iraqi bureacrat working for CPA you can get yourself spec'ed into just about anything." This is getting real tempting - if not for that fucking corrupt practices act and my own odd obsession with doing things right even at the cost of double the effort and irritation - because clearly the honest request for basic information (that only they fucking hold) is not working.

In any case, anyone wanna lay bets that tomorrow's call is utterly useless?

No, that's not fair odds.

Rather, let's take suggestions on what kind of lame ass excuses or justifications I get, along with empty political blather.

Open to you, the reader.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:17 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Chris Dickey's note on Iraq

Chris Dickey (sr. Middle East editor for newsweek and author) has an interesting note on Iraq:
Indecent Interval
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4733368/

I like Chris, he's got a good sense of the place, although no real Arabic, knows enough people to balance, knows enough to listen as well. Interesting commentary. I have a disturbing sense he's right.

By the way, the head shot is in Amman, taken at a mutual friend's apartment last year as I recall. Could be wrong on the timing though.

[edited to adjust to local (GMT) time, posts have been two hours off for some odd reason.)

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:04 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 16, 2004

Bush and Sharon: the "Plan"

I have been reading further analysis of this and have to admit I was wrong. This is a really awful and problematic development. I have said time and time again that the one key condition for Palestinians really making peace with Israel is they have to get 1967 West Bank. Anything less and you have a nasty Versailles peace situ that will never, ever gain real legitimacy.

This is bad for Israel, bad for Palestinians, bad for Arabs, and bad for everyone.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:12 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On the road but a bit of access: thoughts on the dangers of the 'Neo-Cons' or the"Right Bolsheviks"

Thanks to my Ipaq I've done some writing on my thoughts on the dangers of the Neo-Cons or as I will call them from now on, "The Right Bolsheviks."

After reading that note from The Telegraph I've entirely gone over to the view that the Neo-Cons are a serious problem, these "Right Bolsheviks."

However, not done yet and trying to get meetings before Casablanca. Pain in the ass.

I should say, I may add, that I really love BA and I have when I have to fly other carriers.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:42 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 15, 2004

Telegraph: a highly revealing and indeed very important insight into CPA political policy

A quick note before I piss off to the airport (presuming the driver gets here on time... why I would presume that, I have no idea, but perhaps from the sheerest optimism.)

Britain and US 'divided on Iraq policy'
By Alec Russell in Washington
(Filed: 14/04/2004)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/04/14/wirq14.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/04/14/ixnewstop.html

Some amusing and not so amusing excerpts.

British officials in Iraq have all but ignored President George W Bush's plan to foster a new democracy in the country in favour of their own agenda, according to an American former official in Baghdad's interim government.

Well, what can we say. A unique spin, if nothing else. Of course the characterization of American policy as a plan in the proper sense of the word verges on delusional.

...

[notes first slip in public unity] They also highlight the difficulties facing Tony Blair at his meeting with Mr Bush on Friday when the two leaders will try to plot the transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, which is due in 11 weeks.

Michael Rubin, who resigned from the Pentagon 10 days ago after returning from the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, gave a stark account of fundamental divisions between British and American officials over how to run Iraq.

He suggested that British officials clearly had little interest in pursuing the White House vision of a democratic Iraq, a keystone of its foreign policy, and were too "soft" in confronting dissent.

Soft.

Demoracy.

Dissent.

Confronting.

Almost a poem of some kind.

Never mind I would call it, that is the British approach, realistic. And I should bloody well hope they have little interest in "pursuing" Bush's "vision" - never mind the odd confusion of ally with the phrase "servile yes man."

He also said that many American officials had been startled at British attempts to capitalise on their presence in southern Iraq for a "freelance" fostering of ties with Iran, one of Washington's most implacable enemies.

Freelance, eh?

"That is a major policy decision for the White House," he said. "It should not be made in Basra [the centre of the British zone of influence].

"We got a sense that Britons were using the CPA as an outreach to Iran, which was not the Americans' intention."

Well, I guess we can thank him for giving us such a clear view of the US DoD of what "ally" and "diplomacy" are.

Tensions between British and American officials have long been hinted at, not least between Paul Bremer, America's proconsul, and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's former envoy to Baghdad who left - apparently in some frustration - last month.

One CPA insider said: "There was an understanding in the CPA that Bremer and Greenstock didn't like each other. It personified the differences between the two views.

"Greenstock thought Bremer was naive; Bremer thought Greenstock was pursuing the wrong policies."

Well, I understand Greenstock's odd pronouncement at a conference I attended some months back regarding his position re CPA. I can't recall the exact formulation (no doubt I have notes somewhere) but it was a stilted pronouncement of unity of views. Wierdly out of place.

Of course, given their respective records, and now the clear contrast between the Shiite areas under British and American administration, I should think Mr. Rubin might have cause for a modicum of reflection, if only for the sheer novelty of it.

British officials play down disagreements as inevitable. But privately, sources close to the CPA suggest that British officials in Iraq see Mr Bremer as too ideological. In particular his decision to disband the Iraqi army and the freezing out of Ba'athists are seen as misjudgments.

Mr Rubin did not comment directly on relations between the two men. "Bremer is following the president's agenda," he said. "And, in general, most British diplomats still don't agree with the president's agenda."

He says, as if the passage of time was encouraging agreement with Bush's... ahem ... "agenda?" How about fanciful wishful thinking trying to pass as something approaching a childish approximation of foreign policy?

Mr Rubin was an adviser on the governance group of the CPA until March. He is now an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank and arguably the ideological engine room of Mr Bush's administration.

Ahhhhh, the specialists in, how would one best characterise is, retardation in analytical thinking. Utter contempt for actually learning from one's mistakes? Reveling in one's own sheer stupidity?

He said he and other American officials had been deeply concerned by the softly softly approach of the British to former Ba'athists, whom Washington felt should be excluded from positions of authority, and also to Iranian groups.

That's right. One should make, gratitiously just to make some obscure theological point, as many enemies at once.

To prove the point, after all.

Purity in purpose before actual achievement, after all.

"When I travelled down to the British zone in southern Iraq I was amazed at what the British were not reporting with regard to what the Iranians were up to," he said.

"With regard to the Iranian presence in Iraq, the Britons were inclined to see the glass half full and the Americans as half empty. Reconciliation with Iran has little to do with Iraqi democracy but it appeared the FO had another agenda.

That's right. A modus vivendi with an important neighbor while one is trying to stabilise a country has nothing at all to do with achieving the long term aim of something approaching, however vaguely, democracy in Iraq.

Well, readers, I believe we have a winner for ... I don't know how to put this? Sheer idiocy in analysis?

"When I came in to Iraq back in July [last year] my question to British colleagues was, 'What is our end goal?' They didn't want to talk about the end goal of democracy.

"It was clear that the US was serious about democracy, the Brits less so. The US and Britain were working at cross purposes basically because of disputes over how realistic was the pursuit of democracy."

Oh right. Realistic, eh?

No doubt this is one of the people my Agency boy was ranting about, one of the CPA people who masturbated over the fine constitution and investment laws they were designing as a shining beacon of free enterprise and blah blah, even as the actual situation around them slowly slid into shit.

This is a form of fantasy world thinking that is more worthy of Marxists than ... well I suppose Republicans, presuming he votes that way. It is really extraordinary. It appears he is blissfully unaware that his ideological purity is producing failure, while the British pragmatism is at least staving it off.

Mr Rubin stressed that on some levels co-operation was very good. He said Britain had proved better at public relations than the Americans.

But he also hinted that some British officials had deliberately tried to keep some of their activities from the Americans. "It didn't appear that Brits were always forthright with their agenda."

Well, lord knows that if they were dealing with him, they were well served in doing so.

Mr Rubin's account was broadly backed up by a non-Pentagon American source close to the CPA who suggested that British and American officials had been divided by their different traditions of government service.

"Many of the people from Washington were political appointees and real true believers," said the source. "But the British tended to be career people."

Emphasis added.

May we be preserved from the true believers.

Career people, meaning professionals focused on actually getting things done and working pragmatically with the actual facts on the ground, rather than some strange quasi-bizaro world inverted Marxist fantasy world?

At the heart of the dispute appears to have been the personalities of the key players: Sir Jeremy, an old-school, highly experienced diplomat, and Mr Bremer, who is, in the eyes of his critics, a brash and very ambitious appointee.

Our Man in Basra also knew the region prior and had some level of Arabic, I was led to understand.

One American source said that when Sir Jeremy arrived last year after his stint as Britain's ambassador to the United Nations, British officials in Baghdad hoped that such a high profile and authoritative figure would be able to steer the CPA in a "moderate" direction.

But he is thought to have become increasingly frustrated at the way Mr Bremer was running the CPA. Another American source suggested that Mr Bremer felt overshadowed by his more experienced British colleague. Sir Jeremy was succeeded by David Richmond, a career diplomat.

Mr Rubin concluded that the two countries' very different histories and experience of colonialism were a major factor. "The British feel they have more experience [in nation building] and that the US is new to this game.

"The Americans see the British as making the mistakes of the 1920s [when Shias rose against British rule]. They think the British don't realise that the situation has changed."

The situation has changed.

It is hard to put a finger on the precise nature of the stupidity here, but ... well, must pack up the lapy toppy shortly.

(ps in re an inquiry re Steel, email is bouncing, I replied. present situ unclear and am awaiting response from principals as we have a critical issue)

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:41 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 14, 2004

West Bank Plan

Rumour has it that Bush is going to approve Sharon's Bantustans. That is going to be a seriously bad thing. Lots of people are talking about it here as "the final proof" in regards to the real intentions of US policy.

I certainly hope it will not happen.

As for status, I was at a US financed business development office today, couldn't find it at first. Why? They can no longer have a sign out front or even internally in the office building, the security concerns are so high.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:34 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 13, 2004

Cohen: "Blind in Iraq"

Cohen is a close second, in my opinion, on getting things right in commenting on Iraq.

Some comments here on his article/op ed:

Blind in Baghdad
By Richard Cohen
Tuesday, April 13, 2004; Page A19
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6750-2004Apr12.html

First, the opening is just right in terms of analysis:
Here are the reasons Iraq is not Vietnam: It is a desert, not a jungle. The enemy is not protected and supplied by major powers such as the Soviet Union or China, not to mention a formidable front-line state such as North Vietnam. The Iraqis are not, like the Vietnamese, a single culture fighting a long-term war of liberation from colonial masters. They are fragmented by religion and language, and they have been independent ever since the British left lo these many years ago. In almost every way but one, Iraq is not Vietnam. Here's the one: We don't know what the hell we're doing.

Of course it is perhaps our Lebanon. Perhaps all the more problematic for that. Now the underlined part is the key, it is very clear US policy really does not engage the actual reality on the ground in any way that engages the Iraqis. Not in any way. One can kill half the population on the route the US is currently on, and it does not achieve the political goals. There is a kind of victory the "wipe them out" crowd needs to learn about, it starts with a P.

But abstracting away from that, he goes on to say:
This is the most important finding you can take from the debacle of the past two weeks. The sudden uprising of the Shiite militia loyal to Moqtada Sadr took U.S. forces by surprise. For now, it does not matter that this uprising is containable or that Sadr may well be little more than a thug. What matters is that he was able to organize an insurrection right under our noses and put up a more than credible fight. Calling him a thug, as we are wont to do, does not change matters.

I recall a commentator here, I think Truth Seeker, noted the bolded part is the most serious item to take away from this insurrection, which was clearly almost general (and may yet be), and was clearly well-prepared and executed, even if it was the US the chose the timing.

And indeed, the American propensity to engage in silly name calling (thug, etc) rather than clear analysis is not helpful.

This remarkable fact, to use the current argot, is sooooooo Vietnam. Once again, we are feeling our way in the dark. We have 130,000 troops in Iraq. We have 77,000 Iraqi police officers on our side, supposedly with their ears to the ground. We have the supposed loyalty of all those Iraqis who tell pollsters that they are grateful for what Americans have done for their country and how much they want the United States to stay. Still, somehow, not a one of them blew the whistle when Sadr was issuing orders and patting his fighters on the back as they were heading out the door.

Bingo.

Paul Bremer, the American proconsul in Iraq, is by all accounts an admirable and incredibly industrious man, "tasked," in Condi-speak, to do the impossible. But on the Sunday talk shows, he seemed right out of central casting, some actor playing the clueless American, down to his striped tie and button-down shirt. When asked who he was going to turn power over to on June 30, he replied, "That's a good question," but supplied no answer. He simply does not know. He does know, though, that the "majority view" among Iraqis is hardly anti-American. The polls tell him so. This is Vietnam all over again.

Another brilliant analysis actually - of course for all that I remian sceptical of polling in the Iraqi context and given what I know about Arab societies (and the strong tendancy to repond as the questioner thinks you desire) so positive or negative, take polls with a grain of salt.

In the first place, minorities make revolutions, not majorities. Most people simply do as they are told. Second, polls -- even in Iowa, for crying out loud -- are notoriously unreliable. Last, Bremer and the rest of us are simply going to have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that we will never know what is happening in Iraq. It's a different culture.

Well, leaving aside his over-generalisation regarding polls - certainly polls in Iowa are far more accurate, but in a culture emerging from the dark night of a police state, and one in which face saving is important, one has to understand polls are highly problematic.

And of course, as the underlined notes, minorities make revolutions. It is very clear that "support" for America is wafer thin and not enthusiastic. On the other hand, opposition down to hatred runs deep, and wide. That means our "supporters" are not terribly motivated to take risks for the Americans and they are not as motivated as those who want to overthrow the American rule (for many, many reasons).

That is not a positive dynamic, and unless one gives a reason besides fear (for in this context, one must recall Machiavelli's warning not to be hated) to not oppose, that is positive Iraqi reasons, one loses. Pure and simple. One loses. It is how the French lost Algeria, never giving the Algerians a solution as part of France that appealed to Algerians, in gross.

These were the hard truths of Vietnam. This is how the base barber, the smiling guy who kidded with GIs as he cut their hair, could be Viet Cong. This is how the trusted legman for some American news outlet could be an enemy intelligence officer, now available for interviews in Ho Chi Minh City cafes. This inability to read the culture, to discern friend from foe, is what produced such frustration and the occasional war atrocity. Even with our eyes open, we were blind as a bat.

Bingo.

It is the same in Iraq. We went to war for the wrong reasons, and with too few troops and too few allies. Just about every expectation turned out to be misplaced. The occupation has not been financed by oil revenue, as we were assured. The Iraqi army and police are not, as promised, up to the task of maintaining order. Americans were often greeted as liberators, but also as conquerors. The United States did not commit enough troops to intimidate looters and the civilian leaders we backed turned out to have larger followings in Georgetown than in Baghdad. Victory remains possible, but first we'll have to figure out what victory is.

Bingo.

The list of mistakes, many of them the consequences of titanic cockiness and utter contempt for dissenters (remember how fast Gen. Eric Shinseki was shunned after he said the occupation would require several hundred thousand troops?), is long and painful. They range from the consequential to what seemed almost trivial (shutting down Sadr's newspaper) and responding to both Shiite and Sunni provocations at the same time. We could have made better decisions, but believe me, even those might not necessarily have made a difference.

Bingo.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:55 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

An excellent editorial by Ignatius

Let me say that over the past several months, the key, best editorial writer in the United States regarding the Middle East has been Ignatius of The Washington Post

Back To the Basics
By David Ignatius
Tuesday, April 13, 2004; Page A19
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6752-2004Apr12.html
Some excerpts - I suppose it is not bad his suggestions resemble my own.

... The Bush administration must recognize that Iraq is now a three-alarm fire. American policy there is stumbling, and the causes need to be addressed urgently. The basic problem continues to be security, but it doesn't have a purely military solution: We can't fix this one simply by sending in more troops, occupying more cities or patrolling more Shiite neighborhoods. That way leads to a brutal quagmire.

Indeed. Indeed. Indeed.

What the "crush them" crowd forgets is that the "rally round the flag" effect is not simply a domestic phenom that applies to them, it happens elsewhere, and in Iraq in its tribal society, the motors are particularly hostile to foreigners/outsiders.

Program:
What's needed is a "New Deal" for Iraq -- a post-June 30 plan that evokes the crash efforts of Franklin D. Roosevelt to turn the momentum of the Great Depression. No more administration pieties about democracy and terrorism, please. In the nine months before Iraq is to hold elections, the United States must focus on the basics: Put people to work, make them feel that the United States and its allies are bringing a better life. Some specifics suggested to me by Iraqi friends:

• Provide electricity everywhere, 24 hours a day, by the scheduled handover of sovereignty. If it takes an airlift of C-17s carrying generators, do it; if it means expensive temporary fixes, do it. The lack of electric power has been a symbol of U.S. failure in Iraq; make reliable electricity a symbol of success.

• Speed up the $18 billion in reconstruction spending the United States promised in January. That effort was supposed to deliver 50,000 new jobs by June 30. Iraqis need to see action, now.

• Put more money on the streets quickly, through crash public works projects. The coalition cleaned up Baghdad last summer by paying thousands of kids a few dollars a day to sweep streets. Do it again. Put more money into the hands of local political, tribal and religious leaders. Some of it will be wasted, but in a good cause.

Good so far.

The politics:
A New Deal for Iraq means correcting some of the political errors that led to the current mess. The Pentagon (which failed badly at nation-building in Iraq) must give way to the State Department. Occupation czar L. Paul Bremer (a brave man who deserved better support from Pentagon civilians) will be replaced June 30 by a new U.S. ambassador. Because so much of the job will involve liaison with the United Nations, a good choice would be the current U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte. And surely it's time to end any remaining Pentagon subsidies to the mercurial Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi and let him fly solo in the new Iraq.

Well, I am not a fan at all of Negroponte, and indeed I think his (required to be sure) public involvement in the run up is a liability. That aside, the underlined notes, I think are important. Certainly I have hammered home the failure of the CPA, and I largely put that in the laps of the DoD civlians. The other item is certainly we should not be subsidizing Chalabi. Period. To continue to do so is to set ourselves up for failure. Even more so than normal.

The Iraqi security situation will remain a nightmare for months and probably years to come, but there are ways to avoid making it worse. Despite last week's spasm of violence, the United States should stick to its earlier plans for pulling troops out of populated areas and moving them to garrisons from which they can deploy rapidly.

Perhaps.

I think rather it would do well to not retreat into fortresses, but rather spend time training with British on how to engage in proper engagement with the Iraqi population, bringing security but without using Helo gunships.

Iraq's own security forces clearly aren't ready to take over yet, so the transition will be ragged. But last week's surprising unity of Sunni and Shiite religious and political figures suggested that perhaps the country's leaders now hate the United States more than they hate each other. Maybe they can find unity in their Iraq-ness. And to gain Iranian help in stabilizing the budding Shiite insurrection, Britain is said to be holding secret talks with Tehran. ....

I am not sure unity around hatred of the US is positive, but... well throw me a bone as they say.

And I agree, engage Tehren and Damascus. It is their neighborhood, they will be around longer than us, and the capacity of actors, official or even worse, free agents, to blow things up from their side is far larger than US ability to punish. Better to engage them in not being spoilers than this idiotic blustering.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Cole II: an important comment

Now, despite my issues with Cole getting overtaken in his analyses and rhetoric by anti-Americanism, he continues to provide valuable analysis, of which the following is most important:
The problem with this approach is that the Sadrists are a widespread social movement whose history goes back over a decade, and killing Muqtada will not end the movement. There are lots of potential successors to Muqtada. The chief characteristic of the Sadrists is their cheekiness. They were cheeky to Saddam, and they will be cheeky to Gen. Abizaid. They are desperately poor ghetto dwellers, they don't like The Man, and they think they have nothing to lose in taking Him on. If the US military thinks this is a military problem with a military solution, they are just clueless. Someone on a discussion list said that Iraq is not Vietnam because this time the generals are in charge, and they know what they are doing. The US officers in Iraq are bright, dedicated persons, but they don't know squat about Iraq (even Abizaid, a Lebanese Christian, is hardly an Iraq expert), and it also isn't at all clear that they are setting the agenda. Going after Muqtada, for instance, almost certainly was the idea of the civilian politicians in the CPA and the Department of Defense. Once the mission was defined, the military wants to carry it out militarily. If they go into Najaf, there will be hell to pay (see below). Emphasis added.
http://www.juancole.com/2004_04_01_juancole_archive.html#108183514550199863

Now, to be fair, Cole is identifying, even in his more intemprate comments, some of the same issues I have seen - that is the definition of the policy problems and who is doing it, and their ignorance.

The issue, I think, at the core of this, is that the military solution is a non-solution, as in Algeria, etc. Certainly security has to obtain and certainly that will require the US military to kill people - bad or otherwise. However, the core question is the following: are the deaths, are the operations actually leading to a sustainable political route? If they are not - and when I say sustainable political route, I do not mean the transformative fantasies of the NeoCons, Islamophobes and the like, I mean something that will get Iraqis on board - then the violence is not only self-defeating, it is generating more of a problem day by day.

One of the worst issues here is that Americans do not seem to understand that by and large, their self-image is not shared by the Iraqis. One of the commentators in a prior post drew a comparision to the American Revolutionary War - I should quote it, actually. From pantom:
These hardy men of the Blue Ridge and Alleghenies, of deep religious convictions, were accustomed to the hardships and independence of a pioneer life, and in their mountain homes in the highlands and the backwaters they but seldom were concerned with affairs beyond their borders or interfered with by Crown or colony. When Ferguson approached their kingdom and threatened to invade their lands and lay waste their country with "fire and sword," and to "hang their leaders," he aroused their indignation and anger to such a degree that they determined to rid the country forever of this enemy, who menaced their independence and the safety of their homes and families. Had Cornwallis and his leaders known more about these mountain and backwater men, they would have carefully avoided all military and punitive measures which might tend to draw them from their mountain fastnesses to enroll amongst the enemies of the King.
The causes of the Revolution were but little known to many of these pioneers beyond the Blue Ridge. They were concerned in the establishment of their homes, breaking the soil of their new settlements, and wringing a livelihood from it; and with their rifles securing much of their sustenance. They sought the seclusion of the western waters; and in the valleys of the Holston, the Watauga, and the Nolichucky, found freedom in the exercise of their religion. Had the western covering force of Cornwallis's army, as it advanced into the Province of North Carolina, confined its activities, to the plains and lowlands east of the Blue Ridge, and had not Ferguson from Gilbert Town uttered his threat of fire and sword and the hangman's noose, these mountain men would probably have remained in their homes, and but few of them would have joined with those who were in rebellion against the King.

from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/RevWar/KM-Cpns/AWC-KM1.htm

It is evocative, and again the "crush them" crowd presumes certian conditions obtain - that they are in the right, that they are perceived by the population to be in the right, and that one can "crush" the insurgency. Certainly one can at one level, but as recent reporting in The New York Times has noted, specialists do not think that this is anything more than a temporary thing - the insurgency will regenerate unless a legitmate (in Iraqi eyes) political and economic order responding to their desires is in place.

Of course, this presents some non-trivial difficulties given many desires are self-contradictory.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:21 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Cole, valuable reporting in re Iraqi views, but also unnecessary nastiness

first, I highly advise reading Cole's recent analyses of the political interplay on the Iraqi side and the meanings. While I would note that I think he overplays the pessimism to an extent, I also would call his evaluation more grounded than the blather one gets from the Bush Administration and its echo chambers.

However on this:
Virulent Racism, Disregard for Civilian Life Mar US Military Approach: British Commander
http://www.juancole.com/2004_04_01_juancole_archive.html#108170945766449202
is why I am growing rather displeased with his commentary despite its value. Virulent racism? Certainly prejudice, but virulent racism is hardly a fair read I think of the British comments (which I myself commented on).

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Dumb Western bitches

My apologies for the title.

This evening, I am afraid I rather alienated some stupid a German bitch. “Development workers”

I am afraid that I have little patience in general, although I suppose that my online perso is more impatience than off-line, but nevertheless it is a matter of degree.

This evening speaking with some people I had the misfortune to speak to a bit too special, hyper blond German … woman who wanted to convince me that as a Western woman she was oppressed and whatever here in the Arab world. For all her privs.

Let me say, as I said in our rather heated convo, that I fully recognize the disadvantages of being a woman in the Arab world (for all that one can frequently exaggerate them), but I argued as Westerners we, ipso facto, had advantages and privs. No, she argued, no she was oppressed. Never mind her experience in the Arab world has been (a) a cushy German internship with the Dubai government (she was oppressed because no one listened to her… that is probably true, but I would suspect in addition to being female the fact she’s (i) a kid (ii) a bit too special (iii) dresses unprofessionally (iv) it is the Gulf were major inputs into this. Now, in the Sham she feel oppressed because she gets “looks” (well dress like a cheap Lebanese whore and you get looks of course) and people do not respect her (while gender no doubt is important, the fact you’re a fucking moron, and a self centered one at that likely plays a role).

Fucking hell, there are real problems here, but cunts like this in their bloody self-absorbed whiney bitch manners do nothing to help. Fucking idiots.

I am afraid I alienated the entire clique, but insofar as (a) they’re not my social circle, (b) I am fucking off, it was fun to go to town explaining why she is an over priviledged bitch.

Pity, there are vast grounds for legit gender complaints by non-botoxing bitches.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:57 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 12, 2004

Confirm on convoys

Iraq Gunmen Batter American Supply Lines
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: April 12, 2004
Filed at 11:21 a.m. ET
http://nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Iraq.html

On Monday, a convoy of flatbed trucks carrying M113 armored personnel carriers was attacked and burned on a road in Latifiya, 20 miles south of Baghdad. Witnesses said three people were killed.

A supply truck was also ambushed and set ablaze Monday on the road from Baghdad's airport. Looters moved in to carry away goods from the truck as Iraqi police looked on without intervening.

Emphasis added.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:16 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Current Iraq reporting, some notes

I wanted to draw attention to the following extracts.

Fallujah Mostly Quiet on Second Day of Truce
About 70 Troops, Several Hundred Iraqis Killed in Recent Fighting
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A4788-2004Apr12?language=printer
Compiled From Wire Reports
Monday, April 12, 2004; 9:50 AM

U.S. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt released the first full casualty statistics since widespread fighting erupted on April 4.

"The coalition casualties since April 1 run about 70 personnel. ... The casualty figures we have received from the enemy are somewhere about 10 times that amount, what we've inflicted on the enemy," Kimmitt told a Baghdad press conference.

Numbers. numbers. numbers.

What do they really mean? Are we returning to the silliness of the empty quantification of the Vietnam era?

The real issue is winning the population, for if only a third of the population supports in a real manner an insurgency, that is already a few million to sustain a guerrila. At that is a losing game to play, even if you are killing ten times your losses (not surprising since they have no armor).
About 600 Iraqi dead were recorded by the main hospital and four clinics in Fallujah, hospital director Rafie al-Issawi told The Associated Press.

In all, about 880 Iraqis have been killed, according to an AP count, based on statements by Iraqi hospital officials, U.S. military statements and Iraqi police.

And therein is the problem. the ratio of dead. And the ratio of civilians. Not because the US is monstrous, but because it is a losing PR game.

The top U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, acknowledged that a battalion of the Iraqi army refused to fight in Fallujah -- a sign of Iraqi discontent with the siege.

Well, what can we say?

Byrne said U.S. Marines would not withdraw from their positions in Fallujah. "Diplomacy is just talk unless you have a credible force to back it up," he said. "People will bend to our will if they are afraid of us."

I note, however, Machievelli, had it right, if they fear you and hate you more than that, that is another game.

Byrne cast doubt on the numbers and said he was confident troops in his 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment had not killed any civilians.

"Just because (the Iraqis) say it's so, doesn't meant it's so," he said.

Well, as accurate as the comment may be, it has played poorly. And is bloody tone deaf.

Of course, it's idiotic to assert that when you are using air strikes in an urban area that you have not killed civilians.

I note al-Arabiyah is showing several US convoys in Baghdad and Mosul areas that seem to have been ambushed. Unclear if they were recent, but were still smoking.

al-Arabiyah also notes an explosion hit an American convoy in Baqoubah.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:08 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Aged comment response

What did you think of today's news,
Algerian President Overwhelmingly Wins Re-election?

Nearly 60 percent of Algeria's eligible voters cast ballots in the first multiparty elections since a military coup 12 years ago interrupted parliamentary elections that would have put an Islamist party in power. The coup set in motion a cycle of violence in which more than 100,000 Algerians died and as many as 10,000 disappeared.

Mr. Bouteflika stopped most of the killing four years ago by granting the country's Islamic fighters amnesty in return for their laying down their weapons. Though some armed groups continue to operate, the pace of killing has slowed significantly, and terrorist attacks in the cities are now rare.

"We now have less than 1,000 Islamic fighters in all Algeria, while we were fighting close to 25,000 in 1994 and 1995,"

A drop in terrorist violence is not the only the reason the president has drawn support. Though mismanagement and corruption continue to plague the country, Mr. Bouteflika has presided over an impressive improvement in Algeria's troubled economy.

What do I think of it?

Algeria's war is a war of Army clans as much as Islamist violence. What seems to have happened is that Boutfliqa may have mastered the Army. May have.

If you were granted an audience with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, what advice would you give him?

Well, it's not even within the realm of reasonably khayali to pretend to give advice to Sistani. Regardless, he's playing his hand well as far as I can tell.

What do you make of this, Iraqi Claims U.S. and Falluja Foes Agree to a Deal?
Why does Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Mohri phrase his remarks as follows, "We condemn the acts of sabotage, chaos and takeover of public property by a group that unfortunately is part of one of Iraq's biggest and best-known families?" Is he suggesting Mr. Sadr's militia is not representative of the Shiite perspective but a power play by an extended family?

Well, it seems more to be saying that as-Sadr's behaviour is not ... dignified or appropriate for a man of religion. Which it is not. I would not read this as saying that as-Sadr is representative or not, but rather his behaviour is not appropriate for his background and for the legacy of the as-Sadr.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:42 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

A few quick observations - Iraq

An important article from TheTelegraph

US tactics condemned by British officers
By Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent
(Filed: 11/04/2004)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/04/11/wtact11.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/04/11/ixnewstop.html&secureRefresh=true&_requestid=7631

This deserves a close reading. I note that one has heard this continuously over the past year, from British security specialists, in the Media, etc. The issue is clearly among the more serious ones driving the American failure to date:
Senior British commanders have condemned American military tactics in Iraq as heavy-handed and disproportionate.

One senior Army officer told The Telegraph that America's aggressive methods were causing friction among allied commanders and that there was a growing sense of "unease and frustration" among the British high command.

The officer, who agreed to the interview on the condition of anonymity, said that part of the problem was that American troops viewed Iraqis as untermenschen - the Nazi expression for "sub-humans".

Indeed, I would have to see that however charged the usage is, there is a large component of truth. Of course, the Iraqis themselves have behaved in deplorable ways, and Iraqi public culture after ... well never having a genuine public culture... is ill, distorted and violent.

Speaking from his base in southern Iraq, the officer said: "My view and the view of the British chain of command is that the Americans' use of violence is not proportionate and is over-responsive to the threat they are facing. They don't see the Iraqi people the way we see them. They view them as untermenschen. They are not concerned about the Iraqi loss of life in the way the British are. Their attitude towards the Iraqis is tragic, it's awful.

"The US troops view things in very simplistic terms. It seems hard for them to reconcile subtleties between who supports what and who doesn't in Iraq. It's easier for their soldiers to group all Iraqis as the bad guys. As far as they are concerned Iraq is bandit country and everybody is out to kill them."

In part this may very well come from the "black hat", "white hat" thinking that seems to dominate to much American thinking on the issue of Iraq. Certainy, of course, some people are purely out to get the Americans, but as in say Northern Ireland, there is a space of people who may go either way.

But then "force protection" seems to be higher on the logical chain of thought for American forces than actually winning.

...

Although no formal complaints have as yet been made to their American counterparts, the officer said the British Government was aware of its commanders' "concerns and fears".

The officer explained that, under British military rules of war, British troops would never be given clearance to carry out attacks similar to those being conducted by the US military, in which helicopter gunships have been used to fire on targets in urban areas.

British rules of engagement only allow troops to open fire when attacked, using the minimum force necessary and only at identified targets.

As well as other heavy weapons, e.g. AC 130 Gunships.

The American approach was markedly different: "When US troops are attacked with mortars in Baghdad, they use mortar-locating radar to find the firing point and then attack the general area with artillery, even though the area they are attacking may be in the middle of a densely populated residential area.

"They may well kill the terrorists in the barrage but they will also kill and maim innocent civilians. That has been their response on a number of occasions. It is trite, but American troops do shoot first and ask questions later. They are very concerned about taking casualties and have even trained their guns on British troops, which has led to some confrontations between soldiers.

The main issue, I suppose is that the American troops have been trained as a combat machine in the context of total war, in which this sort of logic makes sense. However, that is not the war they are fighting. Or if it is, it is inevitably a losing war. Lose the population, you get a Chechnia, a Lebanon. Win the population over - and not through agitprop that largely plays off of your own self image and thus speaks largely to yourself but through engaging Iraqi view - well then something may come from this mess.

"The British response in Iraq has been much softer. During and after the war the British set about trying to win the confidence of the local population. There have been problems, it hasn't been easy but on the whole it was succeeding."

The officer believed that America had now lost the military initiative in Iraq, and it could only be regained with carefully planned, precision attacks against the "terrorists".

"The US will have to abandon the sledgehammer-to-crack-a-nut approach - it has failed," he said. "They need to stop viewing every Iraqi, every Arab as the enemy and attempt to win the hearts and minds of the people.

"Our objective is to create a stable, democratic and safe Iraq. That's achievable but not in the short term. It is going to take up to 10 years."

Ten years, no, one does not have that much time.

Now contrast this with the following quote:
" A spokesman for the American command, Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, said American forces had no estimates of Iraqi casualties. But he rejected claims, some by Iraqi leaders sympathetic to the occupation, that the marines had used tanks, infantry and air power disproportionately and indiscriminately in a way that had amounted to a collective punishment for Falluja's 200,000 people. "The forces out in Falluja have been tremendously precise, tremendously circumspect, and have not engaged in any violation of the laws of war," he said."
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/12/international/middleeast/12IRAQ.html?pagewanted=all&position=

I hate to tell the General (who is after all the author of the statement that all of Iraq is not at war but 'under combat') but if your own allies are telling you that your use of air power, heavy weapons is disproportionate, it may be time to step away from useless legalisms and ask yourself, is your obsession with force protection losing the real war for you? Wars have political aims, they have to obey more than simply 'laws of war.'

I note the lame response to the issue of coverage:
When an Iraqi reporter at a news briefing said that General Kimmitt had spoken "of a clean war" in Falluja, while Iraqis watching Arab television channels like Al Jazeera, broadcast from the Persian Gulf state of Qatar, had an impression that "what is happening in Falluja is killing children," General Kimmitt responded, "Change the channel to a legitimate, authoritative, honest news station."

I have news for the general, Iraqis, in large part, view al-Jazeerah as authoritative. You need to start communicating to them in a manner that makes sense to them, not giving briefings for the audiences in the States to soak up. Let the people in Washington play to that crowd, your audience should be Iraq.

For more analysis in this area, I direct you to:
Some in Military Fear a Return to Iraqi Battles Already Fought
By THOM SHANKER
Published: April 12, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/12/international/middleeast/12MILI.html?pagewanted=all&position=

Finally, I draw attention to this article:
washingtonpost.com
Iraqi Bond Breaks As Fighting Rages
Tribesmen Turn Hostile to U.S. Troops
By Karl Vick
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, April 12, 2004; Page A15
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A4142-2004Apr11?language=printer

I can say I have had the kinds of conversations described there. Iraqi rhetoric is ... very tribal. One never admits error in public, it's always the other guy's fault, they never started anything. A statement that perhaps they were mistaken is turned to say "Oh you're saying Iraqis never tell the truth?" Things like that. The verbal culture is in many ways extremely alien, and this comes out most of all in negative circumstances ... doesn't it always? Well, again, the problem is that the US has been talking to itself, US communications strategies have been driven by it's own self perception. Liberators. Etc. All in a langauge which does not resonate, that sounds as self-satisfied and superior as one might expect. Not all the time, to be sure. Indeed the CPA used to have early on some masterful Arabic communicators, including in particular one Brit, Heatley as I recall, who was so good I was unsure of his origins for the first couple times I saw him. I recall when Sadaam's son's got whacked, he had just the right turns of phrase. Perfect, not triumphalist, but hitting a victorious note in Arabic.

Instead we have Kimmet and this other idjet who really on the less-then-fellicitious transaltors. They're off in their own world, and sadly I do not think they know it.

Indeed, lack of constructive self-criticism engaged with the reality that has to be faced in Iraq seems to be among the binding constraints in US policy now.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:36 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 11, 2004

On Juan Cole's recent commentary

I normally like Juan Cole's site for the quick translations and flow of information, however I rather highly dislike the gratitiously anti-American tone it has taken on of late. Let me quote several items and explain my issues:

First:
So, my question is, was Badran gotten rid of and Allawi sidelined because the Pentagon is now at the endgame, intending to shoehorn Chalabi into power in Iraq? Are the rivals to Chalabi, from Muqtada to Allawi, being targetted one after another by Rumsfeld's representatives in Baghdad? We by now know how completely hollow the talk of Rumsfeld and crew about "democratization" is. How many people have been elected to office on a one-person, one-vote basis in Afghanistan, Iraq, or any place else as a result of Rumsfeld's policies? Everyone is appointed or jiggered into office by a manipulated Loya Jirga. Chalabi seems set to be jiggered into office. And, his militia appears not to be considered a threat to democracy, since the Pentagon even flew it into Iraq.

This strikes me as rather "Arab" thinking. It does not strike me that there are any signs that Chalabi is being maneuvered into office. Rather, a series of ad hoc actions are being taken in a purely reactive manner. None of the major actors, ex-as-Sadr seem to have the initiative. The implication is unnecessary and not supported by anything I hear on the CPA side. A shame Cole has to dip his toes into the more idiotic aspects of conspiracy thinking, insofar as mere stupidity, incompetence and lack of understanding on the CPA side, posturing on the IGC side are ample explanators.

Second:
The US announced a pause in the fighting to allow the Iraqis to "tend to their dead." This statement of Paul Bremer's is obviously a cruel taunt, and indicative of the fury and hatred of the American administration of Iraq toward the people of Anbar province, who have fiercely resisted the American occupation, largely out of Iraqi nationalist or Sunni fundamentalist motives.

Give me a break, Cole. Bremer was not taunting. Stupid set of decisions, but there is no taunt there.

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BBC: Fallujah fighting continues despite cease fire

However today seems to be a general pause, and fighting has died down during the day per Arab Sat and BBC

Also, out and about, the fine Jordanian is out on the streets with heavy weapons. Must be nervous about something.

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My Plan?

If you had the $18 million and were in charge in Iraq, what would you do to salvage the situation? Can it be salvaged? Do you think Bremer & company would be willing to implement your solution (assuming they ever heard of it)? By now they must be grasping at some pretty thin straws--I'd guess that a substantial one handed to them by someone who knows the area and the culture might be listened to.

Well I hope you mean to give me US$18 billion as I would simply pack up with 18 millions.

Can it be salvaged? Yes, I think it can, but requires a complete volte-face

Certainly there is a problem here, The security situation clearly has to be stabilized, which requires the US to call in massive number of troops. That means it is likely to require a full call up of reserves, perhaps a draft. This is not my area, so let me simply close the security issue by noting that the pre-war claim that hundreds of thousands of troops will be required is clearly accurate. I also note that some stabilization is necessary so as not to automatically hand power to the extremists.

The old game plan needs to be scrapped, and perhaps an Iraqi "loya jirga" or general council should be held. The US desperately needs to show change, and find mechanisms to re-establish ... make that establish legitimacy. An end to the de-Baathification campain, engagement with all parties. Massive public works engagement.

I could go on, but as I think about this, I note that I do not think there is any hope that the CPA will change. Nor do I see a hope that the current Administration will change.

In short, with the current players, the situation is a hopeless, grinding guerrilla war.

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April 10, 2004

And just for evidence that religious militants the world over are murderous bastards

Wrath Over a Hindu God
U.S. Scholars' Writings Draw Threats From Faithful
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A334-2004Apr9?language=printer

No comment.

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Guardian Report on demo Friday

Sunni and Shia unite against common enemy
Protest 200,000 join Baghdad rally to denounce US occupation
Jonathan Steele and Rory McCarthy in Baghdad
Saturday April 10, 2004
The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1189295,00.html

Extracts:
Up to 200,000 Iraqi believers, many of them Shias, crowded into the precinct of Baghdad's largest Sunni mosque yesterday to denounce the American occupation and pledge solidarity with the people of Falluja as well as the uprising led by the Shia cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr.

It was the largest show of joint support by Iraq's Sunni and Shia communities.

Nice we're generating unity for the time being.

...
The huge rally dwarfed the joint marches of a few thousand Sunni and Shia sympathisers in northern Baghdad which took place after the bomb attacks by unknown terrorists which killed hundreds at two Shia mosques last month.

....

Even before the sermon started passions were running high. Residents said they had never seen the vast building and its compound so full.

It was unfortunate for the coalition that the anniversary of the ousting of the Saddam Hussein regime fell on a Friday, allowing preachers to use the occasion for mass protests at the occupation instead of the celebration of freedom which the coalition must once have hoped for.

.........

At the end of his sermon the preacher called for a general strike in government offices over the next two days, and a boycott of American and British goods.

But the most emotional moments came when he turned to the agony of Falluja. Almost crying into the microphone, he told the crowd: "The Americans are carrying out vicious terrorist attacks on the people of Falluja. Falluja is a symbol of Islam." Hundreds of people wept.

....

"We urge you to take medical supplies and diesel for the hospital's generator. Many Falluja families have fled south and are living in the open desert. They need help," he said.

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AM Reports, Arab Sats

1. Critical comments on Americans from Governing Council members.
2. Reports of Spanish troops entering Najaf.
3. Continued fighting.
4. Apparent negotiations between IGC members and radicals in Fallujah.

Business as usual then.

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American Isolation in Iraq [edit to add link, reference]

Let me, before running out to take car eof things, draw your attention to these key items - which round up what I have reported from Arab Sat and personal sources, that is, American "allies" on the ground in Iraq (Iraqi ones) are melting away.

At Friday prayers in Sadr City, the vast Shiite slum in Baghdad that spawned the Mahdi Army, scores of uniformed Iraqi police officers wore paper badges with photos of Sadr, his father and his uncle, respected ayatollahs slain by Hussein's government. When Sadr's deputies abruptly decided that the mosque to be used for weekly prayers was exposed to possible attack, the police helped ferry thousands of worshipers to another mosque.

Iraqi police fought beside Mahdi Army near Najaf earlier in the week, and were cooperating with the militia in Najaf and Kut. Several checkpoints along a main highway through southern Iraq were deserted Friday, with pictures of Sadr plastered on an empty pillbox.

In addition, U.S. officials were investigating whether members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps lured four American security contractors into an ambush in Fallujah that ended in mutilation, a possibility reported Friday by The New York Times. The Civil Defense Corps, which trains with U.S. troops, had been regarded by many occupation officials as more reliable than the Iraqi police.

And in an incident that underscored the danger that a broad-based popular insurrection might pose to the occupation, military officials said they had discovered a roadside bomb buried inside the Green Zone, the tightly protected Baghdad compound where the U.S.-led occupation authority is based.

The bomb was found at 12:30 p.m. Thursday in front of the Baghdad convention center, planted in an area where only government and military vehicles are allowed. It was safely detonated by ordnance experts while the top U.S. field commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, gave a news conference inside, according to a senior military official.

Emphasis added.

I note that the bomb has particularly bad implications. Very bad implications.

And re IGC

"Friction between the Governing Council and Bremer, who appointed its 25 members, broke into the open with the resignation of Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, a renowned Shiite resistance fighter during Hussein's rule.

"They're dealing with the situation in the wrong way," Muhammadawi said in an interview. "They shouldn't be trying to solve these problems with military force."

Two other council members -- Ghazi Yawar, a Sunni tribal sheik, and Salama Khufaji, a Shiite dentist -- threatened in television interviews Friday to suspend their membership. Ayad Allawi, the leader of the Iraqi National Accord, an exile party that has been supported by the CIA, resigned as president of the council's influential security committee, a day after his top deputy, Nouri Badran, was forced out as interior minister."

Emphasis added.

This, in addition to Pachachi, one of the "Coalition's" closest allies calling Fallujah operations "illegal" and "collective punishment" that is "entirely unnecessary."

Now, these are serious, serious problems. The milities, the uprising will be defeated, but the price in terms of American standing and political capacity, in the Middle East and above all in Iraq is clealry exceeding the gain initially seen from these actions.

I am not a pacifist, and I have nothing against the fellows who did the Fallujah event being strung up from a lamppost. However, I desperately want to see something useful come out of this bloody idiotic farce of a policy in Iraq. And that requires taking actions that do not alienate your only bloody allies on the ground.

This looks more and more like a terrible corss between Lebanon and Algeria c. 1958-1962.

[Added]
I might add that the Bush Administration is presently demonstrating the key role of not only pragmatism, but also skill in the success of policies. Sometimes historians underrate therole of the individual or collective government in how events happen. I suggest that we are seeing first hand in Iraq, the wages of narrow-minded ideology and incompetence, for while their khayali visions of transforming the Middle East were never, ever going to work, the current mess. The current disaster rather, is very much a choice, a result of willfully bad policy, willfully poorly executived. Bad policy on top of bad execution. I am becoming almost despairing of the results of this disaster. My Boy was right. American FP is set back 70 years.

Source:
U.S. Troops Battle to Retake Cities
Clerics Call For Uprising; Iraqi Council Dissent Grows
By Karl Vick and Sewell Chan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, April 10, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A428-2004Apr9?language=printer

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:47 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Surreal, Day 5. Or it it Month 5?

Thanks for Publius/Kaatib bringing this to my attention. It is delicious.

Despite the widespread revolt, U.S. authorities here sought to cast the turmoil in the best light.

"It's a gross mischaracterization to say the entire country is at war," Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt told reporters Friday. "The entire country is under combat."
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/world/2497270

Let me suggest we compare this sort of... bizarre parsing of language to avoid saying the obvious, and painfully transparent, with Straw:

"Significantly, Mr. Straw countered suggestions from the Bush administration's supporters in Washington that the sudden spike in violence, drawing in both the Sunni minority and the Shiite majority, had been provoked by small numbers of opponents of the United States-led occupation or non-Iraqi Muslim fighters.

"It is plainly the fact today that there are larger numbers of people, and they are people on the ground, Iraqis, not foreign fighters, who are engaged in this insurgency," he said. "The lid of the pressure cooker has come off, and some of the tensions and pressures which were there and would have come out in any event have to a degree been directed toward the coalition.""

You see, this willful denial of reality, this bizarre... I haven't the words to describe the evasion, is counterproductive, and breeds distrust, and I would undermines the ability to get things done - and correct errors.

I find it staggering.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:34 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

British Leadership - Quality if nothing else

Let me draw your attention to the serious, balanced, and realistic response of Straw.
OVERSEAS
Turmoil in Iraq Jangles Nerves in Allied Capitals, and Bush Works to Shore Up Support
By ALAN COWELL
Published: April 10, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/10/international/europe/10ALLI.html
" Significantly, Mr. Straw countered suggestions from the Bush administration's supporters in Washington that the sudden spike in violence, drawing in both the Sunni minority and the Shiite majority, had been provoked by small numbers of opponents of the United States-led occupation or non-Iraqi Muslim fighters.

"It is plainly the fact today that there are larger numbers of people, and they are people on the ground, Iraqis, not foreign fighters, who are engaged in this insurgency," he said. "The lid of the pressure cooker has come off, and some of the tensions and pressures which were there and would have come out in any event have to a degree been directed toward the coalition.""

A good analysis. I think on target and at least gives the public an idea of the real problem, and in that context an ability to judge the government's response.

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Baghdad - Adhamiyah

In addition to a general strike being reported, there appears to be severe fighting in Baghdad in several neighborhoods in Baghdad. al-Arabiyah is interviewing a woman who appears to be living in al-Adhamiyah (Dr. Siham) and is reporting severe fighting in the streets. She's very upset, hard to say how accurate the report is.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:11 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 09, 2004

FT: Iraq in Turmoil (also chance to compare and contrast American and Brit leadership)

Last one for the night:

Iraq in turmoil on Saddam anniversary
BAGHDAD, Fri 9 April 2004, 15.31
Published: April 9 2004 16:27 | Last Updated: April 9 2004 16:27

Extracts

BAGHDAD, April 9 (Reuters)

.....
Fierce fighting that has convulsed the Sunni cities of Falluja and Ramadi reached the western outskirts of Baghdad, where insurgents killed nine in an attack on a U.S. fuel convoy, and said they had seized four Italians and two Americans. A Reuters journalist saw two captive foreigners in a mosque in a village in the Abu Ghraib district. One was wounded in the shoulder. Both were weeping.

Emphasis added. May someone spare these poor bastards, they're in the hands of savages.

At the scene of the convoy attack, a Reuters photographer saw the bodies inside blazing vehicles. A dead foreigner lay on the road with a bloody head as an Iraqi beat him.

I see everyone is paying attention to the Imam's reminding them of their duties under Islam.

Teenage fighters with rocket-propelled grenades and rifles lurked on bridges or in derelict lots near the main highway leading west towards the embattled town of Falluja.

Long live the intelligence of the teen ager.

Meanwhile, nerves:
Iraq's U.S administrator Paul Bremer said U.S. forces had unilaterally suspended operations in Falluja at midday after this week's crackdown on guerrillas there.

He said the U.S. ceasefire would allow humanitarian access and what would be unprecedented talks with insurgents.

It looks as if the CPA understood that it is in a losing position on this.

This week's bloodshed, engulfing the hitherto quiescent Shi'ite south as well as the bastions of Sunni insurgency in central Iraq, has shown how far the United States is from securing the country whose dictator it toppled on April 9, 2003.

No, everything is fine. Rumsfeld the Wise Wizard of the West says so.

...

Today [Iraqis] face an uncertain future after 12 months of violence that is sapping a reconstruction drive, hampering oil exports to pay for it and frightening off foreign investors.

Hey, I'm still up for it! Come on. Really. Sure. Pretty sure. Well if the US taxpayer insures me 100 percent. It's a good deal for you, really it is.

Since Sunday, at least 41 U.S. and allied soldiers and hundreds of Iraqis have been killed in fighting. Baghdad streets were quiet on Friday as many residents feared more violence.

"America is the big devil and Britain and Blair are the lesser devils," a preacher at Baghdad's Um al-Qura mosque told an angry congregation. Reflecting a growing Iraqi hostility to outsiders, one worshipper said: "When we get the order for jihad (holy war), no foreigner will be safe in Iraq."

Charming, charming. xenophobia in full display.

PRESSURE COOKER

Britain's Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said the situation was the most serious yet faced by U.S.-led occupation forces.

"The lid of the pressure cooker has come off," he told BBC radio. "There is no doubt that the current situation is very serious and it is the most serious that we have faced."

See, now here is leadership. Realism, real comments, realisation of gravity.

U.S.-led troops retook the eastern town of Kut two days after Ukrainian soldiers withdrew after clashes with Shi'ite militiamen loyal to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who launched an uprising across southern Iraq this week.

Other reports have only parts of the city under control, but see:

Witnesses said sporadic clashes continued in Kut. A hospital official said two civilians had been killed and five wounded.

....

Print confirmation of my note prior:
The ferocity of the crackdown has been criticised by Iraqi politicians working with Bremer's administration.

"We condemned U.S. military operations in Falluja which was a form of mass punishment in response to...the earlier killing and mutilation of U.S. soldiers," Adnan Pachachi, a senior member of the Governing Council, told Al Arabiya television.

Another Council member, Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, threatened to resign in protest at the treatment of Falluja. "We are seeing the liquidation of a whole city," he told Al Jazeera television.

Our own whores...

Clashes erupted after Friday prayers in the mixed Sunni- Shi'ite town of Baquba, north of Baghdad, as insurgents fought U.S. troops and attacked buildings, witnesses said.

Super of course, all is well.

Shooting also broke out after a demonstration in the northern city of Mosul, witnesses said, after overnight clashes in the shrine city of Kerbala between Shi'ite fighters and Polish and Bulgarian troops killed 15 Iraqis.

Shi'ite militiamen still control the centre of the shrine city of Najaf, where Sadr is thought to be holed up. The violence erupted as Shi'ite pilgrims thronged Kerbala for Arbain, a religious occasion that climaxes this weekend.

Sunnis and Shi'ites prayed together in the southern city of Basra, in one of many shows of solidarity seen across Iraq.

Well that last line is touching. We're creating unity. Around xenophobia. Won't last, but it is touching.

A major international oil conference due to take place in the city later this month was cancelled due to security fears.

Surprised?

And they only spent the past two days saying it was still on.

And to prove how well love the CPA is:
In Baghdad, new razor wire barriers blocked streets around Firdaws Square where U.S. Marines and Iraqis dragged down Saddam's statue a year ago. Loudspeaker messages warned the public to stay away. The measures appeared designed to foil possible anniversary protests against the U.S.-led occupation.

Posters of Sadr fluttered on a green sculpture symbolising a new Iraq erected on the plinth where Saddam's statue once stood. A U.S. soldier later climbed a ladder to pull down the Sadr pictures in an eerie echo of last year's iconic images.

And on this:
A previously unknown Iraqi group released a video of the hostages on Thursday and vowed to "burn them alive" if Japanese troops did not leave Iraq within three days.

Poor fuckers. After Sadaam, Iraqis really are, in a vast percentage, inhuman animals. I suppose I can understand, but sympathize, no.

In other kidnappings, rebels have seized two Palestinians with Israeli identity cards. A Briton has gone missing and a Najaf-based Canadian aid worker has also been abducted.

Anyone staying in now, and in the field is a fool.

And in our surreal ethnicity balancing of the day....
Bremer named two Governing Council members to key posts. Samir Sumaidy, a Sunni independent, becomes interior minister, replacing Shi'ite Nouri Badran. Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, a Shi'ite independent, takes on the new role of national security adviser.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:15 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

I love these: Hot off the CPA presses

I love these things.

Press Release
Coalition Provisional Authority
http://www.iraqcoalition.org

For Immediate Release
Contact: Shane Wolfe/J. Pepper Bryars
Tel: +1-914-822-4935/+1-914-360-3801
April 9, 2004

Governing Councilmen Assume Posts as Minister of Interior and National Security Advisor

Baghdad, Iraq - Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III announced the appointments of a new Minister of Interior and a new National Security Advisor during a meeting Friday morning in Baghdad.

Following consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council, Ambassador Bremer named Mr. Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaiday as the new Minister of Interior and Dr. Mowaffak Al Rubaie as the new National Security Advisor.

"Mr. Sumaiday and Dr. Rubaie have worked diligently during the past few months to bring security to Iraq, and they've spent decades bringing democracy to Iraq. And under their leadership, Iraqis will have both," Ambassador Bremer said.

Both gentlemen were members of Iraq's Governing Council.

As Interior Minister, Mr. Sumaiday oversees the Iraqi domestic security forces such as the Iraqi Police Service, Department of Border Enforcement and the Facilities Protection Service. Mr. Sumaiday has been involved in opposition to the former Ba'athist regime for many years.

In the role of National Security Advisor, Dr. Rubaie is the primary advisor to the head of government and the Ministerial Committee for National Security on national security matters, and manages and supervises the National Security Advisory Staff. Dr. Rubaie is tasked with providing balanced, impartial advice to the head of government and the MCNS, along with facilitating coordination among the ministries and agencies charged with national security-related responsibilities.

I am not sure who we are fooling with these consultations. I hope someone.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:33 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

BBC Reports on Iraq (first evening report)

• Figthing begins in Baqouba, Kut still not entirely in Coalition hands.
• Polish and Ukranian troops engaged in Karbala.
• Two US convoys destroyed, one outside of Baghdad, one near Fallujah.
• US forces ordered to shoot on sight in Baghdad circle if anyone carries weapon.
• US claims to have intel that Sadr was going to engage in bombing campaign.
• Two more hostages taken in Iraq.

Moscow condemns "disproportionate use of force" - hah, hypocritical bastards, see Chechnia.

Straw calls situation " worse than he ever imagined it would be"

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:10 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

My quick sketch on change

Some quick thoughts on rescuing this fiasco:

First:
Fire the top leadership in CPA.

Second:
Bring in experienced planners from State etc. in re Admin and Development. Remove US DoD from any control over reconstruction, political or physical.

Third:
Begin massive public works project. It will waste money, it will be corrupt, but the aim is reduction of poverty.

Fourth:
At the same time, engage armed groups as intelligently as possible. Bribe for peace where necessary, assasinate if necessary, but do it precisely. No not use airpower in urban areas, it's a disaster. Rid oneself of the corrupt snakes like Chalabi with no legitimacy, for corrupt snakes with some local legitimacy. That is, get rid of the IGC and bring in others, create a non-exile based Provisional Government, even one with a less-than-"pro-American" cast.

Fifth:
After massive public works project begins to dope economy and reduces unemployment, begin further moves against armed groups, while moving decisively to internationalize the interim administration, making sure it does not look too American. Compromise and give up full administrative power.

Sixth:
Rid the US of the NeoCon Administration and their droolingly stupid ideas in regards MENA region.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:56 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Further updates: convoy and ceasefire

It appears that a US fuel convoy was ambushed and destroyed. This is an unambiguously chaotic day, it is clear US forces have lost the momentum. Ceasefire seems to have collapsed.

This Reuters report contains essentials:
Reuters
Insurgents attacked a U.S. fuel convoy near Baghdad today, killing at least nine people, witnesses said.
Published: April 9, 2004
Filed at 6:16 a.m. ET

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Bloody turmoil reigned in Iraq on Friday, the first anniversary of Saddam Hussein's fall, with Sunni and Shi'ite rebels battling U.S.-led forces and holding three Japanese and other foreign hostages.

Iraq's U.S. administrator Paul Bremer said U.S. forces had unilaterally suspended operations in the Sunni town of Falluja at midday after this week's crackdown on guerrillas.

He said the cease-fire would allow humanitarian access and what would be unprecedented talks with insurgents. About 10 bodies lay in the streets of the town west of Baghdad after heavy overnight fighting, witnesses said.

This week's bloodshed, engulfing the hitherto quiescent Shi'ite south as well as the bastions of Sunni insurgency in central Iraq, has shown how far the United States is from securing the country whose dictator it toppled on April 9, 2003.

Insurgents attacked a U.S. fuel convoy west of Baghdad on Friday, killing at least nine people, witnesses said.

A Reuters photographer at the scene said he saw bodies burning inside the vehicles on fire near Abu Ghraib. He said the convoy included U.S. military vehicles and fuel tankers.

U.S. DECLARES TRUCE

Bremer announced the Falluja cease-fire after five days of street fighting in which up to 300 Iraqis have been reported killed and U.S. Marines have also taken casualties.

``As of noon today coalition forces have initiated a unilateral suspension of offensive operations in Falluja to allow for a meeting between members of the Governing Council, the local Muslim leadership and the leadership of anti-coalition forces,'' Bremer told reporters.

He did not say how long the cease-fire would last, though an Iraqi politician said it had would go on for 24 hours.

Falluja residents heard U.S. warplanes and a loud explosion an hour after the cease-fire, but it was not possible to confirm whether there had been a U.S. air strike.

The Marines launched ``Operation Iron Resolve'' after last week's killing and mutilation of four U.S. private security guards showed the depth of anti-American feeling in Falluja.

Earlier on Friday, U.S.-led troops retook the eastern town of Kut two days after Ukrainian forces withdrew after clashes with Shi'ite militiamen loyal to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. The cleric's office was in ruins after it was hit by U.S. fire.

Sadr's followers launched an uprising this week, battling U.S.-led forces in Shi'ite areas across Iraq. One Ukrainian soldier was killed this week in the fighting in Kut.

Shi'ite militiamen still control the center of the shrine city of Najaf, where Sadr is thought to be holed up.

In the shrine city of Kerbala, overnight clashes between Shi'ite fighters and Polish and Bulgarian troops killed 15 Iraqis, and six Iranian pilgrims were shot dead near a Polish checkpoint between Babel and Kerbala, police said.

The violence erupted as Shi'ite pilgrims thronged Kerbala for Arbain, a religious occasion that climaxes this weekend.

A major international oil conference due to take place in the southern city of Basra later this month was canceled indefinitely because of security concerns.

NO JUBILATION THIS YEAR

In Baghdad, new razor wire barriers blocked main streets around Firdaws Square where U.S. Marines and Iraqis dragged down Saddam's statue a year ago. An Iraqi vehicle with a loudspeaker warned people in Arabic to stay away from the square.

It was not clear if the measures were meant to foil possible anniversary protests against the U.S.-led occupation.

Tanks, with names like Beastly Boy, Bladerunner, Blitzkrieg and Bloodlust stencilled on their cannon barrels, guarded nearby hotels used by foreign contractors and journalists.

Posters of Sadr fluttered on a green sculpture symbolising a new Iraq erected on the plinth where Saddam's statue once stood.

Sunnis and Shi'ites staged joint prayers in the southern city of Basra, in one of many shows of solidarity seen across Iraq this week. Two convoys of relief supplies left the Shi'ite city of Kerbala for the embattled Sunni stronghold of Falluja.

For some U.S. allies, the surge in fighting and kidnapping will fuel debate on the wisdom of keeping their troops in Iraq.

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, already under fire at home for sending troops to Iraq said he had no plans to withdraw them despite the kidnapping of the Japanese civilians.

A previously unknown Iraqi group released a video of the hostages on Thursday and vowed to ``burn them alive'' if Japanese troops did not leave Iraq within three days.

Five blasts rang out overnight in the southern town of Samawa, where 550 Japanese soldiers are stationed, but Iraqi police said there had been no casualties.

In other kidnappings, rebels have seized two Palestinians with Israeli identity cards. A Briton has gone missing and a Najaf-based Canadian aid worker has also been abducted.

Gunmen kidnapped seven South Korean church pastors on Thursday but freed them the same day. South Korea said the incident would not deter it from sending 3,000 troops to Iraq.

The U.S. military reported six more combat deaths in Iraq on Wednesday and Thursday, bringing to 449 the number of U.S. troops killed in action since the start of the war.

Bremer also named two members of the Governing Council to key posts. Samir Sumaidy, a Sunni independent, becomes interior minister, replacing Nouri Badran, a Shi'ite, who resigned on Thursday. Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, a Shi'ite independent, takes on the newly created role of national security adviser.

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Pachachi denounces US; demos and US forces firing upon. Edited to clarify

Pachachi gave interview in re the ceasefire, calling the Fallujah operation "more than necessary" in relationship with the killing and desecration of the bodies of four Americans. Quite critical. In the interview, he called American operations, and I quote directly "ghier qanouniya" - that is one of the principal moderate actors in the Gov Council is calling American operations "illegal" and has called for their halt.

al-Arabiyah also reports US forces firing into demonstration heading for Karbala.

Have to head off now.

Unlikely to get better today. Indeed if anyone still thinks that opposition to the Occupation is "limited" they're smoking cheap crack, as my Boy put it.

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Further news: 'ceasefire'?

Bombing continues, not sure what this cease fire means, per al-Arabiyah. Also reports American convoy burning on route but no detials.

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Thoughts on the Mosque, Other Items

Let me offer a few thoughts on the mosque incident, and generally the US troops in Iraq.

First, let me say that I very much doubt that the mosque was struck "deliberately" after fighters withdrew from it - if they did. Obviously in the fog of combat, with all kinds of chaos, any number of things can happen. An airstrike called in, coming too late, for example.

In general, I rather believe in those of us sitting outside the combat zone getting all pious about the bloodiness from a moral perspective. I hold that for both sets of combattants really. Moral outrage (ex-the barbarism in the mutilation of the dead) does not serve one well in analyzing and understanding. And in addition, combat is ugly, combat is chaos and bad things happen. Period. Moral posturing - and I fix largely the anti-war Left I have seen commenting on line - shows either a deep level of hypocrisy or just plain stupidity. It is also not terribly useful.

Now, leaving that aside, where I will focus the criticism is rather, is a set of actions useful in terms of achieving a policy. Sometimes, as the saying goes, to make an omelette, you have to break some eggs. Bad eggs, good eggs. Eggs. The question is not the suffering of the moment, but do the actions have a chance of leading to something better? And of course are the actions really needed - a bit of bloody mindedness is needed in a bad world, but it certainly should not be excessive, both for minimal moral reasons and for the fact that it generates its own opposition and blow back It is useful to think in economic terms, any given set of efforts have a spectrum of returns on on them, and I believe we can agree the returns on any efforts follow that well-known curve of diminishing returns - initially climbing, then peaking, the declining and potentially even becoming negative.

So it is with military efforts, above all in this context where one is in a hostile environment such as Iraq where part of the object is to win over the population to your program.

Let us lay aside the nonsense about "most Iraqis" supporting the US vision. That is not the case. It seems correct to guess most Iraqis were in the final analysis happy to see Sadaam go. It is probably correct to guess that many were initially not hostile to the US helping set up a moderate government for Iraq, and most of all, helping them recover from a decade of privation. It is not the same thing to think most Iraqis, outside perhaps the English speaking, Westernized elites, wre particularly taken with the NeoCons vision of transforming their culture, their society and making an American base and Israel friendly pet dog of a country. Nor is it likely true, as many American conservative commentators ramble on about, that Iraqis are fundamentally opposed to a religiously oreinted government. It is proably correct to guess they are not particularly enamored of the "vilayet e faqih" of the Khomieni line of thinking, an innovation I may add. It is probably best to understand average Iraqis as being most concerned with seeing their lives improve, physically. That includes not just things like electricity, but also safety of course, and a sense of ownership of their lives.

Let us also acknowledge that largely due to its own incompetence, which I think I have amply documented, the CPA has not done very much of this. Its surreal disconnect from what is needed in realty - the ammount of time spent on developing things like 'investment codes' when there is no physical hope of investments (at least ones not fully insured by the US - see my steel investment, which is not yet off track I may add. The lead principal is unique), and doing piss poor job of getting anything resembling a massive public works project going employnig large numbers of Iraqis. That never happened, and for that, you see the poor Sunnis and Shiites, above all Shiites clearly holding a great deal of anger. And I may add the events in Palestine, seen through the eyes of al-Arabiyah and rather more nastily, through al-Jazeerah, reinforce their sense of disposition and tends to play into the agitprop that the Arab peoples are being oppressed and manipulated for the benefit of Israel. This is an explosive mix in a region where the average person in their heart does not like the American government, even while they like and respect America and Americans in the domestic sense.

So, in the context of a population already inclined to distrust you, in a population which has grown up in a Stalinist environment of distrust, one needs to address not your own POV of what they think, but where they are coming from. In short, do not fool yourself into thinking what appeals to you, will appeal to them, and do not fool yourself into thinking they will long be grateful - they do not trust you, they do not really like your presence and they are inclined to think the worst in any given set of circumstances. The benefit of the doubt will always go to their community or communities before you, the foreigner who is not the guest, but the occupier.

Thus, we really have a problem rather ressembling a terrible cross between Northern Ireland and Algeria. Use of force is necessary, however massive use of force is likely to have serious blow back, perhaps more so than the gain from using it. Perhaps. It really depends on how good a set of plans you have for the aftermath, how ready you are to bribe and otherwise cajole to rewin hearts. It is not, as some idiot so-called conservative commentators say, that "they" hate "us" anyway - some do and some will regardless, Some will rather exist in the fluid middle, and can be brought over, but always remember, by the nature of the situation (which this idiotic Administration set up) with little to no international support of any importance, ex-GB, the inclination is against you, whatever pious inanities are spouted.

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BBC: Current reporting

It's Friday, it is going to be a big day.

First, the number of hostages has climbed, I expect a number of programs will now be shut down. Japanese, Canadians.

Second, one year since the statue fell - and BBC doing interview with English speaking professor (Galan Ramiz) from Univ. Interesting convo. He notes the gains in Elec. etc presently count less to Iraqis than the terrible security situation has caused Iraqis to view the Occupation as a failure, angered them as not meeting their expectations.

Professor notes that he had expected a provisional government, and now "the good options have gone." Speaks to the need to national legitimacy, which would be the sole means to resolve the current disaster.

Otherwise, expecting a bad day with massive demonstrations.

Kut is said to be back in US hands, although will this remain.

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And they're getting all press-confrency

***MEDIA ADVISORY***

WHAT: Press Conference with Dan Senor and Brig.
Gen. Mark Kimmitt

DATE: April 9, 2004

TIME: 6 p.m. (Satellite trucks must be at
checkpoint 18 no later than 4 p.m.)

WHERE: Convention Center Room #3

TRANSLATION: English/Arabic

CONTACT: For more information contact the CPIC at
(914)360-5076

Thanks guys. I am sure I am going to get more silly spin.

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A reference and an interesting read

http://babelonandon.blogspot.com/

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Suspension of Operations, Falluja

Hot off the CPA presses, confirming a report I saw a bit earlier in the AM from al-Arabiyah or CNBC Arabiyah:

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
Baghdad Iraq

Baghdad, Iraq - April 8, 2004 - Ambassador Bremer today issued the following statement:

Today at 1200, Coalition Forces initiated a unilateral suspension of offensive operations in Fallujah in order to hold a meeting between members of the Interim Governing Council, Fallujah leadership and leaders of the anti-Coalition forces, to allow delivery of additional supplies provided by the Iraqi Government, and to allow residents of Fallujah to tend to wounded and dead. During this suspension period, Coalition Forces retain the inherent right of self defense, and will remain fully prepared to resume offensive operations unless significant progress in these discussions occurs.

I am led to understand from the Arab Sat reports have an Iraqi delegation going to Fallujah to attempt to negotiate some peaceful surrender or resolution.

Why now?

I suspect per my Boy, that intel has the reaction in Iraq going badly.

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April 08, 2004

FT: Iraq, A key quote on Iraqi interior minister resignation.

Iraq interior minister resigns as battles rage
By Nicholas Pelham in Baghdad and FT Reporters
Published: April 8 2004 10:19 | Last Updated: April 8 2004 13:03
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1079420236995&p=1012571727088

"There will be many resignations," said Mr Abbadi, interim minister of communications and a member of the al-Dawa party. “It’s as if the US army is out of control,” he said. “Their massive use of force is bringing the country to the precipice. Iraqis can no longer afford to been seen siding with the Americans.”

One's pimpdom is over when your own whores don't want to be seen with you.

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Imagery from Fallujah

I noted from watching the al-Arabiyah imagery that the Iraqi foces seem quite mixed. Some of the idiot with an AK firing like a moron, some with clear military training. Also, I noted several with shoulder SAMs - one fine shot of a guy clearly aiming to bring down one of the American planes. The fighters seem rather worked up, I am guessing this is going to be a nasty, bloody house to house fight for days on end.

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Figaro: Iraq rapportage

A rather clearer statement than the coverage in the US press, emphasis added to a particularly disturbing notation:

Prises d'otages et combats sanglants en Irak
http://www.figaro.fr/international/20040408.FIG0392.html

... Parallèlement, des chiites et des sunnites par milliers faisaient route jeudi vers Falloujah pour soutenir la population de la ville rebelle sunnite assiégée par les Américains, empruntant la route d'Abou Gharib au milieu d'une attaque de la guérilla contre un convoi américain et de tirs nourris.

Le convoi de dizaines de camions, camionnettes et voitures, remplis de produits alimentaires et de médicaments, avançait sur l'autoroute vers Abou Gharib à 20 km à l'ouest de Bagdad, lorsque des véhicules américains arrivant en sens inverse ont été attaqués au lance-roquette antichar.

A Falloujah, la confrontation est féroce dans les rues de la ville située à 50 km à l'ouest de Bagdad, où les Marines commencent à comparer les combats à la guerre du Vietnam.

L'armée américaine mène depuis lundi une opération d'envergure destinée à trouver des responsables de l'attaque qui a coûté la vie il y a une semaine à quatre employés américains de sécurité. Deux des corps des tués ont été mutilés par une foule en colère.

Les combats acharnés ont fait 105 tués et plus de 200 blessés depuis mardi soir à Falloujah, a affirmé Al-Jazira, citant des sources hospitalières.

Par ailleurs, la révolte sanglante des partisans de Moqtada Sadr contre la coalition se poursuivait dans plusieurs villes du pays.

A Kerbala (centre), l'Armée du Medhi détenait les postes de police. Les miliciens chiites ont adressé un ultimatum aux forces de la coalition, exigeant leur retrait de cette ville sainte où affluent des milliers de pèlerins pour une importante fête religieuse prévue dimanche.

Dans la nuit, six miliciens ont été blessés lors d'accrochages avec les forces polonaises et bulgares, a indiqué à l'AFP, Hassan Nasrallah, chef de l'hôpital El-Hussein de Kerbala.

A Najaf (centre), la milice chiite a affirmé détenir des otages espagnols et «peut être un Américain» qu'elle entend échanger contre un de ses chefs à Najaf (centre) Moustafa al-Yaakoubi arrêté samedi à l'aube par la coalition.

Le commandant Carlos Herradon, porte-parole de la brigade espagnole Plus Ultra, a démenti à l'AFP ces informations, affirmant qu'«aucun soldat espagnol, hondurien ou salvadorien» n'avait été pris en otage.

Au niveau politique, le ministre irakien de l'Intérieur Nouri Badrane a annoncé jeudi sa démission après que l'administrateur américain en Irak Paul Bremer eut exprimé son mécontentement de l'action de son département.

«M. Bremer n'est pas satisfait de la performance du ministère», a déclaré M. Badrane en annonçant sa démission.

A Bagdad, la milice de Moqtada Sadr a affirmé jeudi être prête à reprendre le combat contre la coalition, après la destruction de son quartier général à Sadr City par les forces américaines.

Enfin, dix Irakiens ont été tués et vingt autres blessés dans des accrochages mercredi entre la milice chiite et les forces espagnoles et salvadoriennes à Najaf, a-t-on indiqué jeudi à l'hôpital de la ville.

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Hot off the CPA presses: onthe resignation of Nouri Badran

Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad, Iraq

PRESS RELEASE

Contact: Shane Wolfe
wolfes@orha.centcom.mil
1-914-822-4935

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BREMER AND MASSOUD BARZANI

Baghdad, Iraq...April 8, 2004 - Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator, and Mr. Massoud Barzani, Iraq Governing Council President, today issued the following statement on the resignation of Nouri Badran:

"We regret Minister of Interior Nouri Badran's decision to resign. He has served with skill and courage in a difficult position at a difficult time. He deserves the thanks of the Iraqi people, and he certainly has ours.

"The Ministry of Interior is a key institution, responsible for handling the internal security threats and law enforcement challenges Iraq faces. As we have seen in recent days, Interior Ministry forces are often on the front line in responding to terrorism and insurrection.

"In view of the importance of this position, we anticipate filling it promptly following consultations with Iraqi leaders. We will ensure that Iraq has a very strong and dedicated security team."

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Le Monde: (Bamami, rep Kurd) Kurdish analysis of situ: "Americans are multiplying their errors."

An extremely interesting set of comments by Ahmed Bamami. I have highlighted the most interesting sections.

Pour les Kurdes, les Américains multiplient les erreurs
LE MONDE | 08.04.04 | 15h57

A un peu moins de trois mois du transfert du pouvoir aux Irakiens prévu pour le 30 juin, les Américains ont commis une erreur dans le choix du moment et de la manière d'engager un rapport de force contre le jeune chef religieux radical chiite Moqtada Al-Sadr, estime Ahmed Bamarni, représentant en France de l'Union patriotique du Kurdistan d'Irak.

"Les Américains devaient certes affronter le problème Moqtada, parce que l'intéressé voulait être le maître -de la situation-, que ses vues vont à l'encontre de leur projet d'un Irak démocratique et parce qu'ils ne veulent pas avoir un Hezbollah bis en Irak. Le Hezbollah libanais est déjà dangereux à leurs yeux, mais seulement dans le contexte de l'affrontement avec Israël, tandis qu'un Hezbollah en Irak est un risque pour l'ensemble de la région du Golfe où il existe d'importantes minorités chiites", analyse M. Bamarni.

Selon lui, ce sont d'ailleurs vraisemblablement des déclarations de Moqtada Al-Sadr solidaires du Hezbollah libanais et du Hamas palestinien, "que les Américains considèrent comme des organisations terroristes", qui ont poussé ces derniers à chercher à museler le chiite rebelle. Ce qu'ils ont fait en interdisant son journal, et en arrêtant Moustafa Al-Yacoubi, le chef de son bureau à Nadjaf, déclenchant en réaction la révolte des partisans d'Al-Sadr.

Les Américains, estime le responsable kurde, "auraient dû traiter l'affaire Al-Sadr bien plus tôt, lorsque l'intéressé a annoncé la création de son "armée du Mahdi" -en juillet 2003- par exemple, ou lorsqu'il se proposait de constituer un gouvernement rival du Conseil intérimaire de gouvernement -en octobre 2003-. Depuis, Moqtada a eu le temps de s'organiser, de se faire représenter partout, jusques et y compris à Kirkouk", dans le nord du pays. "Les Américains ont donc commis l'une de leurs nombreuses erreurs en Irak, qui tiennent toutes à leur ignorance totale de ce pays. Le moment qu'ils ont choisi est d'autant plus malheureux qu'ils ont parallèlement lancé l'assaut contre Fallouja", pour liquider la guérilla sunnite.

LE PRÉTEXTE

Depuis le lundi 5 avril, Moqtada Al-Sadr fait l'objet d'un mandat d'arrêt de la coalition pour son implication présumée dans l'assassinat, le 10 avril 2003, d'un autre responsable religieux chiite, Abdel Majid Al-Khoeï. "Au sein de la communauté chiite, explique M. Bamarni, une rivalité a presque toujours opposé plusieurs grandes familles, les Al-Khoeï, les Al-Hakim, les Al-Sadr, les Al-Modaressi... Après la chute du régime baasiste, le premier représentant de l'une de ces grandes familles à revenir en Irak était Abdel Majid Al-Khoeï, tous les autres étant encore en exil. C'était plus que ne pouvait supporter Moqtada, qui n'entend pas partager le pouvoir qu'il croit détenir de son ascendance. Plus récemment, l'importance, démesurée à ses yeux, prise par le grand ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, devenu l'interlocuteur politique privilégié pour tout ce qui a trait à l'avenir de l'Irak lui était, elle aussi, devenue insupportable. Il a donc choisi de passer à la vitesse supérieure et les Américains lui ont donné un prétexte pour le faire."

M. Bamarni s'inquiète de la situation dans laquelle est placée la police irakienne, tiraillée entre la légalité et ses solidarités communautaires familiales et/ou religieuses.

Ce qui, selon lui, permet de prévoir qu'à l'échéance du 30 juin, même si la gestion du pays est effectivement transférée aux Irakiens, la sécurité restera aux mains de la coalition. En attendant,"si la révolte des partisans de Moqtada est contenue, cela renforcera la politique américaine et le Conseil intérimaire de gouvernement irakien, conduira progressivement à une normalisation et, à terme, à l'établissement d'un Etat de droit. Une évolution en sens contraire risque de renforcer Moqtada, et de donner des idées à des groupes du même type."

Mouna Naïm
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 09.04.04

Emphasis added.

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Arab Sats: Asian soldiers siezed in Iraq (corrected)

CNBC al-Arabiyah reports al-Jazeerah reporting that several Japanese and Korean soldiers, in seperate incidents were captured or siezed by armed forces in southern Iraq.

Correction, the Japanese are civilians.

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In other news

For some reason I am persona non-grata with Syria. Odd. Refused my visa. Bastards. Ah well.

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Friedman, Surreal III [edited to clean up format]

Freidman has this to say:
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Are There Any Iraqis in Iraq?
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: April 8, 2004

When I say that there are no Viet Cong in Iraq, I mean that the Iraqi "insurgents" opposing the U.S. today cannot plausibly claim to be the authentic expressions of Iraqi nationalism — as the Viet Cong claimed to be in the Vietnam War. The forces killing Americans and Iraqi police are primarily Sunni Muslims who want to restore the rule and privileges of their minority community and Baath Party, or foreign and local Islamists who are trying to undermine any prospect of modernism, pluralism and secularism in Iraq.

What the fuck is this fool talking about? What is an "authentic expression" and how does a chubby NYT journalist with a habit of talking to the rentier elites of the region and passing this off as knowledge of the Arab street know what an "authentic expression" of Iraqi nationalism. What he really means is - "Fuck I was so fucking wrong about this that I have to find some bloody scrap of an argument to talk about."

Secularism? Secularism was Sadaam. Secularism in the Arab world has been the corrupt and bloody "secular" dictatorships. The vast majority of Arabs have had loathsome experiences with secularism and it is not surprising the downtrodden do not have much feel for it. Modernism? That means jack at 60 percent unemployment. Democracy? A farce given the circumstances.

The level of denial among Safire, Freidman et al is just ... well I would say stunning if it were not so expected.

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NYT Report on the insurgency

I am reproducing this in detial with comments. I note that the comments attrib to US intel officials match my amigos, only his were grimmer.

Account of Broad Shiite Revolt Contradicts White House Stand
By JAMES RISEN
Published: April 8, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/08/international/middleeast/08SHIA.html?hp=&pagewanted=all&position=

WASHINGTON, April 7 — United States forces are confronting a broad-based Shiite uprising that goes well beyond supporters of one militant Islamic cleric who has been the focus of American counterinsurgency efforts, United States intelligence officials said Wednesday.

As noted, my amigo gave me the same sense.

That assertion contradicts repeated statements by the Bush administration and American officials in Iraq. On Wednesday, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that they did not believe the United States was facing a broad-based Shiite insurgency. Administration officials have portrayed Moktada al-Sadr, a rebel Shiite cleric who is wanted by American forces, as the catalyst of the rising violence within the Shiite community of Iraq.

PR, as I note, it appears to me that people on the ground in fact think it is widespread. Stupid PR as it is more wishful thinking than realism, and shortermist as if the sense this is a general insurrection, that will become more and more at odds with their public stance. Worst of all, this sort of idiocy prevents clear and effective analysis and thinking on the situation. Sadly far too typical of what we have seen so far in regards to Iraq.

But intelligence officials now say that there is evidence that the insurgency goes beyond Mr. Sadr and his militia, and that a much larger number of Shiites have turned against the American-led occupation of Iraq, even if they are not all actively aiding the uprising.

A year ago, many Shiites rejoiced at the American invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein, a Sunni who had brutally repressed the Shiites for decades. But American intelligence officials now believe that hatred of the American occupation has spread rapidly among Shiites, and is now so large that Mr. Sadr and his forces represent just one element..

This of course matches both the international reporting I have seen and what I have heard from my own contacts.

Meanwhile, American intelligence has not yet detected signs of coordination between the Sunni rebellion in Iraq's heartland and the Shiite insurgency. But United States intelligence says that the Sunni rebellion also goes far beyond former Baathist government members. Sunni tribal leaders, particularly in Al Anbar Province, home to Ramadi, the provincial capital, and Falluja, have turned against the United States and are helping to lead the Sunni rebellion, intelligence officials say.

Dead-enders indeed. Emphasis added.

The result is that the United States is facing two broad-based insurgencies that are now on parallel tracks.

And saddest of all, it did not and should not have to have ended up like this. This is not an inevitable result. It comes directly from the incompetence and navel-gazing that I have document in the past months in re CPA.

The Bush administration has sought to portray the opposition much more narrowly. In the Sunni insurgency, the White House and the Pentagon have focused on the role of the former leaders of the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein's government, while in the Shiite rebellion they have focused almost exclusively on the role of Mr. Sadr. Mr. Rumsfeld told reporters at the Pentagon that the fighting in Iraq was just the work of "thugs, gangs and terrorists," and not a popular uprising. General Myers added that "it's not a Shiite uprising. Sadr has a very small following."

Agitprop. An error in PR positioning. But worse than being a mistake, it is a stupid mistake.

According to some experts on Iraq's Shiites, the uprising has spread to many Shiites who are not followers of Mr. Sadr. "There is a general mood of anti-Americanism among the people in the streets," said Ghassan R. al-Attiyah, executive director of the Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy in Baghdad. "They identify with Sadr not because they believe in him but because they have their own grievances."

In short, we (as the CPA / occupation administration) have not delivered.

A key observation:
While they share the broader anger in Iraq over the lack of jobs and security, many Shiites suspect that the handover of sovereignty to Iraqi politicians from the American occupying powers on June 30 will bypass their interests, Mr. Attiyah said.

That is, there is whiff that they are being jerked around - Bremer certainly has done nothing to truly cover his real mastery, and the ultimate facade that is the transition. Not even well done, it is.

With his offensive, Mr. Sadr has "hijacked the political process," he said. As a result, more moderate Shiite clerics and politicians risk going against public opinion if they come out too strongly against the rebellious young cleric, he said.

In short, as I noted a few days ago, they will be pushed towards radicalism - it is inevitable. No exit from that route now.

Also hard to gauge is the relationship between Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Mr. Sadr. Ayatollah Sistani is an aging cleric venerated for his teachings, while Mr. Sadr is a youthful rabble-rouser, with little clerical standing. This week, Ayatollah Sistani issued a statement supporting Mr. Sadr's decision to act against the Americans, but emphasizing the need for a peaceful solution. In this, the older man seemed to be marking out a position that allowed him to associate with the tide of Shiite popular feelings, while allowing Mr. Sadr, for whom he is said to harbor a personal contempt, to risk his militia — and his life — in a showdown with the Americans.

Smart move of course.

While Mr. Sadr's militiamen prepared for battle, all was quiet at the Kufa headquarters of a rival militia that has helped sustain Mr. Sadr's political influence — the Badr Brigade. Nominally controlled by another Shiite political organization, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Badr Brigade has generally been seen as underpinning Ayatollah Sistani's authority.

If there is widespread bloodshed with Coalition forces, I doubt they will stand by.

Although anti-Americanism is hardly universal among Shiites, an anti-American mood has been building for months. At the Grand Mosque in Kufa, where Mr. Sadr took refuge as his militiamen were seizing control of the city on Sunday, this deep vein of anti-Americanism feeds off every rumor. At night, as they torch gasoline-soaked tires to light checkpoints guarding the approaches to the mosque, the militiamen speak of America's planning to uproot Islam in Iraq, to steal its oil, to deny Shiites a voice in the country's future governance, even to bring back Saddam Hussein.

The deadly aspect of Arab societies, the one which no one in the American administration seems to understand is the degree to which information and knowledge passes through informal oral routes.

In the Shiite-dominated areas of Iraq, some Pentagon officials and other government officials believe that Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Shiite extremist group, is now playing a key role in the Shiite insurgency. The Islamic Jihad Organization, a terrorist group closely affiliated with Hezbollah, is also said by some officials to have established offices in Iraq, and that Iran is behind much of the violence.

Bother.

C.I.A. officials disagree, however, and say they have not yet seen evidence that Hezbollah has joined forces with Iraqi Shiites. Some intelligence officials believe that the Pentagon has been eager to link Hezbollah to the violence in Iraq to link the Iranian regime more closely to anti-American terrorism.

Go with the Agency, their peeps have been right far more often in this mess than these idiots in the Pentagon who are obsessed with finding State level actors behind every one of their problems.
... Iranian angle
There were some clues to an Iranian presence in Kufa this week. Even as militiamen ferried food and medical supplies into the mosque this week in preparation for a siege, among the pilgrims to the sanctuary were Iranian men.

Militiamen at the mosque said that at least some of the funds needed for extensive reconstruction work currently under way inside the sanctuary have come from Iran. There are close ties between the Shiite clerical establishments in the two countries. But whether the Iranian role extends beyond finance is hard to know.

Caution in analysis.

Some foreign Islamic fighters have been playing a role in Iraq, particularly in the Sunni rebellion, intelligence officials say. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian affiliated with the Ansar al-slam terrorist group, is conducting terrorist operations in conjunction with the Sunni rebellion, intelligence officials believe. Mr. Zarqawi may have been behind some recent car bombings in Iraq, although American intelligence officials do not believe he is commanding any of the Sunni militia forces facing the United States military.

The Sunni forces appear instead to be led by former Iraqi government members and local tribal leaders in Falluja and other cities in the Sunni heartland, intelligence officials said.

Robert Baer, a former C.I.A. official who worked covertly in Iraq in the mid-1990's, said that some of those Sunni tribal leaders were once opposed to Saddam Hussein, and years ago approached the C.I.A. about working with it against Hussein. But now, many of those same tribal leaders have turned against the occupation, current and former intelligence officials say.

It is things like this that made my conversation last night so depressing. Exit is very hard to imagine in any positive circumstances

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:51 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

The situation

First, it seems very clear that the uprising has become general although not in a truly coordinated manner. Based on the news and my conversation last night with my friend, it seems fairly clear that the US was both blindsided by poor intelligence (or if my friend's characterization is right, poor intelligence triage) and by the degree to which there is serioius anger among Iraqis about the incompetence of the CPA.

Second, I am not sure what can be done. My convo last night was so fundamentally depressing. My man indicated he was thinking of resigning, said something like "Clarke, you want Clarke, I'll give you fucking Clarke times two." Not an exact quote but close enough to his words.

Third, I am not sure I can actually write a note on the conversation. I have to think about it. It was bad. We differed about whether the US should have "gone medieval" or not, my Boy is not a gentle sort, but on the current...Well, what can we say?

Otherwise, the AM news from the Arab Sats is as one would expect. One item I heard last night, we should watch for the Kurds beginning to make a move.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:53 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 07, 2004

Chilling Convos

I had another one of those chilling convos with my Iraqi Shiite maid.

Recall she is secular. I listened to a half hour rant from her about how great Muqtada as-Sadr is so great becuase he is finally teaching the Americans a lesson, and showing that the Iraqi people are gave and know how to stand up for themselves. Rarely do I bother to argue but her cheering the news of the helicopters going down (al-Jazeerah reported Fallujah and Baqoubah) really pushed things too far.

Normally I tolerate her outbursts as she's a simple woman whose political views derived from growing up in an extreme environment - and she swings back and forth. The lesson here is even Iraqis not naturally sympathetic to Sadr will, if they have to choose between as-Sadr and American troops will choose as-Sadr. Nationalist and particularist sentiment will trump reason, above all in violent, emotionally charged environments. This is a losing game for the CPA.

CNBC Arabiyah reports by the way that there was fighting between demonstrators and US forces (showed images of Bradley APCs in the street) in ... get this, Kirkuk.

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Iraq: Current Reportin, al-Arabiyah.

40 Coalition dead.
Polish forces kill head of Sadr office in Karbala.
Around 40 killed in American missile strike on mosque in Falluja.
Spanish forces engage Sadrists in Najaf, with apparent mistaken strike on civilian office.
Notes some Sunnis coming to support the Sadrists.

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Surreal II

Just to prove that the CPA exists in some fantasy world, I get this press release today:

PRESS RELEASE

Coalition Provisional Authority

http://www.iraqcoalition.org

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Mike Hardiman

Tel: 1-914-360-6864

Democracy Wins at the Hindiya Club

(op-ed - 820 words � photos of election day available on request)

Tuesday, April 6 - Founded in 1949 in Baghdad, Iraq with several thousand families currently as members, the Hindiya Club is a social organization primarily for Syrian Catholics though open to all religions. The club�s community center provides a safe and comfortable place for families to participate in social activities, and includes a multifunction room, a nicely manicured grass lawn which is a rarity in Baghdad�s hot, dry desert climate, as well as a playground, picnic area and parking lot. The Club also fosters a number of community organizations, including youth and charitable groups.

Hindiya�s governing board for many years had been largely self-perpetuating, naming candidates for election with little input or challenge from the general membership. However, in the difficult months after the war in 2003, a conflict developed between two factions of club members. Each charged that the other was using the club as a platform for its own political activities, and that the fraternal and family activity nature of the club was being degraded.

Baghdad Central (BC), an entity within the Coalition Provisional Authority tasked with building democratic institutions in Baghdad City and Province, was contacted by the Club in late 2003. It was asked to mediate the dispute and help the club to carry out a fair and democratic election.

After meeting with members and looking into the matter, BC approached the Archbishop of the Syrian Catholic Church, His Excellency Matti Shaba Matoka. The Archbishop�s reputation for fairness and concern for the welfare of the club was recognized by both sides. He selected and convened an Elections Preparatory Committee of eight long-term club members who were approved by both factions, and they began assembling a process for new elections to take place by March of 2004.

BC worked with the Elections Committee each step of the way, providing suggestions on eligibility for voting, qualification requirements for candidates, notifying club members through the media and announcements in churches and other group venues, preparing candidate and voter lists and ballots, arranging security with local police for election day and validating the election results. This was a tall order in a country with virtually no democratic tradition.

On election day, the Club was a flurry of activity as members flowed in to vote. Many members took the afternoon off to talk with others as they arrived to vote, and then await the results. Many parents handed their ballots to their children, and had them place the folded paper in the ballot box as a demonstration of their commitment to establishing a tradition of democracy (photos available).

There were seventeen members running for the Club�s seven person governing board, the largest candidate list that anyone could remember. Turnout was many times greater than any of the previous elections. Each secret ballot was read aloud individually, and the counting took several hours. As the ballots were read off and the tallies piled up, it became clear that regardless of who finished with the most votes, the real victor was the democratic process.

However, club members have spent little time savoring their accomplishment, and are busy looking to the future.

At an early April club reception, Hindiya board chairman Wathiq Hindo was gushing about his plans to expand the club�s sevices over the next year. �First, an internet center. The businessmen can use it, and we will have classes to teach the wives how to as well. Then a library. We will have books and magazines on health and current affairs and novels in both Arabic and English. Also, lectures. We will bring in foreigners, religious leaders, people with different ideas so we will hear all points of view. And a travel club, so members can get better prices with group rates. Perhaps we will have a swimming pool as well, in the back yard.�

With the new board in place, Elections Committee chairman Rifat Allah Werdy is looking toward his next project � gaining a scholarship for his son, Ramy, to attend college. �When I graduated from the University of Baghdad in 1974, Iraq had top quality engineering schools. But under Saddam, the schools did not keep up with modern advances. Ramy needs to leave the country to learn engineering and then return here to apply his knowledge.�

Father Denis Como is a Jesuit from Boston who taught school in Baghdad from 1960 to 1968, when Saddam�s Ba�athist Party forced him to leave the country. He exhorted the younger club members to restore the quality of the college prep schools which existed years ago. �The old people like me will not be around much longer to lecture you about how it used to be, so listen now. Get the schools back, do this for your children, you can do it, it is up to you.�

Despite their country�s present troubles, more and more Iraqis are successfully taking up the challenge of building open, democratic institutions after decades of repression. END

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:13 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Safire

I may add that Safire's column in The New York Times on this is positively surreal. I suppose it is not hard to see how things have gone so poorly given people with his level of understanding are running things.

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Fighting Spreading

It appears that most cities in South and Central Iraq are now involved in some kind of fighting. A US helicopter is reported downed in Falluja. Najaf seems to be entirely in Sadrist hands. As I noted earlier, it appears elements of the new security forces are joining the "intefada" as al-Arabiyah is calling it.

Sistani has repeated his call for calm, but also repeated his condemnation of Coalition forces use of force.

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April 06, 2004

Nassariyah: Militias battle Italian troops, appear to control parts

Basra and other cities as well as Nassariyah appear to still be controlled in part by Sadrists

Reporting is confused, it would appear, however, that Sadrists are spreading their control - if superficially- or being joined by others.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:34 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

A note on US politics

The Buck Doesn't Stop
By Richard Cohen
Tuesday, April 6, 2004; Page A21
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53315-2004Apr5.html

Richard Cohen identifies, I think a core issue here:
" What is so perturbing about this administration is not that no one of note has resigned or been fired -- and some of them certainty deserve the ax -- but that there is not the slightest hint that anyone (except Colin Powell) appreciates that mistakes were made not out of sheer bad luck but because the assumptions, driven by ideology, were so bad.

Terrorism, not missile defense, should have been the top priority; al Qaeda was and remains the threat, not Iraq. (That explains why Saddam Hussein is in jail while bin Laden is still on the loose, having slipped the noose in Afghanistan because the Pentagon left the job to locals.) Iraq was going to be a cakewalk -- the Middle Eastern version of the liberation of Paris -- and somehow that has not happened. In another country, some officials would quit in shame. In this one they can't even quit being smug. "

As I have cited over many, many months, my sensation on the ground is that corrective actions have not been taken, or are taken disturbingly late because of this smugness and inability to admit in a productive manner where and how the errors occured. Why this is, well that is for another analysis, but for me, on the ground watching this fiasco unfold, what I would like to see from the American Administration is something approaching a critical self analysis and some modicum of nimbleness in dealing with these situations.

It strikes me arrogance that has gone beyond mere self-confidence (I would be a real hypocrite if I critized mere arrogance.) to blinding hubris is among the source of the problem, another being wedded to an ideological vision and unable to process a reality at real variance to that vision.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:28 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Iraq, Shiite Radicalisation (Figaro)

Même si elle est le fait d'une fraction chiite, la flambée de violence témoigne de l'exaspération montante dans le Sud irakien
Une majorité qui se radicalise
Luc de Barochez
[05 avril 2004]
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/20040405.FIG0077.html

Some excellent observations:
Population jeune et désoeuvrée, niveau de vie en baisse, frustrations politiques, colère contre l'occupant occidental, avenir incertain : toutes les conditions sont réunies pour une explosion chiite en Irak. La fermeture le 28 mars par la coalition américano-britannique du journal al-Hawza, accusé d'incitation à la violence anti-américaine, aura joué le rôle d'une étincelle dans un baril de poudre.

Depuis, le jeune chef radical Moqtada Sadr, dont le journal al-Hawza était le porte-voix, a choisi l'épreuve de force. Le défilé de plusieurs milliers de ses miliciens vêtus de noir, samedi dans le quartier chiite de Bagdad, en témoigne. Hier, Sadr a appelé ses partisans à «terroriser leurs ennemis», les manifestations étant selon lui devenues inutiles.

«Plus de 60% de la population active est au chômage dans une société où près de 70% des habitants ont moins de 20 ans, explique Hassan al-Ani, professeur de sciences politiques à l'université de Bagdad, cité hier par l'AFP. Ces jeunes sont prêts à épouser n'importe quelle cause qui puisse leur rendre leur dignité et leur donner un sentiment de puissance».

Emphasis added. It is important to note, in that context, that Sadr's appearance of showing some balls in confronting the people who, to the radicals and the young, appear to be a source of bloackage, can attract further support.

I note also the main coverage this AM on the ArabSats is the bombardement of Falluja. I have a hard time seeing use of air power as in any way effective in the instance of an urban guerrilla mixed into civil populations. Of course, in this instance there seems few, if any, good choices, so perhaps a choice less bad. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how airial attacks by helo gunships is in any way effective given they have had shit intelligence so far.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:18 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Before I piss off to sleep: Cole has an excellent ob re Sadr

Cole has the following obs on the Sadr situation:

Arrest Warrant for Muqtada al-Sadr

Dan Senor in a briefing in Baghdad on Monday revealed that an arrest warrant had been issued months ago "by an Iraqi judge" and implied that it would now be served.

US television cable news is doing its best to obscure the real issues here.

1. They keep asking where Muqtada is and calling him a "fugitive." Muqtada announced that he is in his father's mosque in Kufa, and there is no reason to doubt this. He hasn't fled and his whereabouts are well known.

2. Talking heads both from Iraq and from the ranks of the US retired officers keep attempting to maintain that Muqtada's movement is small and marginal. One speaker claimed that Muqtada has only 10,000 men.

In fact that is the size of his formal militia. Muqtada's movement is like the layers of an onion. You have 10,000 militiamen. But then you have tens of thousands of cadres able to mobilize neighborhoods. Then you have hundreds of thousands of Sadrists, followers of Muqtada and other heirs of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr. Then you have maybe 5 million Shiite theocrats who sympathize with Muqtada's goals and rhetoric, about a third of the Shiite community. The Sadrists will now try to shift everything so that the 5 million become followers, the hundreds of thousands become cadres, and the tens of thousands become militiamen.

posted by Juan Cole at 4/5/2004 04:33:49 PM
Emphasis added

Cole's observations strike me as highly on point as (a) my sense from speaking with Iraqi shi'a is there is a certain respect for his cojones and the like the idea of standing up to the Americans, even as Sistani's more subtle game is appreicated., (b) there is a significant percentage that support Sadr on a gut level. This emerged from street interviews today on the Arab Sats and on BBC. I agree with Cole, American talking heads are not getting this right. The threat is non-trivial and further, I will add that the real issue is that even in losing, Sadr may achieve his ideological goal of radicalization of the community. Sistani's statement (my understanding of his statement differs slightly from Cole's, but he is better attuned to the formal usage than I) reflected that.

Sistani will play this well, I am sure, but I think the final result will be harder line shi'a popular feeling as the American forces use gunships and extreme force.

Here is where fools like tacitus and other American commentators get things wrong - confronting Sadr when you have no legitimacy does not win you anything, at all. It builds your opponent, ideologically.

In other matters, I forgot to report I was pitched a really engaging if somewhat evil idea regarding Islamically correct pawn shops. It was fascinating and I thought about it all day. Islamically correct pawn shops.... the structure was brilliant. Really brilliant.

Oh yeah, at least the bloodshed has got the Steel thing moving. I am amazed, but no one is bailing as of yet. Amaizing what a bit of a disaster does to the CPA responsiveness.

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Further reporting

Further end of the night reporting.

al-Jazeerah reporting late night violent clashes in Sadr City and other important Shi'a centers with American tanks firing into the district, with helicopter gunships supporting.

Continued combat is also reported this evening in other cities, but no clear statement is available.

Statements by the Shi'a clergy are not very helpful. I do not expect that the "arrest warrent" will be served peacefully and I expect arresting him will end up in a blood bath - although it is hard to predict.

I note that BBC is interviewing non-Sadrist Shi'a and they are clearly siding with the Sadrist against the Americans. The use of the helicopter gunships was evoked by one, as Publius suggested, in the context of the Sadaam.

I do not see this ending well. The coalition forces will re-exert control, but it is not going to end well in the political analysis.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:07 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 05, 2004

Cole on Sadr's last statement

Juan Cole has a useful analysis of Sadr's last statement (much better than the hyping of the 'terrorise' translationi) but profoundly problematic in its potential meaning. He certainly knows more aboutShi'a rhetoric than I:

"Muqtada's words before he went into retreat in his mosque: "Make your enemy afraid, for it is impossible to remain quiet about their moral offenses; otherwise we have arrived at consequences that will not be praiseworthy. I am with you, and shall not forsake you to face hardships alone. I fear for you, for no benefit will come from demonstrations. Your enemy loves terrorism, and despises peoples, and all Arabs, and muzzles opinions. I beg you not to resort to demonstrations, for they have become nothing but burned paper. It is necessary to resort to other measures, which you take in your own provinces. As for me, I am with you, and I hope I will be able to join you and then we shall ascend into exalted heavens. I will go into an inviolable retreat in Kufa. Help me by whatever you are pleased to do in your provinces. "

The bit about going into a retreat (i`tis.am) and hoping to join his followers later so that they could ascend to the heavens shows an apocalyptic imagination at work. The US is facing another Waco, and what we know is that military sorts of force are the worst way to deal with apocalyptic groups like the Branch Dravidians and the Sadrists. That approach only confirms their conviction that the forces of this world are attempting to prevent them from attaining paradise. "
See http://www.juancole.com/2004_04_01_juancole_archive.html#108114177892405827

On the other hand his comments about the Spanish naming their base al-Andalous I think are stupid and overblown. Naming it al-Andalous is as much a potential sign of respect as anything. That is the sort of thing where if you're searching for offence you will find it regardless. Only the most extreme of the extreme really care about "Andalous" and with them, nothing you do is going to please them.

That is one issue I have with Cole, while it is good he provides a decent insight into thinking, he's also rather a typical American lefty Academic in his sensibilities.

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Egypt Iraq Conference meeting

Results of first Irai-Egyptian CoC conference meeting - Egyptian private sector no longer very interested in Iraq because of the security problems.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:02 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

New Conf. - CPA Mil Command

Arab Journo questions very hostile, fixated on the role of Apaches and claims they are, like Israelis, firing missiles.

We also have a report that US troops are entering hosptial(s?) which they had no info on.

The press conference wrapped up with Senor telling everyone about Bremer's new ministerial appointments. Surreal. Really surreal.

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US Tanks Shell Sadr HQ, "scores wounded"

Reports al-Arabiyah and al-Jazeerah.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:02 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Further information

According to a contact of mine in CPA (contractor) they have been evac'ed from their hotel into the Green Zone palace and told they will remain there at least five days.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:30 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Amman

Visited the HQ of the American run economic reform office. Offices are shut behind steel doors (normally open) and security officers will not let you in the building without a call. Very different from prior visits.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:08 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Current Reporting

al-Arabiyah and CNBC Arabiyah are reporting that elements of the American trained security forces are joining Sadrist and sponteanous takeovers of official buildings.

Further, in re the reports of the captured coalition soldiers, the report indicated that an eye witness say a coalition soldier, badly beaten, blown up with a live grenade, after his capture.

al-Arabiyah showed the "Governor's Palace" in the hands of Sadrists and supporters, and showed elements of the Iraqi police joining the takeover, including a man in an Iraqi police officer's uniform carrying an AK shouting for unity behind the true authority (i.e. not the Americans).

Finally, it is official that the Amman Baghdad highway is closed.

al-Arabiyah reports demonstrations throughout the south. For the moment it appears that the Sadrist have the initiative.

However, the CPA finally returned our calls for data on the Steel project.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:07 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Basra Governors Palace "falls' to Sadrist forces, Basra city center in Shiite militia hands.

Reports CNBC Arabiyah and al-Arabiyah, with slightly different versions.

Also, reports of captured coalition soldiers being executed.

Further, Arab Sats report British soldiers engaged at their base.

I am afraid this feels like a general uprising. Hopefully these early reports may be exagerated.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:32 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Iraq: further, unconfirmed news

According to one of my contacts in Baghdad the road from Amman to Baghdad has been cut, and traffic is being diverted. This is unconfirmed and should be taken with a grain of salt, but sense if Baghdad among foreigners is that the situation is rapidly degrading. Again, may be overreaction, but certainly emphasizes the first gut reaction.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:03 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Shiite uprising

Very hard to know how this is going. Certainly the images on the Arab Sats are very bad. Let's guess that as-Sadr mobilizes 30 percent of the Shiites in the urban areas. The repression that will be necessary is likely to tip even more Shiites into radicalism. I doubt this will go far, but it opens a new front, and makes the Amercan occupation even more difficult.

I would note that the occupation does not end in June, only the American government, so there is a play here to push things. Also, of course, the young radicals felt that the Occupation was going to go for them - the closing of the newspaper seems to have been a serious tactical error, for even after putting this down, they (the CPA) is now in a world of shit, this makes foreign investment right out of bounds. My steel is not going in with these conditions.

Basra seems to be in trouble by the way, but Arabiyah indicates that their sources are confused and they are awaiting confirmation. They are reporting that most Shiite cities have seen manifestations. This does look general, even if it is perhaps a third of the Arab Shiites.

Recall, however, it does not take a large percent of the population to tip things into violence.

This will also make it harder for the Shiite clergy to be moderate, for the pressure will be to radicalism.

And everyone recalls certain of the usual suspects claiming the Shiites would welcome the Americans? I did say I expected car bombs in the spring.

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April 04, 2004

Iraq: Shiites, bloody mess

First, the NYT article:
Violent Disturbances Rack Iraq From Baghdad to Southern Cities
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
Published: April 4, 2004
BAGHDAD, April 4 — Iraq was wracked today by its most violent civil disturbances since the occupation started, with a coordinated Shiite uprising spreading across the country, from the slums of Baghdad to several cities in the south.

By day's end, witnesses said Shiite militiamen controlled the city of Kufa, south of Baghdad, with armed men loyal to a radical cleric occupying the town's police stations and checkpoints. More than eight people were killed by Spanish forces in a similar uprising in the neighboring town of Najaf.

I think this will fail, but it is a very, deeply bad sign.

In Baghdad, American tanks battled militiamen loyal to Moqtada Al Sadr, the radical cleric who has denounced the occupation and has an army of thousands of young followers.

At nightfall today, the Sadr City neighborhood shook with explosions and tank and machine gun fire. Black smoke choked the sky. The streets were lined with armed militiamen, dressed in all black. American tanks surrounded the area. Attack helicopters thundered overhead.

"The occupation is over!" people on the streets yelled. "We are now controlled by Sadr. The Americans should stay out."

Witnesses said Mr. Sadr's militiamen had tried to take over three police stations in Sadr City, a poor, mostly Shiite neighborhood north of central Baghdad named after Mr. Sadr's father.

It appears they are going for broke, unfortunately the Arab Sats are not giving a clear picture quite as yet.

Doctors at Baghdad hospitals reported that several people were wounded in the fighting but there were no details on casualties.

Franco Pagetti, an Italian photographer, said he was caught in the crossfire and witnessed several American tanks firing into the streets.

"The tanks were shooting into the pavement, not at the height of the people," Mr. Pagetti said. "It looked like they were trying to clear the streets."

Mr. Pagetti also said he had watched a group of militiamen launch three rocket propelled grenades at American Humvees but the militiamen had missed each time.

"The situation is getting worse," Mr. Pagetti said. "I saw injured people getting put in cars. The people said they had been wounded by American helicopters."

As the fighting raged, Mr. Sadr called on his followers to "terrorize" the enemy as demonstrations were no longer any use. Last week, his weekly newspaper, Hawza, was shut down by American authorities after it had been accused of inciting violence. The closure began a week of protests that grew bigger and more unruly at each turn.

"There is no use for demonstrations, as your enemy loves to terrify and suppress opinions, and despises peoples," Mr. Sadr said in a statement distributed by his office in Kufa today.

"I ask you not to resort to demonstrations because they have become a losing card and we should seek other ways," he told his followers. "Terrorize your enemy, as we cannot remain silent over its violations."

Well, I am gathering from this that he thinks he is going to get banned so he may as well go out with a bang, and perhaps calculating the "Coalition" can not afford to take on both Shiites and Sunnis.

Here is the online report from al-Jazeerah:
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2004/4/4-4-17.htm

I would provide the text but not sure if it is supported.

(and I note the Arab Sats show their usual shitty news sense on this)

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Bloody hell. Iraq, Shiites, Dead, "Coalition" incident.

Shooting Kills 4 Salvadorans, 14 Iraqis
By KHALID MOHAMMED
The Associated Press
Sunday, April 4, 2004; 10:19 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49194-2004Apr4.html

Not terribly helpful, this.

Indeed, it is quite bad.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:58 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Recommendation: Beur TV

For those with satellite, try following Beur TV. Interesting. Presently watching a docu on the MRE and the problems of culture between France and North Africa. Amusing, I noted the MRE using the wrong pronoun in Arabic consistently, obviously more comfortable in French.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:16 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Why The Economist is so very me

I really love The Economist, they have cojones these stupid mddle market whankers like Time or Newsweek or ny of the weak franco equivs lack.

Case in point:
http://www.economist.com/images/20040403/20040403issuecovUS400.jpg

Brilliant, fucking brilliant, and this on an editorial tha is critical but supportive. None of this weak, namby pamby politicaly correct, can do no wrong lockstep crap.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:51 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

A Rant and Praise to Cato - Suprisingly and refreshingly analytical

First, an item I posted on Calpundit, responding to some drooling pre-fooled sub-literate fool arguing that becuase is was a national goal to see regime change that ipso facto, the Bush Administration did the right thing in re Iraq.

On National Policy and the like. While the rather simple minded may abstract away from the reality that execution and context matters, those of us who actually know something of the region have rather opposed this poorly concieved nonesense since the get go.

Regime change in Cuba is (rightly) our preference in Cuba, that does not mean it is both wise and in the national interest to launch an external invasion on flimsy pretexts at the drop of the hat.

Policies have costs as well as benefits - there are very good reasons why the sage policy establishment of Abu Bush (Bush the Father) opposed the war, what the not-at-all liberal Cato Institute opposed and opposes the entire fiasco (their dossier on this is rich and well informed).

The reason is that execution has been a bloody fiasco since the start - diplomatic preparations were largely based on satisfying the domestic ingnoramuses rather than building a value-add consensus, and clearly execution had large negative externalities in both "public diplomacy" and official diplomacy, effects that have imposed real added costs in both direct and indirect senses.

The military execution is not at all remarkable, Iraq was a prostrate state and only sheer incompetence would have won a substantively worse result, however the (politically driven) post-organised conflict military conflict has been a farce.

The worst item on the agenda, the utter incompetence in regards to the post-organised war administration - the lack of resources and general incoherence of which I have I think documented in my own journal (my job has been precisely in financial affaires in re Iraq) - which has squandered vast amounts of financial and political capital.

In short, while one's theoretical goal may very well be to achieve (X), one should bloody well - if one is thinking critically and analytically - check to see that the net benefit of achieving (X) is in fact net positive. Think of this as a kind of net present value calculation - you bloody well, if youdo not want to have a disaster and not want to make yourself a laughing stock, should have realistic plans and assumptions. It is equally clear to anyone with a modicum of exptertise in the region, such as myself, that there was no way that an invasion of Iraq under the circumstances of 2002-2003 made any sense at all on a rational basis.

One can easily look at a goal (X) as an option to be excercised when its net benefit is positive, not just when you have the urge to do so. Sadly, the Bush Administration did not engage in a clear, rational calculation in this regard (nor the Blair Government for that matter), and for that ended up with - to use financial language, negative NPV project - in ordinary speech, a money losing dog.

The reality is that a goal should be aimed for when it is auspicious, not just because you have a hard on.

I am bloody well sick of these pseudo-conservative bloody blind lobotized party hacks pretending otherwise. It casts disrepute on the rational people we still have around. "

Now, second I want to direct your attention to Cato's little collection of their Iraq analyses that are largely, in my mind, excellent. they rather hit upon my analyses of the situation, but also illustrate one can be opposed to this fiasco and not some namby pamby tree hugging peace and love type. Nor a whacko racist isolationist like Pat.
http://www.cato.org/current/iraq/index.html

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:45 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 03, 2004

Somewhat dated, but an example of self-serving elite arguments in re econ. policy

I've annotated this with my comments. I should confess I find this guy personally despicable so his commentary irritates me even more than usual.

Monday's Economic Pulse
'The dinar pegged to the dollar is working'
Jordan Times

Fahed Fanek
THE EXCHANGE rate of the Jordanian dinar was originally pegged to the sterling pound, then it shifted to the special drawing rights (SDRs), then to a mysterious basket of foreign currencies, the content of which was not known except to the Central Bank. The basket was believed to be flexible, which enabled the bank to change the price from day to day as it saw fit in the circumstances.

Finally, the Central Bank was fed-up with recurring rumours about possible devaluation and decided, since 1995, to fix the exchange rate in terms of dollars, to eliminate daily fluctuations that gave rise to uncertainty. But what about the future? Is change going to happen?

Well, first one should note that our dear Fahed glosses over the crisis of 1989-1990 which was driven not by the exchange rate mechanism per se, but rather the government's generally poor monetary and fiscal policies that included relatively uncontrolled borrowing to support current consumption and subsidies established during the good old 1970s when the Gulf oil boom fueled all.

The file of the dinar exchange rate is supposed to be reopened only when and if the country reaches a problematic situation that could be solved through altering the exchange rate. To open this sensitive file when monetary stability and general confidence are at their best and when there is no sign of distortion can only create confusion and shake the confidence, giving rise to more rumours that can only hurt the economy and the individuals who believe them and act on them.

This is just a stupid argument. What idiot boy is really saying is unless we have a currency crisis, we should just be waltzing along in the dark like there are no problems. The time to best deal with an issue is before it reaches crisis.

Now, his side claim, slipped in there artfully, that there are no sign of distortions is frankly stupid or dishonest. Or both, to avoid unnecessary binary choices. There are clear distortions in the dinar rate, which is pegged to the dollar at JD 0.709 to $1, a fiat rate that has remained unchanged for around ten years, despite substantial changes in the Jordanian trade profile and partners - and the emergence of the Euro zone as a substantial single zone for Jordanian products.

As for the issue of "general confidence" - I don't know what country he is in, but where I am at, confidence is, well, absent.

In short, the opening is mere posturing, emotional appeals to overcome the weakness of his underlying argument.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) acknowledged the positive results of pegging the dinar to the dollar. The fund approved this policy or, at least, did not object to it. However, it should be admitted that the fund is, effectively, an ideological institution. It believes in floating currencies as a matter of principle. It would not necessarily observe the specific circumstances of a given country. It is accustomed to using “one size fits all” policies. It cannot, therefore, be ruled out that the IMF may prefer floating in a free market. Emphasis added

Of course this same hypocrite fulminates against the IMF when it suits him, but leaving that aside, his calim there is an "ideological basis to the IMF's preference for floating rates is just posturing. Floating rates, ceteris paribus, are indeed better. Now, for thinly traded currencies (such as small developing world currencies) there are decent arguments that the markets are not deep enough to provide genuine clearing of the market and can expose a small country (economically speaking) to speculative fluctuations which are not rooted in real economic changes. Obviously in such cases there is a good argument that the "pressure valve" that floating rates represent is absent in such conditions, or at least not efficient. Nevertheless, the IMF position, and this is amply supported by good monetary economics, is that countries should have mechanisms to allow exchange rates to adjust to changing economic conditions. If one does not do so, one ends up with an Argentine problem where your currency value becomes absolutely disconnected from the actual economic relations and trade conditions. A disaster. And of course, IMF flexibility on this is then used to blame the IMF.

For example, in the case of the dollar-dinar peg, Jordan has ridden the dollar up to hits heights in the past five years - essentially an implicit subsidy to imports, an implicit tax on exports, and is now riding the dollar down. Neither set of changes has anything to do with the Jordanian economy and one can argue that the changes are going in almost the opposite directinos needed from a domestic economic perspective. First, the implicit subsidy to imports was a clear benefit to the West Amman elites (read City or Manhattan elites) who consume the most imports, and a direct impediment to developing domestic economic activity, activity that by its very nature has to be export focused because of the small size of the domestic market - and the highly skewed distribution of buying power. So, we have a policy that (i) kills off local economic activty and (ii) provides a subsidy to consumption by elites who hardly need it and who profit from external affaires regardless.

Second, there are a whole menu of choices in regards to exchange rate mechanisms, such as floating pegs and baskets. Confidence does not come from pegging to a particular value, confidence derives from year after year of good execution. Morocco, to use an example, manages its currency by a basket and is not subject to devaluation rumors. The devaluation rumors in the past in re Jordan stemmed from poor fiscal and monetary policies combined with an overvalued target - based in part by the illiterate, outdated 'big cojones' / strong currency views of the elites here.

The governor of the Central Bank of Jordan is said to be fully convinced that the present state of affairs is satisfactory. He is determined to preserve the existent exchange rate of the dinar in terms of dollars, at $1.412 per dinar, to maintain stability and confidence built over eight years. Yet, there are some people who try, from time to time, to raise this thorny and sensitive subject, either by way of advocating another system or by predicting that some change may take place in the near future.

Re G CBJ, well good for him. He's an idiot.

So, what our hypocrite is really saying is that the naysayers who note that the current rate is (a) entirely divorced from domestic economic reality, (b) overpriced and too rigid, (c) by its rigidity a disaster waiting to happen, (d) stability at an unsustainable level divorced from economic reality is nothing but false confidence. Of course the system will eventually collapse, the question is when.

When the exchange rate of the dollar rose sharply against other currencies, several years ago, a prominent banker called for more flexibility in exchange rate through disengaging the dinar from the dollar. The too strong dinar, he claimed, may adversely affect the competitiveness of Jordanian goods and services in their export markets. In other words, he was hinting at devaluation, but did not like to pronounce the word and used “flexibility” instead, which sounded better.

He 'claimed'? It fucking well did.

And again our dear hypocrite belongs to the simple-minded, self-serving "strong currency"/"big cojones" crowd.

Today, some commentators renew the call for disengagement of the dinar from the dollar because its exchange rate declined against other major currencies. This, of course, raised the prices of European and Japanese imports. This time around, they want the dinar to rise against the dollar to keep pace with the euro and the yen.

What can I say? He tries to imply inconsistency, in fact he simply doesn't get the issues.

It is obvious that the exchange rate of the dollar, like the exchange rate of any other floating currency, will continue to fluctuate. No one can predict with any degree of confidence what will happen tomorrow, but the dollar remains the number one world dominated currency. It is backed by a superpower with a large economy that makes around one third of the world economy.

Yes, it is. It is also subject to actual economic pressures and in order for economic pressures to be let off, the dollar will eventually lose up to 25 percent of its value at present. Does Jordan want to ride that tiger? Given the lack of clear thinking and the implicit desire to continue subsidies to his lifestyle, I think not.

Assuming that the dinar were floated to find its price level in the market, would it rise or decline in that case?

Well, anyone who looks at the accounts can see that ex-transfers it should decline. With transfers likely to see an initial rise, then long term decline.

There are plenty of reasons for a rising exchange rate of the dinar, due to high economic growth, the large size of foreign exchange reserves and a surplus in the current account of the balance of payments, but the psychological factors will play in the opposite direction and may lead to a lower exchange rate. No one accepts the claim that the dinar may be stronger in the future than the dollar. Currencies of all developing countries that opted for floating found that their currencies sank to a very low level, generating inflation and uncertainty in the process. Egypt was the most recent example.

High economic growth? Is he smoking crack? Of course in re developing nations currencies decliinging after a float, well that is no fucking surprise. Typcially elites have maintained overvalued currencies to subsidize their import consumption and from idiotic "strong currency" posturing. As for Egypt, they simply have engaged in some of the most incompetent exchange rate management that one can possibly imagine. Why not point to the Dirham? Of course because it deflates his argument.

The dinar pegged to the dollar is working. It served the Jordanian economy very well and should not be abandoned.

It's served the rentier elites who like to have the costs of their consumption of luxury goods subsidized well, otherwise it has done a piss poor job.

Monday, March 8, 2004

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:51 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Excellent commentary on misguided anti-globos attempts to impose inappropriate labour standards

I found this column by Kristof excellent. Now, those who have read my comments for a while know this is likely because he agrees with me, but nevertheless it is better expressed than my own interventions.

OP-ED COLUMNIST
Put Your Money Where Their Mouths Are
Published: April 3, 2004
Columnist Page: Nicholas D. Kristof
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/03/opinion/03KRIS.html

BISKÉ, Chad — With Democrats on the warpath over trade, there's pressure for tougher international labor standards that would try to put Abakr Adoud out of work.

Abakr lives with his family in the desert near this oasis in eastern Chad. He has never been to school and roams the desert all day with his brothers, searching for sticks that can be made into doors for mud huts. He is 10 years old.

Horrible stuff, right. Well, stop a moment and think. Life is about allocating resources between choices - well that is economics, but let's leave that quibble aside - and let's think about, as Kristof does, the actual choices available, not the warmy fuzzy if the world was not the place that it is choices, but the actual ones.

It's appalling that Abakr, like tens of millions of other children abroad, is working instead of attending school. But prohibiting child labor wouldn't do him any good, for there's no school in the area for him to attend. If child labor hawks manage to keep Abakr from working, without giving him a school to attend, he and his family will simply be poorer than ever.

Bingo. Choices. Choices between real options, not idealized ones.

And that's the problem when Americans get on their high horses about child labor, without understanding the cruel third world economics that cause it. The push by Democrats like John Kerry for international labor standards is well intentioned, but it is also oblivious to third world realities.

As are much of the calls for "fair trade" which I rather name "self-decieving ways to dress up short-termist, know nothing self serving protectionism in the false clothes of 'caring'.

Look, I feel like Scrooge when I speak out against bans on sweatshops or on child labor. In the West, it's hard to find anyone outside a university economics department who agrees with me. But the basic Western attitude — particularly among Democrats and warm-and-fuzzy humanitarians — sometimes ends up making things worse. Emphasis added

Well, as a middle of the road or perhaps slightly conservative financier with long exposure working in the developing world, he's got my agreement. And again, I like the turn of phrase. I probably would have been snottier.

Consider the results of two major American efforts to ban imports produced by child labor:

In 1993, when Congress proposed the U.S. Child Labor Deterrence Act, which would have blocked imports made by children (if it had passed), garment factories in Bangladesh fired 50,000 children. Many ended up in worse jobs, like prostitution.

Then there was the hue and cry beginning in 1996 against soccer balls stitched by children in their homes (mostly after school) in Sialkot, Pakistan. As a result, the balls are now stitched by adults, often in factories under international monitoring.

But many women are worse off. Conservative Pakistanis believe that women shouldn't work outside the home, so stitching soccer balls is now off limits for many of them. Moreover, bad publicity about Pakistan led China to grab market share with machine-stitched balls: over the next two years, Pakistan's share of the U.S. soccer ball market dropped to 45 percent from 65 percent.

Unintended consequences and simplistic focus on costs versus the larger picture.

Now those of us on the more... conservative? - perhaps I merit the appelation despite my iconoclasm - side of things fall into similar habits. I have often argued that my experience in the Pharma sector (on the wierd fringes of it to be sure) taught me that government regulation has unpriced positives, that is benefits, as well as unpriced costs. Positive as well as negative externalities. The simplistic anti-government attitude held among many of my confreres I think is just that, simplistic. As many readers know, I am violently opposed to excessive regulation as something that impoverishes in the long term - above all in the developing world where regulation is usually poorly done, poorly executed and poorly administered, and above all, a chance for the elites in the government to extract rents from the poor and the unconnected. That is, regulation meant to "help" the poor as often hurts them as the insular, oligarchic, rent seeking elites impose the costs on the masses.

At the same time, well-done regulation can create markets, and support growth. It's all about execution - like Iraq I may add, the overthrow of Sadaam could have been good or bad, it's all about the execution.

...

I'm not arguing that child labor is a good thing. It isn't. But as Jagdish Bhagwati, the eminent trade economist, notes in his new book, "In Defense of Globalization," thundering against child labor doesn't address the poverty that causes it.

Note to self, next time I am back in the West, need to pick this up.

In the village of Toukoultoukouli in Chad, I visited the 17 girls and 31 boys in the two-room school. Many children, especially girls, never attend school, which ends after the fourth grade.

So a 12-year-old boy working in Toukoultoukouli has gotten all the education he can. Instead of keeping him from working, Westerners should channel their indignation into getting all children into school for at least those four years — and there is one way that could perhaps be achieved.

Well here I disagree. The reality is in countries like Chad, further education is generally wasted. The reality is that the economy does not provide opportunities for the educated, and willl not in the future. And the uglier reality is that there are few exits from Chad, not by emmigration, not otherwise.

Rather better to support mixed schooling - vocational training on projects the local economy can actually support.

It's bribery. The U.N. World Food Program runs a model foreign aid effort called the school feeding program. It offers free meals to children in poor schools (and an extra bribe of grain for girl students to take home to their families). Almost everywhere, providing food raises school attendance, particularly for girls. "If there were meals here, parents would send their kids," said Muhammad Adam, a teacher in Toukoultoukouli.

Bingo, I call it aligning incentives. And hey, basic schooling, at this level in terms of basic literacy in maths and writing is a good thing, above all if one can provide also some support to vulnerable children in terms of nutrition.

School feeding costs just 19 cents per day per child.

So here's my challenge to university students: Instead of spending your energy boycotting Nike or pressing for barriers against child labor, why not sponsor school meals in places like Toukoultoukouli?

Indeed, indeed. Of course, that takes out the beer money and may not be as "cool" or "oppositional" for its own sake.

I spoke with officials at the World Food Program, and they'd be thrilled to have private groups or individuals help sponsor school feedings. (See www.nytimes.com/kristofresponds for details.) Children in Africa will be much better off with a hot meal and an education than with your self-righteous indignation.

Have to send Kristoff a note.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:59 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

The new "biometric" requirements for US travel.

Bloody posturing I call it. My understanding is the key binding constraint is not the raw information but rather lack of abilty to follow up. It strikes me as fairly pointless to spend large amounts of resources to collect information that one is not capable of processing.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:04 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 02, 2004

Lounsbury on Arabic Instruction

Ironic title there.

Very good, a comment asked me about the utility etc. of intensive Arabic instruction in Cairo: "Third, what advice could you give someone (a 44yo US male) considering spending a year in intensive Arabic instruction in Cairo?"

Let me give a general answer.

First, I do not believe initial introduction to Arabic in country is the most efficient approach. I highly advise taking some initial coursework to get basic formal grammar down before heading to the Arab world. Arabic is not generally well-taught in the Arab world (either for natives or for foreigners), and it helps to get a base from someone with more of a methological base. Then, after that, go in country. It helps to avoid English speaking areas, as Cairo, because it takes less discipline not to use English.

If possible, I highly advise a program like the Middlebury Summer, three months intensive. If one is serious, one will really learn and get a base.

Second, on intensive Arabic instruction in Cairo, certainly it is one of the more popular places and the American run programs there have decent methodology - although too heavy on the useless reading of novels in my opinion. Literary focus. Very typical of Arabic language teaching. I rather loathe Cairo and hated every day I was there when I worked there, but it probably is not an overall bad choice.

However my impression is that (a) it is hard to be truly intensive because the programs are set in English speaking settings; (b) as typical of overseas language learning programs, over flowing with young kids out for a lark more than anything. One has to be really serious and really quite obsessive to get anywhere in Arabic - but that's a general statement.

On the utility: here is what I tell everyone thinking of sitting down and learning Arabic. Sit down and think about what you may expect out of this. It takes a bloody long time to get functional. You have to personally put a value on that time. I put it at 3-5 years to functionality, depending on focus, although an intensive pre-country formation to get a base and then a year in country somewhere, intensive hopefully to get maximum value, is useful and can get you up to the level where you can carry forward. Personal discipline is the key factor, the key variable here, because Arabic is a pain in the ass to learn.

I personally would not do just one year without future plans, but that depends on personal valuation of time, etc. That being said, there is no way to know without trying.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:27 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Car bombs, Car bombs, where are you oh car bombs

A bit of a personal news angle:

Police hunt 2 explosives-laden cars, 3 suspects
By Rana Husseini
AMMAN — Security forces are searching for two explosives-laden cars that were driven into the Kingdom from Syria. Police are also continuing their search for three suspects, whose photographs were published in the local press and on Jordan Television, in connection with alleged plots to commit terrorist acts in the country, officials confirmed on Thursday. The suspects are Suleiman Darwish, Azmi Jaiousi and Mwaffaq Odwan.

Law enforcement officials reported that they had arrested several persons in connection with plotting sabotage in Jordan. They also reported the seizure of one vehicle loaded with explosives.

The announcement of the arrests and the appeal to the public for assistance that might lead to the arrests of those still at large brought tight security measures around diplomatic missions, government facilities, the Jordan Radio and Television Corporation and other institutions on Thursday.

"We have not arrested anyone yet but have good descriptions of the vehicles in question and information on the wanted suspects," a senior official told The Jordan Times on condition of anonymity.

The Public Security Department on Thursday said it would offer a financial reward to anyone who provides information that leads to the arrest of the suspects.

"We have received good tips from citizens concerning the wanted men, and we have sensed strong cooperation from the community," one source said.

The official declined to elaborate further on the situation.

Minister of State and Government Spokesperson Asma Khader said police have set up checkpoints to inspect suspect vehicles around the Kingdom.

Friday-Saturday, April 2-3, 2004

Yesterday the city was in a bit of a tizzy, that is this part of the city. The fun folks in the blue camo were all about, and they had their "technicals" everywhere. Nothing makes one feel better than seeing APCs stationed at strategic locations and the blue toyotas with the HMGs here and there.

Well, it is going to happen one day. Jordanian secret police are good, but they're not perfect. No one is. I held a call with a colleague, we agreed, no more meetings at the five stars.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:39 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Jordan and on Iraq and where we are.

First, today was a fearful day today in Amman.

According to many reports after the siezure of the truck bomb today there remains parts of the cell and another engine in country. The city was filled with security agents today, and at every "sensitive point" (I myself live n the embassy district) security forces with heavy weapons are in place.

Jordanian authorities are, relatively unusually, offering rewards for information on the cell. The fact this is public and the fact that they are offering money suggests there are issues.

Latest reports say that Jordanian authorities are searching for a vehicle “other than” the truck bomb and weapons found so far.

[nb: this note referred to 1 April]

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:16 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 01, 2004

Update, Trade Fair Canceled

Unsurprising, but here it is:
" Organisers of the Baghdad Expo, a major trade fair that had been due to start on Monday, said it was postponed -- a blow to U.S. efforts to draw investment to Iraq and project an image of a stable country conducive to doing business.

No new date was set for the trade fair.

International companies hoping to win a slice of Iraqi reconstruction had been due to take part in the exhibition, along with U.S. companies that have won most of the contracts Washington has awarded to rebuild Iraq so far.

But many companies had expressed concern about security at the event -- the site where it was due to be held was rocketed last month, and Baghdad's main hotels have also been repeatedly attacked with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.

Washington hopes economic growth in Iraq will help undermine the guerrilla insurgency, but so far, the lack of stability and security in some parts of Iraq has hampered reconstruction. " (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41305-2004Apr1.html)

You would think then that CPA honcho would take my fucking phone call today re the information he owes me on steel. If these clowns can't even enable my project, with our guts, then I don't know what they are doing.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:55 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Further to Iraq - The Mob {edited, moved forward}

Reflecting on the scenes - as usual the Arab Sats had the most graphic imagery, I have to say it was a bit chilling.

The more chilling was my maid's response. As many of you may recall, my maid is an Iraqi woman, a Shiite. She was happy. Really happy, although my evident displeasure put a cap on her comments.

Normally I am tolerant of her often bizarre opinions - indeed her and her family have given my insights. Today was hard to take. Leaving aside the rather chilling personal implications - however much she loves me as a mother I find it hard not to think the political can over come that - I thought rather about the continuous decline in the political climate here and the rising danger for Americans and westerners.

Well, this quote from The Washington Post perhaps captures it best:
" Mehamdy [a police official] said: "I was surprised. . . . The violence is increasing against the Americans. . . . They took over the country and they didn't give us anything. They came for democracy and to help the people, but we haven't seen any of this, just killing and violence." " (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37891-2004Mar31.html)

Clearly my steel project should be near Basra.

Except tensions are rising there as well.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:49 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Baghdad Expo Alert, progress you know.

The latest security warning issued by the Department of State on the April 5-8 Destination Baghdad Exposition (DBX):

"On April 5 to 8, the Iraqi/American Chamber of Commerce and Industry is hosting a trade fair called Destination Baghdad Expo at the Baghdad International Fairgrounds in the Mansour area of Baghdad. Given the current security situation in Iraq, it is not possible to guarantee the safety of U.S. citizens attending this event. Destination Baghdad Expo is not sponsored or endorsed by the CPA or the U.S. Government.

U.S. citizens are also reminded that April 9 is the first anniversary of the U.S. military entry to Baghdad.

Terrorists do not distinguish between official and civilian targets. These may include facilities where U.S. citizens and other foreigners congregate or visit, including residential areas, clubs, restaurants, places of worship, schools, hotels and public areas. U.S. citizens in Iraq are encouraged at all times to maintain a high level of vigilance and to take appropriate steps to increase their security awareness. "

Emphasis added.

Two comments.

A, CPA and USG were certainly pushing this Expo a few months ago.

B, Looks like they're washing their hands.
j

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:56 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Iraq, The Chaos [edit to add better link]

There are a number of items I thought I would cover.

First, Juan Cole has an interesting, indeed powerful observations (if we leave aside the academic speak):
This degree of hatred for the new order among ordinary people is very bad news. It helps explain why so few of the Sunni Arab guerrillas have been caught, since the locals hide and help them. It also seems a little unlikely that further US military action can do anything practical to put down this insurgency; most actions it could take would simply inflame the public against them all the more.

It seems likely to me that the guerrilla violence will continue for years, since it has a firm class base in the Sunni Arab rentiers who had benefitted from Sunni dominance in the Baath, and to whom the best jobs, infrastructure and most power had been thrown. They are not going to be quietly reduced to a small powerless and much less wealthy minority.

The only hope is political. The Sunni Arabs have to be convinced that they are not playing a zero-sum game. A zero-sum game is one where there is only one pie, and it always stays the same size. In a zero-sum game, if your rivals get a bigger piece of the pie, then your piece will inevitably shrink.

But politics does not have to be a zero-sum game. The Iraqi economy has the potential to expand greatly. So the pie won't stay the same size, and Shiites could get richer without robbing the Sunni Arabs. Likewise, in a parliamentary system, the Sunni Arabs could make coalitions with Kurds and moderate Shiites in such a way as to be a key player and to retain a great deal of political power and to forestall the radical Shiites from taking over. A minority can leverage its power by being a swing vote.

Unless the Sunni Arabs are drawn into parliamentary politics and convinced that the new game is not a zero-sum game, the bombs will continue to go off. ( See http://www.juancole.com/2004_04_01_juancole_archive.html#108080271181902982 )

Could .... Emphasis added. This is Cole's key observation, the underline section. Now before returning to that, let me quote an op-ed piece on counter-insurgency.

"Recent history shows insurgencies span decades. The Chinese Communists fought for over 25 years, the Vietnamese over 30, the Sandinistas 18, the Afghans 10 years against the Soviets, the Chechens over 10 years and the Palestinians over 25 years -- with no end in sight. Even when the British won in Malaysia, it took 12 years.

The trend is clear. Modern insurgencies are lengthy struggles. This is an absolutely critical point. Counterinsurgents need to think in decades, not years."
From:
The Long Haul
By T. X. Hammes
Thursday, April 1, 2004; Page A31
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40800-2004Mar31.html

Now, as to that, Hammes also notes:
" Insurgency has evolved by taking advantage of information-age tools that expand its power and reach. While insurgents still use Mao's basic principle that superior political power can defeat dominant military and economic power, they no longer rely on a Maoist type of hierarchy. They have evolved to make use of loose networks and coalitions of the willing.

As al Qaeda has demonstrated, networks provide exceptional flexibility and resilience under attack. They also make use of all available networks -- political, economic, social and military -- to convince their enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for any perceived benefit. Insurgents directly attack the will of their opponents.

In Iraq, the pattern of attacks on the U.S. presence, our allies, international aid organizations and cooperating Iraqis shows that our opponents have adopted insurgency. They plan to beat us. A coalition of the willing -- former regime loyalists, international terrorists, criminals and radical elements of Iraqi society -- has become a loose, temporary alliance to drive the U.S.-led coalition out of Iraq. "

I would note myself that I appreciate the author does not engage in silly posturing regarding evil and the like, nor exageration in regards to the nature of the"coalition of the willing" - a fine piece of irony I may add.

Further, and here is the most important point:
" Insurgency is a different type of conflict that the short, intense wars envisioned by proponents of high technology. It requires a fundamentally different approach to win. Most important, it requires a recognition of the duration of this kind of war.

Unfortunately, in Iraq the accelerated transition of sovereignty and lack of a clearly articulated post-transition plan indicate an early departure by the U.S.-led coalition. While early departure is not our strategy, the mere appearance of "cut and run" thinking reinforces the insurgents' greatest strength -- patience. It also provides them with one of their most powerful weapons -- intimidation. They have been telling Iraqis from the beginning not to side with America, that the Americans will go home and the insurgents will remember who helped them. They don't even have to sell the idea anymore: They simply point to the headlines in U.S. newspapers.

To win this kind of war we have to dispel any impression that we will abandon Iraq. We must develop coherent, long-term, interagency plans and processes to execute them. We must articulate them clearly, fund them and then stick to them. Only the concrete expression of our political will across the economic, social and military spectrums can lead us to victory. " Emphasis added.

Now the, I do not think that in fact "only the concrete expression of our ...will" across the spectra can lead to "victory" in the sense of the original goals.

As I have often argued, previously on The Straight Dope message boards before the war, and elsewhere, execution matters and once one poisons the well, it is damned hard to cleanse the waters. Damned hard if not impossible.

The piss poor execution of policy - in terms of the self-indulgent and arrogant (in an obvious and clumsy way) lead up, in terms of the equally short-sighted truimphalism of April-June 2003 when valuable time was wasted, when allies needlessly insulted and driven away and when myopic, drunken self-congratulatory triumphalism blinded Washington to the fact that the "enemy" was not in any way defeated, it had only melted away - has consequences. Consequences that make it harder and harder to achieve the original goals, themselves while rather stupidly expressed, not bad in theory.

Of course to pull something like the democratisation of Iraq off, one needs to have a realistic idea of what can be achieved in a given time frame and the realities of what any given society is capable of (at that moment) in terms of change. None of this, as I have argued was in place. I have witnessed first hand the clumsiness and time-wasting (reminds me have to log a call into CPA today, bloody steel people never got back to me - we're all about you! they say. Well bloody well execute because investors like my people are not going to tolerate this bloody mess forever.) of the CPA and the degree to which political vision ("all is going well!") has driven policy more than on the ground intelligence. I recall for longer term readers how I reported in post-briefing comments - Summer 2003 - CPA people would tell us off the record it was much more dangerous than they were briefing, or would suggest they themselves feared for their lives. "Just hope to get home..." Mind you this was senior staff.

Worse, however, as the author above suggests, and as an article I quote below (from a pro-war observer) suggests, the current Administration has no clue as to how to go forward. None whatsoever. Policy is at present driven by short-term political expediancy and is incoherent. It is failure in the making.

As Hoagland, otherwise a supporter says: " The Bush administration went into Iraq with a bold political vision of regime change and a daring military strategy that used speed instead of armored mass to conquer the battlefield. A year later clarity and decisiveness have gone missing in both the political and military spheres in Iraq.

Fewer than 100 days remain before "sovereignty" and presumably power are to be transferred from the U.S.-British occupation authority in Baghdad to . . . ? I can't tell you. Neither can the White House, which drifts toward subcontracting the job of organizing a sovereign interim Iraqi authority to the United Nations. Washington has also decided that a new U.N. Security Council resolution should provide the legal basis for the continuing presence of nearly 150,000 American and other foreign troops in Iraq after the June 30 turnover -- even though the administration had agreed last autumn to negotiate a status-of-forces agreement with Iraq's Governing Council.

Washington takes for granted that the Iraqis, who have not been consulted, will accept this quiet reversal. "
From
Dangerous Indecision in Iraq
By Jim Hoagland
Thursday, April 1, 2004; Page A31
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40801-2004Mar31.html

Now his argument is rather Shiite centered and I think fallacious in its understanding of the situation at the level of the power plays - and in its dismissal of Lkhdar or the criticisms of Chalabi's cynical exploitation of the Baathist ban, however he gets one essental point right:
" But every bomb blast, and every appalling massacre, such as the butchering of four American contractors in Fallujah yesterday, is a message meant for Washington: "You have not beaten us. We have regrouped in a Sunni heartland that you never conquered, whatever your president announced."

....

U.S. flexibility is important to winning this war. But a constant shifting of strategy, of clients, of goals and methods for establishing political structures, all under the pressure of the calendar, is a self-defeating exercise -- especially if it is carried out by fiat and with an air of imperviousness. Neither Americans nor Iraqis can be content with the policy message that we will "leave it to Lakhdar.""

That is indeed true.

The problem is there is no sign that this Administration has truly grappled with the changes necessary to change direction and save themselves from a Vietnam like disaster, that is a disaster created not by military inadequacy but a fundamentally flawed vision of the political and social landscape upon which they are trying to write down their macro-political theory into reality. This utter lack of comprehension of the real driving forces, the strange incoherence which seems to stem from cognitive dissonance between their theoretical structures and the reality.... it is the recipe for a mini-Vietnam for the political framework in which they are trying to operate in Iraq is a failure and always will be.

Final note, using an upload client for the first time, rather than the web, it does seem more efficient, but...

Also, I need to find the time to write something about the Dhimma and the like. I have seen some comments out and about that really irritate me for their combined historical and current illiteracy. Someone call me on this.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:07 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Wolfowitz in Iraq, silly rumours, but amusing

Actually knowing the guy, I rather think he might, were he to grapple with reality, do a good job.

However, this would be more than something of a blunder.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:46 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 31, 2004

Iraq: an ugly day

I watched the fairly graphic video of the murder of the presumed American civilians in or around Falluja. It was disturbing. As disturbing was the fact that my maid, an Iraqi Shiite was clearly happy.

Well, I warned a year ago that invading Iraq in the circumstances which the US set up for itself was opening Pandora's box. The cycle of rage and revenge I think is not breakable now - not with US troops at least. I have a hard time seeing a way out of this, ever harder. Regardless, recall I noted the oreintation for staff heading in-country.

The descent into pure barbarism is a rather bad sign.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:27 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Cyprus

Well, not part of most of your interests, but something I have been following for a variety of reasons.

It appears Cyprus is within inches of finding a solution to the division, for the first time since the 1960s on equitable grounds.

The UN with EU leverage has been doing some real arm twisting and we can see the results, although I am afraid the Greeks and Turks will blow up the deal, from the both sides the local leadership has shown no small amount of bad will although always finding an excuse to blame it on the other side.

The main hurdle at present, of course, is the "right of return" of the Greeks to the North. It appears there is going to be some kind of limitation on this, as the Turks are afraid of being overwhelmed by the richer, better prepared Greeks. Not a pretty compromise but likely necessary. Certainly a compensation fund is likely necessary for both sides. The other rumored point is a right for the militaries to remain in place to guarantee the deal.

Well, it may yet happen, if so it is a good.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:14 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 29, 2004

Afghanistan, it is a pity that my predictions were spot on

As those who knew me back in my commenting days on a message board called SDMB, I rather strenoushly argued after the fall of the Taleban that the promises of a Marshal plan for Afghanistan, or remaking and saving it from its failed status would be hollow. They will also recall that the pre-fooled argued, oh no, that this would be a real effort.

I share this by way of reminding people, when we are thinking of such situations, it is usually helpful to be boundless cynical:

UN warns on Afghanistan reverting to terrorism
By Hugh Williamson in Berlin and Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad
Published: March 28 2004 21:59 | Last Updated: March 28 2004 21:59

A United Nations body will warn this week that Afghanistan is in danger of reverting to a "terrorist breeding ground" with an economy dependent on the illegal drug trade unless the international community significantly increases development funding to the war-torn country.

...

The report, obtained by the Financial Times, complains that "aid . . . has been much lower than expected or promised. In comparison to other conflict or post-conflict situations Afghanistan appears to have been neglected".

...

The UNDP report notes Iraq is receiving "10 times as much development assistance with roughly the same size of population". Development inflows amount to $67 per person, compared with $248 in Bosnia Herzegovina and $256 in East Timor, according to the report.

The report's strong language increases the likelihood of tough financial negotiations at this week's conference, to be co-chaired by Afghanistan, the UN, Germany and Japan.

The Afghan government is due to present a seven-year, $28bn funding programme, while western governments have indicated that funding commitments, lasting four years at most, are unlikely to exceed the $4.5bn pledged by donors in Tokyo in 2002.

....

The report, which compiles the UN's latest data on Afghanistan, says the country's $4bn estimated GDP is small compared with the $14bn in "military costs" spent annually in Afghanistan by western powers.

Over half the population live in extreme poverty and only Sierra Leone ranks below Afghanistan on the UNDP's human development index. Life expectancy, at below 50, is "similar to that which prevailed in the 19th century in Europe".

Separately, Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, insisted the US had not over looked the terrorist threat from Afghanistan in the days before and after the September 11 attacks.

"If one looks at what was done, we went to Afghanistan - we didn't go to Iraq," he told ABC News.

"It certainly took away their training, their haven and it certainly destroyed the Taliban and eliminated them from running the country. That's what the president's action was. It wasn't Iraq. It was Afghanistan."

Rumsfeld position, of course, is analytically incoherent.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:55 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Terror & States, a brief comment

One of the items that I have noted in the furor regarding Clarke is the issue of the analysis and blinders re terror organizations.

I think there is something very spot on in the note that the main Bush team has clung to the comfortable state-based assumptions regarding terror organizations. It strikes me as clear that there is indeed - even now - an unexamined presumption rooted in the old Cold War analytical frameworks that so very, very infects them that things do not happen outside of a state framework.

It's a great pity as while clearly state support can be useful, as clearly the Islamic radical organizations have been, on the level of terror, been able to do very well indeed without really substantive state support. Taking out the "Axis of Evil" - in short - is fighting WWI instead of WWII, if you take my meaning.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:50 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Clarke, a brief note

Of course the book is not available out here - but what I learn about him, I like - ex-some comments in re cyber-terror which strike me as chicken-littlism. I rather dislike this line of argumentation or smearing that because Clarke is a bitter critic of the Administration's mind numbingly stupid FP that he's a "liberal." He rather seems to be someone like myself - and we need more of that, less of this lick-booting lock-stepping in political life.

Looking forward to my upcoming swing through New York, pick up the text in question and learn more.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:41 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

French Elections

Interesting results there. I hope this is not going to roll back economic reforms that France rather needs, and badly. And Germany. My interest, of course, is as much personal as theoretical. European economic stagnation does not serve me well, above all in terms of North African plays.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:34 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 28, 2004

The Reform Summit, there is the reality (added Le Monde reference)

Well, I know American "conservative" commentators (hereafter, "the pre-fooled") have been fellating themselves over supposed winds of change in the region that they so badly want to demonstrate that the Iraq fiasco makes any sense at all, however here's a brutal look at the reality:

Arab Summit Meeting Collapses Over Reforms
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
Published: March 28, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/28/international/middleeast/28ARAB.html

"TUNIS, Tunisia, March 27 — The summit meeting of Arab leaders billed as the first serious effort to make a collective commitment to democratic reforms ended Saturday before it began, with the host nation, Tunisia, insisting that it be postponed indefinitely.

In a statement, the Tunisian government said it felt that the commitment of Arab states toward reforms — from human rights to a greater role for women — was insufficient for the 22 foreign ministers gathered here to hammer out an agreement on common goals that the heads of state would endorse."

Super, a bit - no, rather suprising that they can't even get the facade together, that has been the whole purpose of Arab summits for the past fiftey years, to put a facade together while they busily stab each other in the back, and generally display some of the worst efforts at regional coordination of any given region in the world - this takes even the Africans for a ride.

Note "Some foreign ministers had refused to include certain words like "democracy" and "parliament" and "civil society," said Oussama Romdhani, an official spokesman for the Tunisian government. Officials who took part in the meeting said the very idea of supporting nongovernmental organizations as the building block for civil society had dragged on for four hours."

My money is, Egyptians on the last.

"Even by the erratic standards of Arab summit meetings, long marked by very public displays of anger and mutual insults, the sudden cancellation of the such an important gathering just before it was to begin seemed to come as a surprise."

This is wrong by the way, the public displays of pique are a welcome recent innovation, generally you had summits with all happy faces, and lots of documents that had a snowball's chance in hell of actually seeing anything vaguely resembling application. Like that infamous "Arab Free Trade Zone." Qadhdhafi's calling the Saudis stooges in the last one at least had an air of honesty and reality to it. Which is why the Egyptian cuts the broadcast. Actually that was a moment of rare entertainment, although I recall thinking that there was no way they'd let it go on for long.

And this is most amusing: "Most ministers were tight-lipped, refusing to even comment on a decision that they said had been made by Tunis in the absence of any consultation with them. Some rejected the idea that there had been no agreement on the various issues, saying the Tunisians seemed to have some unspecified reason of their own for wanting to cancel."

Super, at least we are seeing the reality of Arab politics now. And Israel sells these clowns as enemies. They can't even get their act together when they're bloody desperate and need some Potemkin response to the Americans. There's a good reason why Arab armies keep getting and will keep getting crushed by anyone with half a bit of discipline.

And then this note: "The Bush administration had made no secret of its desire for the meeting to end with a strong statement backing more open, democratic change in the Middle East. For Washington, an echo of democratic change across a region marked by autocratic governments would help justify the decision to go to war to topple Saddam Hussein.

But Washington got off on the wrong foot when its Middle East proposal, which laid out a blueprint it hoped the Arab states would follow, was leaked before any Arab leader was aware of its contents."

One diplomatic fuck up after another, and they still believe their idiotic ideas of "transformation" via Iraq, which is a complete fucking mess.

I await with increasing impatience for regime change in the US in the desperate hope that something approaching a clue will enter into American policy in regards to this region.

Also see this:
La Tunisie reporte sine die le sommet de la Ligue arabe
LEMONDE.FR | 28.03.04 | 11h23 • MIS A JOUR LE 28.03.04 | 17h22
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3220,36-358717,0.html

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On the MENA Group Blog

First, let me say that I a bloody climbing the walls, as the drooling moronic incompetents (it was fun telling them this to their faces, if a bit mean) of the "leading" ISP (i.e. who has signed on more suckers than others), have knocked out my email - well everyone's email. These people are the most unreliable morons I have ever had to deal with in ISPs.

That aside, it looks as if a group blog on MENA is starting. I am not the moving force behind this, I may participate if the terms are right, and I like the idea.

I thought I might share here a comment I wrote at the sponsor's website:
"Well, I just found this after getting the note from von and drilling around the site.

Very interesting. And I may add tacitus gets me nod for the reference. While obviously we don't really get on in re a particular subject, and the turns of phrase in the above exchange are perhaps a bit unfortunate. I do respect the nod.

Otherwise, interesting concept, I toyed with it myself.

Last note, I will be happy to participate to the limit of my other commitments and in the context of a wide ranging discussion of the issues - I will say I am utterly uninterested in an exclusive focus on Islam and its problems (as well as "problems").

I might suggest, by the way, that a focus on the Middle East proper is a rather more reasonable focus - something covering the entire Islamic world per se is simply unwieldy.

As for names, well, if I may be so bold to suggest something like " ta'qqul " ~ " judiciousness, mutual understanding " or more amusingingly " 'aqoul " which means both " understanding, reasonableness " and is the name of a spiny bush - English name is 'Camel's Thorn.'

That rather amuses me actually. Hell, even if I do not participate, I encourage the last suggestion.

I hope they go with my suggestion. I like the play. Although perhaps it is most appropriate to me personally.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:14 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Iraq: Why Reconstruction is failing

Actual conversation with the head of private sector development (The Big Cheese, BC), my best recollection. Should be pretty close to the actual.

Me: "Touching base with you again regarding the contacts, people we need to speak with to move things forward."

BC: "Sorry you're catching me at a bad time, just got back and we're restructuring [again] our office." Adds something more about turnover.

Me: "No problem, but we're very eager to start pulling together the data in order to make this happen."

BC: "Absolutely, it is a great project and we want to see it happen if it is appropriate, but we're going through a lot of changes right now, we'll have you the information as soon as possible. [The Group] is never far from my mind."

Me: "Super, excellent, I am always glad to hear that, but you know we need to move hard. By the way, I have the [data source] on [SOE relevant] and I wanted to know if I can speak to the author, get a better sense of status and the like."

BC: "Which is that, I am not familiar"

Me: "The [data source] on the CPA website, you have to drill around to find it but it is there."

BC: "Oh, uh, well to tell the truth it's pretty likely they're not here any more."

Me: "I think it is pretty recent, just found it [date]"

BC: "Yeah, but there is no one here who has been here for more than six months."

Me: [Laugh good naturedly] "Right, I understand, major turnover. Is there any way I can get in touch? I mean it would be really key to understand from a first person perspective the issues here, to the extent it is appropriate."

BC: "Well, a lot of those people are just gone..."

Me: "Right, right. However, I have a name from [data source] might not be the real author, but [name] is identified, could be just a template author."

BC: "Yeah, yeah, I know [author], [author] was demobilized,[author] is back in the US, but I know [author]."

Me: "Great, is there any way I can speak to him?"

BC: "I can try, see if [author] is willing but generaly they are out of the loop now."

Me: "No one is there for more than six months?"

BC: "Yes"

[Get back to nitty gritty, promise to call back, etc.]

Bloody hell, no institutional memory, constant organizational chaos. This is the recipe for blowing through vast funds and doing nothing with them. Nothing truly productive except enriching the few well-placed con artists that can sell these guys an idea.

Hmm, wonder if that includes me? Hope not.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:37 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Delayed, so: On Iraq, Steel, Projects & CPA

Well, my man is dropping off his daughters (bloody family men...) so a moment regarding my conversation last night with a fellow working with CPA (sub-contract, indirect) regarding the opportunity. I've known him a while now, we have off the record convos, bit of checking in on each other.

First, he knows the folks who got whacked by the Iraqi police. As many of you know, the whackers were 100 percent bona fide Iraqi police. Added information on this, from my amigo, was they (the whackees) had made a stupid move of travelling late in the evening without a convoy or heavily armed escort. In Iraq, you do not go out after dark unless you're armed to the teeth and in armor. That's the rule. They, my amigo says, had a bit too much naive belief in "good work." Good work means nada in a guerilla war.

Harsh criticism from him - and he knew the folks - but a clear statement on the reality.

Second, commended my decision to go for the Morocco option, saying, "It's not getting any better anytime soon." Noted the briefings now are explicitely warning people coming in for contract work that even in conditions where you are armed and armored, you're looking at a good 10 percent chance, 2 out of 20, that you are going to get whacked. This is not happy stuff, he is not sure how much longer he can keep at it himself. Further, in his opinion, there are signs of the instability spreading. Hard to tell, but it is there. We agreed that for the Steel project to come off we're going to have to site it in the South. There's noother choice. The Kurdish areas are presently stable, but siting in the North runs a real risk that if Kurd/non-Kurd tensions go overboard - and there are signs of this already - a project sited in the North may end up cut off from the rest of the country.

South Central region might b e a choice, but question is can you relaibly get enough power off-take given sabotage, etc. Note, this is a serious concern, you can't make money on this thing if the bloody thing is down half the time from the power getting cut. Or in the alternative, you hve to build your own power plant to go with your project. It might have an added benefit in terms of co-gen and then off-sales to the grid for excess power, but that's a real gamble.

I had not really thought through the power issue before, so this was a useful convo.

The other issue raised of course was cost of security. Going rate for average security people, no great shakes, is now $1000/day. That is a serious bit of added overhead. Westerners of course, but the IRaqis can not be trusted. There is just not enough bandwidth to properly vet everyone, indeed in the choas, it is well nigh impossible to properly vet people. Of course, you can go the old fashioned way of depending on a "family" to set up something, but then you get into a shadowy set of circumstances. Avoidable? Don't know.

In any case, he noted that right now they are desperate for private activity to come in, because in general, except for Arab trading operations, there is no investment going on that is not driven by CPA itself. Almost everything is the ministries. This should get us leverage. But is it enough to get the kind of coverage that we need to make this work? I don't know, because the cost structure keeps looking more and more distroted. So far I have not had the sense the private sector investment team is realistic enough regarding what they can actually get happening in the prsent circumstances. Sucked down too much of that home brew called "Iraq is a startup opportunity" that they were pimping back last year.

Well, we'll all see as we try to move this project forward. Try.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:02 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 26, 2004

An Arab Editorial on Greater Middle East Initiative.

I thought this might be interesting to share, as I know the writer quite well:

Reforms are long overdue
By Tayseer Abdel Jaber


THOUGH THE American initiative calling for political, economic, social and cultural reforms in the “Greater Middle East” has not been officially formulated in a final forum, it has created a widespread response. At the official level, most Arab leaders declared that reform should be homegrown and adapt in form and speed to the historical developments and current conditions of each country and society. They refuse imposed reforms from outside and suspect their timing and reasoning.
At the individual level, many writers and columnists have expressed their opinions. They range from complete rejection to mild acceptance. Some question the motive and the choice of region, which is basically Muslim and includes all Arab countries. Others raised the valid point that previous American administrations cooperated with Middle Eastern and other governments in spite of some having out-of-date political, economic and social systems.

I believe that the debate has mixed many issues together. There are basic questions that should be raised and answered clearly. The first, and of utmost importance, is whether reform in our region is needed or not. Can we simply rely on the evolution that took place in the last two or three decades, if any, to continue or do we need more forceful and direct changes that bring this region in line with major countries and nations in the world?

My answer to this and related questions is that our region needs comprehensive reforms and fast. Reforms in all areas are long overdue. This has been strongly pointed out by many Arab intellectuals in different fora over the last three decades. Since the early 1980s, many meetings of the Arab Thought Forum have concluded that democracy in the Arab countries stands as a condition for real economic and political development and participation. Lack of it has led to apathy, tribalism, skewed economic development, massive poverty and unemployment, heavy-handed governments and brain drain.

Many economists pointed out, as early as the 1960s, and continue to do so, that the Arab regimes are missing a lot of potential economic progress due to the irrational restrictions they impose on the flow of people, goods and services, and capital. The Arab Economic Unity Agreement was reached in 1957, the same year of the Treaty of Rome. Look at the great disparity between the achievements of the European Union and the meagre ones of Arab integration!

The challenges facing individual Arab economic systems are immense and will not be settled in each country alone and in isolation. This situation is already not sustainable. It has spilled over to worsen the political and social conditions.

Are these conditions not known in each Arab country? Have they been discovered only in the last month? Haven't they been raised over and over again?

Another example was the Arab Thought Forum study of the education system in the Arab countries that was carried out two decades ago. It was clear in that study that there was wide room for urgent reform, but again the volumes of that study were shelved! Why awaken dormant problems?

The problem areas were very clearly defined even before the last two Arab Human Development Reports were issued in 2002 and 2003. The UNDP Human Development Report was first issued in 1990 and since then it has been published annually. It covers about 180 countries, including the Arab states. In each report, it is evident where the Arab states stand. Though they differ among themselves, as a group, and compared to other regions, they have the lowest participation of women in political life, the highest illiteracy rate, the highest spending on arms, the lowest economic growth, the least intra-regional trade, the lowest women participation in the labour force, and the list continues. Do we need reform or shall we wait for the conditions to get worse, to deteriorate more?

Should we be against reforms on the pretext that they come from the outside? Perhaps this nicety could be tackled by protocol people and diplomats, in order to make it partly homegrown. But most Arab countries, as well as others, do follow international developments and benefit from others experience. Moreover, all Arab countries that had to implement an economic adjustment programme had to accept economic and institutional reforms that were imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. They may be called “national economic reform”, but the fact remains that they are under the scrutiny of the international institutions which are controlled by major Western countries.

Another example can be taken from the accession to the WTO, which usually forces a country to amend and introduce many crucial economic and other legislations. Even the Association Agreements between each of the eight Arab countries and the European Union do include a political section which commits Arab countries to respect the United Nations Charter, human rights and democracy.

So, no country in the world closes its doors and windows against overdue reform proposals, especially when there has been a continuous flow of local demands for these reforms coming from inside the room. Reforms are top priority for our future and do not contradict our deep concerns for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Introducing reforms, regardless of their origin, might even strengthen our position worldwide, including our position against occupation.

The writer is a former minister and executive director of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.

Monday, March 22, 2004

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:13 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

MENA Business Media, sharing a memo I wrote

Thought I could share this memo I wrote for some peeps coming into the region for the first time. A favor to help them out. Lightly edited to remove references inapprop for public consumption. This is about English language or French language business and economic news sourcing for an expat staff. Threw in some Arabic lang. source refrences as well.

General Business News
Online:
First, for following daily developments I would advise following both the following:
MENAFN
http://www.menafn.com
and

MENA Report
http://www.menareport.com

Both provide economic and financial news feeds (for free) on the region

MENA Report is easier to navigate but less substantive. Hoever unlike MENAFN it does a fairly decent job of capturing the francophone press articles, which are key for Maghreb. However, this is only in French with limited translation. Let me emphasize that it is difficult to keep informed on the Maghreb through English sources, French sources are truly key.

Middle East Economic Survey
http://www.mees.com/
A weekly newsletter and competitor to MEED to an extent, it is more focused on oil and gas activities than MEED, but contains often useful financial and general economic / business coverage. Like MEED, tends to have a Gulf bias.

al-Hayat: online at daralhayat.com they have scoops on economic/business news in Arabic, inconsistently translated into English at their English site. Worth checking on a weekly basis. (http://english.daralhayat.com/) Note al-Hayat is a pan-Arab publication out of London and widely considered to be the prime quality paper in Arabic. The general news they translate is well worth reading.

Otherwise, I would note that BBC online has good business and social coverage of the Middle East and that one should consult al-Jazeera in English http://english.aljazeera.net/HomePage.

Arabic Media:
I know this may not be practical, but I want to bring to your attention al-Iqtissad wal-Aamal. This is an Arabic language business monthly, which is jam packed with information. It is a hard read, but has a huge amount of information. Very Middle East versus North Africa focused. Local staff should be tasked to tracking this.

Also local staff should be tasked to follow CNBC Arabiyah, a new offering that is surprisingly good and the only really consistent focus on business and economic news on the Arab Sats, although al-Arabiyah (not the same as CNBC) is not bad.

Country Based News
Egypt:
Cairo Times
http://www.cairotimes.com/
A scrappy little publication, this contains largely political/local news, but often has interesting business / economic coverage. Widely read in the ExPat community.

Business Today
http://www.businesstoday-eg.com/
An English language Egyptian / Arab business news magazine. When I was in Cairo I thought it was decent, however the web page is down.

Al-Ahram Weekly
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/
The Egyptian government’s staid mouthpiece, English weekly edition.

Middle East Times
http://metimes.com/2K4/issue2004-12/methaus.htm
This English weekly paper aspires to a pan-Arab scope, but is largely Egyptian in focus, with Gulf and Sham for good measure, not much Maghreb matierals. Business, political and social coverage.

Jordan:

Jordan Times
http://www.jordantimes.com
The real sole online English source for Jordan. Keep in mind this is a government controlled paper, although not as tendentious as al-Ahram.

The Jordanian Embassy in Washington maintains a surprisingly well done news archive that largely reproduces Jordan Times articles, but also some others, such as The Star, a semi-independent weekly which is not online anymore.
http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/newsarchive.shtml

Note, of course this is a selection with a “point of view” I have used this for roughly a year and found it relatively even handed – of course there is prior censorship in the Jordanian press which makes the selection itself limited.

MENAFN and MENA Report are both based in Jordan and by default give coverage on this.

Morocco:
L’Economiste
http://www.leconomiste.com/
A very good daily covering the Moroccan economy, business community. Also covers political events and the like. A scrappy and indispensable source. Takes the most classic liberal point of view of any of the Moroccan press, rather like The Economist. Indeed I would say it is the closest thing to a real newspaper that one can find in the country, somewhat close nevertheless to the Casa business elite.

La Vie Eco
http://www.lavieeco.com/index
A weekly competitor, not as good but useful to follow.

Economie & Entreprises
Not online but a very good monthly. Informative.

I do not know of any good English language sources in Morocco itself. Will follow up on the other request when I get a moment.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:39 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 25, 2004

On the Clarke testimony

I don't normally comment or speak to domestic politics regarding the US - in many ways I only care about foreign policy since I am hardly in the States - but I am fascinated by the firestorm regarding this fellow.

I am curious to know what the impact will be. I understand the political machinery is full attack on the fellow, but the reporting I read suggested that his public appearances have been strong.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:37 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 24, 2004

The Value of Reputational Capital

Lunch, with the CFO of my ex-Fund. Feel sorry for the poor bastard, really not a bad sort although he ... well let's say he did not stop bad things from happening although I am confident he was not a part of them.

We're talking about potential projects, discussing a business plan. He then starts spilling his guts about the present situation in the Fund. The Director, the theif as you may recall, has refused, utterly illegally of course, to pay him his termination of service indemnity. He's being kept hostage in a way.

His problem now is this news has gotten out, not news-wise but in informed circles. The reputation of the Fund in the market is now ... what it should be. This means he's all covered up in it, for all that at worst (which is actually not very good) he was an enabler through inaction of other's bad deeds.

This is the killer since right now, nobody will touch him. He's got potential liability and is associated with a Fund which potentially USG is going to go after. (Legal gears grinding) It's not good, because in addition, and unlike me, he does not have plausible deniability. Totally misplayed the situation. For me, the short term risk was I was seen as an asshole, disloyal, etc. Best pay off I have ever had from a decision and a real lesson in reputational capital, the value. Walking away, and denouncing a corrupt situation, and having the bad reputation with the right people has kept business and proposals coming my way. This guy is looking at potential personal bankruptcy and losing the house he just built. And he didn't even profit (at least in any substantial manner) from the disaster.

But in many ways his own fault. Had he come out cleanly at the right moment, he would have taken the up front hit, but gotten the aura of reformer and straight shooter. Now, he gets no payoff, and worse, rather penalty. Told me - and I thought the poor bastard was going to cry - that he is thinking of emmigrating, the situation is so bad.

Lesson: don't undervalue your rep, it has market value, and don't undervalue options stemming from what may see a risky move (denouncing the boss, even if there is an aspect of 'market timing' in the move).

He saw the costs, but failed to value the implicit option involved in the move.

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So, embassies closing, some fine blue APCs out today; prayers and financial crises.

Fun stuff.

It made me recall during the war when I was walking an American in from out of town through the financial district and we ran into a major demo. All the guys in blue camo were out, the blue APCs with the MGs and water cannons, fun stuff. I recall he asked me "Is this safe" and without thinking I replied, "Well, I don't smell any tear gas so it can't be that bad." I will never forget the look on his face. Really amusing, but he may be right, my standards of bad are getting warped.

And so, off again for lunch. Right next to the UN HQ here. Sure going to be fun.

Ah side note, from my convo with the CBoJ fellow yesterday. We had a fun conversation about the currency crisis in 1989, he was as I mentioned, the responsible official for the forex operations. The interesting point here was on prayer, they're in the midst of a currency crisis and he has staff disappearing for an hour "for prayers." Nice excuse, few are willing to challenge that given the political situation in the region. Our CBoJ fellow indicated he called staff in and asked them if they did Fajr (early am) prayer on time? Nobody did. So, he asks, in the midst of a currency crisis, you can't be late with your afternoon prayer or do it after work?

Excuses and exploitation of the religion for personal reasons.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:05 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On Yassine, III

Machiavelli in the Middle East
By David Ignatius
Tuesday, March 23, 2004; Page A19
[url]http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16411-2004Mar22.html[/url]

And select quotes:

""It is much safer to be feared than loved," wrote the philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli nearly 500 years ago. That harsh logic can be seen in Israel's assassination Monday of Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the leader of the terrorist group Hamas.

It follows that for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, it's better to be seen as ruthless than as weak. .... "The message that Israel sent out by assassinating Sheik Ahmed Yassin is that when the disengagement from Gaza is finally implemented, Hamas will not be able to claim that the withdrawal was promoted by the group's operations.""

I may add that the assertion, from an Israeli security commentator, is frankly utterly without logic. Hamas will certainly still claim - and with perhaps some justification - that their Lebanon strategy worked, and that for this the Israelis are lashing out at them. Indeed, by taking this action, Israel has simply affirmed how important Hamas is to the very people who they are trying to convince otherwise.

As I noted prior, Sharon's strategy has a shown a brilliance in achieving exactely the opposite effect desired.

Ingatius notes: "But even Machiavelli believed that intimidation has its limits. Just a few sentences after the famous passage quoted above, he cautioned: "Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred."

By that Machiavellian measure, Sharon has failed. An enraged Hamas has vowed new suicide bombings in retaliation, and governments across the Middle East and Europe issued statements on Monday condemning Israel. "It's unacceptable, it's unjustified and it's very unlikely to achieve its objective," said British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. "

Indeed, when fear turns to hatred, one achieves the opposite of the desired effect.

The further question is:
" But will the Israeli operation work? That's the question a modern Machiavelli would ask. ... But even by this test, the assassination seems unlikely to achieve its intended result.

A pragmatic critique came from Sharon's own interior minister, Avraham Poraz. He explained Monday to Israeli reporters why he voted against the operation in a secret cabinet meeting: "I'm afraid that Hamas's motivation will increase. [Yassin] will become some sort of martyr . . . a national hero for them, and, I'm sorry to say, this won't prevent Hamas from continuing its activities.""

Bingo.

"Killing the partially blind and paralyzed Yassin "will only reignite and re-energize Hamas," agreed Daoud Kuttab, a prominent Palestinian journalist. ... And how does Israel imagine that Gaza will be governed once it pulls out? Before the Yassin assassination, Egypt had signaled a willingness to help with security. And Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority had drawn up plans (with the tacit approval of Yassin) for restoring law and order after the Israeli army leaves. Both efforts may now collapse in the uproar over Yassin's death. It's hard to see how Israel will benefit from the resulting anarchy."

However it is easy to see Hamas benefitting. Incorruptible, motivated cadres, the motivation of combined "holy" and nationalistic fervor that was clearly evident in watching the Sats covering the demos. Hamas flags everywhere.

Hamas is the clear winner. And the cadres, they can replace the leadership. It is a modern organization in many respects, more so than the archiac and corrupt PA organizations.

Finally the article closes on this:
" ... there is a deeper issue, one that goes to the heart of Israel's dilemma in dealing with the Arabs. Sharon symbolizes the belief that the Palestinians can be intimidated by military force -- and that peace will be possible only when they are sufficiently weakened and humbled. If Israel is tough enough, by this logic, it will eventually break the Arabs' will and force them to accept Israel's right to exist.

That rationale sent Israeli tanks rolling into Lebanon 22 years ago, in an operation Sharon believed would break the PLO and open the way to peace. But it didn't work out that way, and many Israelis now agree that the Lebanon war was a costly failure."

Further..." they [Israel] should consider the evidence of more than two decades that Sharon's approach isn't working. Rather than being humbled into submission, the Palestinians have embraced a strategy of suicidal rage."

The question is what exit from nihilistic violence? I rather think the author is wrong in suggesting Machiavelli was wrong, it is safer for Israel to be feared, but not to be hated with a suicidal rage - for that only begats unending terror for there is no defeating short of genocide an enemy who cares not if he dies in taking you with him.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:58 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Conversations, Jordanian Central Banker

Recently retired former Deputy G, speaking to him about a project, went to his house this evening for a late dinner.

We had an interesting conversation, wide ranging. Of note, his opinion that the recent events have really touched off a negative wave, and felt it could be rather like Sharon's visit to the Haram of the Dome of the Rock in terms of setting off a new round of degragation in conditions.

Otherwise, we spoke about currency policy - turns out this fellow managed the forex operations of the CB during the 1989 meltdown. Chalabi's little thing. Interesting convo there, but that I won't touch. Had some amusing thoughts to share on the Egyptians and their staggeringly mismanaged float of the pound. As he said, they have done it in a way that they have managed to take no benefit from it (floating the pound), nor any benefit from their actions to manage (the float). The funny thing about this is the current Gov of CB Egypt was his professor back in the day - the fellow is operating exactely contrary to what he taught, my man says.

That's Egypt. Say one thing in private, do and say another in public, wallow in incoherence.

Spoke a long time on democracization. Both agreed that there is a popular desire for more open systems, although people do not, understandably, have a good sense of what this means. But there is widespread sense that the old systems have failed, new are needed. However, he noted that the way the reforms are being pushed by the Administration is causing people to say no because of their pride, feelings. He himself is quite pro-American, but things need to be done better. Also shared that he feels the American embassies are very poorly served by their staff - focus on people who speak English well, but not on those who know the country, they get local foreigners - poor langauge skills, poor intelligence (economic).

Have to say, I agree.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:48 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 22, 2004

Arab Media - Yassine

Well things are in over drive. People are ... well climbing the walls over this. The imagery of a blown apart wheel chair, and in particular al-Jazeerah's gruesome imagery of a crippled old man (Yassine) blow to pieces - in all gory directness - is pushing buttons. The US response of course is utterly tone deaf, and plays into the agitprop that the US is doing the bidding of Israel.

In paricular al-Jazeerah is now Yassine 24/7, al-Arabiyah is far better. However, the reality is that al-Jazeerah is responding to market interest. Lots of imagery of Yassine being wheeled around, blind old crippled man. Not good PR, as I noted prior even Xian Arabs I have spoken to find the assassination of Yassine offensive, for all that they have little love for his Islamist supremacist politics. Plays into the feeling that Arab lives mean nothing, are always excused in their death.

This is truly an ugly day and I am certainly going to have to keep a low profile. Luckily deVillepin had some nice comments today, I'll cop to being French.

However, the reality is this was an incredibly idiotic move, unless of course the purpose was to uttelry sink the peace process and futher play into the Bush Administration's simplism and sell them on I-P Conflict = Supporting Israel & in particular Sharonista policies as part of the "War on Terror." Nihilistic politics, this, but I have a hard time seeing how this is helpful otherwise.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:22 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On the assassination of Cheikh Yassine

On the assassination of Cheikh Yassine

Well, it’s a bloody disaster and it’s incredibly stupid.

I have to say the logic of assassinating him escapes me. An old decrepit man, religious leader, saintly pose and looks – of course he’s a bloody minded bastard as well – who really has no effective control, although does do some egging – lots of egging – on in terms of violence. An old man in a wheelchair. That is not good PR.

Killing him achieved what?

Well, it achieved martyrdom for him, and helped reinforce the Hamas agitprop regarding the Israelis.

It will feed into a wave of anger – not just among Muslims, the Xian Arabs I have spoken to today consider the assassination criminal as well, like it or not the man was viewed as a real religious personage – and clearly feed into further attacks on Israel.

It will certainly help Hamas in recruiting, it will almost as certainly help the Islamic militants arguments against Israel and help their recruiting.

It will do nothing to operationally damage Hamas.

So, in one fell stroke the Israeli government has (a) stoked anger to fevered heights, (b) fed radicalism, (c) created a new “martyr,” (d) done nothing to address the underlying problems or in fact operationally damaged Hamas.

This senseless policy of violence for the sake of, well, it appears simple revenge is not going to lead to a way out. I am truly amazed that the Sharon government can continue in this nihilistic spiral into disaster.

On the other hand, I rather believe that they are trying to set up the circumstances by which the Sharonista dream of ethnic cleansing can come to pass. It’s the only thing that makes sense in this context.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 21, 2004

Conundrums and Steel, Iraq and Investment.

Well, finally some movement from the bureaucrats on this Iraqi steel project, have to rap with the chief of private sector investment with CPA - took him a bloody long time to get back to me, but suddenly they're seeing value. Of course maybe those assasinations are helpful, the investors still willing to deal with this situation are getting fewer.

The odd part of this situation is that the Left in American think that Iraq is a great deal for folks like me - on the contrary it's a fucking shitty situation and people like me are not, contra the stereotype, very much supportove of war for commercial purposes. It's getting thigns ass backwards to think the Bush Administration did the war for crass commercial reasons. Quite the contrary, they very much believed their own stories. However, nothing wrong with getting some good business out of the true believers at the same time.

This aside, I'll share another item, came in regards to the Iraq situation and my plans. I was rapping with my amigo, the CEO of MENAFN.com about choices (and ideas for vulture funds, etc) when I spoke to the Iraq situation. It's just crap and getting crappier. My amigo - well we're really not that close, in fact we almost hate eachother, but have similar business views, so money before personal preferences - tells me about a recent convo he had at the Embassy with some CPA folks. One of the fellows, and I quote the reporting of my amigo, said "I probably shouldn't say this, but don't go [to Iraq], it's just not safe."

This is becoming something of a farce - we have happy talk to make the pre-fooled happy nd all warm and tingly inside for the upcoming political season, and then we have the reality. And for the political issues, the CPA-Iraq admin can't speak to reality, and we have continued infighting that has more or less frozen efforts. Bloody hell, I was asked to look into putting together a leasing consortium for Iraq in January - I poke around for the USG types, get interest, try to take it further. Suddenly there is a turf war and no action. The bloody problem of course is that no one is really convinced of this idiotic game, and there is no cleear ownership of decisions outside the political types. I drop the subject because I am not going to expend my personal capital, reputational or otherwise, on trying to get something going to solve their problem (That KBR and Halliburton do not want to take on any more risk in extending contracts to small Iraqi operators, and that the financial system is still entirely dysfunctional) when they seem incapable of realistic follow through. There is still this absurdist point of a view among too many there that investment capital is going to flow into Iraq, and they just need to ... well I don't know what they think they should be doing. Bloody preparing bloody USTDA financing for Telecoms and IT investments, wehn there is not enough electicity and basic services are desperately in need of investments. It's a farce. Well, to be fair, that USTDA financing earmark was congressional. My USTDA contacts actually seemed to be chagrined. The amount of irrealism in the US regarding this whole affair is really staggering. No wonder the American Administration is such a farce. The Brits have better ideas, but then what can I say, a bit of experience in the real world.

Otherwise, regarding the conundrum II
I sometimes wonder about myself. I spent much of my weekend designing a three year budget for personal affaires for the potential new job in North Africa with various scenarios for dollar depreciation and regional currency responses.

And I enjoyed it. Yes, in place of fun, I spent my weekend with Excel playing around with scenarios. I have to say that if my expectation of a 20-30 percent depreciation over the next two years carries through, and the currency basket in Morocco is not adjusted, I am going to be unhappy. Of course, this is all simply ammunition for negotiations, but if I am not hedged, I get a very annoying exposure to currency fluctuations through rent versus housing allowance. If they don’t come up on the offer, they need to give me a currency flexible housing allowance, else it goes from being a very decent one to crap.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:04 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 18, 2004

Regulation and Government: The Evils of Regulation (Developing World)

Now, most people reading here know I am not a knee-jerk, market solves everything type. My experience in the Pharma industry taught me that regulation helps make markets when done right. Confidence in products, reduced costs in terms assurance on one level (against higher costs of meeting regulations, a good cost-benefit analysis has to recognize that an unregulated market has implicit costs in reassuring consumers of quality, in the case of health related / life or death products, I feel these may be substantial if we price in lost market size, etc.).

Nevertheless, this caveat, if done right, is key.

It's a point the ninny hammered "fair trade" advocates rather avoid or abstract away from. However, in the developing world - let me say the Arab region instead, where one can rarely count on any kind of administrative efficiency, let alone clarity, this is a very dangerous assumption. Public good, and all that, are not in fact, if we take reality and not the pious pronouncements made for Western consumption, in any way governing ideas. No, Administration in this region is almost always all about protecting or extracting rents.

Perfect example today. I have a close friend starting up a IT Security and related services consulting house. A necessary service given the truly awful security on networks here, general lack of consciousness regarding IT security issues and the new international pressure on key institutions such as in the financial sector to clean up their act and institute better overall practices, including security - internal as well as external.

Now this fellow's practice is defined (I am not sure if this makes sene business-wise but it's his planning so let's not be too critical) widely to include physical security applications leveraging IT - or higher technology as well.

Two stories to cover this.

First, he brought in a network security appliance that allows one to run dedicated scans of a network for both internal and external (internet, etc) manipulations, weakpoints, etc. Perfect for a bank, for example. Brought this in as a sample. Now, under customs law, the sample should be duty free. However, unilaterally the customs department decided to impose some 'special duty' for 'security reasons' since the machine had 'security implications' and could be 'abused.' Regulation became an excuse to extort a 100 percent duty on the assessed value of the machine. Or pehraps get a bribe. Now, this could be challenged, of course, with a lawyer, but given administrative lenteur, legal costs, one could easily exceed the duty, and in the meantime, customs holds your sample hostage.

Rent seeking.

Worse, today the fellow rings me up, he's livid.

Among the projects he has is to do the full security set up at a new foreign exchange trading house opening up. This runs from IT security to internal physical security. Now he's proposed to them installing wireless IP cameras at stations, etc. to provide a monitoring system. I am not sure that this is in fact a good idea, the wireless part, or even necesary but the principals appear to have desired to have extensive camera monitoring of the site, including the stations. Good idea, bad idea, let's abstract away from this.

Today the administration, again using its security powers, issued a decree declaring wirless cameras to be a security and public threat, and siezed the stock of his employer. No advance notice, no clear explanations, except some kind of strangely incoherent appeal to regulatory authority. Real issue, competition. Again there are avenues to challenge this, but the space for administrative fiat in regulation, for pure and simple manipulation to protect monopoloy rents for connected traders, etc. is immense.

In the developing world, until national institutions take on a life of their own, and good governance at some level is instilled as a general value, a libertarian attitude towards government is well-warrented as government in the developing world, in the Arab world is less about the public than about protecting the rents of the elite. It is indeed the dead hand and dead weight loss of the most extreme libertarian visions.

I might add that I am sure my amigo has no better avalues than the guys who fucked him. Pity that.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:35 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Shia visit: ref via Juan Cole, Shia Chat

A rather well-written and moving recounting of a Brit Iraqi-Shia Ashoura visit, and particularly relavatory re conditions:
http://www.shiachat.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=27124

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:33 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 17, 2004

Spain - Elections - al-Qaeda and Reaction, Open Question for Readers

Boo Foo Foo noted the rather knee-jerk and poorly informed reaction among American conservatives in re the Spanish results.

I replied as follows:
I am aware of the idiocy in this connexion, sad because there is a legitimate question regarding appearances. That is, for all that I absolutely understood that the result was anger re the ETA claims more than any other factor, it will be spun among the al-Qaeda types as a victory. How does one respond to that?

Emphasis added.

The issue then being, while I think the charges of cowardice regarding Spain are ignorant, self-indulgent navel gazing of the meanest and most pitible kind, there is a legitimate issue of appearances - perception and spin on the side of al-Qaeda. I do think the Spanish government needs to address this angle, but how in particular is another matter. Perhaps a clear statement of principle in re Iraq, and one that makes it clear the decision regards the failure of reconstruction rather than a reaction.

However, is this appropriate?

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:23 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Positive Results on Spanish Withdrawal Threats

I believe I can foresee some positive things coming from the Spanish threat to withdraw (joined by the Hondurans, perhaps others as the secutiry situation continues as it is now) from Iraq unless changes are made in the occupation.

First, it appears that the Bush Administration feels real pressure, given the withdrawals will, if they occur, occur not too far ahead of elections, and that they will, at minimum create the appearance of a collapsing coalition.

Second, it appears that under this percieved pressure there is talk of revamping. If, and this remains a very large if, the Spanish threat, joined by others especially, forces the Bush Adminstration to abandon its increasingly self-indulgent (electorally) and bankrupt approach to the administration of Iraq, then that will be a good thing. Indeed, it may help rescue Iraq from becoming a failed state, as it is well on its way to doing now.

If that is the case, that is the Spanish pressure proves to be leverage for changing the increasingly absurdly inappropriate CPA admin, then we have a net gain and indeed something that helps get policy on track to actually reduce terror.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:03 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Iraq, more assasinations

2 Engineers Killed in Iraq in Latest Attack on Foreigners
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
Published: March 17, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/17/international/middleeast/17IRAQ.html

Inevitable, emergence of assasinations of CPA support staff. N.b. it is particularly discouraging that even the "Green Zone" is subject to violence - recall the stabbing in the Zone of an American military officer (or soldier) a few days back. Culprit not caught. That means Iraq assistance from within.

It suggests the CPA really has few real friends at all.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:33 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

maroc, demos

I note that I am led to understand by Moroccan amigos that there were important solidarity demos in Morocco in re Spain.

Shall seek reporting on this.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:50 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

11 Sep and the jordan upblic, extract from a convo with the director of Jordanian TV

I am not going to share the entire conversation, which nevertheless was very interesting indeed. Rather, a side conversation on 11 Sep.

N. D., outgoing director of Jordanian TV opined, while we were dicussing various items regarding a project I have been working on, on the reaction to 11 Sep.

As readers from SDMB will recall, I was in the States at the time. In fact I was ... too close to the actuall events, having flown from NY to DC a day or two before, and having been across the river from the Pentagon that day. I recall it well. That entire day, I recall it well. My ex-wife worked in the towers. Well, neither here nor there, that.

Leaving that aside, I found N.D.'s commentary interesting, and it puts in context some of the worst imagery or information one has.

ND indicated that in the first 24-48 hours many Palestinians rejoiced, for they saw only the symbolism in the American (government) getting its cuppence. Then the imagery of the suffering, the horror, the awfulness began to be reported. At this point, opinion turned, from support, to revulsion, to rejection of the event as non-islamic, etc. Included in this was even the radicals who turned away from the bloodimindedness when shown the real results.

Two observations here. First, ND's characterization, which I found credible, suggest that theliack of a free media impeded the Jordanina - Palestinian population from arriving at the "human" conclusion regarding the horror.

I recall, I may add, that the Moroccan press at the same time - recall that I had just returned from an assignment in Morocco, my last with my old Pharma employer- was rather clearer.

Regardless, I found his characterization interesting, illuminating.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:27 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 16, 2004

A little bit of everything: op survey sponsored by BBC in Iraq

Very interesting document (PDF)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_03_04_iraqsurvey.pdf

Take some digesting. It's all over the place.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:43 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Regarding my judgement on Madrid operators

I believe the linked article is of interest in the context of my earlier analysis that the likely Madrid operators were in fact not directly linked to al-Qaeda, and this is of real operational interest.

Similar Tactics, Different Names
Al Qaeda-Like Groups Scrutinized
By Dana Priest and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, March 16, 2004; Page A16

"U.S. and European counterterrorism officials have seen a growing number of clues in the Madrid bombings that point to terrorists from any one of dozens of Islamic jihadist groups that use tactics similar to al Qaeda's but conduct operations and choose targets independently, the officials said yesterday"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61664-2004Mar15.html

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:09 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 15, 2004

On the Spanish election, a thought or two

How to put this in context? I have been reading accusations that the Spanish have caved to terrorism by supporting a government that wants to get out of Iraq.

Some thoughts on this: the Spanish overwhelmingly opposed the war, and the presence of troops in Iraq. The bombings themselves did nothing to shift that. What the bombings evidently did do was refocus the electorate on foreign policy versus domestic policy, and perhaps also reignite anger over a FP that was overwhelmingly rejected in Spain. Noting this, I note that this is neither to characterize the popular opposition to the Iraqi war and occupation as right or wrong, these are simply political facts.

Now, it is unclear if the loss of the PP is more tied to its perceived attempt to dupe the electoral (I note that my sense is that the PP jumped on the ETA connexion because they sincerely believed it and doubt that there was a deliberate cover-up) just before the vote, or actual opposition to Iraq per se (itself strong) or perhaps feeling sold down the river regarding FP by the PP. Given popular anger over these items, as seen in the turn around, it is unsurprising the Socialists won.

Now there is a real problem in terms of perception here.

On one hand, even pre-elections, there was popular support for ending the PP's deeply unpopular pro-Bush Admin. FP in re the Middle East. That is, there seems to have been clear popular support for pulling out of Iraq, little popular support for remaining. However, pre-attacks, focus was on other, domestic issues, such as PP's ETA policy and economics (PP being uncompromising on ETA - hardly then an indication the Spanish electorate are wusses, to use a phrase so popular in certain quarters).

Having won, apparently on revulsion for perceived manipulation by the PP regarding the attacks, should the Spanish then engage in double think about their pre-existing desire to get out of Iraq? Perhaps, certainly in many quarters withdrawing from Iraq will be seen as caving in to al-Qaeda, although analytically it's not insofar as the desire was pre-existing.

Yet perceptions matter. On the other hand, can one make one's policy making prisoner to trying to double think what one thinks the "terrorists" or opponents etc. are thinking? It would seem perverse for the Spanish to decide at present that although they were strongly against their presence in the "Coalition of the Willing" that they should remain simply out of spite for the perception they might be seen as weak.

It strikes me that perhaps there is a false dilemma here, for it is possible for the new Spanish government to construct a policy response that affirms a continued commitment to fighting terror, but rejects continued participation in the present Iraqi fiasco - indeed something the PS has suggested in emphasizing, as I understand it, it would participate in a truly multinational effort in Iraq.

Nevertheless, a strange moment.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:53 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 14, 2004

Interesting al-Arabiyah interview

Interview with an Egyptian commentator on the Alexandria conference, Ahmed al-Mousalmaneh. Among the important statements, "Every side in the Arab world, Muslim Brothers, the Left, agree on 90 percent of [the reform proposals - i.e. the American proposal re democracy.]" Interesting set of comments that American pressure is less important than internal agreement on the need for change. Pity I am too tired to make a proper resume.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:56 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Madrid: Returns, early polls

Indicate Aznar's party has fallen in a stark reversal of fortunes.

Oddly I rather think the coverup accusations were overdone.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Excellent analysis by Ignatius re Reform and Engagement in MENA region

David Ignatius has used contact with Fadlallah, a Hizbullah leader in the past for insights, in this particular article from Friday he does so with great effect.

I note that my own on the ground experience rather supports the thesis here

Real Arab Reform
By David Ignatius
Friday, March 12, 2004; Page A23
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51888-2004Mar11.html

BEIRUT -- The Bush administration's new initiative to encourage democracy and reform in the Arab world has all the solidity of a hot-air balloon. It's floating grandly toward Planet Arabia, while down below the people who would be affected by it are variously taking potshots, running for cover or scratching their heads in confusion.

Well this may be somewhat unfair, I am not sure the 'initiative' has actually taken off at all.

The next paragraph I believe is precisely on point:
Are we really going to make this mistake again? To state what should be obvious after the reversals of the past year in Iraq: The idea of Arab democracy is meaningless unless it begins at home, driven by an Arab agenda for change, rather than by outsiders. If it's seen as another attempt to impose the West's agenda, then the planned U.S.-European Greater Middle East Initiative will fail -- and deservedly so.

I am not sure deservedly so, but yes, it will fail.

Somewhat further on, Ignatius notes: "A starting point for me is listening to the leading Shiite cleric in Lebanon, Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. He can hardly be accused of pro-American sympathies; he was the spiritual leader of the Hezbollah fighters whose suicide bombs drove U.S. troops from Lebanon in 1984. But he's become a surprisingly progressive thinker and was one of the first Muslim clerics to condemn unambiguously the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001."

Ignatius notes he has had conversations with Fadlullah over two years, with the intro of Jamil Mroue, of the Beiruit English daily, The Daily Star, and quotes Fadlullah's support for reform ("suprising")...""We have always emphasized that governments in this part of the world are obsessed with power, and thus have kept their citizens under strict control," Fadlallah said, speaking through an interpreter. He cited two kinds of bad governance in the Arab world: the "tribal or dynastic families, who behave as if they have some divine right to conduct business," and "governments that have a fig leaf of legitimacy, in the form of ballots that produce 99.9 percent results.""

Quite right, that, and I think exactly what I have argued, as well as exactly the situation that breeds the Egypts of the region, including if we are lucky, Egypt on the Euphrates. Sadly, of course, the other choice seems to be civil war.

Now I found the following to be surprising, for its frankness and I think accuracy: "Fadlallah noted that these undemocratic governments have stayed in power partly because "they are part of a web of international interests" -- meaning that they serve the interests of the United States and its allies. But he cautioned: "It is not fair or accurate to lay all the blame for this deformed political process on the shoulders of the West. There are really serious internal reasons as well for this underdevelopment.""

Very fair.

He further adds: "The failed Arab regimes survive, Fadlallah said, thanks partly to the "excuse" of the Arab-Israeli conflict. "We have emergency laws; we have control by the security agencies; we have stagnation of opposition parties; we have the appropriation of political rights -- all this in the name of the Arab-Israeli conflict." He argued that resolving the Arab-Israeli problem was a necessary component of any serious Middle East initiative -- not just because it was right but because it would take away the props that support bad governance."

I absolutely agree there.

Now Ignatius argues that "...you'd hear pretty much the same opinion everywhere in the Arab world. People are sick of political and economic underdevelopment, and they want change. But they want to make it for themselves." which I think is a bit overstated, or rather I agree but with the caveat that the habit of laying blame on external forces is deep seated in Arab society such that you frequently get a highly mixed set of opinions - matter of face saving soemtimes more than real opinion.

Now, further on, Ignatius states or argues rather "The Bush administration hopes to present its plans at the G-8 summit in June, so there's still time to get it right. Above all, the United States and its European allies should avoid the mistake of assuming that just because people hate the regime they're living under, they will embrace an American-led effort to transform it. They won't, as the Iraqi experience sadly shows."

Precisely the case, emphasis added by the way.

I don't know that there is any way for the Bush Administration to get this right. Their underlying credibility is badly damaged by the incompetence of the Iraq occupation, the faux peace plan in the name of the "Road Map" - no important when it was needed for the political moment, but dropped like a hot potato afterwards. However, the underlying point regarding reform that the people own rather than imposed with an air of snotty superiority is the only way to actually achieve something.

How to enable that, of course, is an open question - although I would say having some credibility as a fair broker would be good.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 10:05 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On terror and the present environment.

Sparked by Madrid and by the recent news regarding the kidnapping plot (initially reported in Arabic as focusing on "investors," then on "Jordanian businessmen" - involving Kuwaiti nationals and coming hard on the heels of a special warning from the US Embassy, I believe the plot probably actually involved kidnapping foreigners, Americans perhaps.), I have been thinking about the degrading political situation here in the Middle East.

First, as I have noted in passing in the past few weeks, I am hearing, from normally pro-American people (and recall of the upper classes) incredibly bitter and angry comments about American policy in the region. The long hangover from the Iraq war continues, and the ongoing violence there, the lack of real progress (not absurd abstract benchmarks but provision of security and stability for the population) and the similar ongoing degradation of the Israeli-Palestinian situation continue to feed anger.

I believe this has begun to enter a dangerous phase and I am becoming concerned that the damage to US interests is becoming substantial.

Further, it strikes me that the thesis that the Iraq war, besides being a waste of resources chasing after a chimera, has damaged the struggle against radical islamist terror - generally al-Qaeda - has to be seen as essentially confirmed.

I draw attention to this article in Le Monde Pour les responsables américains du renseignement, les capacités d'Al-Qaida restent considérables
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-356590,0.html, the title translating as "For American intelligence officials, the capacities of al-Qaeda remain considerable" as the article says, even after two years of intense efforts. I add this Figaro article of interest for its resume - not news but a fine resume of the realities as it were: L'implication de la mouvance islamiste dans les attentats de Madrid signifierait sa réorganisation en profondeur
Le spectre d'une réorganisation d'al-Qaidahttp://www.lefigaro.fr/international/20040313.FIG0172.html

Regarding the Iraqi situation, Juan Cole has several chilling notes summarizing local and international reporting:
Wave of Killings at Sunni Mosques (http://www.juancole.com/2004_03_01_juancole_archive.html#107915995041289156) and
Shiite Crowds, Preachers, Denounce Interim Constitution (http://www.juancole.com/2004_03_01_juancole_archive.html#107915675400101628).

On the second item, Cole summarizes as follows: "In general, the Shiite mosque preachers didn't seem to like it very much. The comparisons of it to the Balfour Declaration and the suspicion that it was "written by the Jews" invokes the fate of the other main Arab population living under occupation, the Palestinians, whom the Israelis have robbed of their civil liberties and much of their land. It is an inaccurate description of the Coalition intentions, but it may well be effective in street protests. "

The last sentance being key.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:12 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On Madrid

I wrote this last night on Calpundit (http://www.calpundit.com/archives/003480.html#128079) before the tape appeared. While still agnostic, I increasingly favor the North African Islamist route, much to my sadness as it has direct implications for the quality of life of my North African amigos living in Spain. I also continue to suspect that there is not a direct "al-Qaeda" qua al-Qaeda connexion, but rather a quasi independent action in al-Qaeda's name. A mere detial on one level, potentially important fact on another.

First, I am as of yet agnostic on any of the explanations, which I think is the only supportable position given confusing evidence.

Second, on the al-Qaeda angle, I will step out and say it is unlikely it was al-Qaeda qua al-Qaeda. However, in regards to potential Islamist connexions, it could very well be North African origin Islamist radicals aping or working "in hand" with al-Qaeda. Recall al-Qaeda is as much an umbrella and a 'flag' as it is an 'organization.'

Spain has a fairly substantial North African derived population - recent immigrants - who could very well have taken part in such an operation. Therefor, while I would exclude al-Qaeda per se as being the immediate source of this, there is a potential reservoir or al-Qaeda associated North African Islamists to draw on.

Lastly on this, the Abu Hafs organization has made frequent claims of responsibility for events they were clearly not responsible for. Their letter to al-Quds is not a data point and may be excluded. The solid lead in this direction is the van with detanators and a religious tape (with texts?) in Arabic. However, this is a bit too convenient - suggesting either a plant or less-competent organizational work (which perhaps points to a non al-Qaeda but allied org of lower quality).

Third, on the ETA angle, we should keep in mind, (i) the lack of warning may have been a fuck up, (ii) that indeed some ETA elements in fact tried to undertake a somewhat similar train bombing operation recently, (iii) that per Spanish representations and other analysis, ETA organization has degraded and there is the possibility that free lancing or break away / uncontrolled extremists in ETA undertook the operation without guidance. The link here, provided supra is relavatory and suggestive: http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/02/29/spain.explosives/?headline=Explosives~intercepted~in~Spain

Final analysis: likely a freelance operation, I personally and sadly give moderate weight to a Espano-Maghrebine Islamist radical angle not directly connected with al-Qaeda but sympathetic to the same.

Unfortunately, it appears I am correct.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:08 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 11, 2004

From Juan Cole: interesting student newspaper article

Interview with school alum regarding Iraq, worth a brief read.

Religion and Ethics
Impressions from Iraq
http://www.dailytrojan.com/article.do?issue=/V151/N38&id=01-impre.38c.html

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

An example of self-serving elite arguments re economic policy

First, full disclosure, I personally dislike this guy.

However, here is

Monday's Economic Pulse
'The dinar pegged to the dollar is working'

Fahed Fanek
THE EXCHANGE rate of the Jordanian dinar was originally pegged to the sterling pound, then it shifted to the special drawing rights (SDRs), then to a mysterious basket of foreign currencies, the content of which was not known except to the Central Bank. The basket was believed to be flexible, which enabled the bank to change the price from day to day as it saw fit in the circumstances.

Finally, the Central Bank was fed-up with recurring rumours about possible devaluation and decided, since 1995, to fix the exchange rate in terms of dollars, to eliminate daily fluctuations that gave rise to uncertainty. But what about the future? Is change going to happen?

The file of the dinar exchange rate is supposed to be reopened only when and if the country reaches a problematic situation that could be solved through altering the exchange rate. To open this sensitive file when monetary stability and general confidence are at their best and when there is no sign of distortion can only create confusion and shake the confidence, giving rise to more rumours that can only hurt the economy and the individuals who believe them and act on them.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) acknowledged the positive results of pegging the dinar to the dollar. The fund approved this policy or, at least, did not object to it. However, it should be admitted that the fund is, effectively, an ideological institution. It believes in floating currencies as a matter of principle. It would not necessarily observe the specific circumstances of a given country. It is accustomed to using “one size fits all” policies. It cannot, therefore, be ruled out that the IMF may prefer floating in a free market.

The governor of the Central Bank of Jordan is said to be fully convinced that the present state of affairs is satisfactory. He is determined to preserve the existent exchange rate of the dinar in terms of dollars, at $1.412 per dinar, to maintain stability and confidence built over eight years. Yet, there are some people who try, from time to time, to raise this thorny and sensitive subject, either by way of advocating another system or by predicting that some change may take place in the near future.

When the exchange rate of the dollar rose sharply against other currencies, several years ago, a prominent banker called for more flexibility in exchange rate through disengaging the dinar from the dollar. The too strong dinar, he claimed, may adversely affect the competitiveness of Jordanian goods and services in their export markets. In other words, he was hinting at devaluation, but did not like to pronounce the word and used “flexibility” instead, which sounded better.

Today, some commentators renew the call for disengagement of the dinar from the dollar because its exchange rate declined against other major currencies. This, of course, raised the prices of European and Japanese imports. This time around, they want the dinar to rise against the dollar to keep pace with the euro and the yen.

It is obvious that the exchange rate of the dollar, like the exchange rate of any other floating currency, will continue to fluctuate. No one can predict with any degree of confidence what will happen tomorrow, but the dollar remains the number one world dominated currency. It is backed by a superpower with a large economy that makes around one third of the world economy.

Assuming that the dinar were floated to find its price level in the market, would it rise or decline in that case?

There are plenty of reasons for a rising exchange rate of the dinar, due to high economic growth, the large size of foreign exchange reserves and a surplus in the current account of the balance of payments, but the psychological factors will play in the opposite direction and may lead to a lower exchange rate. No one accepts the claim that the dinar may be stronger in the future than the dollar. Currencies of all developing countries that opted for floating found that their currencies sank to a very low level, generating inflation and uncertainty in the process. Egypt was the most recent example.

The dinar pegged to the dollar is working. It served the Jordanian economy very well and should not be abandoned.

Monday, March 8, 2004

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:47 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Aside re the Nour USA contract

Now that it has been cancelled I think I can freely say that I actually know some of the principals involved. My own take, I am fairly certain the bid, despite the report in re DoD / CPA /Pentagon staff not being up to speed, etc., was cooked from the start, given what I have heard regarding the parties (including from direct relatives of Fakhoury).

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:22 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Odd report: On kidnapping

I find this odd as I read an original report in Arabic that used the phrase "investors" rather than businessmen and did not mention locals were targetted.

I hate to be paranoid, but the involvement as reported of Kuwaiti nationals in this raises suspicions in my mind. Given the US embassy warning, I am suspicios the news is being "cleaned up."

Plot to kidnap businessmen for cash foiled
AMMAN (Reuters) — The Anti-Corruption Unit at the General Intelligence Department (GID) has cracked a cell that was plotting to kidnap business executives and extort money from them, the official Jordan News Agency, Petra, said on Wednesday.

Authorities arrested six people last Thursday. Petra said they had confessed to plotting to abduct Jordanians and forcing them to transfer large sums of money abroad at pain of death. A seventh man was on the run.

The GID first heard some two months ago that a cell was planning to launder money in the Kingdom, Petra quoted Musleh Kayed, head of the Anti-Corruption Unit, as saying.

“But then we discovered that their intention was not money laundering but rather blackmailing and killing local investors,” Kayed said.

Kayed said the cell had brought guns, a silencer and opiate gas into the Kingdom to snatch a foreign exchange clerk. They planned to force the clerk to contact colleagues at a Lebanese bureau and ask them to transfer $5 million to a member of the gang in Beirut.

Petra said the case would be tried in the State Security Court but did not say when the trial would begin.

A security source said the suspects — four Jordanians, two Kuwaitis and a Lebanese — were also planning to kidnap local businessmen and force them to transfer money.

Thursday, March 11, 2004

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:20 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Hyatt Coverage of Sistani - Shi'a and Basic Law

al-Hyaat has a number of articles covering the basic law and Sistani: the gist of the interviews they quote on the Shi'a side is the Shi'a consider this not really a done deal, but a document they have temporarily acquiesed to in the interest of keeping the ball rolling towards 'independence.' In essence, the battle over the ability of the Iraqi Kurds to veto a constitution has been defered somewhat. I rather detected a familiar attitude towards contracts in this point of view, the contract not being the final say in business here, but a mere reference point.

I am afraid I have to doubt that the CPA-Iraq upper staff understand this.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:15 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On lack of resources

For months, to the point I am sure it was becoming boring, I have been pounding away on my sensation that the CPA is understaffed and unable to handle what it is currently trying to do.

I direct, as sort of indirect confirmation of what I have conveyed, you to this article:
Missteps Led to Canceled Iraq Contract
House Panel to Begin Hearings on Procedures; Pentagon Awards 7 New Projects
By Mary Pat Flaherty and Jackie Spinner
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A22
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48177-2004Mar10.html

I remain astounded that the Pentagon, I would presume through some misguided empire building, wishes to continue - indeed fought to continue, to exercise its main morte control over Iraq reconstruction.

There is an appropriately skilled bureacracy for this, it is the US AID, which while imperfect, has systems and appropriate background for reconstruction and development work. The Pentagon, never a center of administrative efficiency in the best of times, in the nice safety of Washington, is hardly equipped for this task.

Yet, the dead hand continues to weigh down.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 02:50 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

FT on the Iraqi basic law, an excellent analysis: "America values style over substance in Iraq"

An excellent comment which rather puts the finger on the spot:
America values style over substance in Iraq
By David Gardner
Published: March 10 2004 21:04 | Last Updated: March 10 2004 21:04
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1078381675989&p=1012571727092

".... Coming amid last week's carnage in Karbala and Baghdad, where suicide bombers killed more than 200 worshippers, the assent of the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds to this proto-constitution is a political success - Mr Bremer's first.

The maximalist wish-list of each community has been shrunk into a code they can all live with. But just how durable this agreement will prove is another matter. It could well slide into the yawning gulf between form and substance that has characterised the Pentagon-dominated administration of Iraq."
(emphasis added)

Indeed, and my particular agreement with the underlined section .

Which is what makes, I may add, the announcement that the Pentagon / US DoD retains authority over the reconstruction money such a bloody disaster.

" Before this week, Mr Bremer had seen a succession of neat plans for the handover of power to Iraqis (and America's political exit before November's US presidential elections) begrimed by Iraq's uncompromising reality. He has been repeatedly vetoed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the top religious authority of the majority Shia, and he may be again."

Gardner notes that the Shi'a are unlikely to accept the formulas in the basic law that give the Kurds a practical veto out of proportion to their numbers, formula that " enshrines the minority rights of Sunni and Kurds in a way that prejudges decisions to be taken by the elected assembly that will write the permanent constitution next year."

That is the articles 36 and 61 (c) that require unanimity in the presidency and enables any three provinces (rather clearly the 3 Kurdish controlled ones) to block adoption of a new constitution or changes therein.

He rightly notes that the goal is laudable, preventing the Balkanization of Iraq, but notes "its mix of clever drafting and sociopolitical engineering is overly neat - in a way the reality emphatically is not."

Indeed the author rather brings out some points which clearly suggest that for all the talk of democratization, one rather suspects that the reality of support for it is not there. Resistance to elections on the part of the Bremer administration and the Pantagon generally suggest a operative " mistrust of what democracy can do for Iraq."

He further notes: "There are signs of a similar failure of nerve all over the occupation's catastrophic mishandling of security - which remains the nub of the question. Mr Bremer's dissolution of the Iraqi army last May was a disaster from which the whole Iraq enterprise has not recovered. Indeed, although I would also add the inadequate plans in regards to reconstruction, with the key facilities such a risk insurance and reconstruction financing facilites only in place six months later, far too late given the problems of June-August when it was becoming increasingly clear to people like me that things were spinning out of control, and the resources devoted desperately inadequate.

He also argues that "The US narrative of what is going on is that, as the "terrorists" find it more difficult to hit coalition troops, they are targeting "emerging Iraqi security capacity", as General John Abizaid, the US commander for Iraq, put it last week to the US Senate's Armed Services Committee. Such action is often portrayed as desperation as the June 30 date for the occupation's formal handover to an interim Iraqi government nears. That looks to be a serious misinterpretation."

I agree. Witness yesterday's assasination of two US civilians. The whiff of The Battle of Algiers grows rather stronger.

"The devastating insurgent attacks on the Shia - and the Kurds in Arbil last month - seem to be aimed at forcing these communities into sectarian retreat, at driving them to develop their own armies and intelligence and to give up on the federal project embodied in the basic law. If the Shia, in particular, are forced by serial provocation into relying on their own security, this will unleash a dynamic pointing towards the break-up of Iraq. We can only hope Political Science 101 has a chapter on counter-insurgency.' The last a reference to Bremer's comment regarding th ebasic law.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:16 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 10, 2004

Iraq: the Project Report

First stage in project prep has hit a snag. After getting all starrey eyed over US TDA support we find that there are no backdoors open at present, and worse, as a "steel" project they are unwilling to touch it in an election year.

Bloody hell?!?!

Are American policy decisions on reconstructing Iraq getting so parochially electoral driven that a steel sector investment is considered "red lined" because of domestic sensitivities? - Never mind I know the answer and yet was stunned on a level. Iraq needs less of this silly business as usual short termism and more risk taking.

Here myself and my partner (more the inverse in importance, but hey, I am writing here) are proposing an incredibly innovative investment and proposing to take on some major operational risk in order to produce a key commodity for the reconstruction effort, and this gets shot down for funding because some ignoramus from whatever the bloody hell States in the Middle West might object?

That's bloody nonsensical.

Well, there is still the funding route, but fuck, if they won't fucking bend a bit in the wind to get this kind of bread and butter investment in a key area done, then this operation (not the project per se, Iraq recon) is truly fucked.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:02 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 09, 2004

Wolf on the IMF

I would like to draw some attention to Martin Wolf's FT col on the IMF, which I rather liked:
Martin Wolf: Not equal to the job it was meant to do
By Martin Wolf
Published: March 9 2004 20:29 | Last Updated: March 9 2004 20:29
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1078381642188&p=1012571727126

Wolf argues that the IMF has strayed dangerously from its core mission and that its resources are dangerously short of what is needed given his perception (and I share it) of a serious imbalances at present in the international capital flows:
Many emerging market economies have decided to avoid substantial net inflows of capital at almost any cost. They are particularly determined to avoid net short-term indebtedness. Thus they try to sustain competitive exchange rates, run current account surpluses and recycle capital inflows into foreign exchange reserves. The direct consequence is that they have also accumulated massive foreign currency reserves: between the beginning of 1998 and November 2003, Asian countries alone increased their foreign currency reserves by $1,128bn, while the rise in the world as a whole was $1,344bn. Even without Japan, the increase in Asian reserves was $713bn, a sum that dwarfs the usable resources available from the IMF, which are now only $149bn.

This development has two consequences. The first is that investing in reserves on this scale, rather than relying on a mechanism for sharing reserves, as was intended with the creation of the IMF, is intrinsically wasteful. Yet the Fund itself is now far too small to perform that function. The second and more important consequence is that as long as so many countries remain determined to minimise indebtedness, global equilibrium is likely to impose a huge current account deficit on the US and a correspondingly explosive accumulation of short-term claims upon it.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:57 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On Libya, FT art by Indyk

The Iraq war did not force Gadaffi's hand
By Martin Indyk
Published: March 8 2004 19:17
| Last Updated: March 8 2004 19:17
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1078381610689&p=1012571727092

Martin Indyk in this article argues that attributing Qadhdhaf's ridding himself of NBC weapons programs can not be laid at the door of the Iraq adventure. I rather think he takes the argument too far in totally denying credit to Iraq - in fact I think one has to give some credit, although in a cost-benefit framework the cost of this change versus the benefit of the timing of it do not match well.

I would, however, say he makes a well placed and informed argument that Qadhdhafi was already well down the road in this matter, noting the offer made several years back on just this point - i.e. giving up NBC programs in return for international recognition. That, given my background knowledge is certainly a correct argument.

Nevertheless, I must say some degree of credit on the timing has to be placed on Iraq. However, in the contect of him already travelling down that road, we have to apply a discount to the actuall pay-off, and given the huge costs... well it does not look spanky. But sadly people tend not to think rigorously in a cost-benefit manner in regards to security.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:49 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Hans Blix, in WP

Drawing your attention to this:
U.N. Inspector Writes of Pressure From U.S. on Iraq
Blix's Book Says He Was Challenged About Arms Assessment on Eve of Last Report to Security Council
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, March 9, 2004; Page A19
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41476-2004Mar8.html

What can one say? Somewhat old hat now, although confirmatory.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:48 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

March 08, 2004

Local Staff: Reflecting on differences

Looking at this project plan that my locals have drawn up I have to suppress a desire to beat my head on the desk.

First, of course, I guess I was being overly optimistic, indeed unreasonably optimistic in expecting to receive a plan, rather than a list. A list which regurgitated my staff meeting .... well I have to admit rather manic presentation.

Second, I realise that frankly people here are not trained to be disciplined. And frankly these idiots that were hired (not by me) don't like being organised as that implies an ability to (a) track progress, (b) requirement for performance. But more fairly, I have to reflect on the degree to which, however much one likes to complain about schooling, that proper schooling teaches organised methods to attack problems, and projects.

The degree to which the culture also encourages writing and using writing is also important. I've noted that the local staff hate putting things in writing, and even then they like to read it ito me. It's driving me mad, even as I realise that

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:18 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

And in Iraq, we never wish to learn from policy errors

Pentagon wins control over most of a $18.4 billion aid package for Iraq
MENAFN - 08/03/2004

Below, without comment
(MENAFN) The Pentagon has won control over most of a $18.4 billion aid package for Iraq, and rebuilding delayed for a month will start this week, the Associated Press reported.

Officials said that now, the resolution means the U.S. military will have chief control over rebuilding in Iraq, even after its command of the U.S.-led occupation ends, officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Starting this week, about $5 billion worth of contracts are to be awarded to 17 companies for projects in seven various sectors. 10 more big construction projects will be handed out later this month, and that his office expects to complete 2,300 projects over the next four years.

I have a desire to pound my head on the desk.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:41 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Brzezinski on "Great Middle East Initiative"

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR The Wrong Way to Sell Democracy to the Arab World
By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
Published: March 8, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/08/opinion/08BREZ.html?hp

I rather agree with what I take to be Brzezinski's underlying point, that is the Bush Administration seems to only be playing to its converted, the pre fooled as I like to call them, and rather bungling the selling of this initiative in the real world where it counts: he Bush administration deserves credit for its long-term commitment to democracy in the Middle East. But even a good idea can be spoiled by clumsy execution. Worse still, the idea can backfire — particularly if people come to suspect that ulterior motives are at work. "

Of course, everything about this says that it is rather like that short lived "commitment" to the roadmap for peace, an electoral maneuver rather than real policy.

Brzezinkski also highlights the rather defective assumptions (although I continue to wonder if they are in fact really assumptions as opposed to simple agitprop for the home crowd) on the effect of democracy - the rather naive and messianic conception of the same in re the Middle East: "There is no question that the administration has its work cut out for it. For starters, the democracy initiative was unveiled by the president in a patronizing way: before an enthusiastic audience at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington policy institution enamored of the war in Iraq and not particularly sympathetic toward the Arab world. The notion that America, with Europe's support and Israel's endorsement, will teach the Arab world how to become modern and democratic elicits, at the very least, ambivalent reactions. (This, after all, is a region where memory of French and British control is still fresh.) Though the program is meant to be voluntary, some fear that compulsion is not far behind.

There are other reasons to be wary of the administration's plan. Democracy, impatiently imposed, can lead to unintended consequences. If the Palestinians were able to choose a leader in truly free elections, might they not opt for the head of Hamas? If free elections were soon held in Saudi Arabia, would Crown Prince Abdullah, a reformer, prevail over Osama bin Laden or another militant Islamic leader? If not genuinely accepted and reinforced by traditions of constitutionalism, democracy can degenerate into plebiscites that only add legitimacy to extremism and authoritarianism."

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March 07, 2004

On Iraq: The Basic Law

Juan Cole has an interesting comment at http://www.juancole.com/2004_03_01_juancole_archive.html#107864605283851226 wherin he opines that the five president council is may not really be a Sistani demand but rather an invention of Chalabi to preserve his power.

Perhaps. It is certainly attractive to see Chalabi behind such a manuever, and very much in his character. On the other hand, I believe it is perhaps too convenient to assign all blame to what is indeed an unworkable demand to Chalabi. I would suggest to Cole that in fact we may be seeing Chalabi (who is quite the charming talker) selling Sistani on an idea. That is, the demand may indeed be Sistani, on the conviction of Chalabi.

Well, this is the region for subterannean maneuvers, so one has to expect this sort of thing to go on.

One notes, by the way, where the real wrangling is going on, over various items attached to political control. The silly liberal social party dressing on the Basic Law is just that, of little real consequence in the end. It will either be rolled back formally, or become something like the no smoking laws in Arab airports - something that is announced to make the foreigners happy and feel good about themselves (see, we're getting progress!) while having no real effect.

That's the problem with approaching the region with the Holier Than Thou attitude so prevalent now among the Americna Neo-Cons, it is not that change is not necesssary, it is not that American can and should not do good, it is not even that at the core some of their ideas are not fundaemtnally valid. It is rather that by setting benchmarks for change that are frankly impossible for the societies in question to achieve, and in fact are rather poorly and superficially concieved as such, we will see Potemkin village change. Indeed, the more I think about it, the more I think the analogy with Russian "Westernization" under the Tsars is not an unattractive one (in the very loosest and analogical senses, in terms of the gap between the fantastical vision of change by the 'Imperial' power diveroced from the on the ground reality, and the actuallity and capacity of the society in question.) Thus the Potemkin village aspect.

Now mind you, the above is not what in academe might be called an "essentialist" argument - a funny little gambit the American Neo-Cons have trotted out of late to attack MENA specialists who critique their rather khayali visions of the region. Or more clearly, it is not Arab societies cannot change, or Islamic societies, but rather the particular socio-economic reality, rooted in the "secular" history of the region (colonial rule, weak states, poor state traditions and remaining livliness, esp. in classic Middle East, of family/clan/tribal allegiences over wider, non-blood allegiences) make the kind of change they (the NeoCons) claim to want rather unrealistic - at leat not without rather bloody revolutions and Stalin type 'crushing' of society.

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MENA Blog: Practical Thoughts on it

I wonder how one would go about this?

Although the personal may have some interest, rather find something more focused rather more interesting. Of course, I have been whinging on about this for months, but the question is how to do the transition and with whom?

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March 06, 2004

Guardian: an engaging article on Cuban releasees.

It comes to mind that perhaps a policy of kidnapping adolescents and treating them quite well would not be bad....

Hostages, it worked for the colonial authorities (when unfortunate deaths were averted).

Cuba? It was great, say boys freed from US prison camp
James Astill meets teenagers released from Guantanamo Bay who recall the place fondly
Saturday March 6, 2004
The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,13743,1163435,00.html

Now, of course, getting siezed and taken off incommunicado is never a particularly super thing, yet it suggests to me, this story, that under slightly different circumstances - i.e. if the American Administration had played a better hand with the public and traditional diplomacy, it could be getting far better PR than it presently gets in its (often wrong headed) efforts.

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Economist: very decent article

I highly recommend readers pick up the 6-12 March edition of The Economist, and in particular read
Muslims in Europe
A growing band of brothers
Mar 4th 2004 | LONDON, MARSEILLES AND PARIS
From The Economist print edition.
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2479790
Story is subscriber only.

Very good survey article on the Muslim populations of Europe and regarding where things may go. Even handed.

I may also note there is an interesting article there regarding Tareq Ramedan as well.

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Figaro on the Blix book; Le Monde on Sharon

Again, for those who read French, an interesting set of articles:

Irak: Bush et Blair en ont-ils trop fait ?
Par Patrice de Méritens
[06 mars 2004]
"La parution du livre événement de Hans Blix, l'ancien chef des inspecteurs de l'ONU en Irak, tombe au plus mauvais moment pour le Premier ministre britannique et pour le président des Etats-Unis en campagne pour sa réélection. Explications"

"C'est dans ces circonstances pour le moins houleuses que paraît la semaine prochaine le livre événement de Hans Blix, chef des inspecteurs de l'ONU, qui nous fait vivre au jour le jour les secrets de la préparation à la guerre d'Irak. Blix y observe notamment : «On a du mal à ne pas penser que Colin Powell avait été chargé d'une tâche bien ingrate : démontrer l'existence de "preuves flagrantes" que l'on avait affirmées inutiles en janvier, et qui se révélèrent n'être que du vent après mars.»"
http://www.figaro.fr/magazine/20040305.MAG0026.html

More to the meat:
Exclusif: Les révélations de Hans Blix
Avant sa parution aux Etats-Unis, en Europe et au Japon, "Le Figaro Magazine" vous offre des extraits inédits du livre de Hans Blix, l'ex-chef inspecteur de l'ONU en Irak. Son titre : "Irak, les armes introuvables". Publié chez Fayard, il sera en librairie le 10 mars.
[05 mars 2004]
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/sequence/0,2-3210,1-0,0.html
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3212,36-355571,0.html
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3212,36-355571,0.html

Not as interesting as the editorial hype by Fiagor, but nevertheless, intriguing reading.

Another article of interest:
Une majorité d'Israéliens souhaite la démission d'Ariel Sharon
LE MONDE | 06.03.04 | 19h06
D'après un sondage du "Yedioth Aharonoth", 53 % des personnes interrogées pensent qu'il devrait partir en raison de l'accumulation des "affaires".
Jérusalem de notre correspondant
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3212,36-355571,0.html

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For the Americans: from Juan Cole in re MENA studies and censorship

I have been vaguely aware of this: see http://www.juancole.com/2004_03_01_juancole_archive.html#107856006005726524
a move by the Pipesian crowd to censor MENA studies. Having had most of my MENA studies either in the Middle East or in the States, I have a good point of comparision, and find the claims that Pipes advances to be fundamentally dishonest, and further to that, I rather think that it is counter productive to intervene in the manner the bill described by Professor Cole appears to do.

For those for whom this would be relevant, I would encourage heading this off at the pass, so to speak.

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Juan Cole: Analysis at his "Informed Comment" on Iraqi Basic Law

Although I am sure you are largely aware of Professor Cole's web site: http://www.juancole.com/ I thought I would direct readers there to catch his comments on the Basic Law events.

I must say as a sustained commentator, Cole is better than I, but then as a professor with a focus on this, even his blogging has professional role, while my writing gets me away from what I should be doing. That aside, let me recommend Cole for his summaries if not his politics. A rather traditional Left academic, I do not in large part agree with his take on ex-MENA things, or his take on say privatisation. However, having followed the comments for a month now, I rather respect his summaries on Iraq, finding them to match what I hear in large part. For those of you looking for more sustained and nitty gritty following of the press on Iraq, I am afraid Professor Cole is the place.

He is also a news maker to an extent, insofar as his critiques of the Zarqawi document translation (I never bothered myself to read the original) proved penetrating and were reported. I am not sure I agree on his analysis, by the way, in re Zarqawi and the usage on "Americans" (Amrikan, Amerikiyeen) in Arabic. While he was right that the typical Shami uses the mor Fasih plural (the second), the other version is also used from time to time, depending on if the speaker has had exposure to other dialects, e.g. by living / working with non-Shamis. Always difficult to make such judgements in a vacuum if one does not know the person in question. Indeed, look at myself, with my bizarre hybrid English.

Else, Cole has links to some itneresting items I may find time to discuss, although things are hotting up again so not sure where I will find the time.

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On the Iraqi Basic Law document. A brief comment

On the Iraqi Basic Law document.

I have ignored this topic as for all the overheated commentary, largely among the American conservatives who seem to be wedded to their ignorance of the political history of the region, I consider it in the end a farce, rather like the fine, progressive constitution written for the Afghans. Divorced from social reality, something that will exist on paper to make the foreigners feel all warm and fuzzy. Yes, it has a bill of rights. That’s great in a law based society, where rule of law obtains and the constitution is actually regarded, as in the United States, as a real reference point in regards to government and power. That is not the case in the Middle East – I regard constitutions here as something of a farce in the end.

The fiasco today, arising from the meat, which gets down to where power is – for example the Shi’a objections regarding the level of votes needed to change the constitution. They want simple majority rather than two thirds. Says something right there about their attitudes to the American fostered document. The document is a fine little piece of electoral agit-prop for President Bush and team, but will not survive contact with reality.

The political reality, by the way, shows up in our dear friend Chalabi throwing in, if reports are correct, with Sistani’s objections. The man knows where the bread is going to buttered, I would guess.

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March 04, 2004

Why does development money get pissed away?

Let me tell you.

I sat down with the principal of what purports to be a new VC fund with European Investment Bank backing. They're looking for managers, staff and approached me based off the rep thing. It was enlightening although depressing that these guys got money. European money to be sure, but money.

Speaking to deal flow, I opined that the issue in regards to financing in the region is not lack of capital properly speaking, but lack of capital flowing to non-elite groups and further to that, lack of entreprenurial activity or quality entreprenurial activity properly speaking. I further opined that the basic problem for real private equity activity was quality deal flow. In my view, which I think is well-founded, there are few potential entrepreneurs who know how to (a) bring a deal to funding and (b) have the management skills to make something happen. That is not to be judgemental, it's simply the reality arising from economies that are structured around rent seeking, that have been historically state dominated - even in the colonial era where colonial government driven rents were a signficant play for incoming European etc firms, and in the context of social systems that punish innovation rather than reward it.

Blah, blah, I think I have gone on about this in the past here. The surprsing thing here was that the chief principal for this Fund immediately disagreed with me. The fellow argued that I was right regarding deal flow if I was focused on moentarily succesful projects that will pay off in the end. I was a bit floored, insofar as unless I am mad, that is the whole bloody point of private equity - and the bloody document he had given me as their prospectus spoke of achieving venture capital returns, of 35 percent net. As the guy rambled on about vision and finding intersting ideas, it occured to me that he has scammed the EIB, that he's some kind of bloody "visionary" or something and does not really want to make projfits but support 'Arab" "visions". I was horrified and interrupted him to say that vision is great but what in the end counts is results, and results are best understood, if we ever want to this region to actually grow and have non-rent economies by having actually succesful companies. This crap about vision and Arab science and blah blah is just development blather. I am surprised they tolerated my critique, but then I doubt they have closed the Fund and I very much doubt they will, as there is a limit to how much dumb governmental development money is out there. I mean it's no bloody wonder why these projects fail, when you get this bloody namby pamby vision stuff substituting for hard nosed, will it work analysis. Now I admit one has to have vision to take on projects that are 'out of the box' to use that abused phrase, or rather to have vision to see a whack looking idea can actually fly.

However, in this region, one has to understand that being cutting edge, unless you have an export platform and a real market sewn up, is suicicde, and further that given the weaknesses in the management culture, and indeed in the overall coroarete structures here, and traditions, that Western style cutting edge VC is a way to lose money, and further to that, the profit discpline is a head clrearing one. Simply spending money to support "Arab vision" whatever the bloody hell that is, is for governments and hardly needs you to take a 2.75 percent fee on it.

However, this namby pamby do good without thining hard about is the money really working is all too commmon in development work. I am, as you can tell, still stunned at this conversation. I mean bloody hell, what does good deal flow mean if not bloody deals that will have a significant chance of making a game winning goal of a return? What the hell is the bloody point? And why the hell did this spoiled rich son of the rent seeking elite get money from the EIB?

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March 03, 2004

Conversations: Jordanians on Iraq

Somewhat late but some conversations.

The context is in an investment meeting regarding investments that will surely involve US money.

Among the partipants, myself, my lawyer and two senior Jordanians. Readers who know me from prior engagements know my lawyer was pro-US invasion in the period up to say March.

Important context to keep in mind.

Our conversation, as is typical in such circumstances, ranged over multiple circumstances, subject. Including the political. Nothing unusual there, two younger if no longer young fellows talking to two grey hair sheikhs.

The interesting points in this conversation were in regards to Iraq.

I was somewhat shocked to hear several otherwise well educated people asserting, on what they considered good grounds, that the US was exporting illegally, petrol via Turkey by truck. and in important amounts.

Now, it is highly likely that some degree of smuggling is indeed occuring. However, I find it impossible to give credit to an organized American program to pay off the occupation via smuggling. Indeed I have heard credible accounts of Becthel and other contractors of American (white bread) origin in corrupt engagements. Given the level of some people this is hardly surprising given the circonstances. However, the rather fantastic theories advanced by my interlocutors - for all that they all had, including the lawyer long experience in the WEst and indeed in the United States.

however, the level of confidence has sunk so low that even educated and otherwise experienced actors can give credit to rather lurid scenarios.

the other item from the conversation was the assertion by my own laywer, who wanted Sadaam dead not six moths or more ago, that he haped that Sadaam esscaped, for the dignity of the naiton and also for the dignity of the govenrment. That is, the Americans conduct has aliented even those who, in the region, ogirinaly supported the project, to the point they have begun to sypathisee with Sadaam.

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Francophone Reporting online for Baghdad and Karbala

First, a brief comment.

The reaction on the street in the past day is one of mixed horror and anger. As noted, as much blame is being directed towards the Americans for not living up to (impossible as well as possible) expections. Certainly the denial issued by al-Qaeda suggests that there is real blow back.

Nevertheless, as the quoted article supra, yesterday in re the miscomprehension of the American Administration in re their own image in the region is a serious issue, i.e. the popular concept of the USA as imperial hegemon.

Last item, in watching the news, I saw that Kerry's wife speaks excellent French.

As to the materials:
"Je ne comprends pas. Un homme, dans la foule, a explosé..."
LE MONDE | 03.03.04 | 14h02
Après les attentats de Kerbala et de Bagdad, la colère des Irakiens monte contre les "étrangers"

Bagdad, kerbala de notre envoyé spécial

Certains la prédisaient, beaucoup la craignaient. Pourtant peu avaient imaginé une opération d'une telle ampleur. Treize attentats, parfaitement orchestrés, perpétrés par des kamikazes et par des tireurs munis de lance-roquettes, de mortiers et de bombes, ont touché simultanément, mardi 2 mars, la communauté chiite d'Irak en son jour le plus sacré de l'année, à Bagdad et dans la ville sainte de Kerbala.

Cinq autres attentats ont apparemment été déjoués in extremis par la police à Bagdad, Bassora et dans l'autre ville sainte chiite, Nadjaf. Le bilan provisoire est de 70 morts et 321 blessés à Bagdad et de 112 morts et 235 blessés à Kerbala. C'est la journée la plus meurtrière en Irak depuis la chute de Saddam Hussein.

La journée s'annonçait pourtant belle pour les fidèles. C'était la première fois depuis des décennies qu'ils pouvaient célébrer le deuil de Hussein, le troisième imam, petit-fils du prophète Mahomet, sans devoir ensuite croupir dans les geôles de Saddam Hussein, le dictateur sunnite. Ils étaient donc des centaines de milliers à s'être rendus à la mosquée Moussa Al-Kazem de Bagdad, principal lieu de culte chiite de la capitale irakienne, et ils étaient surtout plus d'un million, Irakiens et Iraniens réunis, à effectuer, depuis une semaine, le pèlerinage de Kerbala, où l'imam Hussein est enterré.

Les processions ont commencé dès l'aube entre les mosquées Hussein et Abbas de Kerbala, distantes de 200 m. En ce dixième jour de l'Achoura, le jour du deuil, les croyants se doivent de montrer leur dévotion et leur tristesse. Devant une foule d'observateurs en larmes, hurlant parfois, les hommes les plus déterminés, en transe, se tailladent le cuir chevelu à la machette. Les processions sont incessantes. Le sang coule dans les rues. Les Iraniens paraissent être les plus résolus, ou les plus habitués, à accepter la souffrance. Des Irakiens suivent le rituel, tandis que d'autres, grimaçants, semblent surpris par la violence de la cérémonie.

SCÈNES DE PANIQUE

"Je crois profondément en Hussein, et je suis ici pour montrer que je suis heureux d'être libre,raconte Laith, un jeune homme au crâne lacéré de part en part. Je respecte une coutume religieuse qui était interdite sous Saddam. Aujourd'hui, je suis ému de vivre dans un pays libre." "Ils sont fous. Je crois que ce sont des Iraniens, plus fanatiques, qui poussent les Irakiens à suivre ces rites. Certains imams commencent d'ailleurs à murmurer que ces coutumes sont d'un autre âge, pense, pour sa part, Ammar. Mais tous les chiites irakiens sont heureux d'être libérés de Saddam, et ils sont ici aussi pour fêter cette libération. Rien, pas même un attentat, ne peut empêcher les chiites de célébrer le deuil de Hussein." Ammar ne croit pas si bien dire : ce n'est pas un mais neuf attentats simultanés qui secouent Kerbala, avant que les processions ne reprennent, presque comme si rien ne s'était passé. A la même heure, à Bagdad, quatre explosions retentissent dans la cour et autour de la mosquée Moussa Al-Kazem.

Les deux villes vivent alors les mêmes scènes de panique, la foule qui tente de fuir les lieux saints, les corps déchiquetés qui jonchent les rues, les sirènes d'ambulance et les hurlements des blessés. Les survivants en colère ont comme premier réflexe, une fois les évacuations achevées, de s'attaquer aux étrangers, à une patrouille militaire américaine à Bagdad, à un pèlerin iranien à Kerbala, et aux journalistes dans les deux villes. Ces "représailles" ne font aucun mort mais des soldats américains sont "caillassés", des reporters sérieusement boxés ; l'un survit, par chance, à un coup de poignard.

Dans les hôpitaux bagdadis, la nervosité est à son comble. Les ambulances arrivent sans cesse ; les médecins interrompent précipitamment leur repos de jour férié, et les gardes, nerveux, le doigt sur la gâchette, espèrent éviter l'intrusion d'un kamikaze ou d'un poseur de bombe.

"C'est un désastre ! Un crime !", s'écrie un homme dans la cour de l'hôpital Al-Karama, devant le sinistre ballet des civières transportant les blessés, notamment des gens gravement brûlés au visage. "Des volontaires pour Kerbala ! Ils manquent de personnel là-bas", hurle une infirmière. Des fidèles arrivent pour donner leur sang. "Je ne comprends pas. Un homme, dans la foule, a explosé. Puis il y a eu d'autres explosions. Des morts, des blessés, raconte Naoures, un adolescent juste égratigné au bras. Moi, j'ai été blessé plus tard. Les gens en colère jetaient des pierres sur les soldats américains, qui ont tiré. J'ai été touché par une de leurs balles." Les familles et les curieux s'en prennent aux étrangers... "Les Américains sont derrière tout ça !, vocifère une infirmière. Seuls des étrangers peuvent être coupables ! Jamais un Irakien, un musulman, ne pourrait faire ça !..."

"ACTES INSENSÉS"

"Je pleurais en opérant, dit le docteur Emad Kasim. Quels lâches ont osé commettre de tels actes, contre des gens qui ne faisaient rien d'autre que de prier ? Qui peut avoir si peur d'un Irak libre et démocratique, et souhaiter un Irak ensanglanté ? Vous devez dire au monde que nous sommes unis contre les terroristes !"

Premier officiel arrivé à l'hôpital Al-Karama, le ministre de la santé, Khidr Abbas, dénonce "les criminels, les monstres qui tuent des innocents". "J'ai vu les blessés brûlés, déchirés par des éclats. Je suis très touché, poursuit-il. Il faut dire et répéter que les auteurs de ces attentats vont échouer. Ils sont les forces de la haine, et nous sommes les forces du progrès. Eux veulent un Irak tel qu'il était, c'est-à-dire inhumain. Ils vont échouer. Le peuple irakien soutient les progressistes. Ces actes insensés ne nous dresseront pas les uns contre les autres."

Au lendemain des attentats, Bagdad s'est réveillée, mercredi, soulagée d'apprendre que la nuit a été calme. Aucun cas d'attaque contre des sunnites n'a été déclaré. "Al-Qaida ou pas, de telles attaques ne peuvent pas être planifiées et menées à bien sans la complicité de combattants sunnites de la guérilla, dit Ali, un journaliste chiite. Je ne serais pas surpris qu'il y ait, au moins, quelques assassinats ces prochains jours..." Le gouvernement irakien a décrété un deuil national de trois jours.

Rémy Ourdan

Depuis sept mois, des attentats de plus en plus meurtriers

Les attentats de Kerbala et de Bagdad sont les derniers et les plus meurtriers d'une longue série qui, depuis le 7 août, où 14 personnes ont péri devant l'ambassade de Jordanie à Bagdad, a fait des centaines de victimes. Voici les principaux :

2003

19 août : 22 morts, dont l'émissaire spécial de l'ONU, Sergio Vieira de Mello, dans l'explosion d'un véhicule piégé au siège de l'ONU à Bagdad.

29 août : 83 tués, dont le dignitaire chiite Mohammed Baqer Al-Hakim, et quelque 175 blessés dans un attentat à la voiture piégée à Nadjaf.

27 octobre : 35 personnes tuées et quelque 230 blessées dans quatre explosions à Bagdad, dont l'une près du siège du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge.

12 novembre : 28 tués - 19 Italiens, en majorité des carabiniers, et 9 Irakiens - dans un attentat à Nassiriya.

27 décembre : 19 morts et quelque 120 blessés dans des attaques visant des bâtiments publics et des bases militaires d'armées étrangères à Kerbala.

2004

18 janvier : au moins 25 tués, des civils irakiens pour la plupart, et plus de 100 blessés dans l'explosion d'une voiture piégée à l'entrée du quartier général américain à Bagdad.

1er février : au moins 101 tués et 133 blessés dans deux attentats-suicides aux sièges des deux principaux partis kurdes à Erbil, dans le Kurdistan.

10 février : 53 tués et 75 blessés dans l'explosion d'une voiture piégée devant un poste de police d'Iskandaria, au sud de Bagdad.

11 février : 47 morts et 52 blessés dans un attentat au véhicule piégé contre un centre de recrutement de l'armée irakienne à Bagdad.

18 février : 11 Irakiens tués, 58 soldats étrangers et 44 Irakiens blessés dans un double attentat à la voiture piégée à Hilla, au sud de Bagdad.

23 février : 13 tués et 51 blessés dans un attentat-suicide contre un commissariat de Kirkouk. - (AFP.)

• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 04.03.04

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Globalisation Standards: timely article from Martin Wolf (FT)

As anyone who reads my mumblings knows, I am a great fan of Martin Wolf (whose recent article on the dollar I should comment on as well) in The Financial Times.

Wolf has a fine article on globalisation and standards, responding to an ILO publication. A few excerpts from a fine article:

Martin Wolf: Painful choices, not platitudes
By Martin Wolf
Published: March 2 2004 20:20 | Last Updated: March 2 2004 20:20
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1077690832268&p=1012571727102

".... Last week's report from the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, sponsored by the International Labour Organisation, is .... long on pious aspirations and short on rigorous analysis. Above all, it suffers from "right-thinking", or rather "left-thinking", evasion of some of the dilemmas the world confronts."

That is, the report is full of the pious nonesense that comes from the Left on 'fair trade' and standards, with little rigorous thinking behind that, and rather too much emotive pandering.

Mind you, I do not mistake the Left as being the only ones capable of such idiocy, the Right makes the same kind of errors in other areas.

Wofl notes:"Globalisation has created opportunities. Many have benefited. But many also have not.

Again, the record on trade liberalisation by high-income countries in areas of most interest to developing countries is appalling. The report is commendably outspoken on this, given the participation of John Sweeney, the American trade union leader. "Agricultural protectionism," it argues, for example, "is a major obstacle to the reduction of poverty.""

Wolf later notes, "Last, the report is right to stress that official development assistance is now little more than 0.2 per cent of the high-income countries' GDP. The US is spending more on Iraq than all the high-income countries are spending on all developing countries. This is indefensible."

Aid. But what kind? Regardless, good point.

However, as Wolf notes, there is too little analytical grappling with the real content of the problems: " These come partly from its grudging acceptance of the role of market forces in development and its unwillingness to confront the silliest critics of globalisation head on. But they also come from its avoidance of painful choices. Consider just three areas: democracy, sovereignty and labour standards."

For example, on democratisation, Wolf rightly notes that putting democrtisation before other developments, while a fine little pious position, may get things wrong. I certainly argued in the past this was the case off of the Tunisian model:
"The report calls for "a democratic and effective state". Most would agree. Yet democratisation has proved to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for economic development. The most important and, over the past two decades, most successful developing country is China. China's success is merely the most striking example of a more general east Asian phenomenon: these countries' advance began not under democracy but under authoritarian regimes.

However, the section of his article that prompted this note is the folowing:
"Now, look at labour standards. The report is, as would be expected of a document from the ILO, exercised by the omnipresence, in developing countries, of unregulated, informal labour markets. What is missing is any recognition of how labour markets actually work in economies with huge surpluses of unskilled labour.

A malign relationship exists between the relatively high standards, and costs, in formal labour markets and the absence of such standards, and the low costs, in informal ones. The formal sector's growth is stunted by regulation, generating a larger surplus of workers for an undercapitalised informal economy. The result is a dualistic economy, with a small, relatively well-paid modern formal sector and a huge, unregulated - indeed, impossible to regulate - informal sector.

This is what the calls for "fair trade" produce, via the perverse incentives involved. Emphasis added.

Further Wolf rightly notes: "These are far from trivial difficulties. It is irresponsible to pretend that we can have every good we wish for, without ever having to make painful choices among them. Democracy, sovereignty and higher labour standards do not always, or even necessarily, go together with faster economic growth and more widely spread prosperity. Sometimes, we have to choose. Such a report needs to advise us how to do so.

.... [W]e must also be willing to tolerate the operation of market forces, in rich and poor countries, uncomfortable though they may be. The task we confront is huge and some of the choices painful. Let us not pretend otherwise."

Indeed. Indeed. Painful choices and tradeoffs, not pious hand wringing and posturing.

Reference to the report he responded to: * A Fair Globalization: Creating opportunities for all, www.ilo.org

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Genesis of an Iraq Project? Opening.

As promised, I am going to try to describe the genesis of a potential investment in Iraq, from my point of view as a consultant on it. It may be interesting, or perhaps not. May happen, or perhaps not. I will not directly identify players or locations for a variety of reasons I think should be obvious.

_____

Genesis:

Lounge, Istanbul technical center, late February 2004. I am sitting with KC, a former high flyer in emerging markets fund management for one of the top three asset management firms in the US. Presently based in Istanbul, KC and I have been talking about various projects for a few months now. I have my reservations about him, but he's in the game and has appropriate connections. We're waiting for his laptop to be backed up, some technical problems, and dicussing a recent bit of work I did on Morocco.

It's a bit of a set play, feeling out where things are going, while pretending that waiting for a laptop to be backed up is not a breach of meeting ettiquette. I am moderately annoyed, but things happen. Some ideas are revolving around a vulture fund for the region, as well as a play for official american money. Or both.

Then KC mentions the industrial line he has an inside track on in a bankruptcy proceeding. US quality line, major metal - capital equipment (actually very specific but no matter). Thrown into bankruptcy, assets though are almost brand new, management team is sick of dealing with the situation and wants another option. Major US backer may be there. The idea: shut it down, disassemble and transfer to Iraq. Get US financing for it, with risk insurance, and line up CPA / US backed project clients. The actual production is golden in terms of reconstruction, with US risk insurance you can't los eif expropriateed or busted on contracts by governmental entities, and the connections help on Bechtel dealings.

KC describes this and I begin to see real potential, he stops and says, "I see a light has gone off on this." Light? If everything is as described, this is fucking beautiful. Well, maybe not for the workers but fuck it, the line is in bankruptcy and the industry is a dino anyway. Now, the problem is, avoiding the US effects trap, but if you're buying a closed firm - and taking raw production from US sources, or at least reasonably claiming to intend to do so, then you can trump that. So, I reply "Oh yes, it's beautiful, it's golden if it pans out." That's the trouble, KC is a promoter, I know the perfect scenario is not all that perfect. However, the opportunity is there, and if one can pull it off, while minimizing our own capital at risk, then this is bloody amaizing. The core problem then is how to do this. The capital is not the problem per se, according to KC, it's the pre-investment funding. Need to check out who the competitors are in this niche, and yet not give anyone a hint as to the concept - need to get the assets in bankrupcy court dirt cheap for this to make sense. The other item, of course, is the Iraq end, and convincing the appropirate authorities that yes, there are a group of people crazy enough to put a few million on the line - although if the assets are acquired at the represented probabable price, the value versus what the business should be is well worth the risk.

Now, we're faced with a dilemma. Well, not a dilemma, a challange. This project is beautiful, almost painfully so, presuming we get the bankrupt assets. Still, challenge: Financing a feasibilty study on this, to check out what is what. USTDA would be perfect, but we just got in touch with the Director for th region who tells me that sure sounds great, but USTDA is only budgeted for feasibility studies in IT in Iraq. Fucking IT. What the fuck is that? Iraq doesn't have regular electricity, barely a decent infrastructure, and is far away from being able to effectibvely use IT. So, USTDA has gotten money for IT feasibilitiy studies. What the fuck? Did the American government learn literally nothing about the IT bubble and the fantasme of IT as a solution ot development in the past 5 years? Don't answer that, it's fucking sexy, IT, for the bloody USG people, and given what I see USAID supporting in cockamamie "e-government schmes that make no sense givent he percent of the population with internet access (or the capacity within the governments to use the IT they have let alone new "e-government" projects).

Okay, we're going to have to follow up with our friends in the various agencies. There may be ways around this, or even self-financing, but why do that if US taxpayers can pay for it for us?

Project, still in the idea phase, but gathering information.

More as this goes on.

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March 02, 2004

On the Israeli - Palestinian Issue

A question was asked: What would a just solution to the IP issue be? The rhetoric we hear in the US is that a just solution from the Arab World view would be the disappearance of Israel alltogether; either immediately through its destruction or disolution, or eventually through Arab birth-rate.

I can't believe that's true, but can see how Israel can't risk that it may be. Lots of us average Americans would love to get behind something fair for both sides, but it never seems to manifest, so I'd be interested in hearing what average Arabs tell you would work."

Well, the Middle East no longer is living in the 1970s and the drive the Jews into the sea rhetoric is no longer the dominate rhetoric.

Now, the peace faction has been badly weakened by the failure of the peace initiatives over the past decade and the strong perception that regardless of Arab actions, Israel gets its way and is rarely if ever sanctioned for bad faith (which one must admit the continued expansion of settlment building in the occupaied territories rather clearly suggests).

Leaving these questions aside, it is my sense from the past decade that a solution based ont he following key points would gain support of the majority of Palestinians and lead to a durable peace:
(a) Israeli evacuation of the entire occupied territories, i.e. return to 1967 borders or a reasonable approximation of the same.
(b) Some reasonable sharing or partition of Jerusalem, such that both sides could claim to have Jerusalem as their capital. Some portion of this must cover the old city, although probably the best form would be a shared security responsiblity for the core of Jerusalem - but with the Dome of the Rock under Palestinian legal jurisdiction if nothing else. Also some Xian sites.
(c) Some elegant sidestepping of the right of return, invovling the symbolic return of some Palestinians, e.g. those willing to swear allegiance to the Israeli state and/or pass through strict Israeli security screening. Set up compensation fund for others.
(d) Mutual security guarantees.
(e) Some work on the water issue, resolution of water rights on equitable basis - most likely given technology transfer and fudning for upgrading in the Palestinian areas which have serious issues.

Sounds rather simple, and were reasonable parties on both sides in place, it could be achieved. However, the level of trust between the two is low and extremism is high as well. In the end, Israel has a strong long term interest in seeing a real peace insofar as the demographics run against them and the long run costs of the occupation are very high. There is no chance of normalization in the region without resolution along the lines sketched above. With enough movement on this, above all the settlers issue, it is not hard to see public opinion among the Arab population turning against the terror operations in favor of a normal life.

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Reports from Baghdad, Karbala

The general tenor is rather negative, anti-American. A lose-lose situation for the occupation troops, given the negative PR dynamic ongoing in Iraq regarding the occupation. Many enraged commentators -Shiites- blaming the Americans and saying they had made things worse, not better than under Sadaam as now, to quote one hysterical woman, instead of hidden mass graves the streets are public graves.

I find it hard and harder to see how this can be fixed, although I should note that everything I hear about Iraqi views of British troops is positive. The British appear to have largely won over the population, although serious problems remain.

To quote my Shiite turcoman maid and her Arab Shiite husband, Basra and the British zone is fine, but the Americans remain dogs. Not positive.

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The Greater Middle East Initiative and failed cold war analogies

The Financial Times has an excellent comment from Anatol Lieven which contains some key observations to share:

Lessons for Bush's Mideast vision
By Anatol Lieven
Published: March 1 2004 20:08

Lievan's argument in grosso modo is that the the Bush Administration is looking for the wrong lessons from the Cold War, rather simplistic lessons rather unsuprisingly mistaken given the mistaken underlying suppositions.

Lievan writes:
" The lessons of successful development in the cold war and post-cold-war periods for western policy are threefold. The regimes concerned obviously need to have both the right economic policies and a state strong enough to guide economic development. Second, the west needs to have a strong local nationalism on its side. Third, it has to be prepared to make real economic sacrifices. Democracy as such is not of central importance, though law and social freedom certainly are. After an economy has modernised, democracy often follows; but, outside parts of Europe, the correlation between democracy and modernisation is weak.

Excellent observations.

Better is his statement of an analysis that I have also advanced:
"There has also been much talk of the precedent of the Marshall Plan; but this merely helped what had been successful free-market economies before the second world war to get back on their feet. .... Nationalism was of critical importance in both these regions. In the cases of Taiwan and South Korea the US backed homogeneous authoritarian elites with a strong military element and a powerful sense of national purpose, closely linked to their fear of communism. Later, this was also true of Thailand. Take away the military element and it was true of Japan, Singapore and Malaysia. By contrast, in ethnically divided elites with a weak sense of common national purpose, development was much less successful."

Lievan argues that in Eastern Europe, the conditions of Communist rule - or even better, Imperial Russian rule in a Soviet form (to be mildly ironic), pushed the Eastern Eruopean states to identifying with the Western European and American models, economically and to perhaps a lesser extent, politically (or sometimes vice versa). The West was the pull, the conditions of colonial rule by the Soviets, part of the push, in the context of ethnic nationalism.

Lievan also notes that the effort post 1990 was not cheap, aid while "it seemed grossly inadequate to the recipients but it has been colossal compared with the paltry sums Washington is talking of spending in the Middle East. And even aid was secondary compared with the most important factor of all: the opening of western European markets to eastern European exports and the easing of restrictions on the movement of workers."

The question then is in what way does the Bush Administration's plans - or "plans" as Lievan appropriately characterizes them, mean in the context of actually achieving something in this region? Certainly the risible funding is symbolic, more than real, while the approach has been ham handed and self-indulgent, largely playing to American sense of superiority over the people of the region and not engaging them in manner that would make the efforts attractrive. In short, the game the Bush Administration has played is to its own supporters, not in engaging the people who need to be engaged.

Lievan notes
These factors [access to markets, funds] were also central to the development of some of the east- and south-east Asian countries. First because of the Korean war and then because of the Vietnam war, the US transferred huge sums in aid to states that it viewed as bulwarks against communism. And, once again, even more important was the fact that the US kept its markets open to these countries' products and to immigrants.

Lievan notes: " The contrasts with the greater Middle East are bleak. With the exception of Iran, none of these states is a truly national one, and their sense of real common national purpose is weak." (I interject to disagree, the North African states have a fairly decent national identity, but I do agree in the Midde East proper, there is little genuine national identity.) "Where state nationalism does exist, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and US support for Israel mean it is hard to mobilise it on the side of the west. What the American formulators of the Helsinki parallel cannot seem to grasp is that all too many Arabs see the US plus Israel as playing the Soviet role of detested regional hegemon. As long as Arab television can show daily images of Palestinian suffering, it will be difficult even to begin to dispel this impression."

Lievan has hit the nail on the head, in the text emphasized.

Further he argues: Finally, the readiness of the US or EU to make real sacrifices for the sake of developing this region is highly questionable. Will they, for example, make available amounts of aid comparable with those given to Poland or South Korea? Is there any possibility that the US will allow large-scale Muslim immigration?

The answers to these questions may seem self-evident. Yet, at the same time, simply to dismiss the Bush initiative out of hand is not enough. September 11 2001 proved that mortal threats to the west can emerge from failed Muslim states and this threat must be combated, for decades and possibly generations. ....

The last paragraph is right enough, however, in addition to commitment, in requires a real engagement. It requires also creative thinking, for example, rather than blindly opposing say Sharia law, it is better to engage demands for Sharia law and look for versions of the same that care compatible with modernization of society. That is, do not cede what is in reality the rhetorical high ground (relgious referants) to the oponents but rather grab it. There is no shortage of disgust in the region with the pseudo secular regime, simply pimping secularism without any real understanding of the historical discredit, and the deep problems in the past, is engaging in the empty posturing.

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Bombs in Karbala, Baghdad

Bombs on Ashoura, degrading situation?

Watching BBC and the Arab Sats regarding the bombs in Karbala and Baghdad, the events appear to be clearly aimed at increasing Shiite and Sunni tensions, as well as Shiite anger and impatience with the CPA. Well-coordinated, planned.

On the first point, BBC reporter in Karbala noted that crowds had attacked foreigners, perceived non-Shiites, after the bombings. The second report of interest, the BBC report canvassed responses, which blamed the CPA and Americans for the attacks, either directly or indirectly. Conspiratorial thinking, not terribly rational, but having a deep echo. Indeed footage playing show US troops coming under massive stone throwing from the part of the Shiites after the attacks.

Among the problems, of course, is the mixture of the failure of provision of security on the part of the American forces, along with the failure to resolve Palestinian issues. Israel is widely thought to be taking advantage of “Iraqi” weakness and various conspiracy theories float about among Shiites and Sunnis regarding Israel getting free or discounted oil.

In this context, many people sincerely if somewhat superficially believe the US is exploiting Iraq for Israel’s benefit. While essentially an irrational belief in the direct terms expressed, it is not without foundation in the sense of the geo-strategic thinking behind action on Iraq did indeed very much make reference to creating friends for Israel among the Arab states, i.e. friendly regimes.

Clumsy, ill thought out, but something key to thinking from certain quarters.

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Bombs in Iraq

Unfortunately, the Arab Sats are reporting that a series of bombs have gone off in Karbala and Baghdad, targetting Shiite religious processions. Looks to have been very bloody.

Actions like this, which I will guess were undertaken by "Salafi" Sunni jihadists, can tip Iraq into civil war.

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Ideas regarding MENA commentary - Multi Blog on MENA [edited to correct pasting error, added text]

I am beat, but an idea for comment.

First, I remain unhappy with livejournal, second I am not sure such a very personal site is truly engaging and interesting in the long term, rather I think focus on policy may be more intresting. [edited to correct overwritten text]

Ergo, what do readers think of the concept of establishing an multi author "blog" on MENA issues?

I have no idea how one would do so, but I like the general concept. One needs, of course, particpants. [corrected typo]

NEW TEXT:

The issue of course is participation, who, and then how. I rather think some exchanges are more interesting than a single voice.

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Further to the issue of policy in the MENA region and the long term gamble

Regarding a question on calpundit to my comment on the return on a long term return on a long term policy as expressed here:

"Thanks for the insight/alternate view on the likely short- and long-term state of affairs in the ME. If we treat this as a long-term problem, I'd think we could weather the short-term consequences. But do we expect the long-term benefits in 10-20 years or 20-50 years?"

Obviously this is hard question to answer. My answer should be put in context of my own interests, as a private sector investor with an equity position in the region. That is, I have an interest in stability.

However, at the same time, I realize what the real limits are.

Now, in regards to the payoff, that is a hard question, as I said.

My first point is that one makes a serious error if one is unable to engage the majority of the population in a reform project.

There is a great deal of loose rubbish written in the media in the West about secularism in the Arab Islamic world, that forgets the 40-60 year history of faux secularism that has managed to rather cast discredit on the concept.

If one begins with that understanding, one understands that the idea of secularism has to be resold, and not on the back of the current regimes, in large part. Or at the very least with actions that are rather less "Islamophobic" and rather more creative in terms of engaging the positive in Islamic political action today.

I speak from personal experience - and I mean grass roots experience not academic experience - in stating that much popular support for hard core 'Islamism' arises from disguest and frustration with the Arab governments in place. I can report that in a private convo with senior American diplomats in the region (among them a fellow who keeps pics of him and Republican presidents in his private quarters, i.e. not a namby pamby lefty) that were they or myself in the position of many, they or myself would opt for the Islamists.

The Islamists present a coherent critique, a coherent view that corruption is bad, and to date in the Arab world they have followed through. Now, this is largely because they have not really had the chance to be corrupted, but in fact there is a signficant portion of the Islamist movement that is effectively more modern in outlook that the pseudo-secularists.

Now, can engaging them have a payoff in a meaningful time frame? Depends on many things, among them Israel-Palestine policy. Without a just solution there, you have no street cred and no matter how much the secret police repress, the reality will be that you have little real influence, despite the deep and abiding respect among most Muslim and Xian Arabs for American society.

In essence, expend political capital on solving the IP problem in a manner that shows respect for the Arab POV and you get major baraka - good grace- to do other things. In that context you can aspire to see a turn around in the decade. Else, you have shit.

PS: in re tacitus, well that is water under the bridge. Some people like echo chambers or bounded conversations.

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March 01, 2004

Quick recommendation for the Arabic speakers

On economic news, let me advise you try out the CNBC channel. I have been watching it regularly for the past month and am impressed. Seems to not just be a 'translation.'

Fills a deeply needed gap, and less of the idiotic filler, as one finds in al-Arabiyah and al-Jazeerah.

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On the new US "initiative"

I reproduce a comment made elsewhere, on the new US initiative (http://www.calpundit.com/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=3384) :

As a regional specialist and someone working in the region, I find it exceedingly difficult to take such proposals seriously. Now my dear little tacitus who is taking his virginity losing trip to my region thinks this demonstrates something.

Not unexpected, the partisans on both sides, Kerry and Bush, are seeking election battling points.

I could, to be frank, give a fuck about election points insofar as I end up living the actual policy in action.

Now, reality. Reality is that short term policy goals (stability, acquiesence to US policy) are fundamentally at odds with long term policy goals (democratisation) in the region. Reality is that democratisation and freer press will in the short run produce anti-US commentary and anti-US policy - if we take US policy in the context of a rather blind and not terribly creative support for the appearance of "secularism" or quasi-secular states, blind support for Israel regardless of the need for a more balanced approach, and policy that plays to the rather simplest of views on the MENA region.

Real democratisation in the short term (5-10) years will produce Islamist regimes, will initially produce stricter social regimes (i.e. regression on the image level if not reality on women's rights) and produce less friendly regimes in re US FP in the region. It might produce less investment friendly regimes, but I think actually probably Islamic regimes in the end will end up being more friendly to investors than the pseudo secular ones.

Now, Islamophobes or polite bigots will likely clap loudly at the posturing, and go on about how "we" can not "allow" sharia regimes in Iraq, etc., Islamist threat and all that. The reality is, if the rhetoric of democracy is to work in the long run, it has to allow popular decisions, and allow the societies in question to work out their issues.

The Bush initiative is throroughly incoherent insofar as it engages in rather magical thinking in regarding to what 'democracy' will really mean and what a free press will mean - magically thinking that free press will mean pro-American, and rather not dealing with the contradictions.

I have seen no signs of the American administration actually grappling with these issues, which to give credit to them on a level, are highly difficult, even intractable in the near term.

Intractable in the near term means one has to think very carefully indeed before jumping in. Unless of couse it is just something to sell to the electorate and the Islamophobes who are wetting their pants about the new culture wars....

In addition I will note that to date, the Middple East Partnership Initiative which I have had close relations with in several areas, strikes me as more an issue of ideological point making than a true reengagement with the region. The departure of Liz Cheney rather took the wind out of it, and I find their vision for investing in the region (as part of the Funds function) to be sadly naive.

Money will be spent, as far as I can tell, rather poorly insofar as the ideological component of the critique seems to be trumping the practical.

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February 28, 2004

Iraq: The Painful intervention of holier than thou ideology

Unsurprising:

Iraqi Experts Tossed With The Water
Workers Ineligible To Fix Polluted Systems
By Ariana Eunjung Cha
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, February 27, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10640-2004Feb26?language=printer

Compare with:
Rules May Be Eased for Iraqi Firms
U.S. Wants to Award More Reconstruction Contracts to Nation's Companies
By Jackie Spinner
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, February 19, 2004; Page E04
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53172-2004Feb18.html

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Israel: Palestine Bank Incursion

I thought I should make a comment on this. I know the Arab Bank people involved, have mixed feelings on the justification. On one hand have heard the rumours about the terror financing angle, but also know Arab Bank to be one of the best run and most professional in the region. As well as rather conservative.

Cairo Amman Bank is another story. My call, pending more informatin, Israel either jumped the gun or is taking a rather typical guilty until proven innocent position.

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From Istanbul: on the meaninglessness of "leading" n bizspeak

Briefly as I run off to another meeting:

New idea to work on while the fund reboot languishes, vulture fund for the region.

Not interesting for you all - but having spent too much of my precious time tooling about doing some background on this, I am reminded of how vacuous the term "leading" has become in bizspeak. Every damned firm is a "leading" one. Come now!

It is always more amusing when one reads the profile of firms you know are deeply troubled, to find them "leading."

I was most amused to find a "leading" - no in fact "the leading" PE-VC firm in the region invested in a venture which I personally rejected not six months ago after I became convinced (and have subsequently confirmed) is a scam - a shell game.

Well, some due diligence boyos; I guess that is how a "leading" firm operates.

Pity I can not rant on more about that, but has connections with the ongoing unpleasantness around me old boss.

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February 25, 2004

The Oddness that is Sex in the Arab world.... [edited formatting - corrected]

[edited 26 Feb for formatting]
Many comments to write up - including some chilling convos re Americans from some old and previously pro American contacts of mine, however, in the short term:

Taken from the The Jordan Times website,

Gyrating singers belie stereotype of cloaked Arab women
By Donna Abu-Nasr
The Associated Press
BEIRUT — There's the video clip showing Haifa, the sultry Lebanese shimmying in the rain in a clingy red dress.

And it is, I must say with admiration, clingy.

Quite yummy for those who have this idea the entire region is Saudiyah.

And the clip featuring Roubi, the Egyptian singer belly-dancing in a public square. And scantily dressed dancers aplenty without whom no male singing act seems complete.

How terribly unsurprising, if one knows the region, how surprising if one gets ones views from the overheated commentary in the Western Press (in grosso modo) on the region and its values.

But let us be fair, note the following:

The blitz of dewy looks, pouting lips and suggestive dance on Arab satellite TV stations is outraging some critics.

Noting new in a way, but who are the critics? Let's see, and even better their incoherent comments:

One has dubbed the new crop of performers “weapons of singing destruction”. Another says some women are so offended that they are praying to Allah to smite the seductresses.

Well the fat ugly ones are.

However, the oddity is that one can very well understand from the historical and indeed modern media representations (since the 1950s) that sensuality has a long and deep place in the Islamic Arab world - which once upon a time had sex manuals. Yes, sex manuals. Not good ones, but hey.... this was when Europe thought maggots were demons and sex was a sin.

In the largely conservative Arab world, where many women go veiled and cloaked in public and government censors determine the length of an on-screen kiss, the video clips seem out of place. So why are they permitted to air? Competition, answers Abdo Wazen, a Lebanese art critic at the newspaper Al Hayat.

Well enough, and Abdo is right.

But the conspiracy world is alive here, from the reasonable:"“It's an attempt to divert the attention of youths away from the political and financial frustrations at home,” offers Ali Abu-Shadi, an Egyptian who was a government censor.

Ali is not, probably wrong.

...

To the stupid: “It's part of an American policy to strip Arab cultures of their values,” says Hussein Abdel-Qader of the Egyptian newspaper Akhbar Al Yom.

What does he think of the singers? “They're driving men crazy!” he exclaimed.

Okay Hussein, you're frustrated, and as an Cairene Egyptian your wife is probably a fat ugly cow.

However, as a less than enthusiastic viewer of Egypto-pop videos, and a moderate if not enthusiastic fan of Libano-pop (Rai is far better but not seen on the Arab Sats), the bloody styles and imagery have nothing to do with American values or imagery - except in a wide sense, and very much play to Arab values and imagery (even when Western in setting). No, they're just not pretending in the quasi faux puritan manner of the modern Wahhabi.

Abdel-Qader said women in Egypt go to the shrine of Zeinab, the Prophet Mohammad's granddaughter, “to pray that Allah take Haifa, Roubi and Nancy”. Nadira Omran, a prominent Jordanian actress, said the clips are “very cheap and vulgar”.

Yeah right. Zeinib's shrine prayers have a lot more to do with the price of a tamihay than Nancy (who is fairly hot I should say).

Although it is hard to argue that the Eastern Arab pop video scene is not vulgar and cheap, but that's across the board, not just in sex. Hey, market taste.

“They have turned a woman's body and its superior qualities into a commodity,” said Omran, who bans her children from watching them.

Sure. Sounds familiar. And not credible.

Finally:
Dalal Al Bizri, a Lebanese sociologist living in Cairo, blames male-dominated societies for making women cover up.

“When the condition of women on the street is unnatural, the demand for vulgarity and nudity increases,” she said.

“That's what viewers want and television stations have to cater for that demand.” Nancy — full name Nancy Ajram — is best-known for a clip that shows her swaying her hips and shaking her shoulders while serving customers at an all-male cafe. In an interview with the Associated Press, she denied it contains any sexual innuendoes.

Well, since I had to watch this, and still do every day in the Gym (even during women dominated hours, she's popular [Ousebek leh? for example] and stylish), I have to say the sexual innuedoes are there, although what can we say? She's not an alien, but what is she going to say, yeah I am fucking with your peeps?

The remainder of the article as it is not avail online:
“My clip is bold, but it doesn't go beyond feminine appeal. I don't sing with my body,” she said.

The clips air on several satellite stations, mostly based in Beirut or Cairo, where society tends to take a more liberal view of these things. But they reach all over the Arabic-speaking world.

One broadcaster is Rotana Television, a music channel inaugurated last month in Beirut. It belongs to a production company owned by Saudi billionaire Prince Alwaleed Ben Talal, famous in the United States for having his $10 million donation to the victims of the Sept. 11 attacks rebuffed by Rudolph Giuliani, then New York's mayor.

Michel Murr, who heads the Beirut operation, was not available to talk about the impact the videos are having on viewers. But at another network, Cairo-based Dream TV, general manager Osama Al Sheikh told AP: “We don't broadcast any video clip unless we are sure it is morally acceptable.” He said the station has an in-house “censorship department” of station employees that has banned some foreign and Arab videos, and the Roubi and Haifa clips almost didn't make it onto the air.

“We were not very enthusiastic in broadcasting them. We do broadcast them, but less frequently compared to the rest of the songs,” he said.

Some Arab government TV channels refuse to air the videos, but governments can't shut out satellite signals, and bans on dish ownership are widely ignored. Besides, some of the clips can be viewed on the stars' Web sites.

Several mosques and TV programmes in Saudi Arabia are urging youths to avert their eyes, said Abdullah Al Rufeidy, a 34-year-old Saudi government worker. But the clips remain highly popular.

Many Yemenis also are ignoring clerics' anti-clips edicts.

Some Yemeni hotels with satellite TV rent out rooms for the evening just for people wanting to watch the videos.

In the island state of Bahrain, a few hundred protesters trying to stop people from going to a Nancy concert Wednesday night threw rocks, set fires and smashed car windows. Police reported several arrests and the concert went ahead uninterrupted.

Muslim conservative lawmakers had earlier proposed banning the concert but were rebuffed by the liberal majority in parliament.

Mohammed Khaled Ibrahim, a lawmaker who supported the ban, noted that the Holy Month of Ramadan was about to begin. “We should spend our time repenting and engaging in religious activities rather than engaging in activities that are un-Islamic,” he told AP.

The Bahrain Tribune quoted the singer as saying that she was in Bahrain to “put a smile on the faces of my fans”. “I sing to take people away from politics that separates people and causes chaos in society,” she said.

The videos have spawned a huge demand for salacious celebrity gossip. Newspapers and magazines are filled with bizarre rumours of orgies in which jaws are broken and silicone implants rupture.

Abdullah Al Qobei, who came up with the term “weapons of singing destruction,” sarcastically suggested in the newspaper Asharq Al Awsat that the singers do “veiled videos” for Ramadan.

Wazen, the art critic, had another explanation for the clips' popularity: The stars are Arabs, doing the things that in most Arab countries are seen only on Western TV shows.

“In such suppressed societies, people enjoy watching Arab nudity,” said Wazen. “It's a kind of voyeurism.” Not everybody, however, is happy about that.

Watching a music video channel at home in Cairo one night, Hisham Khalil, 30, and his friends muttered insults when Roubi, the belly dancer, appeared on the screen, a glittering star in her navel.

Such singers are “trying to Westernise their approach to art and entertainment”, Khalil complained. “It means that the Eastern culture has no more to give.” But sexy videos by Western stars draw no such disapproval.

“Westerners have their culture; we have our own culture and we're supposed to preserve it, respect it,” said Khalil, who works in finance. “When people go out of line in terms of their own culture, especially in the Muslim world, others start viewing them disrespectfully.”

Thursday, February 19, 2004

Khalil is full of shit, I may add.

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February 21, 2004

An interesting Pat Buchanen article

Now, I believe Mr. Buchanen is as close to evil as one can get. However, I found this article intriguing.

No End to War
The Frum-Perle prescription would ensnare America in endless conflict.
By Patrick J. Buchanan
March 1, 2004 issue
http://www.amconmag.com/3_1_04/print/coverprint.html

Now, there is a clear line of Israel and maybe Jewish phobia here in Buchanen's artfully crafted prose, the prose of the elegant bigot.

However, the fact he is likely an anti-Semite does not entirely invalidate his analysis here, that a certain set of the people self-identified as "neo-Con" confound Israeli- more properly Sharonista- interests with US interests is not, I think, off-base. His analysis of the historical foreign policy of the states strikes me as perhaps 50percent correct, but his attacking the mythologies of the neco-cons in re 'democracy' and US foreign policy strike me as useful.

Interesting, problematic.

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February 19, 2004

Iraq: Privatization down

18 Feb 2004 21:21
U.S. drops Iraq privatization, focuses on investors
By Sue Pleming
http://www.reuters.com/locales/newsArticle.jsp;:40342b7e:7e819bfe3a1b5cd9?type=businessNews&locale=en_IN&storyID=4387602

A few comments:
(a) There were plans to sell to international investors. Foley is not being honest there.
(b) The playing down of security problems in Iraq is bloody wishful thinking.

More later when I think further on this.

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A Chalabi Story

[Edited slightly]
Start-up Company With Connections
U.S. gives $400M in work to contractor with ties to Pentagon favorite on Iraqi Governing Council
By Knut Royce
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-uschal083671397feb15,0,735950.story

Interesting. I know the Jordanian connexions. No extended comment at this time. One of my partners is related to most of the names in there. Let's just say he's got nothing good to say about them, although he is related to them.

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Another development, another misstep: Iraq - OPIC

I hate to pick on my friends at OPIC, but this strikes me as fully idiotic.

Iraqi Imports Get Citigroup Backing
Bank, U.S. Agency Propose
Financing, With Revenue
Guaranteed by Oil Sales
By MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

http://online.wsj.com/article_email/0,,SB107697670208530936-IVjfYNplaB3nZyra4GHaKyCm4,00.html

First, it strikes me as a possible violation of international covenents.

Second, it strikes me as a political misstep.

Third, it strikes me as far too late in the game, with mere months to go .... in theory.

Full Text in case of no access:

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration and Citigroup Inc. are proposing a joint $200 million arrangement to finance Iraq's imports, with the bank's revenue from the project guaranteed by Iraq's oil sales.

The plan, led by the federal Overseas Private Investment Corp., has raised some eyebrows inside the administration because it comes just a few months before the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority is to turn over sovereignty to a still-undetermined Iraqi government. It is far from clear whether the trade-finance project would get much done before the scheduled June 30 handover or whether the new Iraqi government would abandon it.

THE FIGHT FOR IRAQ

• U.S. Military Seeks More Funds for Iraqi Police, Security Forces

• FBI Collects Data on Way Money Is Moved in Iraq

See continuing coverage at the Fight for Iraq.



But OPIC officials believe their plan to facilitate letters of credit for Iraqi importers will help the economy recover and modernize. OPIC officials stress the assistance the project would provide to Iraqi private companies and private banks. It is an attempt to "put in the foundations that will achieve economic freedom for the Iraqis," said OPIC President Peter Watson.

The project would work through a series of guarantees for letters of credit, a standard tool used to smooth the flow of trade. Letters of credit guarantee payment to the seller -- say, a German drug company or an American tractor maker -- at the time it delivers the goods. Without such a letter, Iraqi importers -- who are by virtue of the country's situation considered huge credit risks -- would have to put up the cash beforehand and trust that the goods would eventually arrive.

In the case of the OPIC/Citigroup project, a Baghdad bank might issue a letter of credit for a local company's imports. An international bank would confirm the letter, assuming the risk of nonpayment. A separate institution, set up by Citigroup, would then guarantee that the international bank gets paid. Citigroup and OPIC would guarantee that the separate institution -- still nameless -- gets paid. Finally, the coalition would pledge to use Iraqi oil revenue to cover any Citigroup and OPIC losses.

All the banks along the way would collect fees for their participation, and as long as the coalition runs Iraq, there is essentially no risk for any of them.

The same sort of arrangement could work for providing letters of credit for Iraqi government ministries through the existing Trade Bank of Iraq. While OPIC argues that it is trying mainly to assist the private sector in Iraq, officials acknowledge that the bulk of the financing would inevitably go to the Iraqi government. Ten Iraqi banks already issue letters of credit on their own, according to the Treasury Department.

At one point, OPIC and Citigroup even proposed demanding that a fixed percentage of Iraqi government procurement go through the new financing mechanism. U.S. officials later decided it would be unwise -- both politically and economically -- to guarantee Citigroup and OPIC a lucrative slice of that business.

Citigroup has pledged $50 million for the project, with OPIC putting up the remaining $150 million in financing. Duncan King, a Citigroup spokesman, declined to comment on the OPIC deal, as did Tom Foley, the coalition's director of private-sector development in Baghdad.

The looming question is what happens after the coalition cedes power. OPIC still has to get the nod from Congress to launch the project, and so, at best, OPIC officials predict it will be operational at the end of March.

Amid the transitional uncertainty, OPIC and Citigroup insist that starting April 1, the coalition put cash from Iraq's oil revenue in offshore accounts to cover any outstanding letters of credit.

OPIC officials acknowledge that when they began developing the idea, they thought the coalition would be running Iraq for at least a couple more years. Now, OPIC and Citigroup appear to be pressing the current, U.S.-appointed Iraqi authorities to do their best to commit the future government to honoring the financing plan.

Confidential draft documents include a section in which the coalition and Trade Bank of Iraq would agree to "use reasonable efforts" to convince the current Finance Ministry and Central Bank to acknowledge "the intention of the Republic of Iraq to continue operating" under the arrangement after the transition.

Mr. Watson said the administration isn't trying to present the incoming government with a fait accompli. "We're not going to force it on them," he said. "I don't prejudge whether they'll like this or not."

"We need to accept that this is possibly a short-duration program," said another senior U.S. official.

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February 18, 2004

An Entreprise Fund

Informed sources tell me that influential staff in the MEPI are going to opt for an entreprise fund, over a regional private equity fund model. This is a stupid decision. A large pot of USG money, admined from Washington to do 'entreprise grants' in a region they are not well-connected with, do not have on the ground business intelligence, and for which the bureaucrats in charge really do not have a direct risk involved. Risk is discipline.

This is a perfect way to piss away a rather large number of millions. Morons.

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February 17, 2004

Speaking of rent-seeking

Iraq bedouins see Japan troops as business opportunity
http://www.jordantimes.com/Tue/news/news6.htm

My response in one phrase: "Lying greedy scum."

They're likely, however, to dupe the Japanese into paying. I bloody well hope it is not $4m a year, a idiotic sum, highway robbery. But it is fleece the foreigner time.

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FT: back article on Iraq and Banking

I missed this while travelling, however it is interesting:

Banking struggles back to its feet in postwar Iraq
By James Drummond in Baghdad
The Financial Times Jan 29, 2004

In the chaos of postwar Iraq last year banks were a target for looters. Now these financial institutions, essential to restoring the country's economy to a semblance of normality, are slowly feeling their way amid violence and a confusing legal and regulatory environment.

Banking in Iraq has a chequered history: foreign institutions were forced out in the 1960s and ordinary Iraqis saw arbitrary regulations slapped on their deposits through the years of war and sanctions. But at least many banks are now open - even if they are protected by barbed wire and armed guards.

"Now you can buy and sell dollars in the central bank. Before we used to buy [hard currency] from people in the streets," says Saad al-Bunnia, chairman of the Iraqi bankers association and of the private sector al-Warka Investment Bank.

"[But] the Iraqi does not have confidence in banking . . . because one day you would wake up in the morning and there was a new law which says that you are not allowed to withdraw more than 500,000 Iraqi dinars from your account. How could you run a business like that?" he asks.

From the 1960s, most of the Iraqi banking system was dominated by the state-owned Rafidain and al-Rashid banks. Then after the first Gulf war, the Ba'athist regime gradually licensed 17 private sector institutions, including al-Warka.

When the invasion was launched last year, Mr Bunnia says that the private sector banks held about 8 per cent of deposits.

A number of non-Iraqi banks are also due to hear soon whether they have succeeded in getting through to the second stage of a tendering process which may see foreign institutions returning to Iraq for the first time for 40 years.

The "strong assumption" is that those who reach the second stage will be offered licences, according to an official with the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority. Those that choose to open full subsidiaries have to commit to a $25m (19.8m, £13.6m) capital requirement.

As with much else in Iraq today it is uncertain when exactly the announcement about the foreign banks is due to be made. HSBC confirms its interest. Citibank says "not for the moment".

Currently domestic private sector banks are forbidden by the central bank to export funds. They are confined to foreign exchange activities - mainly trading in dollars and, as of yesterday, euros. They can also act as correspondents for letters of credit. In the absence of fixed telephone lines their main means of communication with the outside world are the internet and satellite phone.

Mr Bunnia welcomes the prospect of foreigners returning to Iraq, but questions whether managers will commit to doing so in the current environment.

"There is room for everyone - look at Lebanon," he says. A far smaller country than Iraq with fewer natural resources, Lebanon has more than 50 private sector domestic and international banks active in the country.

Iraq's difficulties are complicated by legal questions. The problem surrounding the tendering of mobile phone licences last year was in part one of jurisdiction - a turf war between the CPA and the nascent ministry of communications.

A similar situation appears to prevail in the financial sector. Mr Bunnia says he has to contend with three different authorities.

"I would welcome [the foreign banks] because then they will put pressure on the CPA and on the central bank," he says.

"You have the CPA law, you have the [central bank] committee law and you have the ministry [of finance] law. Who is the legal representative of Iraq? Nobody knows what is going on."

Well, as usual, chaos, but interesting. I have yet to hear very confident things in regards to the Iraqi private banks, except from the specialists in wishful thinking as policy, the US Administration in Iraq.

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Reproducing a comment, developing economies

I wrote this for: http://www.calpundit.com/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=3284 but wanted to share.

Follow ons:

(a) in re Government.
Let me clarify, I am not one of those idealistic fools who thinks government will wither away, that someone one can operate without government.

My original background was in pharma, actually a specific niche therein (Let's say Monsanto was long an archenemy), I very well value the positive externalities that appropriate, market oriented regulation can achieve, and reject categorically the idea that markets can do all. I have seen market failure straight up in emerging markets, very ugly they are.

No, my attack on government is in the context of the reality of how governments generally operate in the part of the world I deal in, i.e. the Arab states, and to a much lesser extent (in terms of my exposure / operations / connexioins) Africa.

Inappropriate government, inappropriate regulation, inappropriate structures are every bit as evil as the ideologues on the Libertarian fringe would have all regulation be. A socio-economic context is necessary for any given range of institutions, try to create an institution without a good social-economic base, you create a rent-seeking vampire. That's what much very well-meaning and well-intended governmental intervention has meant in the developing world. Inappropriate, misconcieved regulation and government has meant rent seeking and leaching.

(b) Monetary Policy:
Devaluation is not inflation of the currency, and in fact the commentator gets the effects 100% backwards. Over-valuation of a currency, above market demand strangles domestic activity, it is in effect a subsidy to the rest of the world, paid for by the (poor) taxpayers. Certainly in the case of brutal devaluations, when things have become so out of whack that the devaluation arrives all at once, in a crash (Argentina, Asia in 98), people suffer.

However the long term real value of savings is in their ability to be mobilized in investments for the savers - an overvalued currency reduces the attractiveness of investment in the home country (artificially depressed competitiveness of home production, artificially increased consumptive buying power - meaning several things (holding things constant, ceteris paribus) (i) less investment at home [capital flight] due to less ops (ii) depressed wealth creation at home (iii) depressed job creation.). Over the life span of the policy, that creates more economic damage (thus damage to the wealth) hidden behind the facade of nominal growth than the actual crisis - or put it better, the currency crises and devaluations are simply the fever of a suppressed disease breaking. It is rather typical, however, to see people mistake symptoms the disease.

Of course, in emerging markets, over-valued currencies (in the name of 'stability') are often popular because they subsidize consumption by the "apparatchiks" - the officials in government and the like- of imported goods. I point to the devaluation of the Franc CFA in Africa in 1994, which produced much howling on the part of "intellectuals" (aka state bureacrats) who spouted nice little leftist lines about capital this and that, in fact it reduced their buying power which was being subsidized by who? By the mass of impoverished citizens who had few opportunities to consume imported goods, and whose agricultural production was priced out of the market, artificially, for the benefit of an elite few dressed up in 'progressive' clothes. Hypocrisy, and pure blindness to be sure.

Sometimes it also is a subsidy to expensive capital goods, which may seem rational, but nota bene, it is a subsidy to using capital intensive methods of production when in fact labor intensive methods of production are more desirable. However, one also notes the perverse incentives in politically directed investment, above all governmental in weak states, of over-investing in prestige projects, inevitably capital intensive.

In the end, simple minded Leftists and "progressives" who maintain an understanding of economics on the level of anectdote have ended up promoting policies that in fact subsidize capital (if often state capital versus private capital) at the expense of the little guy.)

(c) Liberal thought
Rob gets this perfectly wrong.
Liberalism at its roots began as the combination of both political and economic liberalism. Economic liberalism is much more than simple "market fundamentalism" -which I find rather more often among my friends on the right who are rather innocent of proper economics and understand things at a econ 101 level, i.e. largely simple platitudes. There are no proper economists who are not economic liberals, however there is a wide range within solid economic theory for admitting market correcting interventions when one takes into account total cost of events, etc. - what we might call negative externalities, or costs to society that a market, for whatever reason, does not capture (external to the market, externalities, positive externalities are obv. the pluses).

(d) Policies in the developing world
It is indeed true that moving from general theoretical frameworks to trying to find ways to move developing markets to more efficient levels is easier said than done and there is little consensus.

Among the problems is not so much the lessons of what needs to be done, but rather the assumptions about how it can get done in poor institutional environments, and were incentives and responses to incentives are not what classical, neo-classical or other flavors of economic theory would suppose (although people are people in the end, and I think one can, to use an ugly term, 'incentize' once one understands the parameters of their world view).

Thus the emerging works in behaviour economics and related fields to grapple with that. In my journal during the summer I railed on about how the CPA-Iraq in its privatization program was making all kinds of enormously idiotic assumptions, above all about Iraqi capacity to respond to privatization. I note from Juan Cole's blog that Stiglitz (nice to share such company) makes similar points in a recent article.

A question of institutional habits, of ingrained responses, of a variety of cultural and social mores that will take time to grapple with the very necessary move to privatize the economy. I am 100 percent for privatizing every chunk of Iraq, get it out of the hands of the rent-seeking, citizen abusing bureaucrat (mind you, I am not one who dislikes bureaucrats ipso facto, I have immense respect for those who serve well, however my experience in the Arab world teaches that the worst vision is the normal vision here) and into the hands of Iraqis.

However, one can not do that magically, the habits of Western economies, which took a long time to emerge [and for good reason] will not just spring up. The economic habits in the region have deep seated reasons, some good, some bad, some outdated, etc. They will not disappear, and to make a brutal shift to a fully private economy now, in Iraq, to use the example, will only discredit the move, and that is what I fear.

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February 16, 2004

Interesting WP Article on Iraq democracy

In Iraqi Towns, Electoral Experiment Finds Some Success
By Anthony Shadid
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, February 16, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A44553-2004Feb15?language=printer

Of note the surprise by the FSO officer re lack of civic mindedness. Hardly just an Iraqi issue, not just a product of Sadaam.

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Iraq: business views

Came from an interesting dinner this evening with an Indian origin businessman who's been doing work in Iraq for six years.

First, let me say that I found it odd that after roughly six years in Baghdad he doesn't speak a lick of Arabic (or pretends...).

Second, it was an interesting exchange of views. I will spare you the talk re my own projects, rather his views on the general environment. Primo, there is a general sense that things are getting out of control on one level, no one believes that the American plan has any street cred, a self-reinforcing view that tends to undermine influence. There is a widespread sense that CPA is corrupt - something I argued against actually as I think they are not in fact corrupt, but rather that they came in without people like myself and thusly, by lack of lang. and lack of experience in developing countries, are easily sold a line of shit. Easily manipulated.

It strikes me as a strategic error of the first order that the Bush Admin, seeking a rather illusory domestic electoral advantage, has entirely ceded its street cred in Iraq. They have zero initiative at present, and are prey to the changing political landscape. It's sad and deeply dangerous.

On a practical level, my interlocutor noted that Baghad has a strange rhythm. During daylight hours things are near normal, you might not guess there is a war going on (ex-of course the issue of car jackings, and the like), in the evening the armed gangs slowly take over (with the same guard with an AK who protected you earlier on perhaps freelancing on 'the other side'), until by midnight no one sane is out. And so it goes, day after day.

Very clearly no one can think rationally of investing, and we all found it laughable that the CPA still maintains its strange happy talk, which we have all heard, ad nauseum since May, that Iraq is open for business, etc. etc. It reflects... I am not sure what. A surreal sense of the possible? Divorce from the reality? Denial? A sort of stick the fingers in the ears and wah wah wah...?

It's deeply frustating insofar as there is a desperate need to get realistic. Tone down the talk to the possible, set the acheivable aims that can make things appear moving.

The disconnect is palpable.

However, I am no happier with Kery's talk oof pullling out. Perhaps it is necesary to win, but I think it is a mistake to speak in those terms. Without an international presence (but probably not a US led one) Iraq goes to hell. Civil war.

Well, in any case, we all agreed there was money to be made, although perhaps we were a bit ashamed at the mark ups, but then if yo're looking at a serious risk of half a 100 k ton shipment going missing, you need compensation.

Good for some, bad for the end results.

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Stiglitz on Iraq: pessimism

If Bush has his way, Iraq's next shock will be shock therapy
A quick shift to a market economy failed in former Soviet-bloc countries; in Iraq it could fail even more badly
By Joseph Stiglitz
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/archives/2004/02/16/2003098999

Interesting, found this via http://www.juancole.com/2004_02_01_juancole_archive.html#107691296757544385
(I do disagree with the professor's implication that privatization is a bad thing per se)

More interesting, Stiglitz arrived at the same analysis that I did several months ago, notably:

" Now, everyone agrees, the most important task -- beyond creating a democratic state and restoring security -- is reconstructing the economy. Blinded by ideology, however, the Bush administration seems determined to continue its record of dismal failures by ignoring past experience.

When the Berlin Wall fell, the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union began transitions to a market economy, with heated debates over how this should be accomplished. One choice was shock therapy -- quick privatization of state-owned assets and abrupt liberalization of trade, prices, and capital flows -- while the other was gradual market liberalization to allow for the rule of law to be established at the same time.

Today, there is a broad consensus that shock therapy, at least at the level of microeconomic reforms, failed, and that countries (Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) that took the gradualist approach to privatization and the reconstruction of institutional infrastructure managed their transitions far better than those that tried to leapfrog into a laissez-faire economy. Shock-therapy countries saw incomes plunge and poverty soar. Social indicators, such as life expectancy, mirrored the dismal GDP numbers.?

More than a decade after the beginning of the transition, many post-communist countries have not even returned to pre-transition income levels.

Worse, the prognosis for establishing a stable democracy and the rule of law in most shock-therapy countries looks bleak.

This record suggests that one should think twice before trying shock therapy again. But the Bush administration, backed by a few handpicked Iraqis, is pushing Iraq towards an even more radical form of shock therapy than was pursued in the former Soviet world. Indeed, shock therapy's advocates argue that its failures were due not to excessive speed -- too much shock and not enough therapy -- but to insufficient shock. So Iraqis better prepare for a brutal dose.

...

These factors, together with the ongoing occupation, make quick privatization particularly problematic. The low prices that the privatized assets are likely to fetch will create the sense of an illegitimate sell-off foisted on the country by the occupiers and their collaborators.

Without legitimacy, any purchaser will worry about the security of his property rights, which will contribute to even lower prices.

Furthermore, those buying privatized assets may then be reluctant to invest in them; instead, as happened elsewhere, their efforts may be directed more at asset stripping than at wealth creation. ..."

Emphasis added.

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Iraq: rats and ships

I had an evening meeting today with a local parnter, with decent Iraq connexions.

Highlights (a) he sees the door closing. The American game is over. (he's pro American) (b) suggested we try to extract as much $$ from CPA (the Accountants as we call them) as possible before the honey pot runs out. Not a good long term bet.

Well, there is the informed talk on the street. It ain't happy.

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February 15, 2004

On Iraq

It's been a while since I reflected on my sense of Iraq, partially because we seem to be in a mode of stumbling forward.

However recent events, the continued fundamental incoherence of Bush Administration approach and engagement (as usual, driven more by wishful thinking re what would be good or nice for them to happen than reasoned analysis of the possible and the potential), the regain in violence and the brazen attacks (a lesson I may add, pauses may be just that, pauses, not manifestations of collapse), make me ever more pessimistic.

Pantom in comments asked me if I thought conflict could be avoided. In fact I have a growing sense, as many do here, that a civil war is in the offing, whatever is done. It may be that it can still be avoided, but sadly the misteps to date have made it ever harder.

Certainly, as I used to say on the SDMB (sadly prophetically, although anyone with a modicum of knowledge on the region and the country would have said the same [ex-Friedman the self-deluded fool]), Iraq was Pandora's box. And now it is open. Sadly, as Pandora, the Bush Administration was only thinking about the good things, the wishful thinking that is their vision for the Middle East. It is nice, I may add, to have a vision. Very nice. The ultimate goals enunciated by this Administration, however much the border on platitudes and easy posturing like the "road map" that lasted just about as long as the PR utility did, are fine.

However, getting there from here requires something more than wishful thinking. It involves a realistic appriasal of the possible and a realistic weighing of the costs and benefits of long and short terms interests. Rather typical of this adminstration, there isn ot that going on, rather there is hand waving. It reminds me of their economic policy in re debt and proper financing of whatever spending is going on. Magically all conditions lead to their pre-conceved and not terribly economically grounded policies. A terrible danger, the inattention to the problem of getting there from here.

In regards to the Middle EAst and the specific politics of democratization - even including Iraq - there is nothing but a very magical set of thinking going on. In essence somehow they believe that democratization will produce pro-American results. It will not. Else, they do not believe that, but like th eroad map for peasce, are psturing for public consumption, while pursing a sad mixture of cheaply understsood 'realpolitik' mixed with a bizarre naivete about what can be achieved in using force. Now as I have mentioned before, I recall vividly a long ago, and chance convo with Wolfowitz wherein, as I recall (to be fair to us both, ther was much beer involved) he made an argument (in re Algeria) that rested on the concept that applied force just need to be done right to achieve change. This in regards as the convo went to the Algerian war, and perhaps Vietnam. It is not hard to see this thinking behind present policies.

What to do in its place? Certainly one has to sit down and think long and hard about how to purseu democratization, in the context of democratic results that are certain to be anti-American. Faux democratization, (you only get democracy when you agree with us) like Egypt is worse than no democratization. Like th faux secularism of the Arab world from the 1950-present, faux democratization will do nothing but slowly and surely discredit (even further) the concept, at the very least the concept of the West helping the Arab world democratize. That is a bad thing, every bit as much as faux secularism (often aping to please the aid donor) is a bad thing.

In my view, it is better to get those forces that are anti-secular and anti-American involved in a process than to shut them out. In the long run. certainly in the short term one is exposed to cheap domestic political attacks of "supporting" the "bad guys" and the various lobbies, eg, the gender/women's lobby will raise hell. However, better real gains supported by the population than gains that make some NGO staffers and their gullibale donors in comfortable suburbias happy.

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Interesting Article: Israeli Rap, Arab and Hebrew.

Straight Outta Tel Aviv
For Disenchanted Israelis, Rap Takes Politics to the 'Edge'
By Molly Moore
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, February 15, 2004; Page A18
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42614-2004Feb14?language=printer

An interesting article. I have not heard either of these sets - Arabic radio also tends to be "mainstream" and conservative. Interesting. North Africans do rap, although interestingly when using rap/hip hop style they tend to use French, and then fall into Rai style in Arabic - sometimes in the same song.

I note one interesting usage, characterizing a divide as Arab vs Israeli in the context of Arab and Jewish Israeli citizens.

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February 14, 2004

The Neo Colonial Power

The following article was brought to my attention by pantom in a comment, I thought I should highlight it:

THE ROVING EYE
SISTANI'S WAY
Part 2: The marja and the proconsul
By Pepe Escobar
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FA30Ak02.html

Even with all its military might, the US has never looked so fragile and discredited in Iraq. An occupying power which refuses democratic elections using all manners of excuses is being judged by the Islamic world - and the international community - for what it is: a neo-colonial power. It has now been proved there were never any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq - much less the means to deliver them. It is now being proved the invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with introducing democracy to the Middle East.

Now, the article in content and tone is discussable as to its factual assertions and perhaps conclusions. I find it most important for the sentiment, the perception that it conveys. Abstracting away from whether the author is right in his judgement, I will not comment on that as it is in many ways besides the point, the reality is that the manner in which this Iraq fiasco has been carried off has very much given a boost to the worst possible judgements on American intentions.

The mendacity and incompetence of the current American administration is deeply harmful to US interests, it seems to me, above all in achieving security goals that can only really be arrived at - for long term results - cooperatively.

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February 13, 2004

Terrorism: Reflections on why the Arab Middle East and the West

Terrorism: Reflections on why the Arab Middle East and the West

Eva Luna asked me this recently, and I saw it raised on an American conservative’s website as well recently. It’s not a question I particularly wanted to handle as in many respects it requires a vast answer, and extensive research. These are certainly not things I shy away from, as those who know me from the SDMB know from several years of interaction. At the same time, time is at a premium at present and I lack the time to tackle items the way I used to in say the race debates. I might add that I have covered this ground in the past on the SDMB, but let me remind you, I can't give you directions to SDMB threads, etc. because I no longer have access to the SDMB, I blocked the SDMB well over six months ago on the IP level.

Nevertheless, I am prompted to comment based on a taxi ride today. One of those moments where I say, ‘very good, besides the fact my cost-benefit analysis says taxis are more effective than a leased car, given current uncertainty, I get intelligence.’ A strange conversation, but one that revolved around the Arabs as failures, Johnny come Latelies. In fact the expression used in Arab was just about the same as that.

I will not bother with a research-data based comment, for which I lack the time, but rather a sort of commentary based off of my experience and background expertise. I am led to understand some of you find this interesting.

First, Eva posed the question in terms of Islam or Muslims, as I recall. I think that is in error. I think the question has to be honed down to Arabs and perhaps Pakistan/Afghanistan. I shall not even say the Indian sub-Continent as the Bangladeshis and eastern Indian Muslims are rarely (although occasionally) implicated in what we shall call the violence of extremist political Islam. There are some other examples, for example Indonesia recently, but I regard that as largely an aberration and believe that in large part there is not the fundamental problem that exists in the Arab world, and Pakistan by its peculiar history.

Now then, on the widest possible level, ‘why Islam’ and the “why aren’t X, Y, Z’ blowing themselves up in the US, etc., I say, this is a question by someone who is utterly without a sense of history – for behind the question presumes that there is an inherent answer without regard to the historical moment. These are largely the conflict of civilization people.

It seems to me that in the context of the present historical moment the Middle East has a number of particularities that drive the extremist fringe towards violence towards the West, particularities that do not exist, say in Gautemala.

(a) Galloping population growth with large majorities of the populations under 25, and large numbers of frustrated young men.
(b) The sense of threat to their civilization as civilization. That is, for both Arab Xian and Arab Muslim, although clearly more so for the Arab Muslim, a sense of their values and specificity being threatened by the West. In terms of the Muslims, the sense of civilization and values being under attack is probably clearest, although do not forget the Palestinian Xian angle in terror activities.
(c) The sense of intrusion, as represented by massive funding to Israel by the US, and the understanding (however discussable) that their body politics are being deliberately manipulated to (i) guarantee access to oil (ii) benefit Israel; both with plausible real facts supporting radical (and to an extent highly mythical) conclusions.
(d) The economic blockages in the Arab world, versus a relatively well-educated, relatively well-developed social infrastructure. Job creation in the MENA region is at lows rivaled by sub-Saharan Africa – but the social infrastructure, including media, is generally far more advanced and as recently as 20 or 30 years ago, the MENA region seemed to be on a path to growth. That is, unlike Asia, much of the sub-continent, Latin America, not only is there unemployment, but opportunities seem to be receding collectively. This may be contrasted with sub-Saharan Africa where educational levels and by extension, consciousness of opportunities and alternatives (modernity in a Western sense) are rather lower.
(e) Related to point (c ), further, for a variety of reasons the Arab Middle East suffers from a number of social rigidities (which in part are behind the economic rigidities and work together to close off opportunities) that appear to be frustrating modernization of society, and in my view push youth towards radical critiques. Tribalism, or even where ‘tribe’ per say does not exist, a radically reduced social vision that only really cares for the family (in operative sense, not in terms of grand but inapplicable rhetoric) are severe barriers to both social and economic advancement. All the while, a radical, seducing critique of this exists in terms of pan-Islamic political action. Mind you, I do not believe it can or will solve the social issue – see Iran – but in the pseudo-secular regimes supported by the West (or even not, see Syria) the critique is seductive.
(f) A recent colonial history combined with several terror or guerilla based models of anti-colonial resistance – Algeria, Morocco to a limited extent, for example. The Palestinian example of course looms large, both in the Territories, and its various groups in the Diaspora in the region – e.g. Lebanon.
(g) On the theoretical level, the emergence (in chance in part, in part arising from political and historical circumstances) of a radical, messianic political movement willing to see violence as its key tool, i.e. the radical end of political Islam.
(h) On a practical level, few safety valves – emigration is less and less a realistic option; Europe has largely closed its doors, America is both difficult to get too and far away (more expensive). Latin American, for example, has better safety valves in terms of immigration and:
(i) Fundamental opportunities, the MENA region is one of expanding desertification, increasing pressure on water and relatively limited ‘subsistence’ opportunities. Back to the land is not an option, those that are on the land have few other options….

I note that reducing the question to Islam itself is a fundamental error: one has not seen terror in Islamic Africa, for example, ex the imported event in Kenya, for example, and again it is rare in Asia. The key locus is the Middle East proper and Pakistan-Afghanistan (where is was doubtless doped in the 1980s by the Soviet war there).

The rest of the developing word, whether Muslim, Xian or other, in my opinion, lacks the volatile mixture that exists in the Arab Middle East. In the Arab Middle East I always have a sense of massive frustration, of having almost been there and having squandered the opportunity. This goes two ways, or perhaps three ways. Self-hatred, hatred of the outside world (partial scapegoat), apathy and withdrawal.

In many ways, I think the appeal of Islamic extremism and violence is analogous to the appeal of extreme right and left thinking in Europe during the intra-war period, when economic collapse, disorder, and general sense of social and economic malaise fed a rejection of democratic orders set up post-1918 and led to the emergence of extremist movements, be they Communist or Fascistic. Poverty or near poverty drives this, fear of yet worse. I note, e.g. that on conservative American sites there is frequent note that the 11 Sep 01 hijackers did not come from ‘impoverished’ backgrounds – citing to their Saudi background etc. To the best of my understanding, they all came from what I would call petty bourgeois or appartchik type backgrounds, exactly that social class in the Arab world that is inexorably losing ground, falling away from (relative) prosperity and impregnated with a sense of ever reduced opportunities. Not comfortable by any means, they can not look forward, as things stand now, to anything but reduced social and economic mobility. In many ways this seems quite analogous to the situation in Europe in the intra-war period. The fact that Bin Laden, for example, comes from a wealthy background is rather meaningless, with little indicative value for the overall drivers than the fact some Bolsheviks came from wealthy backgrounds… The aggregate is what counts.

The aggregate is the frustrated, semi or fully educated young Arab (or Arabized) young graduate who looks to a job market and a society that is not producing any future at all for him – now of course arguably that is not the fault of the West per se, indeed many of the fundamental issues which at present are presenting blockages are almost entirely internally generated – e.g. socio economic structures focused on rent-seeking and patronage-clientelistic governmental and private sector hiring, promotion etc. At the same time, Western, especially American, support for bankrupt pseudo-secular regimes is at once helping discredit the secular model (and in the manner it has been applied in the Arab world, one can not help but say that it is inevitable there will be a reaction to its essentially corrupt and venal form) and Western rhetoric on democracy and the like.

In the end, as in the case of intra-war Europe, I think the key answer in drawing the poison of those who would have recourse to political violence lies in the sensation there are socio-economic opportunities, and a sense of confidence in the future. Desperation, a sense of doom, a sense of failure leads to extreme solutions.

However, there is a tension between what is needed in the short term (security to be sure) and what is needed to achieve longer term solutions. How to arrive at a compromise. For example, I noted my conversation with a senior American diplomatic official who indicated that his economic agenda was being driven by security concerns. One has to be careful that security concerns do not choke off the developments most necessary to get to the roots of the issue, for security measures, in terms of direct and indirect (economic) costs reach points of diminishing and I argue even negative returns (i.e. more security measures after a certain point can produce insecurity) as anything else.

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FT: Balkanization in Iraq

Secret report warns of Iraq 'Balkanisation'
By Nicolas Pelham in Baghdad
Published: February 12 2004 21:21 | Last Updated: February 12 2004 21:21
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1075982503425&p=1012571727088

"A confidential report prepared by the US-led administration in Iraq says that the attacks by insurgents in the country have escalated sharply, prompting fears of what it terms Iraq's "Balkanisation"."

Further, "January has the highest rate of violence since September 2003," the report said. "The violence continues despite the expansion of the Iraqi security services and increased arrests by coalition forces in December and January."

The report, which is based on military data and circulated to foreign organisations by the US aid agency USAid, diverges with public statements by US officials who claim that security in the country is improving.

"The security risks are not as bad as they appear on TV," Tom Foley, the coalition official overseeing Iraq's private-sector development, said at the US Commerce Department headquarters in Washington on Wednesday. "Western civilians are not the targets themselves. These are acceptable risks." [interjection: this is bullshit, they are indeed targets in themselves.]

"According to the report, "January national review of Iraq", strikes against international and non-governmental organisations increased from 19 to 26 in January. It said that high-intensity attacks involving mortars and explosives grew by 103 per cent from 316 in December to 642 in January; non-life threatening attacks, including drive-by shootings and rock-throwing, soared by 186 per cent from 182 in December. It also recorded an average of eight attacks a day in Baghdad alone, up from four a day in September, and a total of 11 attacks on coalition aircraft."

I should mention that this matches the comments I heard from several sources leavng Iraq, including one high ranking CPA official I know (knew) on a passing basis who had just ended his tour of duty.

I also mentioned earlier (perhaps a few weeks back) the Iraqi-American program officer who I met on her leaving Iraq, again same story of increasing insecurity, inability of US officials to get connected with Iraqis (ex-Chalabi's sycophants) and generally very poor linguistic infrastructure such that US forces rely on completely inadequate translators.

Mentioned that drives many misunderstandings, and with troops under stress, the young men lash out and alienate Iraqis.

I have a hard time seeing, as noted in my prior comment, a means of making this work. The window of opportunity is closed, the money is still not flowing and I don't see a durable pro-American result from this. Afraid Egypt on the Euphrates is looking like almost an upside.

The specter of Balkanisation has always been there, and given the failure of DoD to properly run a reconstruction program, I think will take superhuman efforts to avoid. The bureaucratic wheels on this are simply not moving. I was, for example, asked by a US agency to look into putting together a consortium on capital leading. I dutifully, and mind you for free, did so. Silence so far from their end. No Money for this? I have no idea how Iraq is supposed to work if foot dragging and form filling is the order of the day. I am less and les inclinded on a personal basis to see Iraq as an area where risk and return will be interesting in the near future.

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February 12, 2004

A Book Recommendation

Let me recommend this combined commentary / review (not bothering with the accents):

abdou filali ansary reformer l'islam: une introduction aux debats contemporians editions la decouverte Paris 2003.

Very nice review.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 11:14 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Some items of interest: Iraq, Hijab and France, KSA and Oil

First, I wish to recall the tender hypocrisy of the "write off the Iraqi debt" among the American idelogues:
Debt relief for poor countries held up by discord"
By Alan Beattie in Washington
Published: February 12 2004 0:34 | Last Updated: February 12 2004 0:34
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1075982473860&p=1012571727172

Contrast the eagerness on Iraq, and the "right thing", with otherwise.

Regime Thought War Unlikely, Iraqis Tell U.S.
By THOM SHANKER
Published: February 12, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/politics/12SADD.html?hp=&pagewanted=all&position=

Sadly unsurprising. When one knows the habits of Arab governments, not only th "Stalinist" or quasi-Stalinist ones, the mendacity and lack of realism - as well as lack of of information sharing is of no surprise. Indeed, unfortunatley in the quasi-trbal environment of the Middle East, information sharing is the key challenge in private and public sectors. I recall with no little 'fondness' the former Director of my former Fund refusing to share where he had gotten some information from, even though it harmed our due diligence efforts.

So, my qualification to this article, the sad problem is that it can not solely be laid at the feet of a Sadaam, but rather to deep rooted habits. The rule of the individual and the family to the exclusion of the society, whatever the theoretical calls for cooperation of the Ummah.

Then this amused me:

Data From Iraqi Exiles Under Scrutiny
By JAMES RISEN
Published: February 12, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/politics/12EXIL.html

No comment. Should only surprise the pre-fooled.

Saudis 'hoping to become central bankers of oil'
By Carola Hoyos, Energy Correspondent, in London
Published: February 11 2004 20:52 | Last Updated: February 11 2004 20:52

Interesting, re Saudii positioning on oil market. Best card they can play, if they can play it right.

Now, because I just had a lively, perhaps a bit too lively argument with a taxi driver about this, I bring you a series of articles about the new anti-Hijab law in France. Frankly, I don't like the hijab, but I rather think the law is misconcieved. Nevertheless, the reaction among certain quarters in the Muslim community does indeed reflect a lack of acceptance of Laicisme. I am not a fan of "love it or leave it" thinking, for those in the franco-Muslim community who have advanced arguments about "holy law" being above the State, well, you're in the wrong country. There is always the hijra. I should say that (posing as A Frenchman as I do sometimes) I got into a lively argument with the taxi driver on this very point.

The articles then:
LAÏCITÉ 494 voix pour, 36 contre et 31 abstentions
La loi sur le voile adoptée à une très large majorité
http://www.figaro.fr/politique/20040211.FIG0101.html

Le ventre de "une"
Le voile fait aussi désordre à l'extrême gauche
LE MONDE | 06.02.04
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_articleweb/1,13-0,36-351930,0.html

POINT DE VUE
La loi, vite ! Et passons à l'intégration
par Fawzia Zouari
LE MONDE | 09.02.04
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_articleweb/1,13-0,36-352267,0.html

Pour nombre d'élèves voilées et exclues, l'école s'arrête définitivement
LE MONDE | 10.02.04 | 13h27
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3224,36-352400,0.html
As background for a wider issue.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 03:40 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 10, 2004

Several articles of interest

All surround US FP and the recent unpleasantness:

The Allies' Mindless Bickering
By David Ignatius
Tuesday, February 10, 2004; Page A23
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27181-2004Feb9.html

I rather think that Europe has a firmer ground to stand on in re their present position that the US, in re its public comments, which are gratiutious and ill-mannered - as well as wrong headed.

. . . To 'War President'
By E. J. Dionne Jr.
Tuesday, February 10, 2004; Page A23
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27179-2004Feb9.html

No comment.

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FT: Wolf on American Admin vision for Middle East

Catching up with my FT reading I have another Wolf article to pimp, although I do differ with some key points.

The article, which I again quote in extenso is:
Martin Wolf: Bush is all big stick and no soft speech
By Martin Wolf
Published: December 23 2003 20:12
| Last Updated: December 23 2003 20:12
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&cid=1071251752381&p=1016652197036

Wolf's discourse, as I note supra is, as usual, well-thought through, although in this case I find myself in disagreement on some specific observations:

He opens with Bush's "vision" for democracy, stating "this statement, made by President George W. Bush last month, is astonishing. The man who once rejected mere nation-building has committed his country to civilisation- rebuilding. The enterprise is true to the best in US history. But it also extremely risky.

Indeed risky, I recall for example Friedman's article before the war about the Iraq war being a long ball strategy, risky, very risky - and did the Admin have the wherewithal to execute properly. Of course Friedman fooled and fools himself into thinking so.

Wolf notes: The administration has returned to Woodrow Wilson. His belief that peace is founded not in foreign relations but in domestic transformation became a cornerstone of US policy in western Europe and Japan after the second world war.

The democratic transformation of erstwhile enemies, combined with peace and free markets, was then the basis for western success in the cold war."

Ironic considering American conservatives have long reviled Wilson. Indeed:

"Mr Bush initially rejected this Wilsonian vision. Yet now he argues that "60 years of western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe . . . And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo."

This is the vision of the neo- conservatives, who are Wilsonian in their ends but anti-Wilsonian in their means. Unlike Wilson, they believe that the needed transformations can be achieved by US power unbound by international constraint. On the latter point, they are in agreement with traditional nationalists, such as Richard Cheney, vice-president, and Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defence."

I think a very able summary. However, on the results:

"[T]hey disagreed on the goals of policy after victory. Traditional nationalists would accept a modicum of stability in Iraq; neo-conservatives want democracy. Now, it appears, the president has adopted the neo-conservative vision. He is intent on remaking an ancient civilisation that has proved most resistant to western ideas. Is this policy wisdom or inexcusable folly?"

While I do not fully agree with "most resistant to western ideas", indeed it seems a bit ahistorical in context, in the context of democratization it's a supportable generalization.

"On one point even the fiercest critics should agree: the aim is desirable."

Sure, of course, but then so is universal wealth and edcuation. The problem is getting there.

"If Middle Eastern regimes were democratic and their economies prosperous, the world would be a safer and happier place. But desirable objectives are not necessarily achievable."

Indeed, indeed, indeed. Achievable - of course let us stipulate, in the context of other goals, in the context of short term versus long term incentives, in the context of the risk versus reward in the framework of actual political calculation.

It would have been desirable, for example, for the US to have engaged Hitler earlier - but possible, no. Not economically, not politically.

On his list here:
"The Middle East offers five potent obstacles to democratisation: the lack of a democratic tradition; the strength of belief that the will of God is superior to the decisions of a democratically elected legislature; the role of oil in so many of the economies; the absence of a prosperous market economy; and the consequent absence of a strong, independent middle class."

The second item is, in my opinion, something of a bugaboo - there are indeed even in the US, for example, people who hold the 'will of God' superior to the parliament. That is not the key obstacle. The key obstacle really lies in socio-economic structures. Oil is less of an obstacle also as it's really a Gulf and Iraqi problem, the remainder, indeed the demographic majority of the Arab world is not faced with oil as an issue.

Now here is where I fully agree:
"This is bad enough; but the modus operandi of the Bush administration has added further obstacles. President Theodore Roosevelt once recommended speaking softly and carrying a big stick. A century later, this Republican administration also believes in the big stick. Unfortunately, it believes in a loud voice. It has humiliated allies, undermined international institutions and projected a narrow vision of US interests."

Emphasis added.

I rather believe this has been my argument, and one of my chief sources of disdain for this Bush administration, the load voice of the self-indulgent and perhaps not entirely self-confident but blustering bully.

"So what, one might ask. Has the US not put Saddam Hussein in prison and forced Colonel Muammer Gadaffi to abandon his programme for making weapons of mass destruction? Indeed, it has. Force works. But it will not, on its own, achieve the democratic transformation the US now seeks. As Ivo Daalder and James M. Lindsay argue in an important study of the administration's foreign policy: "The Iraq experience underscored that how America led mattered as much as whether it led."*

Legitimacy, without force, will founder; but force, without legitimacy, is barren. The US transformed Europe, because the defeated came to accept American values as superior to their own. Now it asks the Middle East to do the same. But it suffers from a huge handicap: remarkably few people in the region trust its good intentions, partly because of the history of its support for authoritarian regimes, partly because of its role in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and partly, as Jeffrey Sachs wrote in yesterday's FT, because of its objective of securing cheap oil at all costs."

Emphasis added.

Again, it strikes me that the argument is spot on, but the following I think is even more relevant, and I think key to understanding the underlying failure of the Bush administration, and indeed why I think any other given candidate is superior to the present fool:
"I would add that there exists a deeper contradiction. The core democratic values are reason above force, procedures above power and consent above coercion. It is hard for the democrat to argue that these have no applicability to the behaviour of states. Yet that is precisely what neo-conservatives do. They argue that democracy and freedom are the best way for people to live. Yet they also believe that paying "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" is a policy for wimps.

An unbound superpower dedicated to pursuing its own interests will fail to export its values. In international relations it appears to think, might, not right, makes right. The Bush administration now accepts, correctly in my view, that US foreign policy must be grounded in values. But it will fail to achieve its goals if it continues to proclaim that those values are irrelevant to guiding America's own relations with other states."

A cogent statement, and I think one that gets right to the heart of the essential emptiness of present American foreign policy, as well as its deep internal contradictions.

[his reference referred to: * America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings Institutions Press, 2003)]

For all this, I do not see Cold War and immediate post-Cold War model that evidently lurks behind present policy tinkering as a fundamentally useful jumping off point.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:20 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 09, 2004

FT: Martin Wolf on the new rebound in the market

As anyone who reads my commentaries knows, I am a great fan of FT's Martin Wolf. Sharing another article by him which I believe merits attention. Quoted in extenso.

[Edited to correct coding 10 Feb]

Martin Wolf: End of the bear market?
By Martin Wolf
Published: February 3 2004 20:53 |
Last Updated: February 4 2004 13:30

First, I want to note that I very much like Wolf's sense of humour:

Is the US bear market now over? The durability and strength of the US - and so, global - economic recovery depend, at least in part, on a positive answer. Unfortunately such an answer can be given only by someone who believes, if not six, at least four impossible things before breakfast.

I hope you all get the reference.

He continues:
If we cast our minds back four years, we shall recall the era of belief in the "new economy" and surging equity prices. These, we now believe, were the bad old days. Welcome, instead, to the bad new days. By the standards of the late 1990s, today is an era of moderation. But it is moderate only by those standards. Since 1881, US stock market valuations have been as high as they are today only twice: in 1929/1930 and then around the recent peak (see chart). The question we confront is whether such valuations should now be deemed the norm. My answer is "no".

Nothing like historicity I say.

Skpping ahead, Wolf notes: "Today's ratio of stock market prices to earnings - the p/e ratio - is roughly double its long-run average. The cyclically adjusted p/e ratio (the ratio of the value of the stock market index to the moving average of real earnings), which is the method proposed by Robert Shiller of Yale, is more than 70 per cent above its mean. The valuation ratio (known as Tobin's Q, after the late James Tobin), which is the ratio of the stock market to the replacement cost of corporate assets, gives a similar picture (see chart). As Prof Shiller and Andrew Smithers of London-based Smithers & Co argue, stock market valuations are mean-reverting in the long run. Since markets are mean-reverting, exceptionally high valuations mean that markets are subsequently more likely to fall than rise. .... As today's valuations are high, by historical standards, markets are, argue the bears, also far more likely to fall than to rise in the years ahead."

A bit of background, then this. Hwever what I rather enjoyed was the following:

How do bulls counter the argument that stock prices are now overvalued? The first impossible thing they argue is that profitability is exploding and will thereby validate current prices.

It is true that the share of profit in gross domestic product has soared (see chart). Indeed, it is close to levels last seen in 1997. Yet this is a bearish, not a bullish point. Profit margins oscillate sharply in the short run, but profits tend to rise in line with GDP in the long run. Since 1970, the share of profits in GDP has averaged 8.4 per cent. In the third quarter of 2003, it was already 10.1 per cent. This suggests that profit shares are now more likely to fall than to rise as a share of GDP.

Skipping further argumentation to this point:
"A second impossible argument is that the equity risk premium has fallen far below historic levels, thereby justifying today's high stock market valuations and prospective low returns.

This argument, widely used before the bubble burst, is, in essence, that people enjoy high returns today because they desire lower returns in future. Markets then enjoy a once-only revaluation, as the risk premium falls, and subsequently deliver low returns by historical standards. The shift envisaged is large. In the long term, real returns have averaged around 6.5 per cent. But today's cyclically adjusted p/e ratio implies a long-run real return of less than 4 per cent. ...... So what we are asked to believe is that those now buying the market are doing so in the belief that their return will be only 4 per cent, before they pay any of the costs. This is a stockbroker's fairy story.

Positively lyrical. As well as sharp.

Further:
A third impossible argument relates directly to the second. It is that the risk premium can collapse without affecting the risk-free cost of capital.

Grant, for the moment, that the equity risk premium has fallen. Yet nobody is suggesting that the marginal product of capital has collapsed. On the contrary, many believe it has risen, along with the improvements in productivity. It follows that, if the risk premium had fallen sharply, the risk-free rate should have risen, to clear the market for investable funds. Yet the risk-free rate has not risen. On the expected inflation rates for next year, the risk-free real interest rate on US government bonds is only about 2.5 per cent.

Not sure if I entirely am with this observation.

This brings us to a fourth and last impossible argument, that the return on capital is independent of its cost.

A high equity market implies a low cost of equity capital. But the confident expectations about high prospective economic growth imply a high return on corporate capital. Yet the two have to converge. They can converge in one of two ways: by an investment boom that lowers the returns on corporate equity or by a fall in the stock market. The former route was tried in the last years of the bubble. As returns fell, so did investment. The adjustment will, instead, occur through the second route: a fall in the market.

Most importantly, and rather dangerously, Wolf argues:
Where does this leave us? Worried is the answer. The Federal Reserve has helped create a mini-bubble, to alleviate the impact of the implosion of the maxi-bubble. This makes no secure basis for a sustained recovery. US stock valuations are not grotesquely high this time. But they are still very high. The bear market is not yet over. Until it is, we cannot be confident about the recovery.

I highly recommend the full article: http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1073281525056&p=1012571727088

Posted by The Lounsbury at 08:14 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On my caustic comments on democratization and Bush admin policy

I see that this Washington Post piece has materials to reflect on:

washingtonpost.com

Bush Aims For 'Greater Mideast' Plan
Democracy Initiative To Be Aired at G-8 Talks
By Robin Wright and Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, February 9, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A24025-2004Feb8?language=printer

I don't believe the Eastern European model is applicable at all in the region, the issues and core problems, ex perhaps Yugoslavia (and Russia in the context of its fringes) are too different.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 07:49 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

On MENA and Economic Opps

Yesterday I was in a truly foul mood and was rather pessimistic.

Today I am in the same, but feeling a bit more fair minded.

First, I do think there is potential in the region. However it is bounded, even abstracting away from socio-economic barriers, by the environmental bounds.Certainly an area with severe water shortages or at least shortfalls presents bounded growth opportunities, above all in regards to transitioning from quasi-subsistence agriculture under heavy demographic pressure to something else.

However, as I noted in a reply, I believe, however limited opportunities in a region, the skillful, the clever and, yes, the lucky can make money. Unilever, for example, makes its best profits in sub-Saharan Africa - a region I also know (at least its Western portion, not really Central, East or South) and like, having perhaps an affinity for trouble. Hard markets often have unexploited ineffeciencies which a savvy operator can exploit for substantial economic profits, and in my opinion, potential real gains for the population as the more efficient operator puts pressure on a typically rent seeking elite.

As an aside, in my opinion, actually, much of the anti-globo agitprop that comes out of the developing world emerges from these rent seeking elites who hypocritically dress up their narrow, corrupt interests as "popular" issues - and sell the same to the gullible and ignorant bleeding hart leftists in the developed world whose economic illiteracy speeds their swallowing about any tale at face value. Not all, of course, but much.

Regardless, in regards to opportunities in this region, for growth and then for business. That is a complex set of questions, difficult to generalize across all MENA. The petro-states, for all that they are facing diminishing returns still have enough capital and wealth to, if they have the nerve, verve and savoir faire, rescue themseleves from the consumption trap they have placed themselves in. However, among the key problems is that the biggest of them, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, lacks any of the three, and looks to be in a demographic trap. Their pop growth rate, which remains subsidized, is terrific, I think 6% annual? However, until pain becomes overwhelming, it seems unlikely there will be the real change that is needed. And make no mistake about it, that change is not some stary eyed bullshit about democratization, the change is an Islamic revolution that sweeps aside an archaic tribalist system with a Islamic veneer to install a more modern system. That is not beoing to be a "democracy" except in the sense that Iran is a democracy. Now, in many ways, Iran is the country in the region with thhe most real democratic contestation. sure, it is limited, subject to police controls, etc. etc. but frankly, that's as good as it gets.

I would look at Egypt and the basket case of a political system there. No real contestation, no real choice, but a lot of corrupt rumbling. And sadly, the only real alternate choices that are in touch with local social mores are the Islamists. I am no fan of the Islamist movement, but when it comes right down to it, they are the only real choice. Now, they themselves are not monolithic, and its strikes me that probably the only real way for democracy to emerge in the region, is via the various modernist strains competing - in short, very much like the evolutoin of Iran.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, economic reform -meaning trade oriented liberalization with some degree of programs to support change, is the only way for the region to emerge from its current negative cycle. Sadly, only Tunisia seems to be on this path, discounting Dubai and the mini-Emirates of little demographic / political consequence. Now, this is not only because of the issues of corrupt rent-seeking interests. There are real and serious challenges in a economic transition. asI have said before, little of the economic fabric in the Arab world can be said to be truly "entreprenurial" despite stupid characterizations by some Bushi Administrtion and related neo-con commentators speaking more through Freidmanesque wishful thinking than anything else.

In truth, to achieve liberalization there are serious sociological barriers to the kinds of actions one needs for people to truly take advantage of the opportunities offered by a liberal trade regime. That includes attitudes towards risk taking. As an economist, one has the habit of presuming rational responses in the context of a menu of economic opportunities. However, as an actual practitioner on the ground, I can attest to my sensation that those responses are not to be taken for gratned. Certainly they may develop, but the near term suggests that passivity and economic collapse may be as likely a response. Of course, the problem is, that is not that different from the non-liberalization option. At least liberalization allows for a way out of trap they are currently in.

The question is how does one generate or allow for the generation of productive responses in good time to liberalization? Or more bluntly, how does one dope risk-taking in an socio-economic fabric which has disdained and shied away from risk taking, in favor of searching for rents - where rent seeking is a deeply ingrained and often unconscious habit - how does one shift such attitudes in "real time" and not historical time? I warned the First Secretary in Rabat that while they (the Americans) were selling the Jordan FTA as a success story, in fact it is not really - from the Jordanian side. Sure their exports have jumped, but the entreprenurial capital that has been taking advantage of that has been largely Asian, largely non-Arab and almost entirely non-Jordanian - except for their seeking real estate rents off of those activities of foreign capital using Jordan as an export platform. Passivity and back biting between the economic clans seeking rents off of the foreigners have been the dominant response in my opinion.

I certainly have my own ideas on how to do this, but the issue is that they are politically risky, and involve really rubbing the "powers that be" in the economic clans the wrong way. And it would be hard. Will such happen. Never. Not even worth pretending otherwise. Rather, small, incremental programs like in democratization with a view to making the taxpapyer in Iowa feel something is being done to keep his fat white butt safe from the scary Muslims / Arabs.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:02 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

A venal system

I think my comments on this comment are going to be extensive enough to deserve their own entry: http://www.livejournal.com/users/collounsbury/102998.html

Now, on the Kay excerpts:
Firstly, if anyone hasn't yet seen it, a Reuters interview with David Kay. A couple of choice excerpts.
Q: What happened to the stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons that everyone expected to be there?

A: "I don't think they existed.

"I think there were stockpiles at the end of the first Gulf War and those were a combination of U.N. inspectors and unilateral Iraqi action got rid of them. I think the best evidence is that they did not resume large-scale production, and that's what we're really talking about, is large stockpiles, not the small. Large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in the period after '95."
...
Q: Do you think they destroyed it?

A: "No, I don't think they existed."

Of course, in many ways Kay�s conclusions have to be a surprise and news, in the very literal sense to that little gaggle of true believers, the pre-fooled. It should have been abundantly obvious by now that this Bush Administration oversold its intelligence, and that in fact the underlying intelligence was fundamentally wrong, regardless.
Now as to the comments that follow, on Kay:
I found another article with info from Kay which just about made my head spin. I think it is illustrative of just how hard it is for a westerner to wrap their heads around some of the culture in the MENA.
From interviews with Iraqi scientists and other sources, he said, his team learned that sometime around 1997 and 1998, Iraq plunged into what he called a "vortex of corruption," when government activities began to spin out of control because an increasingly isolated and fantasy-riven Saddam Hussein had insisted on personally authorizing major projects without input from others.

After the onset of this "dark ages," Dr. Kay said, Iraqi scientists realized they could go directly to Mr. Hussein and present fanciful plans for weapons programs, and receive approval and large amounts of money. Whatever was left of an effective weapons capability, he said, was largely subsumed into corrupt money-raising schemes by scientists skilled in the arts of lying and surviving in a fevered police state.

"The whole thing shifted from directed programs to a corrupted process," Dr. Kay said. "The regime was no longer in control; it was like a death spiral. Saddam was self-directing projects that were not vetted by anyone else. The scientists were able to fake programs."

I should say that I believe this was suggested and discussed months ago, and I believe that I also opined that given my experience with the governments of the region and the record keeping, that I would not be surprised to learn it was chimerical. I admit I did not really think of a wholesale program of internal corruption within the programs themselves, as opposed to a deliberate program of deception aimed at the external world. Nevertheless, given poor record keeping, poor administrative controls and generally weak institutional environments in the Arab world � and little to no sense of social or public responsibility (the syndrome of the spotless home, but with its garbage dumped in front of the house being emblematic on a very pedestrian level) � this is not at all surprising.
Sadly, there is a word one would use here, < �adi > that is, �typical.�
On your comment:
This is just bizzare to me. The scientists would simply HAVE to know that he would kill them if he discovered the duplicity. Perhaps some of the Iraqi scientists we've been seeing on various news program interviews were imprisoned/persecuted by the regime because they tried to cheat Saddam in this manner. I just can't tell what to believe anymore.

When I was back in the United States, I met with a fellow, a guy now in partial retirement, who first taught me about emerging markets and investing in the region. He was Citibank back in Lebanon at the opening of the civil war, then in Iran right around the revolution. Experience back when this region was even more difficult than it is now, although on the other hand there was lots of petrodollars sloshing about to conceal this to an extent.

We were conversing about my former Fund, my current efforts and related angles. He noted, when he was operating in the region, he rapidly concluded that he could trust literally no one, that he had to look for an agenda behind every act.

I think I have noted the same thing. I trust no one and nothing, sadly.

Now sure, the Iraqi scientists had to know they could be killed if their schemes were uncovered. But then they could have been killed for any number of reasons, and given the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq, the ever harder life, and the obligation in Arab tribal societies to look after the family before all else, meaning the extended family � well the cost-benefit calculation, above all in a context of an administrative apparatus that was crumbling in its own filth of corruption, had to look good.

GAAAAAAH! I don't think I ever understood how maddening this could be. I can't even imagine what being a risk analyst would be like in a culture where the de facto rule seems to be social Darwinism. Shaft or be shafted as it were. It is making me nuts even trying to understand it, I just can't imagine what your job must be like Coll. I tell you this, if you're ever in the same area I am I'll gladly buy you a drink or thirty. I can easily understand wanting to escape from such a predatory reality. Perhaps predatory isn't the correct descriptor. Perhaps opportunistic without regard to personal costs to parties not related or affiliated in some important way would be better. I can understand why your mentor recommended a dog if you want a friend. A dog won't even eat you after you're dead, some of your business associates may well be looking to eat you alive.

Predatory is indeed the correct descriptor. I am afraid that I have often described the Arab business community as a �bunch of motherfucking back-biting vipers� with some degree of accuracy.

Again, this comes down to issues of social structure and the degree to which the region has clearly outgrown past structures (the tribal / family structure) which I believe have long stymied progress (then so did Ibn Khaldoun) but failed to generate alternate possibilities.

So, yeah, I trust no one. Not even my �friend� who I am sharing an office with.

It comes down to the habits generated in a society where the pie has been stagnate or even shrinking in real terms for decades, ex a brief oil doped burst in the 1970s and early 1980s, with the possible exception of the 1960s as an era of actual real growth when the logic of state lead development had not run into diminishing returns.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 01:16 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 01, 2004

Figaro: profile , Tareq Ramadan

I direct those who can follow such things to this article:
Enquête sur l'étrange Tariq Ramadan
JEAN-MARIE MONTALI
[31 janvier 2004]
http://www.lefigaro.fr/magazine/20040130.MAG0038.html

Intriguing.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 12:40 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

January 25, 2004

Tardiness, but some interesting articles

I am afraid work continues to such my free time away from me, and I will be travelling again next week, which rather makes it look as if my poor little commentary is withering away.

Nevertheless, a few moments for those still checking in to note the following:

washingtonpost.com
Guantanamo Spy Cases Evaporate
Chaplain and Arabic Translator Are Now Facing Only Lesser Charges
By John Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, January 25, 2004; Page A03
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A44930-2004Jan24?language=printer

I note this article for its double interest, first in regards to the overreaching and overreaction in the context of 'War on Terror' hysteria, second for the apparent Islamophobia involved in the same (and I note that if you run searches on this case when it broke, in the conservopornsphere, media and websites, one finds it coming out rather clearly).

It rather looks as if this is fairly clearly a case of rather extreme overreaction (taking the facts as reported as true, which of course one should do with caution).

Islamophobia, I rather beleive, is running strong in "conservative" American politics, with much of it driven by that lying, rabid smarmy ideologue fuck, Pipes.

Second, a Freidman article which I rather enjoyed, however much I despise the fellow:

OP-ED COLUMNIST
War of Ideas, Part 6
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: January 25, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/25/opinion/25FRIE.html

Friedman, in support of his otherwise idiotic war of ideas series (yes, I am being unfair, but let me indulge myself), rather gets to a correct issue, if I may quote:
"So often, since 9/11, people have remarked to me: "Wow, Islam, that's a really angry religion." I disagree. I do agree, though, that there are a lot of young Muslims who are angry, because they live in some of the most repressive societies, with the fewest opportunities for women and youth, and with some of the highest unemployment. Bad contexts create an environment where humiliation — and the anger, bad ideas and violence that flow from it — are rife. In short, it is impossible for us to talk about winning the war of ideas in the Arab-Muslim world without talking about the most basic thing that gives people dignity and hope: A job.

"For a long time now, I've felt that what we're really facing is not a clash of civilizations, but a clash of generations," argued David Rothkopf, a former acting U.S. under secretary of commerce. "You have an aging developed world, particularly Europe, that is trying to protect its jobs, and you have a young, job-seeking, job-needing emerging world, particularly the Muslim world, that will go anywhere and do anything to either seize the job opportunities or express their frustration with not having opportunities."

Certainly, from my perspective out here in the region, on the ground, trying to make investments work, attempting to attract captial to the region, and generally working within a sick economic system (or better systems as the Arab world is not really a unified economic system, other than the omnipresence of vampire sttes, ex-Tunisia), this is precisely true.

Now, I will hasten to point out, now, this does not explain every terrorist, or every act of terror. Yes, some come from comfortable backgrounds, and perhaps would have turned to violence in a certain set of political circumstances regardless. Wealthy Germany in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s produced terrorists as well.

However, if we look to support in its aggregate and do not get caught in mindless anecdote shopping, it strikes me a very clear that the main "driver" of anger, of extremism for the vast majority of the rather too large support for extremist political solutions is precisely the lack of economic opportunities, coupled with closely related lacks of social opportunities and a general malaise in the social systems in the region - the root causes of which are closely related to those at the heart of the economic illness. Sclerotic control by rent seeking, corrupt, and rather incestous (in alomost literal terms) elites.

However, returning to Friedman's column, his thinly veiled swipe at France, and open swipe at Europe in general is badly misplaced. First, of course, he betrays the "politicians'" disease in thinking of investing being driven by political / policy concerns. I tis not, investment naturally foll0ws from a positive economic environemtn, and does not get ahead of that. Saying Europe has done a "poor" job of investing in the MENA region (aside from being economically idiotic) begs the question. In what fucking context? Europe certainly has invested (if we are speaking of the EU majors) far more per captita than the US to date, ex-oil sector where US oil majors of course are the largest in the world. As to the poor job of integration, well, that is of course in part true, but again a rather different situation than that faced by the US in terms of either of its minorityies (immigrant that is).

Well, let's discount his economic iliteracy and cheap shot at France / Europe.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 04:31 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

January 13, 2004

Washington Post Article on Middle Eastern Studies

Today 13 Jan.

Pipes is a vile piece of scum, and I rather detest these idiots.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 09:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

January 07, 2004

Not yet time to summarize the Iraq data but:

A fine FT article:

White House 'distorted' Iraq threat
By Stephen Fidler in London
Published: January 7 2004 21:56
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1073280860558&p=1012571727088
Not really news per se, however reports on a Carnegie Endowment report analyzing what of course is abundantly clear.

Hope I may have time over the next few days to rip through the data, but no promises. As a tantalizing tidbit, it shows the idiotic bluster of the Sam Stones in re achievements are largely just.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 06:50 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

January 05, 2004

Iraq data

Just obtained the most recent internal data on Iraq from DoD as part of the Fund issue. I will try to put up some resume data, those of you in discussions and debates on real progress will find it interesting.

Posted by The Lounsbury at 05:41 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack